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A Note from the Editor
This work is based on a trialoguethat took place among three
socially and politically committed individuals in the winter of
October 1999, seemingly light-years ahead of  the morally,
ideologically and humanistically horrendous events of the recent
past, which manifested themselves as eruptions of  violence that
cared little for lives, let alone national boundaries—whether these
be of Afghanistan, Palestine, Israel, India, Pakistan, Indonesia,
the US…
Conversations is being published at just such a time, in the
wake of  killing and suffering. It is important to locate it in this
historic context, where the sounds of gunfire and laser-guided
artillery drown the natural tendency of humans to seek one
another in that most primeval of urges—the need to reach out
and communicate. Or, simply, converse. Even at an epochal
period when the terms of  discourse and engagement seem to
have been permanently mutated.
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Though focused on the specific milieu of fisheries,
Conversations deals with themes that are timeless—power,
discipline, intervention, organization, motivation, will, identity.
Part oral history, part polemic, part ideology, part philosophy,
the trialogue takes on the nature of a freewheeling disquisition
in search of  understanding. It is this spirit of  open-minded and
open-ended discourse that we hope Conversations will invoke in
the reader, who must remember that these discussions took place
at a time when the world was a slightly more peaceful place and
when different cultures were not boxed into antagonistic stances.
Michel Foucault, the French philosopher of  power, said,
“In our time, history is that which transforms documents into
monuments.” While not wishing to sound grandiloquent, we at
ICSF hope that Conversations will be such a transforming document.
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In Memoriam
Michael Francis Belliveau
31.7.1942 — 26.1.2002
Indeed, it is with a strange feelingof incredulousness that we
dedicate this book to one of  its creators.
We do so with pained hearts and with near disbelief, as it
is difficult to accept that Mike Belliveau, but for whom this work
would not have seen the light of  day, has left us so suddenly—
even before this book was published.
Yet, at the same time, we can console ourselves with the
satisfaction that we have, in some measure, been able to capture
within these pages the essence of  Mike’s lifelong search to
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understand the processes that lead to social inequality, in this
case, with specific reference to fishworkers.
I first met Mike in 1986. His participation that year at the
founding meeting of the International Collective in Support of
Fishworkers (ICSF) in Trivandrum, India, had been recommended
by a Canadian friend of  mine, Gaetane Gascon, who, in the mid-
1960s, had worked in the Marianad fishing village, just outside
Trivandrum, where I too had lived and worked in the first decade
of  my involvement with fisheries. Gaetane had subsequently met
Mike through her work in Development and Peace (D&P), one
of  Canada’s leading international development agencies.
Although ICSF, as an international NGO, has always had
a pronounced Southern bias, Mike’s commitment to the inshore
fishery and his sensitivity to development issues were so evident
that, despite belonging to the geographic North, he was
immediately requested to become a member of the first
Animation Team (AT) of  ICSF. He accepted only reluctantly—
as I did too—wondering whether he would be able to do justice
to the task. Our close interactions at AT meetings and during
discussions on various issues, in those first three years, created a
long-lasting bond, which helped us examine our involvement in
fisheries with a rare degree of simultaneous objectivity and
subjectivity.
Having myself been professionally trained in organization
methodology, and having spent almost a decade in mass
mobilization work among Indian fishworkers, I found in Mike a
trade union leader with a difference. He seemed to ideally, and
simultaneously, blend aspects of  both a professional trade
organization campaigner and a political trade unionist. My own
experience in India, on the other hand, was that these aspects
run parallel to, and quite apart from, each other. Although Mike
and I constantly discussed these issues and wildly dreamt of
throwing the debate open through the pages of  ICSF’s
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SAMUDRA Report, that never happened—for lack of time.
It was only years later, in October 1999, that, along with
Aliou Sall of Senegal, we got the opportunity to sit together for
nine days to share our experiences more comprehensively. Our
conversations took place at the little Treasure Guest House in
Accra, Ghana. ICSF’s AT had planned to meet there that year in
order to familiarize ourselves with the work David Eli (Co-ordinator
of  the NGO Technical Services for Community Development, TESCOD, Accra,
Ghana and an Associate Member of ICSF – Ed) was involved in as a
member of  ICSF. Mike, Aliou and I decided to meet there two
weeks earlier in order to record our discussions for possible future
publication. Though we were all equally keen on putting
something down on paper, we were also interested in just talking,
getting things off our chests and inviting feedback from friends
we trusted. All of  us had been through difficult times in our
work, which raised several questions in our minds, and we really
needed to work through them. Though we wanted to get together
in conversation, none of us had had the time to think through
what we intended to do, nor the manner in which to do it.
All we knew was that we had asked David to book
accommodation for us from a particular day onwards. I went to
Accra via Dakar—it is still convenient to travel to West Africa
through Europe than directly from India—and picked up Aliou.
That was important because I knew that Aliou is not an easy
person to pin down! I arrived at Accra with Aliou, only to hear
that Mike was held up in Canada due to discussions on the native
people’s issue, and so would be a few days late. The delay
ultimately turned out to be four days, and that meant we would
get only nine full working days for our discussions.
As Aliou and I had other work to complete in any case, we
went ahead with our plans. After Mike arrived and briefed us on
recent events in the fisheries of the Maritimes, we decided to
get a good night’s rest, before starting work the next morning.
CONVERSATIONS6
When we did commence in the morning, we started talking with
no fixed agenda or plan. We talked from 10 a.m to 8 p.m., with a
brief break to eat. Being out in the garden meant there were no
smoking breaks either, and Mike puffed away while continuing
to speak.
When we decided to call it a day and go for a break, Mike
said, “Hey! But how will we get this book done? I do have a tape
recorder but I wonder whether those little cassettes are available
here, as I have only one.” We burst out laughing, with Aliou
adding, “This time Our Barbarian is so high-tech that we will
not find his technology here!” We often called Mike “Our
Barbarian” as the poor guy had to suffer all kinds of experiences
accommodating to Third World lifestyles. He ended up signing
his letters to us that way too! As a ‘dutiful, responsible’ woman,
I told Aliou and Our Barbarian, “OK, you guys go and have fun,
but get a good night’s sleep. Maybe the night will bring good
counsel about how we should proceed. Let’s be ready to start
work tomorrow morning at ten.”
While they were out, I went up to the computer and tried
to reconstruct the conversation of  the day from memory, recalling
each one of  us speaking. None of  us had taken any notes, and
one precious day had already gone by. In the morning, I reread
the notes, edited them—and then realized that the whole thing
sounded like a great conversation. Why not just record our
conversation, I thought, so that it remains spontaneous and
relevant to our own needs? I was agog with excitement at this
feasible proposition. When the guys awoke, they were not looking
very bright because the night had obviously been too short, fatigue
had built up, and no bright ideas had surfaced. Mike said to me,
“You look pepped up. What have you got up your sleeve?”
I read my notes out to them, and asked, “How does it
sound? Why don’t we just call it ‘A Conversation?’” They were
both quite amazed. “It sounds great. I didn’t see you take any
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notes. How did you recall it all? It’s a great idea, but does it
mean you are going to do that kind of job every day? How much
sleep did you get last night?” each of  them asked alternately.
“Well, if  you think that’s fine, then let’s just proceed. I’ll take
care of  the writing,” I replied.
And that’s exactly how this book got on its way. We just
talked non-stop for eight continuous days. When we got into
very personal details, we would say, “This is off  the record.”
Those pauses also gave my hand a rest! I took handwritten notes,
and succeeded in keying in almost all of  a day’s conversation
into the computer every night, trying to be as verbatim as possible.
We had to stop abruptly when the other members of  the AT
arrived—or our conversation would have gone on for at least
another two days.
It was only through these conversations that I began to
understand Mike’s lifelong search for, and commitment to,
working class issues. I could only respect and admire the
objectivity and integrity with which he worked through issues,
struggling to find answers.
That was also the first time that I got to understand Aliou’s
thought processes. While working closely with him on
programmes in Senegal, I had always realized that Aliou’s
rationale was different from mine. Though we had become close
friends, I often could not understand his logic. Always aware
that each culture had its own way of  interpreting reality, I was
content to let Aliou do things the way he thought fit, even when
I did not understand his actions. But the ‘dive’ into Aliou’s
imagination that occurred during our conversations indicated how
profoundly different we actually were. And, by implication, I
realized how much deeper and more complex the social reality
we were trying to deal with, is.
As our conversations had been such a great learning
experience for us, I suggested that three other activists in the
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fisheries sector should have a similar chance. I asked Mike to
spare time for this. Of  course, he was reluctant, realizing that
such a process could take place only among people who trusted
one another. And, of  course, there was the vexing question: “Who
would do all the writing?”
Although this book should have been published more than
a year ago, it was Mike’s individual contribution that took the
longest time to write. Mike could not find the time and space to
complete it by the initial deadline. I managed to get three days
with him in Canada in mid-2000, when I engaged him in the
same Treasure Guest House method. But he finally completed
the essay on his own, reworking it to leave behind a very precious
document of, and for, the Maritime Fishermen’s Union (MFU).
For nearly ten days, we—Mike, Aliou and I—talked, we
argued, we probed, we disagreed. Yet, the final outcome of  our
conversations was no mere rambling. At least, Aliou and I think
so. And I’m sure Mike would’ve agreed with us.
But the ultimate worth of this book must be decided by
you, the reader. For us, the authors, the process of  producing it
has been of immense value. Though printed and bound, this
work is by no means complete in any way, but is probably just an
instrument for greater reflection and dialogue. That is what Mike
would have wanted too, I’m sure, although I know we have lost
his great wisdom in carrying this trialogue ahead.
And in that loss, I grieve—as do hundreds of  Mike’s friends
around the world.
Conversations is dedicated to you, Mike.
Nalini Nayak March 2002
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Preface
This book is the collaborativeoutcome of three individuals
who have worked to build organizations of  fishermen and
fishworkers since the late 1960s. The three of  us—Aliou Sall
from Senegal, Michael Belliveau from Canada and Nalini Nayak
from India—live in different continents and so our fisheries are
situated in varying contexts.
Aliou Sall is a native of Hann, Senegal, and has been
associated with the formation and development of  the Collectif
National des Pêcheurs Artisanaux du Sénégal (CNPS) since its
birth in 1988.
Michael Belliveau is the Executive Secretary of  the  MFU,
based in the Maritime Provinces, on the east coast of Canada,
where it has organized inshore fishermen.
Nalini Nayak comes from Bangalore, India, and has worked
her adult life in the fishery of Kerala, a State in the south of
India. She played a support role in the emergence of the Kerala
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Swatantara Matsya Thozhilali Federation (KSMTF, the Kerala
Independent Fishworkers’ Federation) and, later, in the National
Fishworkers Forum (NFF).
Of the three of us, only Aliou grew up in a fishing
community. Nalini has been involved in community work among
fishers for nearly two decades since 1967, working full time at it
until 1980 and continuing thereafter on a voluntary basis. Mike
started to organize inshore fishermen in Cape Breton in 1981.
Nalini had met Aliou in Senegal when he was doing his
field work in fisheries as part of  his university studies. She invited
him to India to learn from the experience of  the KSMTF. The
three met in Trivandrum, the capital of  Kerala, in 1986 as
participants at the founding meeting of  ICSF. Since then, ICSF
has been instrumental in bringing them together on several
occasions and in several different fishing areas of the world, like
Cebu in the Philippines, Accra on the Gulf of Guinea, Thailand,
Senegal and, of course, south India. Aliou and Mike have crossed
the Atlantic back and forth several times, as members of their
respective organizations, exploring each other’s fisheries and
institutions. Nalini has also collaborated with Aliou on several
West African initiatives. She visited the MFU and the Maritimes
only in mid-2000.
Given this background, our lives, naturally, are lived
quite differently and our practical day-to-day work varies
greatly. While we cannot claim to have had a common project,
we have had much to say to one another over the past
15 years.
We owe a great debt to ICSF, not only because it has
provided material support for this publication but also because
it has afforded us unique opportunities to meet many of the
inshore or artisanal fishworkers in their own settings.
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The text that follows is divided into two sections. The first
is a conversation amongst the three of us, a spontaneous trialogue
that went on for more than a week, which we recorded.
The second part of the text is a more detailed
documentation of the organizations we work with. It differs
editorially in the way each contribution has been written. Michael
and Aliou have chosen to reflect more on what is going on within
their organizations, being in no way obligated to the organizations
by way of  mandate or tasks. Nalini, on the other hand, has written
a brief  historical overview, together with her reflections.
We hope the conversation that follows will give the reader
a feel for the questions that have arisen through our involvement
in the inshore and artisanal fisheries sector. Needless to say, the
three of us are the ones who have benefited the most from this
exercise, as there could have been no better way to reflect on
our individual and shared experiences.
Aliou Sall  •  Michael Belliveau  •  Nalini Nayak
June 2000
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Introduction
Three Continents, Three Fisheries
The regions that the authorslive in lie in three different
continents, and have significantly large fisheries:
• Atlantic Canada, which once boasted one of  the world’s
richest fishing grounds, until the collapse of the cod
fishery;
• Senegal, in West Africa, where fishing is central to the
economy and where resources, especially of pelagic
species, are large and productive; and
• India, which has a diverse multispecies tropical fishery,
and provides a source of livelihood to around 10 million
people.
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The discussions below focus on the inshore fishery, where
the coastal communities display important differences in the way
they access the resources. In order to be able to appreciate the
conversation that follows, the reader needs to know the contexts
in which the fishworker organizations that the authors work with,
function.
Canada and the Maritime Fishermen’s Union
The MFU was created in 1977, with the aim of organizing
the inshore fishermen in the Maritime Provinces or the Maritimes,
as they are called. The three Maritimes have borders on the Gulf
of St Lawrence; two of them also have coasts on the Scotian
Shelf, which extends 200 miles into the Atlantic and is washed
by the Gulf  Stream near its outer edges. The MFU can claim a
wide base among inshore fishermen in the Maritimes, but it has
never worked in Newfoundland, famous for its Grand Banks
and historically huge cod stocks. (Newfoundland fishermen
organized earlier under the banner of the Newfoundland
Fishermen’s Union, affiliated to the national Canadian
Autoworkers Union.) The Maritimes and Newfoundland have
approximately the same number of independent owner-operator
fishermen.
Unlike the Newfoundland union, the MFU chose to
organize only inshore fishermen, not members of  the crew on
industrial vessels or workers in fish processing plants. In the
Maritimes, the inshore fishery is usually understood to include
fishermen who operate in vessels under 45 ft (13.7 m) in length,
which mainly return to port the same day. There are
approximately 8,000 inshore operators in the Maritimes. While
the MFU can claim membership both in the Gulf and the Scotian
Shelf, it has tended to be far more successful in the Acadian
regions of  New Brunswick, where it started.
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The Maritimes’ inshore fishery relies on several groundfish,
pelagic and crustacean species, but it is the ubiquitous Homarus
americanus (lobster) that the inshore fishery is most dependent
on. The lobster fishery employs traps and is regulated by season,
number of  traps and limited-entry licensing, and not by quotas.
The herring fishery is executed almost exclusively in the inshore
with gill-nets, and the goundfish are pursued with a number of
different gear. Both these species are managed by restrictions on
mobility and gear, as well as by quotas. A typical inshore fishing
operation would involve a crew of three, including the captain.
The Gulf of St Lawrence region freezes over in the winter,
restricting the time fishermen can be out on the water; but,
overall, the boats are at sea between 75 to 100 days a year. All
fishermen rely on wharves to land their catches and to moor
their vessels.
There are more than 300 coastal villages or communities
in the Maritimes that would be regarded as fishing areas. In many
of these communities can also be found some aspect of fish
processing or packing. Unlike in Newfoundland, most fishing
communities here are within an hour’s drive of  a large town or a
small city. Nevertheless, opportunities to work in the winter
season are not many; fishermen have been categorized alongside
other workers in Canada who are temporarily out of work,
allowing them to claim unemployment insurance benefits during
the winter.
As a group, Canadian fishermen are getting older in relation
to the rest of  the workforce. Generally, they have less formal
schooling than the average Canadian. Standards of living,
naturally, vary within the fishery, but most inshore captains would
enjoy approximately the same living standards as other full-time
workers elsewhere in Canadian society.
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Senegal and the Collectif National des Pêcheurs
Artisanaux du Sénégal
The CNPS is a fishworker organization of national
character. It includes the fishermen of  the ‘grand’ and ‘petite’ coasts
of Senegal, with the exception of Casamance. In Senegal, fishing
is not an ethnic-based activity, although, in some cases, specific
ethnic groups may practise a specialized kind of  fishery.
Fisheries is an important sector in the economy of Senegal,
and, after independence, the Senegalese government has tried
to have a great stake in the fisheries sector. Senegalese women
have a major role in the inshore fishery, as the fish they process
artisanally finds an important place in the diet of the nation.
The existence of polygamy forces the women to strive for their
own sources of  income; the role they play in post-harvest
activities is also important in maintaining social structures.
Of the Senegalese population, 92 per cent is Muslim, and,
although fishermen may belong to different Islamic tendencies,
they are, for the most part, religious and bound by social custom.
The national literacy rate is around 33 per cent, and most of the
fishing community speak Wolof, the single most important
language.
The inshore fishery is dominated by pirogues and a variety
of  gear like hooks-and-line, gill- and drift-nets and, more recently,
ring-seines. (A pirogue is a canoe powered by a small outboard motor, and
ranging from 3 to 25 m in length. Pirogues use a variety of gear, including lines,
gill-nets, beach seines, cast nets and traps – Ed) Approximately 90 per cent
of the vessels are motorized and, since the last two years, have
been equipped with large insulated boxes, to provide for the
increasing duration of  fishing voyages.
To date, Senegal has imposed neither a licensing nor quota
system in the fishery, although there is legislation that demarcates
the inshore fishing zone to 12 nautical miles from the shore.
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Senegal has had a tradition of signing fisheries access agreements
with the European Union (EU) under the Lomé Accord.
India and the National Fishworkers Forum
In India, the NFF was created in 1979. It is a trade union
made up of member federations from the nine coastal States of
India, each of which has its own government and jurisdiction
over its marine waters up to 12 nautical miles from the shoreline.
The waters beyond that range fall under the jurisdiction of the
central government.
Fishing in India is a caste-determined activity, and, in some
areas, the fishing castes are considered more backward than
others. Being backward and at the edge of  the land mass, these
communities have been pushed out of the mental and physical
radars of  the country’s successive planners.
The Indian artisanal fishery is extremely diverse both in
craft design and in gear usage. In the upper parts of the west and
east coasts, an extended continental shelf calls for larger craft.
In the south, the shelf narrows and so the craft get smaller,
especially towards the tip of the peninsula, where the kattamaram
used to be the common craft. (The kattamaram is a traditional fishing
craft found in south India, built of  three logs of  lightweight albyzzia lashed together
with coir rope – Ed) Today, around 80 per cent of  the craft in the
north and about 60 per cent in the south are mechanized. The
northern craft have increasingly been developed into trawl boats
although, for the most part, they are still controlled by traditional
fishermen.
In many coastal Indian States, women play an important
part in the fisheries, traditionally being involved in the marketing
and processing of fish. The complementary division of labour
between men who fish and women who market and distribute
the fish has made these coastal communities very vibrant and
self-contained. As fishing requires traditional skills, the male
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children often drop out of school early in order to set out to sea.
Female children, once old enough, are burdened with household
responsibilities, as both mother and father have long working
days outside the home. This pattern is changing in areas where
the fishery has got modernized, and, as such, we can say that
fishing communities are always under transition. Around 60 per
cent of fishworkers in the northern coastal parts of the country
are literate; the figure decreases as one comes southwards, where
the literacy rate is around 40 per cent.
Eight of  the nine coastal States of  India have some form
of legislation or regulation relating to their marine waters, but
all of  them have different norms for determining what constitutes
the artisanal fishery. In no State are the norms strictly observed,
as the fisheries are not rigorously regulated. The only clear-cut
resource management measure is a closed season for trawling—
varying from one to three months—that is observed in most
States.
No two States share a language and, although fish forms a
major part of the diet in many coastal States, in some States like
Gujarat some of the coastal population do not even eat fish.
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CONVERSATIONS 
A Trialogue on Organization,
Power and Intervention in Fisheries
On Intervention and Being an Intervener
Mike: Maybe we should start with the concept of the
‘intervener’ since you, Nalini, seemed less than
enthused with the term when I started using it earlier
today.
Nalini: Why do you use the term ‘intervener’? Can—and do—
individuals intervene in social processes?
Mike: No, I do not mean individuals as such that intervene—
but organizations like the MFU do intervene in social
processes. How do you see your role anyway in all the
years that you have been involved in fisheries?
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Nalini: In India, we use the term ‘social activist’. People who
are conscious of social contradictions take a stand on
the side of the poor, the oppressed, the outcast, and
get involved in processes and organizations that try to
counter the forces of marginalization.
Mike: I have a problem with the concept and role of activism.
The concept of  intervention is interesting because it
refers to the actual move to recover power in a
situation that is outside the supporter. An intervention,
at least in theory, allows the people you are intervening
with to test out their ideas and actions on the supporter
group in a context that is friendly.
I’d like to go back to a process I was involved with in
the 1970s, through a person called Gerald Belkin, a
filmmaker who spent time in Tanzania and made a
series of documentaries on how people lived
and thought. I thought those were powerful
communications of the life of the people in Africa.
The filmmaking team came to realize that they were
not a neutral phenomenon in the villages where they
were filming and that the local people they filmed were
using the opportunity to draw attention to existing
problems in the area like, for instance, hidden problems
with the chief  or with an aid worker. The film group
realized they were making an intervention. They were
a kind of  mirror. Paulo Freire (Brazilian adult educator, born
1921, died 1997, whose most famous work is Pedagogy of  the
Oppressed – Ed) too used the concept of mirror images
that captured a problematic. Social relations were
problematized.
In Belkin’s case, the crew was very conscious of  not
becoming a part of the village because, while they
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integrated with the local situation—learning the
language, etc—they were conscious that they were
independent of the situation and were autonomous,
and, therefore, were not taking sides. This posed a
challenge in articulating their own ideas. Unlike Freire’s
methodology, which seemed to be more ideologically
charged, Belkin documented a situation on video; in
this way, he captured what people thought and the
logic that lay behind particular themes or issues.
Belkin attributed his conceptual tools to a group called
‘Desgenettes’, whose founder, psychoanalyst Gerald
Mendel, developed a theory of social power and how
a group might go about recovering its rightful share of
power. Mendel believed that groups tended to project
on social situations their own psycho-familial
schemas…But we won’t go into that now.
Freire also used the term ‘intervention’. Unlike the
Desgenettes approach, the approach of INODEP
(Institut Oecuménique au service du Développement des peuples or the
Ecumenical Institute for the Development of  People, a Paris-based
organization that uses the social analysis methodology derived from the
work of  Paulo Freire – Ed) would be to identify key
informants in a situation, develop a social analysis from
what they communicated, and feed it back into the
community, provoking the community to reflect on,
and identify, the contradictions that occurred in the
process of change.
When I started working in the MFU, there seemed to
be pressure on me from the fishermen to be like them,
a sort of implied questioning that since I was from the
‘outside’, what was I doing trying to organize
fishermen. The tendency is to want to get familial and
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that was a way for me to get involved, to get to know
deeper the people one was working with. But, as I had
some tools from Belkin, I made a conscious effort not
to give ground, to remember that I was not a fishermen
and that that was not my role. I tried not to get
subsumed. My job was not to ‘accompany’ the
fishermen but, in a sense, to challenge them in their
secure atmosphere. ‘Accompanying’ a group is different
from ‘supporting’ it. What does one contribute just by
‘accompanying’ a process? In relating to me, the people
have to find some meaning.
In fact, in the MFU, people have remarked on the ‘rare’
relations between its staff  and its members. I think
we have established a way of working where we
neither dominate with our own ideas nor simply leave
the ideas of  the fishermen unchallenged. Despite the
fact that we are salaried, we have tried to shape the
staff  as interveners. We developed this approach over
time. In fact, in the mid-1970s, I had Belkin organize
a workshop for us in Moncton. He came along with a
Swedish person called Bertil Malmstrom.
I got together about 20 people and, after the workshop,
we created a working group that would get initiated
into the methodologies of  the group Desgenettes. We
got together regularly for about two years, practising
the methodology. We had a series of  sessions with the
students of  the School of  Social Work, who were
facing some problems with the administration. We
would record their discussions and then reflect on
them, analyze them as a group and give them feedback,
on which they could make the decisions they wanted.
In the long run, although our group got dissolved, what
we learnt in the process actually shaped us.
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When I met you people in India, in 1986, what
impressed me was the care you took in writing up your
work in a way that the group Desgenettes did. You
were conscious about what you were doing as a team,
analyzing and documenting your work in a popular
manner for others to read, but also, in the process,
learning. Danilo Dolci in Italy did something similar, I
think. (Danilo Dolci, 1924-1997, often called the Gandhi of  Sicily,
used peaceful protests and hunger strikes to work with the poor and
unfortunate in Sicily during the time of  Mussolini’s rule, inspired by
the work of Don Zeno, a Catholic priest – Ed) He too worked
as a social animator and documented his observations
in his book No Man is an Island. So, in a way, I think
social animation predates Freire and has different
expressions but all in the genre of ‘making an
intervention’, which allows for people to bounce their
ideas off one another and sort them out better as a
group.
As time moved on, I got convinced that intense
technical workshops for people to get conscientized
are really not very effective. People get conscientized
through the broader process of organization. When I
got to the MFU, I found it a reasonably stable
organization, where people could test their ideas and
carry them through. That methodology kept us from
getting burnt out because, although you get more and
more involved as time goes on, you can always distance
yourself  from your actions and think objectively.
Nalini: I too followed some of the debates of that time. That
was in the early 1970s, when a Marxist debate was
still going on about the pros and cons of  Lenin’s theory
of  organization. (As a young Russian émigré recently returned
from Siberian exile and living in Geneva, Switzerland, Vladimir
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Illich Lenin wrote the long vigorous polemic What is to be Done in
1902, in which he sketched out a new vision of  a Marxist revolutionary
party to counter the Russian ‘economists’ view that the Social Democratic
party in Russia should focus on legal activities aimed at improving the
economic well-being of the working class. “The whole art of politics lies
in finding and gripping as strong as we can the link that is least likely
to be torn out of  our hands, the one that is most important at the given
moment, the one that guarantees the possessor of a link the possession
of the whole chain,” wrote Lenin – Ed) There was
disillusionment with the Left because of its failure in
organizing the working class and, as a result, there was
a spate of  writings on social movements. There were
also analyses of what made up the psyche of fascism.
This had an impact on us in India too.
But people’s praxis is influenced by their social
consciousness and, in this way, every human being is
a social actor, and the term ‘intervention’ cannot be
used to identify some individuals. From what I
understand you saying, the ‘intervener’ is outside the
process and not a part of it and, hence, is not
influenced by the process. But look at us. Haven’t we
been influenced by our involvement in the movements
too? Haven’t we grown, changed and developed an
evolving perspective because of our closeness to the
movement, and, in this closeness, haven’t we also been
able to contribute our own ideas to the process?
Aliou: I prefer the term ‘supporter’. I acknowledge that the
supporters have been key in bringing dynamism into
the fishworkers’ movement. In my case, I must say
that the role of a supporter vis-à-vis the movement can
sometimes be ambiguous. While I respect the
autonomy of the movement, the fact that I come from
Hann and from a fishing family that held a respectable
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position in the village makes me organically linked to
the community and the movement.
Nalini: Well, Aliou, by saying that, you introduce us to another
dimension of  our reflection, namely, where do we come
from? Why do we do what we do? Mike, all that you
have shared about the evolution of your
methodological approach does impress me. You
mentioned Paulo Freire. How come you were
interested in what he did? At what point of your life
was that?
Despite having interacted with you all these years,
I did not imagine you had this kind of  a past! Yet, I
always felt on a similar wavelength when we discussed
organizational strategies, and now I am not surprised
why. I knew you earlier played hockey and worked in
Michelin Tire…But what led you to the MFU?
Mike: I heard of Paulo Freire when I attended a lecture by
Ivan Illich, who explained how Freire had used literacy
as a means of  conscientization. (Born in Vienna in 1926,
Ivan Illich founded centres for cross-cultural studies, first in Puerto
Rico, then in Cuernavaca, Mexico. During the 1970s, his Centro
Intercultural de Documentación became an internationally respected
focus for intellectual discussion. Illich’s radical anarchist views can be
found in his most famous works: Deschooling Society, Tools for
Conviviality, Energy and Equity and Medical Nemesis – Ed)
Subsequently, I read Freire’s books and was fascinated
by the way he developed a methodology that used
words and concepts and reflected on their social
meanings. That was at a time when I was interested in
international development issues. I had been working
with the Canadian Council for International
Co-operation. I had looked at what Julius Nyerere was
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attempting in Tanzania through his ujamma programme;
all the obstacles he faced had to do with issues of
international development and aid. (Julius K. Nyerere, the
founding father of  Tanzania, guided what had been the British Trust
Territory of  Tanganyika into sovereignty in 1961. He was the youngest
of  Africa’s triumphant nationalists, a group that included Kwame
Nkrumah of  Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of  Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda of
Zambia and Félix Houphouët-Boigny of  Ivory Coast. His ujamma
movement involved a shift from traditional lands into paternalistically
planned villages in what, according to The New York Times, became
Africa’s largest and most debated example of  social engineering – Ed)
Nalini: Oh, I am glad you talk about the ujamma experiment.
Last year, when we organized a workshop on social
analysis in Ghana for African activists, I was surprised
to discover that none of them had heard about the
ujamma experiment. I referred to the ujamma experiment
because we were talking about indigenous approaches
to development, like the gram swaraj movement that
Mahatma Gandhi began in India. (Gram swaraj, or village
self-rule, was a pivotal concept in Gandhi’s thinking, where every village
would be “independent of its neighbours for its own vital wants and yet
interdependent for many others in which dependence is necessary,” according
to Gandhi, writing in 1942 – Ed)
Mike: It was after that that I got into the Belkin approach.
But why are you so surprised that I was interested in
Freire?
Nalini: Just because I had never dreamt that you would have
gone through such a conscious methodological
approach. I know very few trade union or
organizational people who use any particular
methodological approach in their organizational work.
But, now that you say it, I understand you better and
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that is probably why, very early on, I felt I could discuss
organizational strategies with you. Do you remember
we had wanted to engage in a written dialogue on this
subject years ago?
Mike: Yes, I remember, and we have only got down to it
now. But how and when did you folks in India get to
know Freire? Was he also the source of  inspiration for
you in India?
Nalini: Well, that was in the early 1970s. His book Pedagogy of
the Oppressed was discussed in the ‘Free University’ that
radical elements in the student movement organized.
We were not so much taken up by the details of  Freire’s
methodology as by his analysis of  poverty. We
ourselves were studying the impact of colonialism on
the history of our nation, and the complex and unjust
Indian social system that discriminated between
people. Freire spoke about the ‘culture of silence’ and
how the process of conscientization gave people the
possibility to break out of this culture, and helped
them to fight discrimination.
Then, in 1971, Francois Houtart conducted a workshop
in India on social analysis, where he developed tools
of  analysis. (A Belgian priest and proponent of  liberation theology,
Francois Houtart is director of  the Belgium-based Tricontinental Centre
– Ed) What was really appealing was the fact that he
used Marxist tools, but integrated symbolic social
representations, like religion and people’s world-views,
into the analysis. That approach was later developed
in the Indian context by Duarte Barretto at the Indian
Social Institute, Bangalore, and, still later, it was
extended to embrace feminist and ecological
perspectives by the feminist movement, with women
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like Gabrielle Dietrich and Chhaya Datar making
significant contributions. (Gabrielle Dietrich work with the
Christian Institute for the Study of  Religion and Society, and, since
1975, has been on the faculty of  the Tamil Nadu Theological Seminary
in Madurai, India. She recently co-authored, with Nalini Nayak,
Transition or Transformation? A Study of  the Mobilization,
Organization and Emergence of Consciousness Among the
Fishworkers of Kerala, India. Chhaya Datar is Head of the
Women’s Studies Unit at the Tata Institute of  Social Sciences, Mumbai
India—Ed)
Interestingly, Francois Houtart had also worked in
Brazil where the initial conscientization work of Freire
coincided with the post-Second Vatican Council
liberation theology movement. It was at that time that
concepts like “Church as the people of God” and “the
Church of  the Poor” stimulated students to venture
out of the secure confines of family and acquaint
themselves with the problems of the oppressed people,
if  they meant to take their Christianity seriously. Our
student movement was radicalized then, and was also
influenced by radical students from Kerala where, for
the first time in history, a communist government had
been democratically elected to power in 1957.
So, as students, some of  us got exposed to rural India
through work camps. Then, inspired by the Bishop of
Trivandrum and a group of  committed women social
workers, I went to a fishing village in Kerala, called
Marianad, where I lived for two years. That is a story
in itself. Subsequently, I went back to university, did
my masters degree in community organization, and
came back to the same fishing village. I have been in
the field of fisheries and coastal communities ever
since.
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Mike: It’s interesting to gather that similar thought processes
have influenced us. What about you, Sall, what were
the influences on your life?
Aliou: I do not think we are what we are because of certain
people, like Freire or Marx, influencing our thought
processes. I feel that there is something in the human
disposition itself and in the play of social events on
our lives that makes us do what we do. I think it was
my local situation between 1975 and 1979 that made
me react to certain things that were happening in my
society.
As I lived in Hann, the closest fishing area to the city
of Dakar, we were the first to encounter the impact
of urbanization. Hann became the first site for the
installation of  fish processing plants. It started with a
huge tuna plant that started pouring hot and polluted
water into the bay. Then others came along, a huge
Japanese plant and then Sardine Afrique. These
companies began to occupy our land too. That enraged
us and we made a lot of  trouble for them. We physically
confronted them when they occupied the processing
grounds of  the women. We also began to understand
how they were able to buy up some of our local leaders,
who then began to intervene on their behalf, saying
they would create more jobs, and so on.
That was when I was about 19 years old. The prevailing
situation stimulated us youth to get together and, in
the process, some more senior, shall I say Left-
oriented, rebels joined us.
Hann never took easily to the coming of foreigners
into its midst. In fact, I recall an incident, which
happened when I was about seven years old, when my
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grandmother made captive six French soldiers who
were caught helping themselves to coconuts in our
fields. Yes, Hann was then surrounded by fields, and
many of  the fishermen also farmed, as they were
traditionally inland fishermen-cum-farmers who had
migrated to the coast. It was my father’s uncle who
had led this settlement of migrants in Hann, and he
was a great fighter. That spirit probably transpired to
us.
As a group of youth, we organized the other young
people into doing things together and having
discussions. We also ran a tuition programme for
children so that they could pursue their school studies
better. Ours was the first generation that reached
university. Yes, I was very interested in school and
studies, and that was why I was probably one of the
few of my time who did not go to sea, as all my peers
did. I was fascinated by learning at school and it was
probably because I was away from the practice of
fishing that I developed a deeper consciousness about
it, which helped me see more objectively what was
really happening in the sector.
Mike: You make me think here about my colleague in the
MFU. He is a bit of  what you’d call an ‘organic’ type.
I would not take any major decisions without first
sounding it out on him. He was with us at the start of
the union and is still there. He came from the first
generation of the Acadian people who went to the
University of Moncton. University education
commenced in the Acadian region only in the 1960s.
This colleague came from a fishing family, and knew
great poverty and hardship, but went to university to
study social sciences.
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Five years after the university was inaugurated, the
debate on the language and status of the Acadian
people began. It was part of the movement for identity
and valorizing the Acadian people’s work of  farming,
logging and fishing. They were up in arms against the
Anglophones, who controlled the fishery as well. They
went back to their people as volunteers and started
the mobilizations that grew into the MFU.
Nalini: This reminds me of people like Eugene Culas and
A J Vijayan too—Eugene, who knew poverty and
initiated the formation of  the fishery co-operative in
Marianad, and Vijayan, the son of a major fish
merchant, who got exposed to the thinking of the
student movement in the early 1970s and went on to
mobilize the first trade union in fisheries in India. (Eugene
Culas and A J Vijayan have been active in the fishworkers’ movement
in India – Ed) But, Aliou, what made you leave your
country and go to Europe to study?
Aliou: In the late 1970s, the university in Senegal was in a
crisis and the Department of  Sociology and
Demography was closed. That was also partly due to
the happenings in Europe in 1968. The social science
faculties were considered the origins of social revolt
and so it was felt better to close them down. That was
the reason I went to Europe. But it was extremely
difficult because my father didn’t have money. Yet, I
can say that in the nine years that I was in Europe, I
did all kinds of work to get money not only for my
studies but to go home every two years. You know,
the children of ministers and other influential people
monopolized Francophone scholarships, while those
like me had to struggle.
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While in France, and especially in Toulouse, I worked
with the immigrants, and that was a real education for
me. There, too, I was involved in adult education for
the immigrants who had to learn how to integrate
themselves into the French system. In fact, I even
wrote my lycée (a French public secondary school that prepares
students for the university – Ed) thesis on the problems of
the migrants. For this, I was influenced by the writings
of  Pierre Bourdieu (French anthropologist and sociologist who
worked extensively in Algeria before becoming Professor of  Sociology
at the College de France—Ed), who wrote Le echeque Scholai,
as well as by other books that critiqued the educational
system, including those by Illich, who you mentioned
earlier. I applied that analysis to my understanding of
the experience of the migrants amidst the constraints
and compulsions of the French system of education,
which was very elitist and racist too.
You must also know that there were many other
Senegalese students in France. There were some
Burkinabes too. Only the sons of  the rich got the
Francophone scholarships, but there were lots of
others who were political rebels, and they organized
the Society of Senegal in France. I didn’t really join
them and tried to keep my distance as I found them
too dogmatic. I think I was more influenced by the
writings of Africans like Cheer Antio Diouf, Theophil
Obenga of  Congo, Bau Bau Amme of  Niger and
Kserbo.
I chose to study sociology instead of  demography,
which was the main attraction for other Africans
because they held out a scope of  better job prospects.
But my interest was to get better tools to understand
society. So, I finally moved to the university at Geneva,
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where I was attracted by Professor Rolf Steppacher,
who was sort of marginalized in the university because
he spoke about ecodevelopment. His approach, and
the issues he raised, rang a bell for me, as I looked
back at Hann.
Mike: It is strange that we are repeatedly going back to the
1960s era. Why were the social science faculties so
dynamic in those times and so mediocre now?
Nalini: I think in the 1960s sociology was just coming into its
own as an academic discipline. The people who were
entering university were people who came more from
‘real life situations’ like your colleague, and Eugene,
who I mentioned earlier. Their education was
motivated by the questions that arose from the pain
of being discriminated against. This made them reflect
on the social contradictions of their times, and
academia helped develop tools to understand society
as it existed. The social sciences were developing a
critique of  society.
Today, many of  the social science faculties do not seem
to develop in the student a critical analysis of  society.
As large numbers of students in our countries are those
who have no ‘real life’ experience, the thrust of
education is more academic and career-oriented. This
has to do with the way that society at large is
developing. Life is becoming more of  a rat race, and
society is no longer based on harmony and sustainable
growth. People, and the students of the 1960s, in
particular, hoped for a change, but they were not
supported, and the dominant class continued to call
the shots. From then on, the questioning spirit in
universities only further deteriorated.
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Aliou: Also, I feel that social sciences have fallen into the
trap of what is called ‘specialization’. In the process,
it has lost the ability to analyze holistically and get
inside actual social dynamics.
Nalini: Specialization is an approach encouraged by modern
science. It leads to the dysfunctioning of  society, of
the environment and even of  the human body, which
are all complex dynamic realities. The approach, which
dichotomizes dynamic reality, is the base of  the
modern ‘development’ paradigm. We can see, for
instance, how ‘scientific’ management of the ocean
resources has led to the collapse of  our fisheries.
Mike: Before we get into that discussion, I still want to know
what makes the ‘non-organic’ individuals get involved.
Like you and I, Nalini, we come from more urban
backgrounds. Your father was a bureaucrat, wasn’t he?
I personally had no political consciousness when I was
19, the way Aliou seems to have had. Rather, I can
say I developed a different perspective due to what I
call an existential crisis when I was around 20 years
old.
I completed undergraduate studies in philosophy,
literature and psychology and started teaching in high
school until about 1966. I was getting frustrated with
the formal schooling process because the students were
more preoccupied by identity and relations than by
Shakespeare. I thought I could make more of a
contribution by getting deeper into psychology to
understand the students better.
Instead, I ended up travelling. I went to Europe and,
in order to earn money to keep on travelling, I played
hockey. We were in Czechoslovakia in 1967 and we
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saw what was happening there. Remember, it was only
a few months later that the whole Czech society broke
out in revolt against the Soviet bloc system. That was
the first time I got interested in anything political. Then
I went to the Middle East and spent three months
travelling there. It was the time when Nasser had
ordered the United Nations (UN) troops out of the
Sinai, and we were asked by the Israeli police to leave.
So, we went to Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, where also
there had been a recent coup.
We toyed with the idea of  going to India, but fathomed
it would be too hot and so we went to Russia instead.
At that time, not many visitors went to Russia and, to
my surprise, I was amazed to see a fairly normal society,
in the sense that people had their lives and pleasures
and laughs, even if they were under a communist
regime, which had been portrayed in Canadian minds
as the darkest of  eventualities. I came back from my
travels and decided that I would not pursue my studies
in psychology but would go back to university and
study political science instead.
On Organizational Work
Mike: Most organizations, once formed, cannot conceive of
a time when they will have to wind up. To the extent
that they become ideas, they take on an eternal sense,
which doesn’t give people a feeling that things can be
changed. In 1986, I was on the verge of quitting the
MFU, where I had been for five years already, but
meeting all you folks working in the fishery gave me
new motivation. A few months after that, Gilles
Theriault left the MFU. He was one of  the founders
of  the MFU, and a charismatic one, at that.
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I took over and realized I couldn’t ‘replace’ him, but
the attitude that I took was to allow for the possibility
of what I call ‘the will of Allah’—there are too many
things beyond our control. I think that was the perfect
attitude to have at that time because the first decade
in the life of the MFU was so charged. It was a time
when people who were ideologically driven gave of
their time to build the organization, even without any
pay. Finally, in some areas, it became so difficult that
people had to leave. When I joined the MFU, it was
like being self-employed.
Nalini: The movements of  the informal sector have a real
struggle to survive because of  limited possibilities of
access to funds, more so if they are political
movements. In India, movements are always suspect
if they have any links with the outside world, as they
are not supposed to receive foreign funds. Aliou, I am
really a bit surprised to see how the CNPS makes
applications for funding abroad. I have not been able
to understand why CREDETIP (Centre de Recherches pour
le Développement des Technologies Intermédiaires de Pêche or the Research
Centre for Development of  Intermediate Technology in Fishing, Dakar,
Senegal – Ed) as a support organization, has not been
more discreet in exposing the CNPS to funding sources
so that some amount of  self-reliance is built up.
Aliou: That is indeed a complex issue, and you must know
the complexities of our Senegalese society if you want
to understand it. In fact, I have reflected on this in my
part of the text later on, where we document the
organizations we work with.  But right now, I would
like to say that we made a conscious choice right from
the beginning that CREDETIP, besides doing some
‘support’ activity for the CNPS, would not get involved
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in direct fundraising for the organization. This has been
to our advantage as CREDETIP now cannot be
criticized for existing at the cost of, or because of,
CNPS. But I can see that it has had some negative
effect on some of the leaders of the CNPS as they
have become dependent and have not taken the
question of  self-reliance seriously. In some cases, they
have made grave mistakes too, as in the case of  Kayar
and the insulated vans to transport fish. Nevertheless,
we have tried to discuss with the locals at each phase
and explain to them our disagreements.
Mike: I think I want to say something on this too because of
the way we have grown in relation to financial stability.
The MFU was conceived around 1975. In its early
phase, organizational inputs were given by supporters.
At that time there existed in New Brunswick what
were called ‘Rural Development Centres’, which were
funded by the provincial government. Those centres
attracted old-style rural workers and some young
Acadians just out of  university, who wanted to bring
along their people, from the farming, wood logging
and fishing sectors, which were the poorest. These
centres allowed for a lot of freedom for different
initiatives in the north of the Province.
In particular, there was a core group that was
influenced by the Frenchman, Louis Rousseau, who
did his military service as a ‘co-operant’ in the Acadian
region of  New Brunswick. You, I think, would call
him a social thinker. That group did several innovative
things with the money from the social centres. There
were people working full-time to form a union to
organize under one umbrella all people of the
Maritimes, not just the Acadians. They got the
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endorsement of  the Canadian Labour Congress.
Though they were considered to be radicals, they did
get endorsed as the official organization for the inshore
fishermen of  the Maritime Provinces. Newfoundland
fishermen had already been organized under the
International United Food Fish and Allied Workers
Union and had been formally organized into a trade
union by 1974. Their union included all the workforce,
plant workers, crew on the fishing boats, the offshore
fleet and the fishermen in the coastal fishery.
Initially, the MFU had support money from the
Development Centres, but that source dried up in
1976. When it was officially launched in 1977, it was
getting funds from some non-governmental
organizations (NGOs)—Oxfam Canada, the Canadian
Council for International Co-operation—and a small
grant from the Canadian Postal Workers and the British
Columbia’s Fishermen’s United Food, Fish and Allied
Workers Union, the Provincial Federation of  Labour,
as well as from the Canadian Labour Congress.
It also raised some funds from the co-protection
projects. Let me explain: There used to be big poaching
going on in the lobster fishery. The MFU was keen to
eliminate it and it wanted more help from the
enforcement officers. By creating this co-protection
programme, the fishermen directly helped identify
infractions, and worked closely with the officers to
apprehend poachers. The co-protection programme
was financed by the federal government, and the MFU
was able to use it not only to pursue the poaching
problem but also to help with the general finances.
Then there were funds from Canada’s generous
unemployment programme. You could work for 10
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weeks and then survive for the rest of  the year on
unemployment funds. Those funds were absolutely
essential in supporting the organizers of  the MFU.
When the MFU was formed in 1977, the same year
that Canada declared its 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), there were lots of  expectations. Canada
extended its quota management programme to all its
fleets. Other organizations were emerging at the time
as well. The Minster for Fisheries then was an Acadian,
Romeo LeBlanc. He came up with a plan to get all the
upcoming organizations together on one platform. He
asked them to form a federation, saying that if  they
did so, he would give it an allocation of  squid, which
meant big money at the time as the Japanese were
buying squid at sea.
The quota was worth a million Canadian dollars. That
was key. But the idealism of  the MFU and its view of
itself as a trade union representing only the coastal
fishery kept it away from the new federation that was
created, the Eastern Fishermen’s Federation (EFF),
which comprised all the other sectors—the herring
seiners, the crab boats, the specialized midshore
draggers and the co-operative federation. By
deliberately staying out of the federation, the MFU
forfeited access to a valuable source of  money. But
within three years, many of these groups dropped out
of the federation because of internal conflicts, I guess,
and the EFF was left with a good base of funds from
an amalgamation of small-boat associations of the
inshore. They began to take positions on questions of
the inshore fisheries that were different from those of
the MFU. For example, they considered a fisherman a
businessman, who, therefore, had no need for unions,
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while the MFU regarded a fisherman as a worker. In
this way, the EFF became the main antagonist of  the
MFU and got all the money.
I started work in the MFU in November 1981 in Nova
Scotia, which was the area boasting the biggest landed
value of fish catch. It was an Anglophone area. By
that time, the MFU had gone through four years of
militant fights and was exhausted. So, in 1981, there
was nobody working for MFU in Nova Scotia, as there
was no money to pay anyone. I agreed to take up the
job for one year, sharing my time with the Nova Scotia
Federation of  Labour.
The union thought that its precarious situation in
Nova Scotia would improve within the year, with new
provincial legislation that would allow for collective
bargaining of  inshore fishermen. The legislation never
materialized and by 1982, the MFU was virtually
bankrupt. We were almost self-employed, hunting for
funds, as dues to the union were voluntary and only a
fifth of the members paid them. Thus, seven years
after its birth, the MFU wasn’t self-financing. To our
advantage, we could still use unemployment insurance,
but I personally was averse to that for various reasons.
Around 1984, Gilles—the magician, as he was often
called for the way he managed to keep the organization
going—came back with a surprise. He located some
friendly people within the bureaucracy in Ottawa who
understood the merits of the inshore fishery being
organized. These were people who probably felt
unhappy about the way the squid deal had got
appropriated by the EFF to the disadvantage of the
MFU. Gilles came back with Can$300,000, which was
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significant in those days and allowed us to pay back
all our debts. That gave us a break and then, by 1985-
86, when we had won trade union-type legislation in
the Province of  New Brunswick (but not in the
neighbouring Province of Nova Scotia), we thought
our problems were over.
In 1987, Gilles left the MFU, believing the union was
in good shape. But that was not the case. The
legislation recognizing the MFU as negotiator in
collective agreements with buyers, which would
include a dues check-off, didn’t work. The fact is that
the MFU had no real bargaining power because the
all-important lobster fishery was too short-lived and
the fishermen could not afford to give a strike call.
We were in bad shape, both financially and
organizationally. We couldn’t even raise Can$10,000
as a bank loan to keep going. I recall having serious
discussions with my co-worker at that time, trying to
assess the real strength of  the MFU. Did it have any
real social force?
In 1988, there was a change in politics in New
Brunswick. The Conservative Party was defeated and
the Liberal Party that came in brought in many
Acadians. These, in fact, were peers of  the MFU’s
Acadian organizers. Having greater access to them,
we pursued them to create a different kind of
legislation and we got what might be called the ‘Rand
Formula’. It stated that if  a union succeeded in getting
recognition as the majority union representing the
workers of a plant, then, in any plant, even in those
with no members of the union, all workers would have
to pay dues to the union. With this new legislation,
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although we had no bargaining power, we only had to
demonstrate that the majority of  the fishermen in
defined areas had chosen the MFU to be their
representative. Then, all fishermen in that region had
to pay us dues.
That happened in 1991 and it took us two years to get
the legislation properly implemented because some
fishermen and buyers who wouldn’t do the check-off,
were against us. There were also legal battles. Although
there has never been a total compliance with the new
law, we can claim to have had at least 90 per cent
success. The legislation is applicable only in New
Brunswick and so the MFU is strongest here. The
legislation has helped us solve some of our financial
problems. All our workers are now on full-time salaries
but, in the process, the former spirited style of  the
MFU has got domesticated. I say this because, initially,
the MFU fought provincialism, as we looked at the
fishery in a more federal way, but now we have
acquired stability under a provincial law. Subsequently,
in 1995, we won an allocation for snow crab, which
was managed collectively by the MFU. Through this
allocation, we were able to build a significant fund for
health insurance and contingencies.
I think since then we have become more of a
professional organization. I have never thought of the
MFU as a movement, but in its origins it was really a
part of  a movement of  inshore fishermen in the
Maritime Provinces of Canada. But you could not call
it a professional organization, either. In the 1970s, the
MFU took a purist approach regarding funding, and
we were a bit of a basket case, generally hobbling along
all through the 1980s. The main focus of  the activists
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was to get the fishermen organized under one umbrella
and they really skinned themselves doing that, working
with very little money and means. Then, despite the
legislation, in 1987, we had the failure of not being
able to negotiate with the buyers, although the whole
decade of  struggle was aimed at getting the new Act
through. That meant there was no way of deducting
dues and making the organization self-reliant.
The only way I think we could transcend that failure
was by taking a different view of the organization and
what it stood for. As we had no mandate to boycott
the buyers, we had to give up the possibility of
bargaining. As such, we took on the character of  an
association, rather than a union. From then on, we
had a completely different history—a new lease of
life, if you like, as it was widely felt by then that the
union would die.
By the mid-1990s, we were quite established, but we
were no longer seized with trying to organize all inshore
fishermen. In 1994, while at the ICSF Conference in
Cebu in the Philippines (In June 1994, ICSF organized a
conference at Cebu, the Philippines, to mark the 10th anniversary of
the International Conference of  Fishworkers and their Supporters,
since called the 1984 Rome Conference – Ed), it began dawning
on me that we were becoming a professional
organization, rather than the ‘fighting’ organization we
had earlier been. While the organization didn’t grow,
it stabilized, especially in the Acadian regions.
Ironically, the MFU became financially strong during
the period of  the collapse of  the Canadian cod fishery.
You have to remember that our base is still only in the
inshore fishery of the Maritime Provinces and this
fishery was never cod-dependent, as in Newfoundland.
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In fact, our most important fishery was lobster, whose
stocks continued to expand. (Sue Calhoun, in A Word to
Say, notes that the first lobster cannery was established on the Miramichi
River in the mid-1840s, and by the turn of  the last century, there
were over 200 in New Brunswick – Ed)
In the Maritimes, various expressions of militancy
continue to grow. But what I find interesting is that, in
the 1990s, most of them took place outside our
organization. The fights have taken different forms
and most of them have been started not by the poor
and oppressed, as it were, but by some of the most
privileged pockets of  fishermen who were in the
inshore and midshore fisheries. Their actual interests
were very narrow. But they adopted a kind of  rightwing
populism. The MFU has come into the picture in a big
way only on a couple of  issues outside New Brunswick
and now specifically on the issue of ‘native fishing
rights’.
Nalini: What you have told us, Mike, leaves me with several
important questions. I hope we will have the time to
discuss all of them, at least to clarify the questions,
even if  we do not have the answers. Let me voice
them as they come to me.
You seem to look at the inshore fishery as a closed shop.
What has it to do with our concept of ‘a way of life’?
Do you feel the task is over? Has the union achieved
what the organizers set out to do two decades ago?
The fishermen still depend on social security from the
State. But, today, with changing global equations, the
concept of the welfare State is itself being challenged.
So what will happen to your fishermen if  welfare is
increasingly withdrawn?
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What development choices are we making in the
process? Do we just succumb to market forces and
lose control of our destiny? Or, now that fishworkers
from around the world have got together and see
themselves as one group dependent on water resources,
should we ponder on what development options will
guide them in arriving at some common vision of the
fishery?
What will the role of  supporters be, now that the World
Forum of  Fish Harverters and Fish Workers (WFF)
has been created? (On 21  November 1997, men and women
fishworkers from 33 countries met at New Delhi, India to create
WFF — Ed) Will we continue to bring to the Forum a
global vision, as we did through the last decade,
thereby challenging it to go beyond mere micro-
realities? Or will we be expected only to offer the WFF
the services that they ask of  us?
Aliou: I would like to start with the last question about the
supporters because I have always seen great value in
supporters contributing to the thinking process of the
fishworkers’ movement. More than ever now, I think
we have to be there because the situation at the global
level will get more and more critical. Various forces
may try to use the World Forum, and we have to
continue to help it steer clear of  such manipulations.
Mike: This has to do with the position we have to take as
supporters or interveners. If  we don’t engage the World
Forum in debate, it will not end up being responsible
to the base. Only if there are supporters will it have
some important historic contribution to make to global
fisheries development and the coastal communities.
The easiest thing for any fishworker organization to
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do is to fire its staff  or marginalize its supporters. And
if that is not resisted, these organizations will only dig
their own graves. But that does not mean that we are
not indispensable as individuals. A social grouping
becomes regressive and infantile in its thinking when
it starts to believe that it is self-contained.
Aliou: Well, I am not sure the WFF will be able to build itself
in such a way as to permit room for ‘intervention’. It
is already creating its structure and once that is
formalized, it will be off  on its own, sort of. At the
global level, I think it is so preoccupied with ‘who
should be in and who should be out’, in terms of  the
fisheries sector, that it hasn’t had the time or the
foresight to think of creating some alternative kind
of  organization. For that, it should have engaged in a
discussion with ICSF but it didn’t, despite the fact
that we had two occasions of exchange with its
Chairperson, first at the ICSF General Body meeting
and then at the India group meeting.
But whatever it is, what would we have to say on this
basic demand of  the WFF, ‘to protect coastal
communities’? Mike, you keep repeating that we should
not idealize artisanal communities.
Nalini: Do we tend to idealize the artisanal fishing
community?
Mike: Let me try and explain it this way. In some areas of
the Maritimes, there is a long history of anti-unionism.
Building a union was like going against religion, almost.
The union ideology was more related to the industrial
proletariat; the fishermen considered themselves their
own masters–self-employed, as we would say now.
Actually, as a social class, they are ambiguous. There
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are some among them who aspire to climb up the ladder
to become ‘big’ fishermen, and others who may have
to drop out when they can’t make it any longer. So we
can never consider them a homogeneous group, and
that creates problems in the organizational process.
But they want a union because of what it represents
in terms of  power, discipline and organization.
Aliou: In Senegal, the fishermen who created CNPS didn’t
have any such class understanding. They only wanted
to have an organization to defend their rights vis-à-vis
the government and, in their minds, such an
organization is a ‘syndicate’.
Mike: Can primary producers appropriate a form of
organization that originated in the industrial model?
They have tendencies to be owners and workers at
the same time. Therefore, it will be normal if  they
mix association-type work with classical union work—
making demands on the State, etc.
Nalini: Yes, it has to do with the fact that access to common
property is obstructed when the State asserts its rights
over the commons. So, while the ‘property’ question
is key, I can also agree with you about the ambiguous
nature of  this sector. I can see this as one of  the main
reasons why we in the NFF have not seriously been
able to advance the discussion on self-management
or community management. This will happen only
when we realize that we ourselves precipitate the crisis
in the inshore.
Mike: I’m glad we are talking about the question of ‘property’.
In fact, I am not convinced that the MFU model, as it
exists in the context of the Maritime Provinces, is
sustainable outside New Brunswick. We are as if  in a
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shell. When the MFU started 20 years ago, its ambition
was to organize all the inshore fishermen under one
umbrella. Now, as I look back, I can see we have not
been able to live up to our stated objectives in
organizing the fishermen of  the Maritimes. Therefore,
either our model has to be questioned or the fishery
has significantly changed during this period. This will
be the case with the World Forum too.
In our case, in the creation phase, the people who
started MFU saw themselves as an exploited group
and they thought that was the case throughout the
Maritimes and, therefore, felt the need to organize
under one organization. Then, there was the fear that
the fishery was growing towards greater
monopolization and centralization. These people
turned out to be dead wrong. In fact, in the inshore
fishery, there has always been competition among
buyers.
So, the simplistically stated ideas that formed the initial
ideology of  the MFU may have only corresponded to
reality in the 1970s, but not for all time. Nobody
predicted the inshore fishery would stabilize around
lobster. So, what happened between 1970 and 1990,
within the context of  the Maritimes fishery, was the
extension of regulation, differentiation of licences,
further limits on licensed catch and the developing of
quotas into a highly elaborate management system.
The only people in 1970 who were on quotas were
the offshore draggers and seiners. But, by 1983,
virtually all the inshore was on some kind of quota,
except for lobster. The lobster had a different kind of
management regime, based on effort controls.
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Nalini: What led to this development in the inshore? Why did
the property regime develop within the sector?
Mike: I think it started when Canada made its claims on the
EEZ to establish its property rights. If  Canada didn’t
impose quotas on its fleets, the foreign fleets could
come in and fish. So I do not know what came first
exactly. I think it was the owners of  the herring fleet
who first introduced the quotas, wanting to establish
a more orderly marketing system, and not really for
resource reasons.
Nalini: So what you are actually saying is that as the capacity
of the fleet increased, as in the case of the herring
fleet, it was necessary to ensure catches to sustain the
viability of the fleet, and hence the insistence on
property rights.
Mike: You are right. Capacity had to do with it, although it
was never accepted. The cod fish companies would
generally get their quotas around January. In 1981,
when they got their quotas, they were not satisfied,
and so they went on strike and refused to fish. This
was because the quota wasn’t a viable one, considering
the number of  boats and their total capacity. At that
time, it was the famous Fisheries Minister, Romeo
LeBlanc, who promoted enterprise allocations—
something like the individual transferable quota (ITQ)
system. (Individual Transferable Quota is an individual fishing quota
that can be transferred – Ed) Actually, this was a system
worked out by the enterprises themselves. Even before
that, the herring seiners in southwest Nova Scotia had
formed a co-operative, around 1976, and they
managed the quota as a kind of enterprise allocation.
John Kearney has documented this in his study on the
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herring-seiners in the Bay of Fundy during that period.
(The Transformation of  the Bay of  Fundy Herring Fisheries
1976-1978: An Experiment in Fishermen-Government
Co-Management, John F. Kearney in Atlantic Fisheries and
Coastal Communities: Fisheries Decision-Making Case
Studies, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1987 — Ed)
By 1983, we were seriously implicated in a full-blown
quota management system, if you like. This was in
the groundfish sector, of which cod comprised about
70 per cent of the catch. It is clear that the offshore
trawlers were the dominant players, and the quota
system was really a corporate model, with the
government as the regulating agency.
The large offshore fleet reached an agreement that they
would ‘manage’ the resources under the Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) regime. (TAC is the total catch
permitted to be caught from a stock in a given period, typically one year
– Ed) The companies had no scientists and so they got
the government to build up a large scientific enterprise
that would do the stock assessments and set the TACs.
Inshore fishermen were not impressed with quotas,
especially in the seasonal fixed-gear fisheries.
The fishermen in southwest Nova Scotia, who had
their own association of  groundfish fishermen at that
time, were dead against quotas. I remember them
aggressively saying at meetings that they did not agree
with the quota system at all. They had a long tradition
of fishing all over the continental shelf and saw the
quota approach as foolish. They also fished alongside
their American counterparts on Georges Banks and
the Americans would have nothing to do with quotas.
It was the companies that bought into the quota
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system, embraced it and legitimized it. Of all
countries, I think it was Canada and its government
that bought into the quota system most seriously,
committing itself to an extremely elaborate system. I
recall government officials priding themselves about
their management system, claiming that it led to
stability and surplus value, when even the United States
had no such system in place.
I remember sitting in at a meeting in 1987 as part of
the inshore-offshore review process. The Government
of  Canada was doing the review, which we, of  course,
thought was a sham because it had plans all worked
out, regarding the split in quotas. Fifty per cent of  the
groundfish resources belonged to the offshore fleet and
the rest of  the thousands of  fishermen had the
remaining 50 per cent.
We had always challenged this unequal division
because it left the offshore sector with ample quotas
for their capacity but it meant that the whole capacity
problem was passed on to the inshore. This was a bit
like turning reality on its head, since one of the reasons
organizations even got going was to fight against the
growing capacity of the offshore, which was taking
everybody’s fish. We couldn’t believe that the
government was saying there was no overcapacity
problem in the offshore, only in the inshore. I
remember blasting forward at one of the meetings:
“What you are doing here is passing the capacity
problem on to the inshore. By dichotomizing the
capacity problem, you are protecting the large
industrial fleet. It is like a system of  apartheid. You
corner the best property for the few companies and
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then you blame the rest for being the capacity
problem.”
They all looked back blankly at me, said nothing and
just went on. For the MFU, the real dynamic in the
1980s was the growing emergence of the midshore
specialist fleet. This was created as an alliance
between bigger fishermen, the companies and the
provincial governments, building larger and more
specialized craft worth Can$1-2 million, almost as big
a capacity as the offshore trawlers. But the rules of
the inshore only applied to them. Much of the rhetoric
of  the fishermen was still targeted at the offshore. In
a sense, the midshore fleet escaped being targeted for
attack because the government still designated it as
inshore.  By 1987-88, at least 10 per cent of the inshore
fleet were large-capacity midshore vessels, which had
70 per cent of the quota. Area by area, this sector
progressively went into the ITQ system. Now, not only
did the offshore companies have 50 per cent of the
property but the midshore fleet was also claiming 70
per cent of  the inshore as property.
Up until that point, the offshore fleet felt a threat from
the midshore fleet because it had the capacity to catch
all the cod in Atlantic Canada. The Canadian
government lost control of the capacity issue and, at
the same time, the associations lost their initial image
of  the fishermen being a deprived group, especially
the groundfish midshore fishers and the crabbers. A
lot of  the rightwing populist ideology that you see in
the fishery came from these new, elite, midshore types.
They have done a lot of  damage to the MFU, in Nova
Scotia, particularly. The WFF should beware of  the
differentiation within what is still officially called the
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inshore in places like Canada, but which actually
contains these elite groups of  specialist enterprises.
Nalini: Will this be the group that will gain entry into, and
control, the WFF? I can just see them making use of
demands like “protect the rights of the coastal
community” and “ownership of resources for
traditional fisher people”.
Mike: I think that will be an inherent danger. The capital-to-
labour ratio is ten times less in the inshore than in the
midshore and, therefore, what you have invested in
your fishing becomes a dominant factor in your
thinking.
Nalini: This is similar in Senegal or India. Once the old social
controls break down in the community, you begin to
think individually. So these two issues are really
linked—the property question grows out of the
capacity issue.
Aliou: I think there are also certain market factors that have
to do with the property issue. In Senegal, the fish plants
had their own fishing fleet in the past, but still
depended on artisanal fishers because of market
factors. Certain markets like Japan and, more so, Italy
do not accept fish that is not caught within 48 hours.
Since industrial technology cannot guarantee fresh
fish, the traders had to engage the artisanal boats and
take the catch from them.
Mike: In Canada, normally, fish plants cannot own licences
in the inshore fishery. This sector is owner-operated,
which keeps the companies away. If  the companies
do succeed in destroying this policy, within a few years,
they will change the system completely, leading
towards greater centralization in all the important
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inshore lobster fisheries and using the quota system
as a way to eliminate the base of the inshore fishery
as we know it now.
Aliou. This makes me reflect on the new Maritime Fisheries
Code in Senegal. The government wants to license the
fishermen.
Nalini: Could licensing be a way of  recognizing the fishermen
as workers?
Aliou: No, it is the first step in declaring property rights. It is
a means to control access.
Nalini: What is the alternative in situations like ours?
Aliou: Let me explain the reaction of the CNPS to the
Maritime Fisheries Code. Fishermen initially did not
refuse the suggestion regarding the need for licences.
Their argument was that if the government gives them
licences to fish, it has to guarantee the existence of
the resource because the licence is to fish. But the
fishermen saw through the game in this and the role
of  the new investors in the fishery. There are many
non-fishermen, even foreigners and some non-resident
Senegalese, who see the fishery as an interesting area
for investments. It is this group that is introducing new
equipment, the 45-hp outboard motor, and the global
positioning system (GPS). It is this category of people
who will accept the licence regime and then it will be
imposed on the pirogues too.
The attempt to privatize resources has not yet
succeeded because we are wary of it and take
inspiration from community-based resource
management, which is a collective system of
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management and control. In Kayar, the fishermen
managed to control the price of what was brought into
the market as a high-value species. They did not go in
for short-term large catches, even when the CFA franc
was devalued and their inputs were costing much
more. (CFA is the Communaute Financiere Africaine or the African
Financial Community. The CFA franc, the currency of  14 African
nations, was linked to the euro in a fixed exchange rate of 1 euro to
655.957 CFA francs on 1 January 1999 – Ed)
Mike: So, what you are implying is that there was a problem
with the market, which led them to this regulation and
not a resource question.
Aliou: The open-access system poses a problem. Without
controls, the more able fishermen want to grow and
progress. They invest in bigger craft and gear and, in
the process, the organization of work on the craft
changes too. The percentage of  earnings that goes to
the owner gets larger and that to the workers gets
smaller. Therefore, the question arises:  how does the
community control this greed and, at the same time,
help the fishermen to retain their common-access
rights? Limiting what is landed is the only way.
Mike: The main problem with open access is the resource. Is
it in their minds to regulate their fishery at all? What
would motivate fishermen to limit their open access?
Do they feel there is a limit to the resource? In Kayar,
they were motivated more to control the price than
the resource.
Aliou: Yes, but although it was an economic motive in the
beginning, I think that motive got ‘biologised’ later.
But I do not want to be simplistic or to oversimplify
it. Why did this regime succeed in Kayar and not in
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Yoff, where it was simultaneously adopted? One reason
may be the tradition of social control in Kayar, which
is related to the second factor that most of the
fishermen are also landowners and have a concept of
private ownership. This can inf luence their
understanding of  the fishery, contributing to an
understanding of  territory. Then, the people of  Kayar
are more a settled community and do not have the
feeling of  being migrant, as the Yoff  people do. Well,
even if it is merely an economically motivated decision,
we have to learn from it because, as a community,
they succeeded where the government could not.
Mike: The more I hear you talk about land and Kayar, it
makes me think differently on the matter. The fishing
grounds in Kayar are much more contained and
identifiable, isn’t that right? Therefore, the concept
of control becomes more easily acceptable and hence
they succeed where the Yoff  people do not in a more
open fishery.
Aliou: Something becomes a resource only when it is
exploited. It is exploited only when there is a need, a
market. This makes me look at species like octopus
and squid. Let me tell you the story of  octopus. It’s a
crazy story. This year there was so much octopus all
over our coasts that octopus was selling for 50 CFA
francs a kg. Originally, it was a specialized fishery in
Joal. So, from a situation of  being rare, octopus became
abundant. The fishermen of  Joal had their own way
of maintaining the octopus prices, but this year
everything went haywire.
Mike: So what does CNPS do as an organization? How does
it respond to this situation so that its members can get
the best benefit from these catches? We in Canada
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used to do ‘over-the-side’ sales, where we would
contract a freezer trawler to come in and freeze the
catch for us, especially of herring and mackerel, when
there was not enough of  a market for the surplus.
Aliou: No, CNPS did not do anything and I do not know
which is a better stand, because marketing is such a
risky job for an association. Moreover, the fishermen
do not consider octopus as a stable stock. It can come
and go. Fishermen saw it as a means of  making some
good money, which they would then invest in their
regular gear.
Mike: I understand what you are saying. This is like our squid
catches in 1979. There was so much abundance and
there were different ways of taking advantage of it.
Squid, to this day, remains part of  the lore in the MFU.
Only the Japanese freezer trawlers could handle it. So
the Minister of Fisheries at that time thought, like your
fishermen, that the squid abundance was only a passing
phenomenon, and so he allowed the fishermen to catch
and sell the squid to the Japanese on the sea. There are
always situations of  glut landings in fisheries. In the
herring fishery, we were already encouraging over-the-
side sales. This was when the Russian fleet was deployed
in our waters. Our inshore boats caught herring and the
Russians just bought it off us, especially from 1978 to
1987. The Newfoundland people did this even with cod.
Aliou: That was possible under certain conditions and that
too out at sea. I think the area of the market is specific.
The market is an institution with its own rules that
are well controlled by fishmongers and the fish plants,
which have a common agreement. Therefore, if ever
a fishermen’s organization wants to go in for
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organization of fish sales, it has to go through this
network and cannot sell directly.
Mike: Here you touch upon something very important. All
fishermen’s organizations dream of  selling their own
fish as a way of  increasing earnings of  the fishermen
and making some money for the organization too.
Market interventions can be done by the fishermen
themselves but not through organizations like the MFU
or the CNPS.
Nalini: The MFU and CNPS cannot do this as they consider
themselves organizations with some political positions.
The dynamics of an economic organization are
different. An economic organization can be controlled
by fishermen and can get them better bargains. This is
what is done through the co-operatives we organized
in Kerala and what the South Indian Federation of
Fishermen Societies (SIFFS) demonstrates today.
(SIFFS was formed in 1980 as a non-governmental apex organization
of village- and district-level fish marketing societies of small-scale
artisanal fishworkers of south India – Ed) But they are distinctly
different from the local union. And there too, the co-
operatives only control the right of first sale by
controlling the auctions; they do not go into the actual
marketing of  the catches.
Aliou: Well, this is what the fishermen at Joal did too. They
did not displace the small buyers, but they collected
all the products and negotiated with the traders to settle
on the price.
Mike: Well, I am still interested in how the CNPS might
address this issue of the large octopus landings and
whether there is a way that both the CNPS and the
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fishermen can gain by this short-lived show of  so much
octopus.
Aliou: The large landings of octopus have not really impressed
the fishermen because, I think, they see it more as a
symptom of a looming problem rather than a gift from
nature.
Mike: I can agree with you there because it reminds me of
the dogfish phenomenon in Canada, where the dogfish
seemed to appear when the other goundfish had
become depleted. But I want to get at the collective
consciousness of  the fishermen of  the CNPS. What
do they think they can or cannot do as an organization?
Our fishermen would have made life miserable for me
in the MFU if this had happened in Canada and we
did nothing about it. What are the expectations of the
fishermen of  the CNPS?
Aliou: I think it is a combination of  factors. First, the octopus
fishery was traditionally based in Joal, where the total
number of  fishermen is small. Second, the fishermen
are not impressed by the symbolic representation that
the phenomenon will not last. Two or three months
before the glut, CNPS was involved in an official
discussion on the subject. Officials were trying to work
out a regulation and decided to have a biological closure
for octopus but nothing has yet been finalized.
Mike: Well, maybe that explains it then, and it sure makes a
big difference how you look at the issue. When we
had our over-the-side sales, I had the support of the
government and most of  the fishing industry. The
government would allow foreign vessels limited access
to underutilized species in exchange for buying in
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some of these glut fisheries from inshore vessels that
tied up with the freezer trawlers to transit their catch.
Of course, all this has disappeared, especially after
the collapse of the Soviet bloc. In any case, you cannot
imagine such a programme without good collaboration
from the government.
I would like to come back to the context of what I
call a kind of  populism in the Maritimes. Its origins
are not completely clear, but in the fishery it seems to
originate in parts of the inshore and midshore sectors,
which held specialist licences and were made up of
privileged fishermen. Their interests are very narrow
but they managed to wrap themselves in ideologies
that attracted a mélange of  inshore fishermen who
are disaffected for a lot of reasons, some having to do
with these very same midshore interests.
Nalini: This happens, I think, when a small group with a
particular vested interest takes advantage of some
growing contradictions and uses a populist slogan to
appropriate the base. I think we have a similar situation
in Kerala at present. There is going to be a new
Fisheries Act that will recognize the rights of
ownership of fishing equipment only for bona fide
fishermen, sometimes interpreted as the fishing
community. In this context, the caste organizations
came together to create a platform to struggle for their
rights. The KSMTF or the Kerala Independent
Fishworkers Federation, which is a class-based
organization, joined this platform. It has been the only
legitimate body making this demand for a long time.
So now in the name of ‘caste’, all in the community
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will stake a claim to ownership and I feel they are using
the base of  the KSMTF, which, knowingly or not, has
fallen into a trap.
Aliou:  In Senegal, there is another factor that encourages
the new investors to emerge as a force within the
inshore fishery and that is the way the macro-policies
impact on us. For instance, the Fisheries Code now
talks about ‘economic operators’. This term is gradually
replacing others like ‘artisanal fishermen’. This change
is linked to the global context, where everything is
seen as an ‘economic interest’, regardless of who it
represents. This is the easiest way to privatize. This is
how all the freezing plants, etc. that came for the
development of the artisanal fishery fell into private
hands.
The new form of  civil society leads to the promotion
of private initiatives, profitable projects, and so on.
Today, ‘ownership’ is what makes you a fisherman and
not the fact that you go fishing. The government
prefers to relate to the new brand of entrants because
they function with a modern business logic, unlike the
artisanal fishermen and their informal base. The guy
from Fenagie Peche who went to France to make an
attempt to join the WFF is also one such person who
owns a pirogue. (Fenagie Pêche or the Fédération Nationale des
Groupements d’Intérêt Economique de Pêche  is Senegal’s fisheries
federation – Ed)
Mike: You see a similar phenomenon in the Canadian context,
even though the person who holds the licence has to
fish. But there are lots of  exceptions. As the ITQs
developed in the midshore, the fishermen sold their
quotas to small enterprises, which get other fishermen
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to fish. So what actually developed was a fishing
enterprise.
We see this particularly in the groundfish sector in
southwest Nova Scotia. In that large fishing area, half
the inshore groundfish fishery is under the ITQ system
and the other more numerous small-boat fishermen
are working within a kind of community quota
management system. This is a conscious experiment
as an alternative to ITQs, but many say it is simply
setting up the sector for the full-blown ITQ system.
This southwest area is real fish country and most of it
had remained in the hands of  fishermen, with lots of
small buyers and processors. But, gradually, quotas are
being consolidated by a few buyers.
Nalini: Are you saying that the monopolization or centralism
that was feared would take place in the fishery 20 years
ago is actually taking place now?
Mike: No, I don’t think you can say that because the larger
base is in the lobster fishery, and these tendencies are
not seen there yet. Certainly, in the groundfish sector,
there is enterprise taking over and even if it is not in
the nature of  monopoly, it is certainly corporate. I can
tell you of  one guy, for instance, who is supposed to
be a business agent for the specialist vessels. He only
has to talk to two or three plant owners who have a
number of  ITQs, and he speaks for the entire fishery.
It is this guy who is calling the shots in management
discussions these days in the Nova Scotia area.
You know, after the moratorium on cod was put into
effect throughout the Atlantic region, most of the
midshore fleet that had been such an emergent force
in the 1980s went bankrupt and, under normal
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business norms, would have disappeared. But because
they continued to hold their quotas as quasi-property
rights, they still had a claim on the future fishery. It
has been amazing how they have been kept in business
by provincial governments who covered their
mortgages to the federal government, who gave them
various forms of  grants and support, and transferred
to them lucrative allocations from other fisheries like
the snow crab fishery and shrimp. These allocations
directly affected what might have been available to
the inshore fishermen.
Nalini: Does that mean they had great political clout too?
Mike: Their political clout is mainly through the provincial
governments, who have been sponsoring them since
the beginning. And, you know, if  you talk about the
present reality in the Maritime provinces, it is the
inshore fleet that is by far the most productive,
employing thousands of  fishermen and plant workers.
In some ways, this is driving the governments and
planners crazy because, in their vision, the midshore
was supposed to be the future of the fishery and the
inshore was scheduled for elimination.
The quota systems have, in reality, proved to be a
complete bust. So, even though the inshore fishery in
the Maritimes has turned out to be the largest and most
productive in the country, we still find the general
direction of government policy being shaped by the
various corporatist midshore sectors, even the
bankrupt ones. It is for this reason that I keep on
insisting that the inshore fishery has to be valorized.
What I see, though, is that there are growing factors
and forces that, right now, tend to rip it apart.
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Aliou: I think this is the most serious problem, that the
inshore people are not sufficiently conscious of their
actual power. In Senegal, the fish plants are actually
doing their best to reach out to the artisanal fishers
and make alliances with the CNPS. They understand
how fragile a proposition it is to bank on the industrial
sector. Even the government can one day just
withdraw their licences, and the industrial fishers will
be finished. But the inshore defies control. So the
CNPS must take this fact into serious consideration
and build further on it.
What strikes me is that in Senegal, the CNPS has not
only to contend with the State, which, realizing its
inability to control the organization, is now using the
parallel power of  religion to divide the CNPS. This is
a more fearful situation because, as you know, our
fishermen may defy anybody, but when it comes to
religious leaders, they will bow their heads.
Mike: Well, that is the most important question facing all of
us—the question of control. The latest decision in
the Supreme Court of Canada recognizing the rights
of  the native people has triggered a consciousness in
the MFU and all inshore fishermen. It is a very brief
moment in history, but all realize the importance of
an organization like the MFU. It is amazing the way
people called from all over and offered financial
support for the legal battle. All kinds of people—
former members who had deserted the MFU, some
who had taken stands against us, enemies if you like—
called to say this is the time they have to help their
Acadian brothers, and so on. Even the Fish Packers
Association called and offered to help. So this is a
moment in time but it will make history depending on
65 CONVERSATIONS
the next step, that is, how the government will use it
to address, and accommodate in a rational way, the
new rights given by the Supreme Court order, which
recognizes the old native treaty rights to fish.
I have a suspicion that all those who want to break up
the inshore fishery will use this occasion to intervene
with suggestions on how the natives should be
accommodated. Here we have a situation of a fishery
that was scheduled to be scrapped by several attempts,
but is surviving and is the only sector that is most
productive. But it has no real consciousness, as we
were saying, of being a powerful sector, as rightwing
populism and various reactionary forces have
deformed the normal process of  negotiation that
would actually have taken place between the regulatory
authority and the fishermen, now represented by the
MFU.
You have this whole other group of  fishermen who
are taken by hysteria, using all their energies on non-
issues or actions that are symbolic, and which never
advance the real interests of  the sector. They tend to
be strengthened by people in the sector who are the
most privileged. They are a kind of a mirror of a
political trend in our country, represented by the
Reform Party, whose tenets are anti-big government,
pro-total privatization, and don’t recognize the
founding people of this country or any differentiation
by group. This populist phenomenon, with all these
rightwing trappings, is what translates into  ‘fishermen’s
rights’.
When you talk about ‘fishermen’s rights’ in the Indian
context, Nalini, it is a progressive slogan but for us
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today, it is a cover for rightwing ideology. That’s the
difference in an organization like the MFU. We believe
there are very few creative ways of accommodating
the newly established rights of the Mi’kmaq native
peoples, without weakening the base of the inshore
fishery.
But the question remains as to whether the inshore
fleet will develop conscious solidarity to be able to
recover its rightful power vis-à-vis forces that want to
integrate this fleet into a corporate system of property
rights.
Aliou: I feel the powerlessness, or lack of consciousness in
the fishers’ actual power, has to do with the fact that
they do not have access to correct data about their
role in the economy. If  they had facts about their
contribution to foreign exchange earnings, about the
number of people the sector feeds, the number of
people it employs and absorbs from other dying
sectors, they will valorize their fishery more.
Mike: Is it possible to organize the broad base of inshore
fishermen in terms of  the real recovery of  power?
Aliou, you are asking how come the CNPS is not able
to recover the social power that fishermen are
generating in Senegal. This power is generated by the
work activity of  fishing, but in the fishery, maybe more
than in most sectors, the power that is generated by
the fishermen is captured by virtually everyone other
than the fishermen themselves—these could be the
governments, the merchants, the staff, the supporters,
etc.
That is my simplistic analytical framework. There are
other ways in which power is used up or dissipated.
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I am referring here to the kind of populism I was talking
about, because I think that both the energy and power
of  the fishermen are used up in actions that are infantile
and regressive.
Nalini: Is it being used up or is somebody using it or exploiting
it?
Mike: We always like to think about external factors. We
should look squarely at the internal forces—the
fishermen themselves, the associations they create, the
actions they take, etc.
Aliou: It is so important to talk here about some social actors
who are part of the process itself and use this power
for their individual interests. This leads us to the
question of  organization, how organizations structure
themselves and how they function within, how the
leaders in the movement are generated and how they
can be bought up by others in an effort to strengthen
their positions.
But I would first like to come back to the reference
that you made, Mike, regarding those people who
appropriate the power that is generated. In Senegal, I
get frustrated to see that decades of  our hard work
can be appropriated in one stroke, as, for instance,
when the Fisheries Minister refers to the fact that he
belongs to the same ethnic group as the fishermen and
then  goes on to neutralize everything that the
movement has gained.
Mike: It is an enormously frustrating problem for
organizations.
Aliou: Further, earlier on, the fishermen created great myths
for themselves. They believed that if  they got a minister
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from their own community, he would be sympathetic
to their cause, and so they kept striving to have a
minister from the community. But the actual danger
arose when there was a minister from the community,
who is more able to destroy the CNPS and negate what
it stands for.
Nalini: We have experienced this kind of  frustration right
from the start in Kerala because the KSMTF has been
independent. All the struggles in fisheries have been
fought or led by the KSMTF, which makes very specific
demands on the government. Finally, when the
government decides to negotiate, all the political party
unions are also present and whether or not they know
anything about the issue, they give their opinions and
have a say in the final decision. Initially, we thought
that this would force the other unions to take up these
issues too, but then we realized gradually that their
positions depend on their status in the government—
being in the opposition or not—and they were only
using the occasion to get as much political leverage as
possible.
Mike: So how do you advance this power that makes a
difference to their lives?
Aliou: In our context, where the ‘politique du clientelism’
(the politics of cronyism – Ed) plays a big role, the National
Congress is a way to prevent the appropriation of our
powers by others. The fact is the minister sees
hundreds of people flocking to the Congress and so
many taking the mike to speak in the name of the
CNPS and in this way owning the organization. That
makes a tremendous impact. Moreover, if you look at
it from the point of  view of  the informal sector—a
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sector that is considered dispersed and, therefore, of
no consequence—the organizational force that the
Congress displays dispels all earlier misconceptions
about this sector.
Nalini: In India, mere numbers at congresses are not enough
to impress anybody. All political parties pull huge
crowds. The real impact is made when you can draw
large numbers into sustained struggles and this reveals
the mobilization ability of the organization, which
gives weight to the cause.
Mike: Yes, so tell us a little more about the NFF, and the
sector in the inshore constituency that it represents
and which is the leading force in the fishing industry
today.
Nalini: The thrust of  the NFF is certainly the artisanal fishery.
When it was created two decades ago, there was
enough data to prove the major contribution that the
sector made to the economy, towards export earnings
and, in our context, in terms of  creating employment
and food security. The NFF has always maintained
that this is the only sector that is viable and can exploit
the resource in a sustainable manner.
But the fisheries scenario has changed dramatically
subsequently. The highly skilled artisanal sector has
got motorized, massive ‘development’ in gear has taken
place, and the fishermen have increasingly entered the
midshore. While catch per unit effort has dropped
substantially, the value of  fish has gone up. This has
helped the successful fishermen break even. In this
development, the motorized sector has had a clear
advantage over the non-motorized sector.
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While this was initially the base of the union, as it
entered into the struggle against the deep-sea vessels,
the hub of the NFF moved from the south to the
northern parts of the west and east coasts of India.
There, the artisanal fishery was of a different nature,
with much larger craft using gill-nets, bag-nets and the
like. The individual fishing operations were much larger
than in the south. When this section got mechanized,
they shifted to the trawl gear, and so, though they are
from the traditional fishing community and are actual
fishermen themselves, they form the small trawl sector
that the NFF was virtually against in the earlier stages.
Now, they have become allies in the struggle against
the bigger enemy in the deep sea.
My understanding is that although the NFF has
consistently fought for aquarian reform based on the
strengths of  the inshore fishery, within the base itself,
it has failed to check the growing disruptive
technologies in the artisanal fishery. The problem is
so overwhelming because of the numbers involved
and the fact that government priorities are so skewed.
Traditional social control mechanisms have also
broken down as the State grew to be the regulator of
the fishery.
On the other hand, the NFF through the Kanyakumari
March to “Protect Waters, Protect Life” grew
increasingly into a broadbased social movement.
(In 1989 the NFF organized the Kanyakumari March along the
entire coastline of  India on the theme ‘Protect Waters, Protect Life’, to
create greater awareness of  environmental problems and to forge greater
unity among the fishworkers – Ed)
71 CONVERSATIONS
The march started simultaneously from West Bengal
on the east coast and from Gujarat in the west and
proceeded towards Kanyakumari, the southernmost
part of the Indian peninsula. I feel that, over time, the
NFF has made more allies with social movements that
have lost their space in the area of primary production
and are, therefore, struggling for the broader and basic
issue of ‘right to life and livelihood’. This, I think, has
dissipated the energies that should have gone into the
creation of a solid conscious base among inshore
fishermen, and, although it may still be able to mobilize
them on specific issues, there is no real intensive debate
in the organization on hardcore fishing issues.
Mike: My contention here is that movements or people in
movements sometimes escape into politics. An ‘escape’
into politics, as distinct from political-level
functioning, is an escape or disassociation with a
specific base. I would say that, under severe conditions
of  poverty, you would be more vulnerable to such
phenomena.
Nalini: At this point, I must add that there are parallel
organizations like SIFFS that have a very specific base
and whose concerns have been to provide support to
the artisanal fishery. But, again, these would not play
the role of  a fishermen’s organization that fights for
the rights of  the artisanal fishery. So I do recognize
the dilemma of  two organizations that run parallel to,
and do not necessarily complement, each other. The
union, on the one hand, gains political power because
it has legitimate demands and is able to mobilize
people but has no local base in the actual fishery. On
the other hand, an organization like SIFFS that has a
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solid base among active fishermen, functions like an
association of its members, assisting them with credit
and technology but without entering the larger political
debate. I do not make this critique as an outsider as I
have been closely associated with both these
organizations.
Aliou: I would like to know here whether it is the organization
or a small group of leaders who give the direction to
the movement. Who are the people who symbolize
the movement? I tend to think it is people who are
not fishermen who symbolize the movement in the
case of  the NFF. Why I say this is because I want to
look at the role of leaders in a movement. Is it possible
that these leaders can have expectations that are not
the concerns of the fishworkers?
Nalini: Your question is very pertinent because there are a
number of non-fishing people giving leadership to
these organizations. In this context, I should tell you
about another development in the union. I am talking
now about the union in Kerala, where there have been
leaders and supporters who do not hail from the fishing
community. As I told you earlier, when the NFF got
into the struggle against the deep-sea vessels, this
struggle was fought in alliance with the small-trawler
sector. A section that we were always fighting now
became allies in the struggle and some of  the
boatowners had a sympathetic position towards the
artisanal fishers.
But look at what happened on World Fisheries Day
1998, the first time it was celebrated in India. The
Kerala union called it World Fishworker Day and had
a week’s celebrations. For these celebrations, they
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formed an organizing committee on which there was
also a representative of the boatowners’ association.
On the day of the convention, this boatowner made a
speech. He emphasized that they too were fishermen,
coming from the same community. In a way, he was
staking their claim over the pending Fisheries Bill that
the government was soon to discuss on declaring only
fishermen as owners of  fishing craft and gear.
What was happening was that the boatowners were
taking their chance to neutralize the actual differences
among the fishers. The union got carried away by the
fact that it could create a joint forum and get the
boatowners to collaborate on its demands. The local
union leaders did not realize that they were falling into
what appeared to some of  us to be a trap. A few months
later, the union joined an alliance called ‘Joint
Committee for the Demands of the Fishworkers
Community’. In Malayalam, the local language in
Kerala, this name confuses the connotations of both
caste and class, and is a melange. That was actually a
committee on which all the caste organizations came
together to work for a series of demands, both social
and economic. They were able to get the KSMTF, which
is the largest organization working on the actual
fisheries demands of the fishworkers, to go along with
them.
Interestingly, these decisions were made by leaders
from the fishing community. When some of  us did
raise questions, I realized that there was no possibility
for debate. Gradually, the union leaders began to
isolate those of us supporters who had been with the
movement from its inception, on the pretext that we
are not from the fishing community.
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Mike: What gives these communal groups their energy? What
is their material base?
Nalini: Those who use the community or caste card do not
really have any material base in the fishery. They are
the educated ones who have other political interests.
You must understand this in the context of  identity
politics as it develops in our country. In fact, these
people talk about the fact that the act of fishing has
kept this community out of the mainstream of the
nation. Now that the fishery gets less and less lucrative,
why should the union struggle to keep the fishermen
in the fishery? Getting into the mainstream will give
other economic opportunities to the community and
why are those people from outside the community
building up a case to ‘valorize’ this occupation? Is it
to keep the fisherfolk in perpetual subjugation? So,
with such questions, they are able to whip up some
emotion that creates a solidarity within the caste, and,
in the future, this position may take them away from
the real issue.
Mike: What you are saying is similar to what we are facing
today. I only think that we may be able to weather the
storm because we have such firm roots with our
members in an experienced organization.
Aliou: This makes me think about some other aspects too. It
may not always be the leaders of the movement who
‘escape into politics’, but they may be used by other
people who have some frustrated ambitions and hide
them under masks that give them respectability.
Mike: Maybe the NFF should make more attempts to move
back from being a social movement with lots of
ideological positions and get back to being a
fishworkers’ organization.
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I think the need of the day is the existence of real
fishers associations working on hardcore fisheries
issues as they arise. That is why I am a bit sceptical
about the way the World Forum seems to see itself. It
should not be an ideological organization, a structured
organization, as such. For a few more years, it should
have been a kind of  associational platform working
out hardcore issues and then deciding what specific
issues should be on an international agenda.
Nalini: Yes, I too am of  the opinion that the broader slogans
may just carry them away. They do not seem to have
started on solid ground. At the start, they should have
been a small group of  organizations that could trust
and rely on one another, and having the time to work
out their specific fisheries issues. It should have been
opened up gradually, once a core group of  associations
that trusted and felt comfortable with one another had
already been built up. Once there was a good grasp of
the international scenario, the allies should have taken
the lead in creating the World Forum. In this way, there
would have been a hard core that had clear objectives
and could call the shots.
Well, let’s get back to the supporter issue. Mike, you
were saying that I should further explore the role of
being a supporter…
Mike: Well, that is because I wonder how the ICSF supporters
in India look at what is happening in the NFF and
your role in it, now that this question of ‘outsiders’ is
being raised by your local union.
Nalini: We haven’t addressed the question seriously as a group.
We do exchange some ideas at times, but, as a group,
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we have not felt the need to take a serious stand and
communicate it to the organizations.
Mike: There is no question that the NFF can mobilize large
numbers of people and hence demonstrate that they
represent the artisanal fishworkers. On the other hand,
it appears that there are no actual members who get
together to discuss hardcore fishing issues and who
are the base of the movement. How do they build up
a sense of belonging to the union and a sense of having
a stake in it? For how long can the NFF repeat such
demonstrations of  mass support? For the majority of
the fishermen, the struggle may be over as the initial
demands are met.
Aliou: Sometimes, I wonder whether it was better to just
leave the informal sector as it was, unorganized, when
it was difficult for the vested interests to appropriate
it. Institutionalizing a movement exposes it to such
dangers.
Mike: This goes back to the theme of making an
intervention: an intervention is an initiative that
apparently comes from the outside of a group or class
of people. I would like to read a book on ‘spontaneous’
organizations of  fishermen. To what extent were they
really autonomous? Fishermen easily organize at the
local level on particular issues, so what you are saying,
Aliou, is, if  they do organize anyway, why should we
get involved in giving an organizational impetus? Well,
Nalini, you often mention writers like Susan George,
who made major contributions in breaking down myths
about aid and development. (Susan George, Associate Director
of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam, and Vice-President of
the Association for Taxation of  Financial Transaction to Aid Citizens,
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is the author of 10 books, including How the Other Half Dies
and The Debt Boomerang — Ed) These contributions
are ways of  supporting change and organization, too.
Let me go back to Canada for a minute. When the
group we formed with Belkin was doing its work, it
was with people in community development, social
action and international development, and NGOs. The
people with whom we would make our interventions
were supporters. What challenged us at that time was
realizing how unformulated and unreflective the
relation between the supporter and ‘supported’ was,
and how much psychological garbage was involved in
this relation—psychological baggage that was carried
into the relationship.
Even at the international level, we were asking
questions about the interface of  the Western world
supporters in Third World issues. What struck me was
the potential in these kinds of relations for false
consciousness. Supporters feel they are doing
something great, possibly building misleading
assessments of their real situation. I would like to read
some astute book on, for example, how the whole
supportive thing worked out in relation to the
Sandinistas (members of  the leftwing Nicaraguan political party,
the Sandinist National Liberation Front or FSLN. The group,
named after Augusto Cesar Sandino , a former insurgent leader, was
formed in 1962 to oppose the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle –
Ed)
Can I give you an example of how I learnt the hard
way? In 1968, I was bothered by the Biafra issue, but
as it was far away, I could not make the connection
that I could do something about it. (Biafra was a secessionist
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state of  West Africa that existed from 30 May 1967 to 15 January
1970 and comprised, roughly, the east-central, southeastern, and rivers
States of  the Federation of  Nigeria, dominated by the Igbo people.
Fighting between Nigeria and Biafra broke out in July 1967 and
Biafra surrendered on 15 January 1970. During its existence Biafra
was recognized by only five nations, although other countries gave moral
or material support — Ed) When I discussed it with my
professor, she suggested we organize a discussion on
it. I was surprised to realize that there were a fair
number of  people around Toronto who had worked
in Nigeria through CUSO and were also perturbed by
this problem. (CUSO or the Canadian University Service Overseas
came into being as an independent non-profit agency in 1961, in Montreal
– Ed) Subsequently, in1969, we decided to go to
Ottawa and occupy the office of the Minister of
External Affairs and we refused to budge till he
promised that Canada would help the struggling
people. We were dragged out of  the office and arrested.
This was my first political action.
Well, to make a long story short, what shocked me
was when the dream collapsed in Biafra and the leaders
of the movement escaped, leaving the poor Biafrans
high and dry and in an absolute state of famine. On
the other hand, heaps of aid were poured in and even
a month before the collapse, we were being told that
the Biafrans were winning the war. Maybe the Igbos
did believe they were winning because of the hype
built up by the supporters. This was my first lesson
about the great complexities in support relationships.
Aliou: In cases like this, I think it is the supporter who will
be frustrated and not the supported because there was
no demand for support. The supporters build up the
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demand. So it is important to see how the need or
demand is created.
Mike: This is why I say it is an ambiguous relationship. You
cannot be literal about it but it is an important question
for the supporters to think about. For instance, when
my MFU colleague came back from Montreal to work
with the MFU, I am sure his fishermen friends didn’t
actually ask him to do so, but were surely happy to
have him back.
Aliou: I don’t remember being ever asked by fishermen to
come and help them. The problem arises when, as
supporters, we think we are indispensable. We must
help ourselves to better manage our expectations. In
order to do this, we must look at the origins and see
how the relationship arose. I am in a situation of
wondering how fishworker organizations can be
sustained in a context of the political powers wanting
to appropriate them. On the other hand, it is sure that
we, as supporters, contribute to the thematic
development in the organization and in its strategies.
Mike: What you are suggesting is that there could be moments
when the fishermen say they do not want us or make
it clear that they don’t in other ways. It is an ambiguous
situation that is difficult to deal with as an individual.
So if  we are conscious of  doing interventionist kind
of  work, we have to react collectively.
We have a right to claim our work in an organization.
We are not wage labour. If  we have developed
reasonably productive activities in an organization,
why should we be the ones to leave? Maybe it is the
individuals who find our presence uncomfortable that
should be the ones to leave.
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This is a theme we should look at under ‘forms of
organization in the fishing sector’, because we are
constantly faced with, for instance, some fishermen
saying, “We don’t need any staff. We can do the job
ourselves.” That attitude springs from what I call an
associational model; it is localized. It cannot grow
broader without supporters and staff. It is normal that
the fishworkers need to engage intermediaries if  they
want to intervene at broader levels than their
immediate local ones.
I think when fishermen get together as ‘fishermen’s
rights’ groups or the kind of ‘caste’ group that you
talk about, Nalini, we can predict that they do not
want any non-fisherman around. In a way, it is
reclaiming the space they feel they have lost in the
organization as the issues get wider and they feel the
staff or the supporters are taking over, and getting all
the exposure. This grows into a kind of
‘fundamentalism’, as I call it in the metaphorical sense.
This feeling can lead to fishermen even saying that
they can run their own fishery and that the government
should quit. When this attitude spreads because it is
whipped up by some people, it is very dangerous and
can just wipe out an organization in one stroke.
I have experiences of that kind in Nova Scotia, when
we were subjected to the populist wave. One of our
former presidents got drawn into this phenomenon
partly through his woman companion who was doing
some part-time work for us in Nova Scotia, mainly
churning up the fishermen to actions of  all sorts. She
was the activist type, telling them they should fight
for all kinds of issues, but without any analysis or idea
of how such things could be done.
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While her actions led to splits in the union, the
president wanted to make big changes in the MFU.
He started focusing on the constitution and she
functioned like his lawyer. She knew nothing about
the organization, whereas he had been one of the
founding members and knew all about it and had been
part of  the initial creation process. He came to the
1992 convention, upset its entire plan and, in his
position as president, asked to focus on the
constitution. He came up with some marginal proposals
for change. One was proposing that the Executive
Secretary should not have the power to hire and fire
the staff. He wanted his woman to become a full-timer.
When he did not get his proposal passed, as the
majority of  the fishermen were not impressed by what
he did, he said he was pulling out as president and
within weeks after that, he left the union and was a
major factor in breaking up the local. Going back to
the letter of the constitution, making use of some of
its marginal clauses to achieve another objective, is a
characteristic of what I call ‘fundamentalism’.
Nalini: Before we go on much further, we have to talk about
women’s participation in our organizations.
Aliou: Hey, Mike, have you any women in Canada or not?
Nalini: It actually seems as if there were none, eh, Aliou!!
Well, Mike, when I read the history about the MFU in
that book written by Sue Calhoun (A Word to Say: The
Story of  the Maritime Fishermen’s Union by Sue Calhoun was
reviewed in SAMUDRA Report No. 10 & 11, December 1994
– Ed), do you recall I asked you where the women in
fisheries were?  You said there were lots of  women
involved in the initial stages of  the formation of  the
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MFU, but when it got structured, women were just
left out.
Aliou: Yes, I too have wondered. Because when I was there
last year for the celebration of  World Fisheries Day, I
was really impressed by the participation of women
and particularly by the leadership of women like Lucie.
(A mother of five, Lucie Breau has been fishing for close to a decade in
New Brunswick. She is a member of the Comité des femmes côtières
du Nouveau-Brunswick – Ed)
Mike: I will have to go a bit into the past to think more deeply
about this myself. When I started with the MFU in
1981, I had had some exposure in the national farmer’s
union, which had membership by family and where
the women were involved and around all the time.
They were present in everything. When I got to the
MFU, the absence of  women was a striking contrast.
I recall that they talked about women in demonstrations
in the earlier days but by 1981, the MFU was a totally
male-centred type of organization. There were many
supporters who spoke about including women, but
nothing materialized. There were traditions in the farm
sector that we didn’t have. For instance, women
travelled around for meetings with men more freely in
the farm sector than women did in the fishing sector.
If  I may say so, it was kind of  taboo, even.
I have always said, moreover, that the MFU was not
really a movement in the sense of the fishing
communities being mobilized for some national
objectives. Earlier on, it set itself  up like a trade
organization and as 95 per cent of the people involved
in the trade were men, it seemed logical that the MFU
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would be an organization of  men only. The division
of  labour was far clearer in the fishery. Women were
in the fish plants and they had no immediate relations
with the fishermen; you cannot discount that.
But let’s look at one recent period in our history,
starting around 1993-94, when the Government of
Canada began implementing changes in the
unemployment insurance (UI) for seasonal workers.
There were spontaneous revolts, mainly in the province
of  New Brunswick because these changes would have
immediate effect on the number of weeks of seasonal
work. Who took up the battle? Not the MFU, although
they had always joined any battle that would touch
UI. These new reforms weren’t going to touch the
fishermen. So who took up the cause of  the women
who were going to lose their food stamps? It was the
Canadian Labour Congress and some industrial trade
unions. There were former distant supporters who were
disappointed with the position of  the MFU.
What seems to have taken place at the time is the
emergence of  some women’s organization to which
the MFU made small contributions, but the action was
outside the MFU, although it related to fisheries. It
showed again how different the MFU was in practice
from its idealistic origins. We take pains to have women
delegations come to our annual conventions but,
otherwise, there is little done.
Interestingly, where women have come out again to
get involved in the preoccupation of the MFU is
around the native rights issue. On the other hand, they
are also coming out in Southwest Nova Scotia, where
the populist types are running the show.
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Nalini: When the UI issues hit the women, did the fishermen
in the MFU not discuss it seriously? Many of their
wives must have been affected and they must have
had former experience of  working on such an issue…
Mike: UI was a special programme established in the 1970s.
It has always been attacked by the corporate lobby
and it was always an issue for the MFU to defend. So,
when it was clear that they were going to make reforms
in the UI, the fishermen’s organizations joined issue
from the start and we were part of a study of the fishery
where UI reforms were being addressed. We made
recommendations based on it and built up a strategy
for negotiation. For the seasonal workers, it was a
spontaneous upheaval. Our attitude was a bit different.
We wondered how to stick our heads into it when it
was not an issue for our members anyway and when
we had enough on our hands.
This reveals that the MFU isn’t able to pick up on
such social issues. It is only able to respond to things
that relate to its members. We had to concentrate on
issues that we could properly take on; joining larger
social movements can happen at certain times, under
specific conditions.
Nalini: Well, that is because the women aren’t members of
the organization. What prevents the MFU from giving
membership to the wives of  the fishermen?
Mike: We have never had an expressed demand from any
significant number of women. Why would you invite
more issues if they do not come to you?
Nalini: You mean there wouldn’t be any other reasons,
technical reasons, to refuse if they asked?
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Mike: Well, at the level of  the constitution, it would have to
be debated, but I would not assume that it would get
defeated. But you would have to wonder why women
would be interested anyway.
This raises another historical feature of  the MFU. When
we started, we were affiliated to the Canadian Labour
Congress for the first seven or eight years of our
existence. We never formally withdrew, but we just
let it go and, interestingly, it is related to this question
of women.
The seasonal workers movement was in no way
confined to the fisheries. The woman who was
emerging as a leader there was a seasonal worker in
the national park, which was based in an area where
our fishermen worked. There were all kinds of
seasonal jobs that women had and this brought the
movement about. Some of them who were in fish
plants were members of the industrial unions and their
cause was championed by the unions. As we were
functionally not a part of the trade union movement
anymore, we didn’t get involved.
I know this is not a satisfactory answer, but it is just
to tell you where we are. I would go one step further
and say that women are still silent contributors to the
fishing enterprise, in the homes, managing the books,
etc. But even this situation is changed in the case of
the younger generation, who tend to have their own
independent work.
As distinct from Newfoundland, most of our fishing
areas are not far from places where women can find
other non-fishery related work. So even in the nucleus
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of  the family, the woman is no longer a ‘traditional
wife’, as she works herself and, in many instances,
doesn’t even know what is happening in the fisheries.
Aliou: I realize, listening to you, that, compared to Senegal
and India, women’s direct involvement in fisheries,
processing, marketing and credit, makes a big
difference. The other fact is that women were already
organized in the fish plants and when the MFU started,
the need was to organize the fishermen in the inshore.
But what I want to come back to is what you said
about the silent contributors. For those who have a
consciousness on gender discrimination, they are able
to capture how women contribute, even as they remain
‘silent contributors’. In France, for instance, I think
women have a greater stake in remaining in the
informal sector because of  the taxation system.
In the Senegalese case, if you analyze the reason why
women are involved in the organization, it is because
they are more exposed to a number of  issues. So they
make a great contribution through their participation.
But I would like to go deeper into this issue of ‘silent
contribution’. Isn’t it a more subtle way of contributing
to the total fishing earnings rather than if one were to
make money from another job?
Mike: I may not be the best person to give you an answer.
Certainly, to have the UI you have to have some kind
of recognized work. As silent contributors, the women
are not considered to have work.
Nalini: Have they not asked for their silent contribution to be
valorized?
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Mike: Well, looking back at the farming union, one should
ask, why aren’t the women around more in the fishery?
I would have to assume that the fishermen were more
conservative about roles, the family, etc. and more
dominant, unlike in farming, where women seem
independent. I’m really not confident to speak on this,
as I have never explored this area enough since it has
never come up as a substantial issue in the MFU. I do
not want to just use concepts to be politically correct.
Nalini: Well, this takes me back to a number of  things in my
work on these issues. The first is how the private and
public spheres get dichotomized—work outside the
family has value, but inside, it hasn’t. The family is in
the private sphere. So the women who are in the fish
plants do not realize that they are there because their
work in the inshore fishery has been subsumed and
gradually appropriated by the industry, that they have
lost their rightful place in the fishery.
Yet, Mike, I want to go back to our workshop in
Senegal, when we were trying to arrive at an analysis
of  women in fisheries. I was surprised how close we
felt to the Canadian women; we seemed to be on the
same wavelength. Barbara Neis  even spoke about an
artisanal way of life and the resilience of the artisanal
fishery because of the major contribution of women.
(Associate Professor at the Department of  Sociology, Memorial
University, St John’s, Newfoundland, Barbara L Neis is co-author
of Their Lives and Times, which examines the cultural, social and
historical presence of women in Newfoundland and Labrador – Ed)
Mike: I told you that the Newfoundland fishery, in terms of
the inshore sector, is so remote from urban centres
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that there are no options for work other than the
fishery. That’s a simplistic answer. But what I want to
say is that there have been several women who have
done various investigations on women’s silent
contributions in the fishery, but nothing substantial
has come out in terms of  demands that a fishermen’s
organization can take up. Our organization, like the
Newfoundland Fishermen’s Union, is completely
preoccupied with fisheries issues and resource
management issues. But despite the involvement of
women in the Newfoundland fisheries, when we go to
meetings, there are no women in the Newfoundland
delegations either. We do have a few women members
who are fishers, though!
Nalini: We have seen that women get marginalized in fish-
related activities, as the fishery modernizes. We have
discussed how the resource and capacity issues are
related. If the fishery has to be sustained, capacity
has to be controlled and fishing effort has to be
managed. Now, we are up against more serious
situations when the wonderful welfare State begins to
collapse. When the State gradually withdraws, as usual,
women are the first to be hit; tomorrow it will be the
men. Don’t you also see that protecting the spaces of
women in the fishery is a way to control excessive
modernization, to control investments in fisheries,
which, at the same time, will make the fishery more
viable and, therefore, more sustainable?
This is what led us to talk about an ‘artisanal way of
life’ and what made some of you men laugh when we
said, “With no women in fisheries, there’ll be no fish
in the sea!”
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Mike: Your question is certainly not lost on people in the
MFU who think of larger issues that we face. Since
1988, we have been always saying that we should
connect with the communities, and what better way
than by involving the women. But we have never
found a way to do it.
In the Maritimes, we have seen several mass protests
and demonstrations in the fishery, and all kinds of
women participated on the wharves, in Halifax, etc.
All this was outside of any organization, certainly
outside the MFU. So you cannot say that rural women
have not been responding to the withdrawal of the
State and its welfare system. But it hasn’t happened
in our organization because, I think, we have become
so specialized in one aspect of  the fishery.
Nalini: Well, Mike, if  wanting to link up with the communities
was a serious concern, have you not felt the need to
initiate a discussion with the women even in the last
five years when Chantal, Maureen and women like
Lucie have taken so much interest in getting women
together? (Chantal Abord-Hugon, Co-ordinator of Development
Education, OXFAM-Canada/Project Acadie and an Associate
Member of  ICSF, has been involved in community development with
women in coastal communities in the Maritimes. Maureen Larkin, a
former nun, and the only woman to have worked with the MFU on
and off through the 1980s, is now with the Cooper Institute, Prince
Edward Island – Ed) This was also seriously discussed in
the ICSF, which undertook such a serious Women in
Fisheries programme. Weren’t there some insights that
you could start off with and initiate a discussion with
the more active members of the MFU?
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Moreover, when you talk about this business of
specialization, it makes me go back to the discussion
we had about the ‘specialization’ approach of modern
science, which fails to see the dynamics of the social
process and, therefore, the need to have a more
holistic vision and approach.
Mike: Look, Nalini, during the 1990s, when I talked about
most of  the public manifestations in the fishery, those
had to do with the UI reforms too. But in 1996, when
large numbers of people again took to the streets, they
were hitting at the crab allocations. In fact, the inshore
fishermen were portrayed as the villains because we
had been allocated crab quotas. The women were part
of  the riots orchestrated by the big crab interests. They
were even part of the mobs coming to attack our
fishermen, even physically. This may highlight one of
the reasons why women are not a big consideration in
the MFU.
You see, the crab licence holders in the enterprises
had established such a strong position because of the
wealth they had been able to generate from the crab
fishery. They also controlled most of  the fish plants in
the region and were able to generate a belief among
the workers in the plants that they were losing work
because of  the quotas to the inshore fishermen and,
therefore, their jobs were being threatened. Hence, the
reaction of the women and the antagonistic relation
with our fishermen, who had to even take protection
those days.
Nalini: So, the women workers were actually used by the fish
plant owners against the inshore fishers. This is not
the first time this is happening. I remember in South
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Africa a few years ago, when they were formulating
their fisheries policy, the industrial houses used the
fact that they were providing 20,000 jobs to women
in the plants, to support their claims that their quotas
should be increased and that the ‘subsistence’ fishers
should marginalized. They cleverly referred to the
artisanal fishers as ‘subsistence fishers’ to deprive them
of  fishing rights.
Well, I can see here that the women who give
leadership in such cases do not really have a deep
analysis of the fishery and, hence, fall into these traps
and this is indeed a great pity.
Mike: We have never appreciated the role played by the trade
unions that had some representation in the crab plants.
As people from the outside, we could say that since
then, women have formed plant workers’ associations,
and what they talk about is becoming professional plant
workers.
I must tell you that the main issue of the association
is the fund that they established—what they call a
solidarity fund—with contributions from the crab
licence holders and the provincial and federal
governments, which provided a certain amount of
money to extend the work of the crab plant workers
so that they could increase the number of working
days and then be entitled to the UI.
Central to the deal was to cut out the MFU fishermen
from the crab fishery. We were furious that the
provincial government would use this as a way to cut
us out of the crab quota. But we challenged them and,
I think, we were far more progressive in our position
in respect to the plant workers. We said that if  they
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were genuinely interested in the workers, they should
organize them legitimately and give them full workers’
rights and not treat them as casual workers. This
business of  a fund was like extending some form of
charity to them. We were the only ones making such a
progressive demand because this link between the
government and the plant owners is directly linked to
the cutback in the UI programme since 1996.
The other aspect is related to the provincial
government’s own cutbacks. This takes me back again
to the UI protests spearheaded by the New Brunswick
women. They were the most militant in the country
because they were the most directly affected. It was
around 1994-95, when the woman leader I referred to
earlier—the one who was a seasonal worker in the
National Park—became a kind of  celebrity. She
decided to run for office as an MP and in the 1996
elections, she affiliated herself to the only really
progressive party in the country, the New Democratic
Party (NDP) that had never gained more than 8-10
per cent of the vote in the Acadian area. She won the
election and it was a kind of electoral revolution.
Another trade unionist, who was a leader in the plant
protests, also won, defeating one of the key cabinet
ministers in the government.
Just a month ago, in October 1999, when the MFU
was in the heart of the native rights issue crisis, this
woman announced that she was changing parties, and
she joined the conservative party.
Nalini: Wow, politics makes strange bedfellows and,
unfortunately, women fall into the trap too. So why
did she do this?
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Mike: Well, I cannot say for sure but what I would assume is
that she found the NDP was going nowhere nationally
and, to assure herself of a place in the next election,
she felt she could do more for her people from within
the conservative party. But what worries me is to think
of the trade union people who supported her and put
all their energies behind her. What must they be feeling
now? This may even highlight why the MFU took a
bit of a distance in the UI battle.
I myself am a little sensitive to people who are rabid
with their leftist ideas and look at me and my colleague
as business agents or hacks. But in our type of
organization, if it has to make some contribution, we
have to be careful about what we can and cannot take
on, rather than, I say again, just be politically correct.
But if we are not directly involved in some of these
struggles, you cannot say we are not in solidarity. By
trying to keep close to our members’ issues and by
trying to win struggles within our limited contexts,
we might be able to hold on to a progressive
organization and resist the ways of populism that have
curious outcomes like this woman who is now
affiliated to the conservative party.
Nalini: Mike, you make a serious point when you talk about
nitty-gritty questions in the fishery. I too believe that
we women can make a point only when we relate to
the nitty-gritty questions of  the production process.
For this, we require in-depth work and an analysis of
the development of  the forms of  organization of  the
work process. That is what we have tried to do in our
‘feminist analysis in fisheries’ in the ICSF Women in
Fisheries programme.
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My position was critiqued because this analysis grew
out of our Indian experience, where the industrial
fishery is not so developed, a criticism that I accepted.
At that point, I wasn’t really able to capture issues
like the ones you are bringing up now, which would
give me a real insight into what is happening in the
modern fishery. In order to develop a perspective of  a
sustainable fishery, to understand these issues and then
evolve strategies for action, it would be necessary to
have long discussions like this among women and men
from many corners of the world.
Mike: Well, I have offered to go to the women’s meetings
and discuss things with them, but they haven’t picked
up on the offer.
Aliou: As supporters, we need to invest more to understand
in what waters we are swimming. We cannot contain a
wave in our arms, it is said. I am trying to learn how to
be more realistic. If we want to persevere in our work,
we have to be realistic and keep our cool. This has
helped me to be satisfied with less outcome and to get
less depressed by what I encounter. So when you tell
me that the wisdom of various people in your
organization Mike, sometimes helps to function like a
break, I am very impressed, because we need such
breaks in our complex contexts, so that we make
proper sense of what is actually happening before
plunging into action. The fisheries situation has its own
contradictions and this makes women’s interests
conflict with those of the inshore fishery in the
immediate context. But it is important to know whether
the MFU sees a way out to convince its members to
change and focus on the real issues.
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Mike: My judgement is that we make no contribution to the
world by just getting agitated by what is going on
around us. We have to find the right point at which to
strike.
Aliou: But I would like to insist that the participation of
women in the process of social movement and
organization, and their capacity to participate, depends
on the role they actually play in the fishery. I say this
because, as supporters, we also have to have realistic
expectations. That helps us put things in perspective
too. There are other factors that impact on women’s
participation and these differ from region to region.
When I think about India, it is a strong movement of
women not only because of the role played by women
in fisheries but also because of the general social
condition of women, which doesn’t have to do with
fisheries directly. So when we assess the women’s
involvement and the degree of politicization, we have
to take into consideration the social contexts too. We
cannot generalize.
On Assessing Some of the Gains of Organization
Mike: Sall, you have children. Have you noticed the kinds
of toys that interest them when they are around three
to five years old? I remember a comic strip in North
America that used to have a character called Linus,
who always dragged along a blanket. Linus’ blanket
was a topic of conversation. (Linus, who sucks his thumb
and carries a security blanket, is the ever-philosophizing character in
Charles Schuz’s classic comic strip, Peanuts – Ed) The child
psychologist Winnecott wrote that children sometimes
use ‘transitional objects’, holding on to something in
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the past that gives them a sense of security as they
tread on new ground. (Paediatrician-turned-child-psychoanalyst
Donald Winnecott is author of  Playing and Reality – Ed) These
transitional objects usually are ill-defined, but the child
is strongly attached to them.
When we got into more socio-psychoanalytical work,
this concept came up about ‘transitional
organizations’. When a particular institutional class is
moving on into another phase, the organization can
be considered like a ‘transitional organization’, not a
regular trade union, which is clearly defined. In some
sense, we can look at our organizations as transitional
organizations, especially the MFU and the CNPS.
Each organization has all sorts of meanings for those
who adhered to it in the early days. Fishermen
themselves are facing a transition period and the
organization is a place where they can work out their
ideas. You could say that it is a phase in which the
actual consciousness within is very ambiguous. I could
see us in the MFU going through a long transitional
phase, when fishermen were playing out their ideas in
the organization. The organization provided the forum
for the fishermen to work things out. Our annual
conventions were occasions where fisherman after
fisherman would speak out into the microphone;
sometimes it was the first time one had spoken in
public. These were the exciting parts of the
conventions, when people took the stage to articulate
and display their ideas. At that time, they were not
asking the organization to deliver a lot of bread and
butter. But that’s not so now. The MFU is very
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streamlined and its members expect results. I think
the CNPS is not a simple local association, nor a trade
union; it is transitional, in that it is not clearly defined,
but the fishermen clearly need it and they know they
want to be there in it.
Aliou: My first comment is that I appreciate your effort to
help us reflect using certain psychological concepts
like the ‘transitional object’. In fact, I did not know
this side of  you earlier—your interest in psychology!
Well, as the child grows s/he is still herself. But in the
organization, there are such forceful dynamics that it
may happen that the transition is not always provoked
by any common agreement. There is no straight line
and we must understand the external influences that
impact on the transition.
Mike: You’re right. Using the concept of  a transitional
organization implies that it is organic and that it will
gradually mature, which is not necessarily the case.
One of  the keys of  the analogy is that the kid, at one
point, drops the transitional object. So with an
organization, fishermen probably leave the phase that
I am calling transitional and demand more business-
like results from their organization.
It is just a concept, this idea of an organization being
a ‘transitional object’, but it helps me sort out the
MFU’s past and present, and I feel that the CNPS could,
in some ways, be looked at as being in a transitional
phase.
When a child is an infant, in Winnecott’s theory, the
child’s consciousness is undifferentiated. S/he sees no
difference between the mother and herself. For the
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organization, when you think of the CNPS and the
hundreds of  fishermen who come to a Congress, their
consciousness is very undifferentiated and the demands
are kind of wide. But what impresses me about the
CNPS is that in the movement of many such interests,
the Congresses are a manifestation of their strength.
But this will not last forever. How do you look at future
developments? When do we look at what we achieve
in the long run?
Even if  the MFU disappears tomorrow, it would still
have achieved something as an organization for the
fishermen. I think our fishermen used the organization
to work and to learn about the new management
systems that came into the fishery in the 1970s, and,
gradually, they themselves were implicated into the
new systems and into having a say about them. In the
short lifespan of  the MFU, many, many fishermen
developed quite a sophisticated understanding of the
new management systems and, in a sense, became
integrated into the modern fishery. This was certainly
not what the leaders had in mind when they started.
Aliou: If you see how people mobilize during a Congress, it
is crazy. There is massive input by the fishermen that
cannot be calculated. This is in the form of  support
they offer, to host the participants, feed them, etc. It
is tremendous. It is, in fact, very symbolic in the history
of the Senegalese fishery that such unity of purpose
can be displayed. I am still convinced that the social
recognition of  the fishermen, the simple fact that they
make such a show of numbers and gather at the sight
of the word ‘congress’, is extremely important. This
itself is a phenomenon—just to see the way the
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fishermen get onto the dais, how the senior ones are
honoured and they come all dressed up as real chiefs,
and sit on the same stage as the minister. I think this
has given the fishermen a tremendous social status.
They have begun to experience that they have power.
You know, because of  this sense of  power, a mere
decision taken among themselves is like a decision
vis-à-vis the State. They do not need to make a big
manifestation of demand or broadcast their decision.
There is no need because the State power is actually
so weak and is just waiting to see what the fishermen
are saying. In fact, when the government decided to
close the octopus fishery, it was goaded on by the
participation of  the fishermen. This is what convinces
me that the fishermen are powerful, but they are not
really conscious of  their power.
Mike: You are saying this confidence has come from the fact
that they are organized and have their Congresses, etc.
Would it have been any different if  they weren’t
organized?
Aliou: I feel that even if  we are a very small country, the fact
that fishermen can meet from across the country, and
build up relationships in the process, is very important.
Earlier, if people considered you stupid, they would
say “You are a fisherman.” Today, this has changed.
Often, newspapers carry big headlines:  ‘les pecheures
dit non’, ‘le CNPS block l’accord entre Senegal et the Union
European’. None of this happened because of any huge
manifestation or raising of  demands.
Mike: Have you never had a mass demonstration?
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Aliou: No. Why? Even the whole administration and the secret
agents come to the Congress. It’s crazy, you know. A
big part of the planning is the seating arrangement on
the dais and who will sit on the dais. Earlier, the
fisheries officials—some young, recently trained
graduates—would come to fishermen’s meetings
condescendingly. They would arrive when they liked,
cigarettes in hand and go straight up to the dais, as if
they were born to chair meetings. But we have taught
them now that they have to learn to be invited. So
now they do not go straight to the dais but sit among
the audience and listen and learn. They also have to
accept that there may be meetings of  fishermen where
they shouldn’t expect to be invited.
I remember the Congress in 1993 when the Fisheries
Minister called the day before to ask whether he was
expected at the Congress. A couple of  weeks earlier,
he had called saying that there were 2 million CFA
francs for CNPS. Our committee had gone and got it
from him and he had tried to ask for details about the
Congress and he was told vaguely that he would be
informed later. But the fishermen didn’t inform him,
as they had no intention of inviting him, since they
wanted the Minister of Agriculture, instead.
This leads me to talk about the question of ‘autonomy’
vis-à-vis the State and how the CNPS has arrived at
demonstrating its autonomy. It is this fact, that they
cannot be controlled, that impacts more on the
government than a big demonstration.
Earlier, the presence of some foreign friends at our
Congresses played an important role. The Minister felt
obliged to impress them too. But this may not be
necessary in the future.
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It is not that there is no history of  struggle in Senegal
in different sectors, but in the fisheries, fishermen
haven’t adopted this form. I think that in the minds
of their interlocutors, they are considered a counter-
power, and these are the impressive gains of the
organization. The question of the CNPS linking up to
the broader social movements is always a risky
proposition. Will we lose our soul?
Nalini: From what both of you are saying, you seem to express
that your organizations have achieved the ultimate,
and that they are, therefore, stable. But tomorrow, if
there is a collapse in the lobster fishery, Mike, the MFU
will be threatened and if social security is withdrawn,
even more so. Nothing remains static and these are
the lessons we learn from history too.
You talk about your State being so weak, Aliou. Well,
the trend in the world today is to weaken State power
so that the financial interests will call the shots. If  the
Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) gets through
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) debate, we
will no longer have the protection of the State before
these giants, and the State will lose its role of arbitrator
too. Don’t you think it is imperative that your
organizations take seriously the need to create
alliances?
Aliou: I am not questioning the need to build alliances, but it
is important to determine with whom and how exactly.
We must not also underestimate the risks in this
process. In Senegal, when CNPS maintains its
autonomy, it does not mean that it does not relate to
other social sections. But this is not structured or
institutionalized.
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I am referring here to the way the CNPS related to the
general population during the time of the last fisheries
agreement. This was more than a structural alliance. I
am convinced that the organization can still have its
power without linking to other organizations because
there are other means of strengthening fishworker
organizations. For example, in our context, the fishing
communities are dynamic social realities. You can see
and touch them, and they are centres of economic
activity. So, I think, to build a community-based
organizational approach can be an interesting
alternative. This will also enable us to integrate the
wider issues into this form of  organization because
the organization need not be limited to the resource
questions, but can take up things like the impact of
tourism, sanitation, etc.
Nalini: So this brings us to the ‘Will of Allah’.
Mike: Maybe there are other sectors of society that are as
fascinating, but I think, to this day, the oceans are a
kind of last frontier – little understood. Even to this
day, though we have large scientific enterprises, they
are often surprised by large annual catches of fish,
apparently coming out of  nowhere. We have heard no
end of visionaries and planners predicting that the
inshore fishery would collapse, but nobody paid much
attention to the lowly lobster.
When you look at the terrible results we had in the
cod fishery, you really have to consider whether the
Canadian management model, backed by its big science
enterprises and companies, was not just a giant hubris.
Our cod collapse was a catastrophe of biblical
proportions, as one of our leaders called it. Even Aliou
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was kind of smug, feeling a bit like many of our own
inshore fishermen that “it served them right”, those
high-and-mighties, who thought they could manage
the oceans with their science and management models.
At the moment of  the moratorium, inshore fishermen
all through Atlantic Canada saw it also as a conjuncture
in which, ironically, they could regain some of  their
status. The sad story that follows is to see how the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada (DFO),
the fisheries management authority, appears to have
recovered its hegemony over the fishery. You would
think there would have been a huge institutional
change.
Aliou: I want to clarify what leads me to use the ‘community’
approach. First, because of the way our fishing
community is structured. They represent an important
part of the population, where there is so much
immigration from other sectors. Second, all fish landing
areas have fishing communities and, because of this,
anything they do has an impact as they are a live and
important presence in the economy.
Third, going through the people in the community
makes it easier from the point of  view of  transparency,
as everybody knows what is going on
Mike: Aliou has just put his finger on a significant difference
between Canada, India and Senegal. Just establishing
clearly that the CNPS is active and productive in these
fishing communities is enough food for thought
because of  the role fish plays in that economy. What
Aliou is saying is that if you get a good political
organization in the fishery, you are almost at the centre
of power in Senegal.
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In the Canadian context, we could say a similar thing
only in the Atlantic region in case of the cod, which is
actually losing political power in the country now. We
are only highlighting the differences in our contexts.
Aliou: ‘Alliance’ develops a kind of  psychosis in me because
of the risks and dangers it confronts an organization
with, especially in the context of  the CNPS, where all
the other unions are linked to political parties who
have electoral ambitions. I am always surprised at the
way the fishermen themselves make a distinction about
relating to some individuals who are linked to political
parties, and remaining independent as an organization
themselves. Never have I heard it being raised that
the CNPS must support one party or the other. We
will lose our identity as a counter-power once the party
you side with gets into power.
Nalini: An alliance does not imply that you lose your identity,
although it does have tremendous risks of weakening
you. But, I feel, Aliou, you are not looking far enough
as a supporter, as you are gripped by this psychosis
regarding alliances. In your situation in West Africa,
as your country shares a resource with so many other
little neighbouring countries that are all making their
own decisions about the resources and signing
agreements with the Northern world, don’t you think
you have to build some cross-border alliances?
Similarly, from you, Mike, I would like to know how
you see the alliance that is being built up through the
creation of the WFF?
Mike: I think you are stretching it a bit, but I’d like to first
hear what Aliou says.
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Aliou: Nalini, don’t you know that we are preoccupied with
this question particularly through the West African
programme? But you see how this programme got
derailed too, by people wanting it to be just an aid
project. As the fishermen have a long tradition of
migration between these countries and as we share
some resources that are the same, of course, we have
to see how they can be also managed to the advantage
of all.
But the CNPS is a unique kind of  organization in West
Africa and it is not because of the fact that we think
alliances are important that we should rush into them,
especially when other countries do not have any
organizations like the CNPS. All the organizations that
I know are either government-sponsored or have been
hijacked by the government, except probably in
Guinea-Bissau, where it is a women’s organization. In
Mauritania, there is a federation, but it is created by
the government and the chief of the federation is an
army colonel. That is the base of  our fears, although
we have not given up.
But to tell you that the CNPS is serious about alliances,
I must say that there is one fisherman elected in the
CNPS who is responsible to help create links with other
fishermen in West Africa. In this context, I want to
add that even the ICSF contacts in other African
countries are with such organizations that are linked
to the State and we have to be very careful about that,
especially if the ICSF moves without a deeper
awareness about these processes.
Then you may ask why can’t the CNPS exploit more
the fact that there is so much migration in fisheries, to
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create alliances? But the situation of the migrants is
also changing today. Earlier, even if  it were the
Senegalese fishermen who had helped build the
fisheries of the neighboring countries, there are
tendencies to disassociate with this trend now. The
Senegalese now have to get licences to fish in these
countries and what they fish there has to be landed
there. In Mauritania, particularly, they are so racist and
are growing violent and there are lots of border
problems. That is why for the World Fisheries Day
Celebrations in November 1998, the theme of the
conference was ‘Resource Conservation, Migration and
Security at Sea’.
You see, fish has no real meaning in the culture of
Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau. It is only an investment
business. These countries have developed a nationalist
ideology regarding fisheries as it earns them money.
The only fishery they had earlier in the inshore was
the octopus fishery and that too fished in a very
unskilled way, with pots from fibreglass boats, as
taught by the Japanese, and not with hooks, as our
fishermen do.
Mike: Aliou makes me think of another aspect that we
experience in Canada within our fishery. It is a very
difficult process to make alliances with organizations
that you do not consider to be at the same ‘level’ as
yourselves. You find some of  those organizations are
just empty shells. Even with formalized organizations,
it is one thing to have a symbolic alliance with them,
but when it comes to carrying out effective action,
you discover they can’t deliver. So these are very
problematic areas.
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The little social power that can be attributed to your
organization can be eaten up by coalition exercises.
Even in a more formalized council structure like we
have in Canada, we are asked to sit at the same table
with several other organizations that are either
business-like organizations or shell-type ones. And so
you end up having very little possibility of making
any real political action.
The Canadian Council of  Professional Fish Harvesters
(CCPFH) is only a tool that helps us to share
information with some people we wouldn’t otherwise
have met because of  financial constraints. So when
you get to a ‘World Forum’, you can imagine the
potential for used-up energies, mystifications,
neutralizations — whatever you like to call it. We have
only a handful of organizations that recognize one
another as engaged in somewhat the same work, with
similar perspectives on the fishery. Quite frankly, I
don’t think we should look at the WFF like that.
Nalini: So will the MFU join the WFF?
Mike: Do you actually believe that the MFU has the
opportunity to join the WFF?
Nalini: Why do you say that?
Mike: In Canada, there are at least three large, sound
fishermen’s organizations, none of  which has joined
the WFF. Anybody who wants to grasp the complexities
and ambiguities of the WFF only has to look at our
CCPFH.
Aliou: Coming back to the WFF, I think we have to distinguish
between kinds of actions because nothing can replace
actions at the base itself, or in our own countries.
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I really do not see how any action of the WFF can
impact effectively on our governments. Let me relate
this to what happened in France in the last few months,
when farmers pressured their government to react to
the WTO regulations. Farmers went on a rampage to
demand that this be stopped.
Nalini: Now that you refer to that, it brings me back to this
question of  alliances. Actually, I think this present
action in France also has to do with what the Indian
farmers association did some years ago, an action that
was carried to Europe as the ‘International Caravan’
through the network called People’s Global Action.
You probably recall that reference was made to this
People’s Global Action last year at our ICSF
Animation Team meeting. Diegues asked Sebastian
whether he was there and Sebastian said he didn’t
know anything about it. (Antonio Carlos Sant’ana Diegues,
a Member of  ICSF, is with Núcleo de Apolo à Pesquisa sobre
Populações Humanas e Áreas Úmidas Brasileiras or NUPAUB,
the Centre for Research on Human Population and Wetlands in Brazil.
Sebastian Mathew is Executive Secretary of  ICSF – Ed) I had
cynically remarked that the ICSF is not inclined to
such political actions!
Well, this year, People’s Global Action organized this
International Caravan where 500 farmers from India,
together with 20 fishworkers from organizations in the
South, spent almost a month in Europe. They
interacted with various groups in Europe, telling them
about their struggles against new happenings in the
sector because of  the new WTO regulations. These
Indian farmers were part of  the group that burnt down
the research station of the giant US seed multinational,
Cargill, which was manipulating the Indian seed
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industry, not only by appropriating the intellectual
property rights of  the Indian farmer but also by creating
a regime of  centralization. Subsequently, the farmers’
organization also attacked Kentucky Fried Chicken
outlets in India, including its posh outlet in Bangalore,
my hometown. Then the legal battle of the
multinationals started, asserting their individual
property rights in the context of the new economic
and legal order. This stirred up a whole wave in India
of groups getting together to fight this domination by
the WTO and led to the demand that India get out of
the WTO.
Well, after these interactions, the Caravan participated
in a huge chain when the G8 countries met in Bonn,
where the Northern people demanded that the debts
of  the Third World be written off  as we enter the third
millennium.
All these groups will be there in Seattle, where the
WTO is meeting, so that they can lobby their
governments and demonstrate the hundreds of voices
that want an alternative.
Mike: You are getting into hot waters there, Sall!
Aliou: No. This only confirms how important it is for
organizations to put priority on building up local
organizations because if  the French farmers, for
instance, were not organized, they would not have been
able to pick up these ripples and react the way they
did. It is not only an international issue that makes
such things possible.
Nalini: I think what you are saying is important. We have to
make a difference between what is today called
lobbying, and organizing for change. I know that
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lobbying is another cliché that pulls money these days
and lots of ‘activists’ find this a very challenging and
also paying job. There are all kinds of  training
programmes in advocacy, which is becoming another
profession.
While I do believe that lobbying is an important
supportive task, I have always been sceptical of the
way it has developed. Things have to be ‘sold’ the
way people in the echelons of power like to hear or
see them. So the issues have to go in the wrappings of
modern development concepts. This defeats the
purpose altogether. Such strategies do not relate to a
solid base and can have all the trappings of the negative
side of organizing that we have reflected on.
Mike: In a way, our discussion on alliances triggers off  ideas
that have gone on in the history of any political
movement. So there is no categorical position to be
taken here. We have to have alliances. But what you
seem to be pointing out in Senegal is that the
conditions aren’t really there to formalize alliances,
and, at the global level too, we have to ask whether
the conditions are really there to create meaningful
alliances. We know intellectually that globalization is
in full operation today. We know we need alliances on
a world scale but we have to be serious in assessing
whether the conditions exist for it. This still remains
to be answered.
Nalini: Well, I have questions to both of  you. Aliou, if  the
international alliance has no real effect and can’t really
deliver, then why are you bothered about Fenagie Peche
seeking membership in the WFF? And to you, Mike:
You sit on the board of  CCPFH and you have been
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instrumental in inviting the Southern fishermen to
interact with the Council; and you saw the seeds
being sown for this al l iance. With al l  your
experience, why haven’t you been a more active
player in determining the course of  the WFF? If
you are so bothered about energies being dissipated
and if you are also concerned about the ‘power’ of
the inshore fishermen being appropriated by others,
what is your role, as a member, even, of  ICSF, in
this happening?
Aliou: I think, when you address me, you do not raise the
question correctly regarding the participation of
Fenagie Peche in the WFF. Nalini, how can CNPS,
which does not want to relate to Fenagie Peche in
Senegal because it identifies with the government
position, relate to Fenagie Peche at the international
level? All this relates to what I have said earlier about
CNPS playing the role of a counter-power in the
Senegalese context. Moreover, I didn’t say that the
WFF has no role at all to play, but in political action
and lobbying, it may be more effective as a
communication channel between organizations than
by getting into political action itself.
Mike: I think I have to clarify that I—or we—have all
kinds of  different thoughts about the WFF, but we
certainly haven’t concluded that the initiative
should not be launched. But you asked a more direct
question: Why was I walking away from having a
say in how the forum gets shaped? The question is
right on the mark. I have to ask myself  why.
I guess my main answer to this would be that I have
limited energies and time and that there is more than
enough to do in the MFU, as it is. The other is the
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question of whether this will weaken or strengthen
the basic fishermen’s organization. Up to now, our
experience in the Council has been extremely
ambiguous. It is hard for our members to see value in
our participation in the Council.
Nalini: If the leadership in the Council is taken up by one of
the three or four organizations in which you have more
confidence, because they are genuinely good
fishermen’s organizations, would you think differently
about it?
Mike: I am going to give you a long-winded answer. We
already know that the origins of most of our
organizations are quite ambiguous—a mixture of
various forms of  associational models, etc. The
Council in Canada is even more vague in its origins,
even misty, if  you like. Moreover, nobody can forget
that the Council is already recognized as a sector
council under the country’s Human Resource
Development Ministry. Every other sector council is
a corporate-type model of labour and management
coming together to see how the sector can be
improved.
The Council was able to get recognition without this
management side by arguing that, in the fishery, the
fishermen are both managers and workers at the same
time. Now the real business of the Council is supposed
to be the professionalization of  fishermen, and it gets
hundreds of thousands of dollars from the ministry
each year to promote this professionalism. There are
three or four good, union-type organizations that
decided to participate in the Council for two reasons.
The Newfoundland union wanted to develop a
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professionalization programme, which, when you
come down to it, is a form of  licensing that we
introduced in the Gulf  of  St Lawerence 20 years ago.
So this organization generally stuck with the Council
because it was an opportunity to meet at the national
level, which we couldn’t probably do on our own.
The question I am asking after five years is: Has the
amount of  energy we put in been worth it, just to have
the opportunity to meet others? I think the only reason
I would acquiesce to the Council being the official-
type member of the WFF is because the Council has
the infrastructure and money to not only help out in
Canada’s participation in the WFF but also to help
the WFF financially too.
You cannot imagine the actual amount of  money that
the Council commands. There is something about it
that is somewhat corrupting too. They also have
consultants, who are really good people, but who get
caught in these ambiguities. When you get into
Canadian government-type monies, you are as good
as gone.
Aliou: In a way, I see you have been trapped. I am sure you
would not have minded if the WFF was created, but
in a very informal way. We were all there in Quebec
when  the idea was mooted and we were not against
it. But the turn it took into trying to establish itself at
its very first meeting in New Delhi took us all by
surprise, and I think this is very frightening.
Mike: Well, let’s come back to the gains of  organization,
which we had started discussing. We found, for
instance, in the early days, when the MFU went to a
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wharf to collect dues from members, they would
invariable ask, “What is the MFU doing these days
anyway?” When you try to explain all the things you
are doing and mention some results too, the fishermen
would say, “Oh, that would have happened anyway.”
This kind of reaction shows that they do not attribute
the gains to the organizational efforts of  the MFU,
while the MFU, on the other hand, cannot demonstrate
that it alone won the day, or was responsible for those
gains. Even in the case of  one of  the biggest victories
of the MFU—getting the crab resource—as time
progressed, you heard fishermen saying, “It was the
minister who got that.” When we look at the gains our
organization has made, they are not clearly defined.
Even if  they are experienced by the fishermen, they
are not clearly understood.
Nalini: Well, what you are saying is that collective memory is
very short and this is a general phenomenon in many
ways. But in our case in India, while the fishworkers
are conscious that lots of the gains are a result of their
struggles, the successes accrue elsewhere. For
instance, the major demand of  the fishermen in Kerala
has been the closed season for trawlers during the
monsoon. After a decade, the union had only succeeded
in getting a 45-day closure.
But there have been numerous other things they have
demanded and got. In fact, the Fishermen’s Welfare
Corporation was established to handle these demands
like insurances for accidents at sea, compensations for
death at sea or loss of equipment, housing grants,
educational grants, buses for women vendors to go to
market, etc. Now the Government of Kerala boasts
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that it is way above all the other Indian States in
providing welfare to the fishworkers, as if it were its
own progressive policies that made this possible. The
fishworkers were in constant struggle, demanding these
things, which were easier to grant than the major
demand of a closed season.
Mike: I think people remember only direct cause-and-effect.
In 1982, the second years of the quotas in Canada, a
few hundred of us actually occupied the building of
the minister and demanded an increase in quota.
Within a couple of hours, we came up with an
agreement that gave our fishermen 2,000 extra tonnes
of cod. Only those things in which they are fully
involved, do the fishermen remember. But when you
talk about fisheries management, there is a whole range
of  things. Virtually every struggle within the fishery
has to do with how the management programme is
implemented.
For us, it is the ambivalence that actually poses the
problem. The fishermen know they have to have a
regulatory authority, but, in practice, they see scientists
taking non-objective positions, and government taking
sides. So they are ambivalent. You need to have an
honest and impartial system. Since 1977, many of the
unions’ struggles have been in relation to the
management of the fish and those gains have been
ambiguous too. On the other hand, during the same
period, the lobster fishery expanded, both in terms of
value and resource availability. So, did the MFU create
this?
Aliou: I have two comments. One, some gains are more
qualitative and difficult to assess. For example, in 1994,
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the union and the core of all those in the industrial
sector came together for the first time in a meeting
organized in Joal. That was a very important occasion
for the fishermen. It was the first time they heard the
industrial people say that the government should create
a compensation fund for the artisanal fishermen to
take care of the victims of accidents at sea. And they
were saying that they, the industrial group, would be
interested in contributing to the fund. The fishermen
were surprised to hear a Lebanese plant owner stating
that 60 per cent of the industrial fish plant raw material
came from the artisanal fishery. I remember what an
impact that statement made on the fishermen.
That was an occasion when the industrial group came
to ally with the CNPS against the fisheries agreements.
What I consider a gain, though, is the fact that the
industry recognized the power of the artisanal fishery
and, as a trade-off, was willing to contribute towards
the security of  the artisanal fishermen.
Subsequently, when the fishermen participated in
negotiations at various levels with the government,
they also had access to documents that would be
stamped “confidential”. You can imagine what this
meant in the hands of  the fishermen.
Mike: These are certainly gains, but only momentarily in what
I would call ‘conjunctural’ moments. I recall in the
earlier days how proud we were to be on every
committee that was set up for the management of the
fishery. Given our militant positions, that was a big
deal for the fishermen. It was the way we were engaged
in the negotiation process that mattered. It did not
necessarily bring in the bread, but it took us to the
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way in which the fishery was managed, using scientists,
money, power, etc., and for the fishermen to be there
was important.
Aliou: Now we can look at who profits from these gains.
Senegal has what is called the Consultative Advisory
Board in Fisheries, in which CNPS has two
representatives. Two CNPS persons are also officially
in the Socioeconomic Council, which gives direction
to the planners. This is surely an achievement.
Mike: These are examples of getting into new grounds, where
you can either win or lose. I know people who say
that the MFU is collaborating with the government,
and that is looked at negatively.
Aliou: Yes, lots of  things can be misconstrued. In our case,
when the government offered us a share of the money
from the EU fisheries access agreements, CNPS refused
it. This rejection was used against us, and it was said
that we were just being political, when Fenagie Peche
and the fishmongers’ association wanted the money.
Mike: The whole objective of organizing is to get into a
position of  negotiation. You have no pretence of
assuming the power of the State.
Nalini: This makes me think differently. When we are asked
to be on consultative committees, most of them are
not mandatory. It is a way for the government to pick
our brains and then to use what we say to fit into their
paradigm. This does not mean that we have not been
able to make any impact on policy, but we can never
claim it as an achievement of the NFF alone.
Aliou: In our case, participation itself is important because
recognition is the main thing. Let me go back to the
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legislation that brought the 6-12 mile coastal zone
regulation. When this zone was enlarged, because of
fishers’ demands, it was not made public. The
government wanted to make it appear as if the new
measure was coming from the government and not
from the demand of  the fishermen. There are other
instances like this. When we demanded a reduction in
taxes and a change in identity cards, one fine day we
discovered that these regulations no longer existed.
The government had made these decisions on its own.
So it is actually difficult to assess the gains of
organization.
As supporters, we have to be conscious of the fact
that the fishermen have their own way of  assessing
their gains. This makes me think of  the Chinese
painkiller oil, Mike. If the pain in your leg disappeared
when you applied the oil, it would be interesting to
know if it was the oil that really helped you or whether
there was an internal process in your body that healed
you.
This brings me to what I call the myth of  gains. From
1992, CNPS started participating in discussions on the
fisheries agreements. In 1994, it did so for the second
time. It was interesting to hear fishermen from Joal
and Hann say that it was because of CNPS and its
actions that the condition of the resource had
improved. In 1994, they said the resource was in good
health and that there were no more boats coming into
the artisanal zone.
At that point, I did not interfere with what was being
said. It was not the figures that mattered, it was the
belief that this had come about as a result of what
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they had done. The actual fact was that the Spanish
had realized there was less fish in the Senegalese
waters and they were no more willing to pay so much
for the access agreement. An official document from
Pescanova proposed why they should go to other
waters. (Pescanova, S.A. is a large company based in Pontevedra,
Spain, primarily engaged in the processing, distribution and marketing
of fish products, mainly finfish, for human and animal consumption. In
fiscal 2000, Pescanova reported sales of US$628 million – Ed)
But letting the fishermen live with their myth of  self-
won gains actually gave them more strength.
Mike: One of the central myths in the MFU is that it drove
out the herring seiners from the Gulf of St Lawrence
around 1980. Actually, my sense is that the herring
seiners were big in the Gulf in the 1960s and, by the
1980s, the resources were so overfished that the MFU
was victorious only because the seiners had defeated
themselves; but this is a commanding myth in the MFU.
The other thing that occurs to me now is that, around
the elections every four years, the party that usually
stays in power does so because the economy is doing
well. This is objectively independent of any
government action. Recessions and the growth of the
economy are caused by so many micro-factors. But I
thought what we want to say is that the organization
plays a watchdog role. You can lie dormant in a public
way, but still have a huge impact on the political
landscape.
Nalini: At this point, I would like to reflect on the negative
aspects of gains—how they can give you a sense of
being bigger than you are in reality. I tend to look in
this way at the last struggle of  the NFF against the
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deep-sea trawlers. The NFF has been recognized as a
national union with an extensive base. But does the
NFF really have the clout and organizational
infrastructure to change things at the base?
I ask this because there were several initiatives we
could take at the base to introduce local management
strategies, but the NFF has not been able to do
anything of  the kind. Many suggestions and some
attempts have been made, especially in trying to
diversify the trawl fishery, but nothing of  significance
has really happened. Mass mobilization for larger policy
demands has been the thrust of  the NFF and, in this,
significant gains have been made. This has to be seen
in the context of India, where social processes involve
a large number of people. While the mobilization of
large numbers is significant in mass struggles, large
numbers of people at the base make local
organizational strategies extremely difficult.
Aliou: As for myself, I have not talked about gains being
always positive. I mentioned what I felt just to help
you to be sensitive to how people in my context assess
things, mainly the intangible things. When symbolism
plays such an important role, it is important for you
supporters to  understand how we look at things that
are palpable gains, like the coastal zone being extended
from six to 12 miles. There is also something symbolic
in this because when the fishermen were discussing
this demand, they were already aware of the fact that
they were targeting the resource beyond the coastal
six-mile zone. And in demanding access rights, they
were staking their claim to do so. The 12-mile limit
was only to legitimize what was already happening.
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So I start distinguishing between visible and invisible
gains. Even in the visible, you have an element of
symbolism. This is mainly because of, again, the
situation of recognition and whether the government
is trying to take more and more of the credit, which is
increasingly becoming an issue in CNPS.
Mike: I will make a comment on recognition. It is related a
bit to the question of  gains. My sense is that the
fishermen in the MFU forgave the organization for
what it did not accomplish in the earlier years because
then it was more of an idea, an aspiration, a hope,
but, gradually, the demand to deliver bread and butter
has grown. My own sense is that you may be facing
this right now, when I hear you speak about Fenagie
Peche and that it is getting more of the material gains
like money, etc., while CNPS isn’t. But let us go back
to Nalini’s comment about NFF riding on what she
calls the bubble. Over time, the big gain of  the struggle
against deep-sea trawlers will be lost, while the NFF
too is losing sight of  the nitty-gritty issues.
Nalini: You have to understand this in the context of  the fact
that it was a tremendous mobilization effort, which
was sustained for close to three years. Subsequently,
there were other issues like the Coastal Regulation
Zone (CRZ) Notification, which, again, called for
large-scale mobilization to get fishworkers’ rights
recognized. Again, this was a broad-based issue.
So when I speak about a bubble that can burst, I feel
that the energies spent on these larger mobilizations
attract large groups of the dispossessed in the coastal
communities, while the actual fishermen continue to
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comb the seas in a desperate effort to survive. With
no simultaneously effective organization at the base,
the movement has not been able to check the
destructive fishing that has entered the artisanal fishery.
Undoing this will be a Herculean task.
Mike: From what you say, Nalini, there is probably a huge
history behind those events. Most people who are
involved in the fishery tend to be unidimensional.
Everybody can understand what devastation big
trawler fleets can cause to the resource, but what I
can’t understand is the power of this unidimensional
David-vs-Goliath image to carry on within a militant
organization, even when their daily lives are determined
by other factors.
I can recall our minister going around in 1995-96,
making it appear that the presence of foreign trawlers
in our waters was the main issue, and he got support
from fishermen everywhere. The only foreign trawlers
in Canadian waters then were near Greenland, and some
Cuban trawlers fishing Canadian hake that the
Canadians themselves did not want. So there was no
objective threat, but it was still a rallying cry and
mystified the real problem facing the fishermen, which,
in our case, was the emergence of the huge midshore
fleet. I feel you are implying the same thing, while
touching on a similar phenomenon in the Indian
context.
Aliou: I think we have a similar problem in Senegal because
we have the French style of administration, very
complex and hierarchical, with many sections and
subsections. But management of  the fishery is under
the tutelage of the Minister of Fisheries, who relies
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on different institutions to assist with specific
contributions. You have the research centre, CRODT
(Centre De Recherches Océanographiques Dakar-Thiaroye, the
Oceanographic Research Centre Dakar-Thiaroye – Ed) which is
supposed to make the assessment of stocks and is the
only one of  its kind in the West African region. Then
there is that huge impressive scientific boat, Nouis
Sauget, for sophisticated marine surveys. Orstom
overseas became the Institut de recherche pour le
développement. (Orstom was the Institut français de la recherche
scientifique pour le développement en co-operation, a scientific research
institute supervised by both the French Ministry of  Research and the
Ministry of  Co-operation, set up to contribute to the sustainable
development of  southern countries. The Institut de recherche pour le
développement or IRD is a French public science and technology research
institute under the joint authority of  the French ministeries in charge
of research and overseas development – Ed)
It is very complicated, the continued influence and
probably domination of the French. Look at the major
contributions of  these institutions. They all
concentrate on tuna, which serves the interests of  the
industrial fleet. These very posh and well-equipped
institutions give a sense of false prestige to the
Senegalese scientists too. Though the research centre’s
main mission is to provide the government with data,
based on which it can make policies, the actual
research has been oriented towards the interests of
foreign companies. You can guess how the priority of
studies is linked to the interests of  the West.
Mike: Would you describe it as a neocolonial institution?
Aliou: That has been the main reason why fishermen have
denounced it—the foreign interest. But I think the
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fishermen were forced to this conclusion mainly
because of the lack of interaction between the
government and the fishermen. Nor is there any
transparency. So much information is secret. In 1987,
when ICSF was organizing a meeting with West African
scientists in Dakar, I sent a letter to the Director of
CRODT, but he refused to come and address us to
share the work being done by his institution. He didn’t
feel free or confident to do that.
Besides, there is the Directorate of  Fisheries. This is
again a complex institution. In the same building is
situated the Senegalese Surveillance Project, supported
by Canada, and also the Senegalese Coast Guard. For
three or four years, Senegal has been profiting from
the West African Development Programme, called Lux
Development, centred in Gambia, with massive aid
from Luxemburg. This is supposedly to improve
surveillance of  the fisheries subregion among six
countries. So all the responsibilities are diversified and
very complicated.
Nalini: My goodness, this is very unlike the Indian government
that is so conscious about security issues and so
suspicious of any foreigner getting involved in any
scientific work on the coast! I remember the trouble
we had when SIFFS was in the process of  constructing
the artificial reefs with the help of a technical person
from Intermediate Technology Development Group
(ITDG), England. (ITDG, founded in 1966 by E F Schumacher,
is now an international group of  development organizations with
charitable status. Its head office is in the UK, with regional and country
offices in the three continents of Africa, Asia and South America –
Ed) We first had to ask permission if  he could dive
and use an underwater camera and this was possible
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only when the government research institute was made
a partner in the study.
But coming back to the fact that you say, and seem
surprised, that all research is funded by, or serves the
interest of, the industry. Let’s face it, this has been a
growing trend in all sectors over the last two decades.
The funds for research available to public institutions
‘gradually’ dried up. Research grants came from
industry, initially with no strings attached, but later
industry began to dictate the areas of  study too. So
the researchers had to fall in line with the research
priorities of the institution. Now some of the research
labs are directly controlled and funded by the industry.
Let me tell you about one case in India. There is a
prestigious institution in Bangalore called the Indian
Institute of  Science. Recently, we heard that the
multinational food giant Monsanto had invested money
in the biotechnology laboratory in this institute. So
despite the fact that there is a large farmers’ movement
around Bangalore protesting the entry of
multinationals into Indian agriculture and against the
‘terminator’ gene technology, the Indian Institute of
Science goes ahead with such an alliance.
Aliou: I still cannot see this kind of thing happening in the
university in Senegal. When the octopus moratorium
was being decided, we saw how the industrial fleet
pressed for the closure. When I heard from the
fishermen, I did not believe the fishery had been
closed. So when we went to CRODT to enquire about
the grounds on which such a closure was made, nobody
there could answer us. Obviously, the closure was not
stimulated by scientists but by the industry, which
wanted to keep a control on prices.
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About the money for research, I know that IFREMER
(Institut français de recherche pour l’exploitation de la mer or the
French Research Institute for Exploitation of  the Sea, at Issy-les-
Moulineaux, near Paris — Ed) gets a lot of  private money
and I think even Orstom does. But even if  Orstom
gets such money, I do not think that private interest in
research is increasing and that the public interest is
decreasing. In France, the relation between research
and the private sector is visible, but the way the State
of France operates and behaves, is not the way our
government behaves and operates. France is
maintaining CRODT to control information related
to the Third World.
Nalini: You seem to be looking at it from a narrow perspective.
You do not see the role of  finance capital in the world
today. As I said earlier, it is this force that is pushing
for the MIA at the WTO. If  this happens, the power
or sovereignty of  States will be totally undermined.
The way has been prepared for this by the creation of
the WTO, which now plays a leading role in
international relations, even minimizing the role of
UN institutions. On the whole, the role of  the UN
institutions is being relativized. Even NATO (the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization) today decides to
start a war with no reference to the UN. So we should
be aware of these international dynamics and global
equations that are changing the face of our world and
the rules of  the world order.
Aliou: Yes, of  course, we can see the impact of  the global
market on our economy and on the fishery. But the
whole WTO thing that you talk about still evades me.
You see how the US tries to displace France in its
relation with West Africa in the much-publicized visit
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of US President Bill Clinton. So there is a power play
going on between the Western nations themselves,
which, I feel, is shrouded by things like the WTO, etc.
I would take some time to come to such conclusions
as you seem to be making, Nalini.
Mike: You get me thinking, anyway. You have to be careful
when you arrive at the fact that the State is losing its
power under the globalization phenomenon. We
shouldn’t lose our nerve. There is every reason to
believe that there are other political forces coming into
play and, maybe, for the moment, France’s historical
preoccupation with its colonies and the question of
preserving its culture is one of  those forces. I’d like to
get back to the fishery where we are trying to
understand how the management authority works in
the three different countries that we represent.
I’ll come back to the fact that companies are paying
for most of  the scientific work. In our country, the
scientific work is mostly managed by the government.
It is still a publicly managed business, but the fleets
are paying for the scientific research work appropriate
to their fishery. Last year, we challenged the findings
of the scientists in the snow crab fishery and we
threatened to hire an independent investigator. We
haven’t yet done it, but we did write a strong letter to
a minister, making some claims. Clearly, the minister
and the scientists at the national level were sensitive
to the things we wrote about. The fact that there are
still such people in the public domain allows us to
have some leverage still. Therefore, there is no reason
to believe that the public domain will not make a
comeback.
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Nalini: Well, Mike, if  I didn’t feel like you too, I would not be
here! I feel strongly that these things are reversible
because things backfire at so many levels. But what I
am trying to make both of you more conscious of is
that there are major changes taking place at the macro-
level that are going to completely alter the international
playing field, and we have to beware of them.
Simultaneously, there are a number of  so-called
philanthropic industrialists who are creating
foundations that are looking into humanitarian ways
of  managing the upcoming crisis and contradictions.
When various peoples’ movements cried halt to certain
unsustainable developments, they felt that science and
modern technology would find answers to all the
questions. It didn’t take long to realize that this would
not happen. Now they appropriate the logic of the
movements and try to integrate it into the capitalist
logic in order to give them greater legitimacy.
Have you heard about the World Humanist Action
Trust (WHAT)? This body of  extremely eminent
persons, mainly from the Northern world, was set up
by two big industrial giants. The trust has set up two
or three international commissions to develop
perspective documents on various global issues related
mainly to the use of  natural resources. Industry has
the money to pick the best brains of the world and
then decide to do what they like with all the
information they get.
I recently read a wonderful book by Marshall Berman
entitled All That is Solid Melts Into Air (All That is Solid
Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity by Marshall
Berman, Penguin USA, 1988 – Ed). The title is a sentence
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taken from the Communist Manifesto, in which Marx and
Engels make a critique of capitalism while, at the same
time, upholding the freedom, creativity and democratic
values and energy released by the bourgeois revolution.
Marx was thus a great admirer of  modernity. While he
sees the tremendous potential unleashed by the
bourgeois capitalist revolution, he also sees imminent
in it its destructive forces. Capitalism’s growth requires
that it destroys what it creates. The question we have
to ask ourselves today, therefore, is to what extent
modernity is sustainable.
Mike: Financial capital is clearly mythical and divorces itself
from production capital. It takes on a life of its own
and, I think, is getting to a point where money becomes
almost fictitious. But when it reaches a point that will
make people react, you will get a massive cultural
revolution—in a popular or fundamentalist sense. All
through this week, we have been searching, in our
conversation, how to understand this growing
populism and fundamentalism. The informal sectors
that are beginning to agitate must surely include culture,
religion, identities, etc. Nobody knows what attitude
to take in this context. We all have to really watch
ourselves.
Aliou: I would like to come back to the management
authority. I said that there are poor relations amongst
all these institutions that are involved in the authority.
Even through routine data collection, many new
concepts are being introduced, which is a way to
appropriate people’s knowledge. I am referring to
something that is called participatory research, an
approach adopted by some research organizations.
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By utilizing such an approach, the management
authority has been greatly enriched, but it has given
nothing back to the people who actually gave the
information in the first place, greatly reducing the
transactional costs of the research.
When the fishermen give information, they exercise a
sense of caution. They do not give out all the
information. This paucity becomes visible when the
management programmes are put in place. The
fishermen then get to see how little the scientists
actually know. They can even be said to be lying
because they do not have a total understanding of the
issue. The fishermen thus form a negative image about
scientific work. But on occasions that please them,
they participate fully, and then things can be mutually
beneficial.
I will end by saying a word about the negotiation
process. The participation of  fishermen enables the
management authority to apply for more funds in the
name of a better management system and support for
the artisanal sector. The existence of  the artisanal
sector is used to strengthen the management authority.
In this case, the informal sector actually empowers
the management authority.
Mike: But it is true that the fishermen have always been
indispensable for research. There is a need to negotiate,
though. What happened in Canada was that scientists
became the chief scapegoats for the downfall of the
cod fishery. But they blasted back, saying, “We work
with models and if  you give us bad information, how
can we develop a model?” It is true that the fishermen
do not give all the information; that’s one feature of
the business.
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But now you hear a lot of talk about  ‘traditional
knowledge’. Scientists are now talking about the value
of  traditional knowledge. This is another potential trap.
At least, for fishermen, it is terrain where they should
tread cautiously. Why should scientists have the
information just for the asking, anyway? Information
remains an unnegotiated area. If the traditional
knowledge of  fishermen is invaluable, why should they
give it away unconditionally?
Nalini: There are two aspects to what you are saying, Aliou.
One is the importance given today to ‘people’s
knowledge’. As social scientists realize that post-
industrial society has not been able to provide the
quality of life that it had promised, there are some
schools of thought that profess the need to restudy
traditional and customary practices. Some of  the
scientists are genuine in this search. There are others
who jump on to the bandwagon, if you like, and do it
because it is the fashionable mode. We should beware
of  these types.
But the other side of the coin is related to the question
of  intellectual property rights. This is another area that
is being debated worldwide today. People’s traditional
knowledge is being hijacked by the so-called scientific
community, which then establishes rights over it and
makes it a tradable commodity. Again, it is the victory
of the richest and most powerful in the world, who
then call the shots. New international treaties are being
made to govern the rules of  the game, and this is an
inherent part of  the new world order.
Aliou: You must be relative in saying that there are no stated
demands on the terms of  negotiation. I think two
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periods have to be distinguished. Earlier, we had
scientists go to the fishermen to do research, to collect
data on catches, etc. This was a kind of regular,
unbiased process, with no conventions. But, today,
things are changing and we have to be careful about
who appropriates the knowledge of  the fishermen, and
what role we, as supporters, play in encouraging this
process.
We have been saying here that the inshore has to be
valorized and this can be done only if  the fishermen
are able to retain for themselves the power they have
as inshore fishermen. In Senegal, part of  CNPS’
involvement in research has been provoked by the urge
to get more information and access to the research
done. CNPS was influenced by many events and it
claims a right to have, and to play, a role in the public
institutions too.
I want to come back to the business of indigenous
knowledge. It has been referred to in the conference
statements of  ICSF too. But, I think, we have to be
cautious. Would merely making statements mean there
are gains for the fishworker organizations? Traditional
knowledge has empowered the management authority,
and the researchers who use such concepts have won
recognition. Today, as researchers try to be more
integrated, they use terms that are supposed to be
politically correct, as you say, Mike. Now you notice
the whole thing in the United Nations Convention on
Environment and Development (UNCED) Agenda 21
too. (Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of  action to be taken globally,
nationally and locally by organizations of  the UN system, governments
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and major groups in every area in which humans impact on the
environment. Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, and the Statement of Principles for the Sustainable
Management of  Forests were adopted by more than 178 governments
at UNCED, held in Rio de Janerio, Brazil, from 3 to 14 June 1992
– Ed)
Nalini: I think Agenda 21 sought to defend the property rights
of communities because the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) was going to be negotiated. (One of the
key agreements adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro,
where world leaders agreed on a comprehensive strategy for ‘sustainable
development’, was the CBD. The CBD establishes three main goals:
the conservation of  biological diversity, the sustainable use of  its
components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits from the
use of genetic resources — Ed) If only government
representatives had their way, they would nullify
numerous such rights. Agenda 21 was a lobbying tool
or exercise that highlighted the areas for action in order
to demand more justice from these new agreements.
Mike: The business of  science and information clearly
requires as much strategy and political consciousness
as in any other domain. I was struck by what you were
saying. The fishermen demand that their knowledge
be taken into account, but it is not a negotiated
demand, in the sense that in making the demand, they
cannot be certain that their knowledge will be used in
a management system that will benefit them. So it is
problematic, the sharing of  information with the
scientists. On the other hand, if  you withhold
information and do not co-operate, what is your
alternative? Is it to reject the use of science in
managing the fishery altogether?
CONVERSATIONS134
Nalini: You come to a very important point here, Mike. You
ask whether we should refuse modern science, refuse
modernity. I do not know whether I will go all the way
and say we have to reject it, but we certainly have to
question it and we have to accept that modern science
has tremendous limitations. We, therefore, need to
exercise much more caution, take more time and even
probably blend several knowledge systems to find the
best solutions. This requires an open mind and great
humility and should certainly not be considered in
commercial terms.
Aliou: But we have to come back to the fishermen. Why don’t
they reject collaboration with scientists? Mike, you
seem to say that the fishermen don’t succeed in having
control over how their information is used. This makes
me come back to the management authority. Though
I would like to question the participatory approach,
from the fishermen’s point of  view, it is some sort of
achievement to be shoulder to shoulder with the
scientists, sharing coffee and a simple meal, perhaps,
and being together with them in the village setting.
Mike: Well, it’s a big issue, that of  the fishermen and their
knowledge and their relation to the scientists, more
so because it is never a negotiated relationship, since
the scientists are not accountable to the fishermen. I
know what you mean when the fishermen feel
‘valorized’ and flattered by associating with scientists.
In our own fishery, we find a tremendous amount of
spontaneous interest shown by the fishermen when
scientists come to their field. That clearly demonstrates
the fishermen’s knowledge about the resource and their
desire to improve their knowledge. It’s always a
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problematic area when the scientists try to fit all this
into a model and the fishermen are left with the model,
while the scientists have the last word.
But what I wanted to know was when you have a
conscious process where fishermen refuse to
collaborate with the scientists, what next? If they took
a political stand to withhold information, where do
they go from there? In our context, when we see this
happen, it is not done with any sophisticated
understanding. It generally gets displayed as mere
fundamentalism, hostility to knowledge, hostility to
planning, and so on. It is a problem area, especially
when political work has to be done by the fishermen’s
organization.
Nalini: When talking about scientists, I think there is a marked
difference, in general, between the scientists in India
and in Canada. From what I have seen in your part of
the world, I get the feeling that they are more hands-
on people and that their training involves direct
interaction or work in their areas of specialization.
Their approach is both practical and theoretical. I
think it is different in my country, where the technical
people are the less hands-on type, and to be a scientist
or engineer is a prestigious thing and requires that you
do not dirty your hands. I would be surprised if  many
of our marine biologists have ever swum in the sea!
Such scientists rarely think they have anything to learn
from the ‘simple’ fishermen; their training makes them
distant from the people and their issues.
Aliou: To place what you say in the Senagalese context, even
participating in this limited way is already political. In
our country, even if  scientists come from the fishing
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village—today many village people are educated—as
scientists, they belong to another class and are not
expected to dirty their hands. Unlike European and
Canadian scientists, Senegalese scientists are
automatically linked to, and dependent on, political
power. In your country, Mike, they can remain
independent of  the political power. We will never see
such a situation in Senegal. Also, former friends
became distant once the CNPS became political itself.
It is in this political context that we come back to the
question of ‘recognition’ and the fact that CNPS thinks
it is a big success to hold discussions with researchers
and scientists.
Mike: You have to assume that it is true that in Canada
scientists are more informal and more implicated in
the fishery, but it is not that they are independent
because they too are employed by government. What
I was driving at earlier was that the fishermen clearly
do search for knowledge about their fishery. They
certainly have their own intuitive knowledge, which
is not really explored, and that’s why you see this
fantastic energy in their interaction with scientists. But
this has nothing to do with the appropriation of
knowledge and how the people’s science is being used.
Aliou: I think the fishermen have to relate constructively too.
But, in Senegal, they are satisfied with the minimum
because of the difficult political context. They now
have to keep something for themselves, to hide
something, because it is a question of  status. The
scientists, on the other hand, need to show that there
is a difference between them and the fishermen. Thus,
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they will resort to symbolic gestures, like bringing their
laptops along to a meeting, even if they don’t use them.
I will say that in Africa, we can stop with the recipe of
models. It is ‘des demarche participative est plus un problem
de comportement que un question du model, des neuveau model
(The participative approach is more a behavioural
problem than an issue of the model, the new model)’.
Mike: I am trying to get at another point and that is the
potential of  being anti-intellectual. We see that
phenomenon among fishermen. It is the easiest thing
in the world to mobilize fishermen against scientists.
And then, what do you achieve? How do you manage
the fishery? Do you not use science at all? Maybe you
shouldn’t!
Aliou: I am sure if you ask the majority of Senegalese
fishermen, they will say, “No need for science; it is
useless.”
Mike: Well, even in Canada, they would say the same.
Aliou: I think you have a kind of complex situation, a
constellation of  factors like the stars. I think populism,
even if it can lead to anti-intellectualism, is, at the
same time, influenced by other factors in society, for
example, religious fatalism and the failure of fisheries
management plans. We cannot rely on the so-called
scientific people, as there is a complex interaction
among several factors.
Mike: I get stuck with this term populism all the time. There
are all kinds of populism that needn’t always take a
negative form. I was talking about a particular trend,
where you can indulge in mobilizing fishermen to be
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anti-scientist, but you have nothing else to offer. Once
you do this, you have to ask yourself whether you can
actually have a management system in the fishery.
These are areas of such misunderstanding, precarious
areas for fishworkers’ organizations to be in. You can
see that my own tendency is to want to see a lot of
the fishery ‘descientized’, if you wish. After all, the
project in Canada that was called scientific
management of the fishery has been such a spectacular
failure. How can we want to proceed with such a
system?
I am myself in a dilemma. I’ll give you an example
from our lobster fishery. We get a kick in saying that
of all the funds that go into fisheries management,
the lobster fishery gets the least, and yet it is the
country’s biggest fishery in terms of  value. So now
the scientists are paying more attention to lobster and
that is making me nervous. I have no confidence that
they are going to make any productive contribution.
On the other hand, we all want to have a better
scientific understanding of the resource. I think that
is natural, but I wonder whether the trade-off in having
more science is worth it at all. Here is a fishery that
has emerged as the best fishery, with the least amount
of science, and now science comes in and makes us
nervous. Science is not independent of  the
management system, and management systems are not
independent of  the dominant powers in the country.
Aliou: Your concern can be valuable because you have
nothing else to propose if you reject the existing
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system. This means that the fishermen must have an
appreciation of science. In Senegal, science has been
considered useless. In that situation, by withdrawing,
you have nothing to lose. So although our fishermen
may have collaborated with scientists in some
instances, it is not really difficult to withdraw. A lot
of data about the collapse of the fishery came from
outside sources, not from the scientists. This led to
the Germans concluding that Senegal was, in fact,
getting more money than it should for resources that
didn’t actually exist.
Nalini: I think, Mike, when you raise your question about the
relevance of present-day science, you are actually
seeking an alternative. I think the elements of your
present system of managing the lobster fishery should
form the basis of  the alternative model of
management.
Mike: Precisely. We are now seriously looking at this. The
lobster fishery is the backbone of the Maritimes, and
it has a management system that has worked much
more dialectically with the managing authority, without
scientists. That gives us a hint on how this experience
can be extended into broader management areas. In
Canada, we use the conceptual distinction of ‘input
controls’ and ‘output controls’. You can control a
fishery in many more ways than just by quotas. Quotas
are a system of ‘output controls’. Our lobster fishery
is controlled by ‘input controls’ or effort control. Those
who have thought it through, do not think it is crazy
to question the quota system. We can now picture how
to build in effort controls even for groundfish that
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migrates. Another element is the fact that lobster itself
is sedentary and widely dispersed and so is easier to
manage.
On the Will of Allah
Mike: We could probably start this discussion on ‘the will of
Allah’ from an unusual angle. We have never
mentioned even once that fishers are a different breed
of  people. I have always been struck by the fact that
fishers are hunters and their anthropology is different.
In our context, in Canada, they are in transition because
things have changed. Their implements have changed
and have become more sophisticated, with fishfinders,
GPS, etc. But the culture of  fishing that we used to be
in touch with, can still be experienced.
But what do I know about the anthropology of  fishing?
Except that holding on to this tradition in today’s
system is holding on to an anarchist system, compared
to the rest of  society. We have referred to the apparent
fatalism in fishing culture, mainly arising from an
inability to handle things like storms at sea, and so
on. I think, in a simplistic way, any organization that
wants to survive in the fishing culture can’t ignore
this distinct aspect of fishing being a hunting type of
culture. Any organization that forgets that aspect of
fishing culture will not succeed. We must learn to leave
a lot of room in our thinking for ironies, for occurrences
that take place unexpectedly, and even for reversals.
That’s what I mean when I say you have to leave room
for ‘the will of Allah’.
But then we have all these other conditions for gains
and victories. Such things are never consciously
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determined by fishermen’s organizations. My
experience is that the actual scope for conscious action,
rational acts of  planning, and so on, are very few, and
you are constantly waiting for conditions to develop.
I’m surprised that when I sit with fishermen friends,
we are always making predictions, trying to read the
lines of the future in order to know where to go next.
This brings us back to where we started in our long
conversation—how and when we can make effective
interventions in the fishery.
You have to wait for the right events and conditions
to emerge before you do. The main work of  an
organizer in the MFU is to keep in touch with the base
and build up a reading of the situation. Gilles
Theriault—whose job I took over at the MFU – was a
voluntarist and that zeal of voluntarism would drive
the staff  and keep everybody going. But it was not a
generalized phenomenon. So you would find really
burnt-out and frustrated people in situations that were
not winnable, where the conditions permitted no action
at all.
Nalini: What you seem to be referring to is that the objective
conditions have to be ripe for anything to happen, the
‘historical conjuncture’, as I think it is called, but not
the ‘will of Allah’.
Aliou: Yes, what you have been mentioning sounds very
objective and palpable for me. Some people have a
monolithic and very structured way of  looking at
organizations—everything has to be in place and
organized, meetings have to be regular, reports have
to be presented, and so on. But I am glad you look at
organizations differently. In Senegal, people need not
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meet on any regular basis to keep an organization going.
This kind of logic is not understood by those who are
not close to reality. In my mind, fishermen take action
only when they realize they have to. It is more related
to le justess (correctness). It is somewhere between what
is illogical, on the one hand, and thinking that is
rational, on the other, somewhere in the middle. When
you talked about ‘the will of Allah’, I was thinking
about events that are not controllable in the life of
the fishermen, which makes them fatalistic. I thought
you were referring to that aspect, but I now appreciate
how you have tried to develop a different
consciousness.
Mike: I would like to clarify that I am using it in context. All
it means is that there are so many vast areas beyond
our control that you cannot change anything just by
an act of  will. That’s why I associate it with dialectics.
Everybody in this business of social action is prone
to magical or omnipotent thinking, even fantasy
thinking, if you like. These tendencies will always be
related to a kind of voluntarism and the belief that
you can actually do all this stuff, that, for example,
you can change the nature of the State by an act of
will or through sheer determination. But perhaps we
should find a concept other than ‘the will of Allah’
because that may touch upon some people’s
sensitivities.
Nalini: Now that you have clarified what you said, I think I
understand what you are trying to communicate.
Initially, I too didn’t expect to hear ‘the will of  Allah’,
although, as you say, being able to read events and
feel the pulse is absolutely necessary to determine when
and how an organization should grow and act.
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I have a very different personal experience. My initial
years in fisheries were spent in a Christian fishing
community, Marianad, where people were very religious
and the Church was the main force or power. I went
there with my own values and understanding of
poverty and, as I told you earlier, all that dramatically
changed after I got deeper into the actual economics
of  the fishing community.
What I want to say here is that I was repeatedly struck
by the way the people led their lives and took
everything as it came, so to say. When they went out
to sea, they never knew whether they would come
back with anything. If  they did, sometimes it would
be just enough for themselves. If  there was a surplus,
it would be shared with neighbours; the children of
the neighbours would just come over and sit to eat.
Nothing needed to be said; it was taken for granted.
This was based on the belief that “what is given is
from God”, and that “God will take care of us”, and
that “God knows what is best for us”.
Having been brought up as a Christian myself, I found
these people lived more genuinely by what was written
in the scriptures than I, who lived more by the logic
that “god helps those who help themselves”. I realized
that this factor of religion in their lives also meant
that solidarity and sharing mattered so much in the
community, and that this communitarian dimension
was so necessary in sustaining the fishery.
Later, when we were faced with diminishing catches,
we thought we had to try to understand better the need
for resource management. I remember we organized
what we called a ‘fish-bowl’ discussion. We had a group
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of scientists discuss among themselves questions about
the resource, in their own jargon, while the fishworkers
observed.
In that process, one statistical biologist explained that
the method of sampling is very representative of
reality. He gave an analogy: if  you want to see whether
the rice in a pot is cooked, you take out a single grain
and feel it; if that particular grain is cooked, you
presume all the rice is cooked.
When the fishermen were given a chance to respond,
they were quite adamant that fish stocks could not be
assessed this way. Fish stocks were dynamic and such
assessments were illogical. The scientist explained that
models had been developed using a number of
variables and factors that took into account the
dynamic situation. But this did not seem to convince
the fishermen, who couldn’t fathom how a model could
understand the sea!  For a long time, they refused any
discussion on ‘management’, saying that resource
stocking is a cyclical phenomenon. Some also came
up with fatalistic arguments.
I remember how the fishermen would get upset with
me when I talked about fishing being a hunting activity,
when I introduced some of them to the ‘feminist
analysis’ of  the fishery. I tried to explain it in contrast
to agriculture, which was such a conscious act and
which required a period of  waiting for results. They
did not want to associate their work with the act of
hunting because they felt they were not as ‘violent’ as
hunters, and that they used time and skill to trace and
catch their fish. Moreover, the overriding belief was
that the fish is ‘God-given’.
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I felt it was a well-integrated system, where people’s
beliefs and production systems resulted in social
relations that they developed among themselves. Well,
now, when things have changed dramatically in the
fishery, both this consciousness and the sense of
community and solidarity have also drastically
changed. Today, the fishermen are led more by very
individualistic goals. I wonder whether this kind of
individualism in their work will obstruct the
communitarian social process that may be required in
what is today called ‘community-based resource
management’.
Aliou: Mike, when you talk about the ‘will of God’, I can
understand that where religion plays an important role.
What you say is applicable in Senegal. When people
gather even for an official meeting, they have to first
pray. God is always present and, at the same time, this
deep religiosity also makes them accept other religions
and they are thus tolerant. This is important because
we can see how the fishermen are able to link the need
to build their organizations with the fatalism that
animates them.
There are so many accidents at sea, when people die,
but it is considered a great thing for the fishermen,
that they have been taken by God, and it is all the will
of  God. It is almost like a blessing. That’s why, Nalini,
Abay Fall, General Secretary of  CNPS, did not mention
the devastation by the cyclone. I have been thinking
about that. You were so amazed that the fishermen
did nothing when so many were killed at sea and so
much equipment destroyed. Actually, Fall had not even
mentioned to me all that had happened. He was telling
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you only because you were asking, and he seemed to
get worked up by your questions and your concern.
But I’m sure he kept quiet with me because it was not
something to report. The wind and the water have a
great importance in people’s lives and beliefs; floods
are considered a punishment from God, a time to
repent and change your lives. It is amazing that, during
a flood, we can sometimes hear on the radio requests
to people to go back to God and to repent.
Mike, you also make a link about fishermen who are
in transition. I think there is need for revitalization.
There are cases when fishermen lose the habit of  being
hunters and become more of technicians, using
fishfinders and GPS, and so on. But technology
actually makes fishermen greater hunters. In our case,
the fishermen saw massive openings with the coming
of outboard motors, when the resources in the inshore
were becoming scarce. As with the ring-seines, there
is a tendency to chase the fish, so the fishermen have
to go farther out into the sea.
The idea about where the traditional fishing grounds
are is also changing. That sense of  property regarding
certain fishing grounds is also disappearing in the
language that the fishermen use. Now they have to go
in search of  fish. The fishermen put out to sea with
two tanks of fuel.
Mike: You make me conscious of  how easy it is to be
simplistic in our comments. It is not so much to do
with technology. I haven’t had much contact with
trawler captains. And, for a brief  moment, you can’t
say that that man, the trawler captain, is not a
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fisherman, even though he is operating a huge vessel.
I am sure he too has so many of these characteristics
we have been talking about.
But, Aliou, to digress a bit, you made me think of
something. You said ‘the will of  God’ and not ‘will of
Allah’!
Nalini: I noticed that too and it rang a bell.
Mike: Aliou, you used ‘the will of God’ because that has no
emotional connotation for you, just as using ‘the will
of Allah’ has few emotional connotations for us
Christians. If  I said ‘the will of  God’ in my context,
people would think I was nuts. But both of  you talked
about the concept in a religious way, which is very
different from the way I used it.
Nalini, you described Christianity in the
communitarian spirit of  your village. You were also
aware that you were coming there with different
values, but the way you concluded your analysis
seemed to me rather weak. You seemed to be
lamenting that the old solidarity has been broken, and
that there is no longer any base for community
management. There are a billion different ways to look
at community management. In Nova Scotia, for
instance, it means a particular group of  fishermen
sharing a quota.
Nalini: That’s not how we conceive of  community in our
country. For you, it is a closed shop—this many
fishermen have access to ‘x’ quantity of  fish.
Aliou: In the lobster case, is i t  community-based
management? I am not sure. Yours is a system of
community-based access rights.
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Mike: I never use the word community-based management,
except in one case where it is used to refer to a specific
experiment and all that meant there was that a group
of  fishermen got a quota that they managed amongst
themselves. Community quota is a misnomer,
according to me.
Nalini: Then why all the big noise about community-based
management systems?
Mike: Yeah, watch out for it. In theory, it would mean that
instead of your management authority being national,
you would have a locally-based management system.
Aliou: I realize, as we proceed, that we have to question this
concept. We have to always consider the local context
of  the fishery. In Senegal, if  we talk about community-
based management, we should use the concept of
territory because we are in a multispecies fishery and
in a context where migration is highly developed. Since
we do not have any system of management now and
as we do not know the dynamics of the resource, isn’t
it dangerous to speak in terms of  a community quota
now?
Mike: Coming back to you, Nalini, we have to explore the
concept of  solidarity. Could you explain it a bit further?
Nalini: Basically, Mike, looking at the fishery like a closed
shell—sharing what exists amongst those who fish
today—is inconceivable in our context. The fishery
offers a source of food to so many people in different
ways. Earlier, the idea that fish was a gift from God
made you share some fish if you caught more than
enough; and you knew that if you didn’t get any
tomorrow, you could always get some from those who
had.
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So many people in the community—the old, the sick,
the disabled—have an unstated right to the fish when
it is landed. I remember Joseph, the ‘poor’ leprosy
patient in Marianad village. One day I saw that some
extension was being made to his house and I wondered
how he managed to do that. The women told me, “Oh,
you should see how much fish he takes on the beach.”
When Joseph died, there was the usual big feast that
takes place a few days after the funeral. Without
‘earning’ a penny all his life, Joseph had put aside
money for this event, so that he could be buried with
due honour.
Aliou: Let me tell you that the same thing happens in Senegal
too. For instance, if  in a poor fishing season a fisherman
from St Louis has to come to Dakar for a meeting, he
may borrow some money to pay for his transport.
Before he returns home, he will make a trip to Hann,
where there are a number of  migrant fishermen from
St Louis, and he will go to the beach at landing time.
He can be sure to get his money back and maybe even
a little extra from a fisherman who lands a good catch.
Nalini: Yes, in times of  solidarity the surplus gets distributed.
But these relationships have broken down now. So if
a management system comes in and access is further
restricted, where will all these people go? There is no
social security programme of the State to fall back
on.
Aliou: If  the community’s solidarity gets dislocated, that may
be related to other factors too. I think we have to
identify the constraints that lead the fishermen to these
positions. Perhaps sharing takes place in other ways.
For instance, take the introduction of  the outboard
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motors in Senegal. It did lead to some changes and
dislocation in family relationships, because the right
that the family members earlier had to the revenue
was restricted.
But what you say, Nalini, may give the impression that
the fishermen are getting very individualistic. If  you
put it like that, vested interests will capitalize on it
and press for greater privatization. I have never seen a
fisherman becoming a capitalist.
Nalini: I am not saying that the fishermen will become
capitalists. I do understand all the pressures they face,
even for those whose operations manage to break even.
But the mentality that seems to creep in under this
pressure is the ‘survival of  the fittest’ attitude. In the
process, lots of  people are left by the wayside. So,
while the fishery may appear to be ‘developing’, there
are lots of people who are dispossessed. This is more
visible in some areas than in others. The other factor
is that in some areas, the sector that processes bycatch,
which goes into fishmeal, absorbs labour from the
outside. People who are dispossessed from agriculture
come to work for a pittance to sort and dry the bycatch.
Mike: What you are saying is that the community solidarity
spirit, built into the sharing system, is breaking down.
You are asking, what could now be the basis of
solidarity? You can go further and ask whether
fishermen can be organized at all, under these
conditions.
You are talking about a community crisis generated by
the combined dynamic of diminishing resources and
the transformation in operations of  the fishing vessels.
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Under these conditions of a huge community crisis,
what you mentioned earlier occurs—communalism
grows in the community. Could you also say that this is
part of the community crisis? And that the phenomenon
of an ‘escape into politics’ takes place? I am not at all
surprised that this happens under such circumstances
because the conditions to organize sound real bad.
One of  the biggest protests that we have had in recent
years has been in Southwest Nova Scotia by fishermen
in the Shelburn country area. The issue involved a
combination of factors, mainly the introduction of
groundfish quotas. This was being done on the basis
of history; so if your history in the fishery was minor,
you got a smaller share of the quota. Relatively poor
people were thus being disenfranchised. So in what
was otherwise a rich fishery, protests began. And where
do those people who are disenfranchised go?
Nalini: So what will you do in a community of community-
based management? What do you call community-
based management?
Mike: That is what I am asking you because I don’t know. I
am trying to learn from your experience. I have heard
people talk about it theoretically and I do not know
how one goes about it in reality.
Aliou: I would like to say a word about this community crisis
that we are talking about. The transformation of
ownership does have a negative impact on solidarity
in the community. I recall that in the early 1990s, the
Senegalese government released a sum of money to
contain some social revolts from the university. This
money enabled some university people to invest in
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the fishery. These people came in with new ways of
managing the enterprise by changing the sharing
system. That led to heaps of  problems. Other
dependents, like the wives of  fishermen, for instance,
were left out.
In our context, solidarity is reciprocal. There was a
reaction as the fishermen are exposed to risks, and
since fishing is unpredictable, the idea of reciprocity
is very deep among the people. The system of
reciprocity is destroyed if the basis to share is
destroyed. So I understand what you say, Nalini. In
fact, because it is so important to maintain this aspect
of  reciprocity, a fisherman who is dispossessed of  his
craft, will agree to work as captain and not as a crew
member on the pirogues of investors from outside. In
this way, he is still in control. He maintains his social
status and remains within the system of reciprocity
and in this way, a sort of  security net is maintained.
Mike: Wait a minute there. I am still trying to understand
Nalini, what is possible under the conditions you
mention. If  there is no intervention of  some sort, the
fishermen will continue to diminish the resource.
Nalini: Yes, that’s right, Mike. In fact, in Kerala in India, I
think there has been no real revolt in the fishing
community although these safety nets have crumbled,
because there has been an inflow of money from the
oil-rich Gulf  or Middle East countries. People have
gone and made some money there, and remittances
into Kerala are high. But if  that source dries up, I
wonder what will happen.
Aliou: It is difficult for me to understand the stratified social
classes built up in the artisanal fishery.
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Nalini: Aliou, you should see some of  our fishing areas. I have
seen the Gujarat fishery, for instance, evolve over the
last 23 years. I had gone there first because their
artisanal fishermen had ‘successfully’ made the
transition to the outboard motors, when our fishermen
in the South had rejected them. I was really impressed
to see the whole community buzzing with life at one
big village in Veraval. Fishermen fitted motors on to
their small crafts and zoomed off to fish. Others would
be returning from fishing trips to land huge catches of
good-value fish, unmount the outboard motors, put
them on their shoulders and walk off home. That was
really impressive. There was also one section of
artisanal fishermen who had much larger sized boats
with large gill-nets. Their boats had inboard motors
and they went on longer fishing voyages and they too
landed huge quantities of fish.
But when I went back later, these gill-net boats had
begun to change to medium-sized trawls like we had
in the South. That spelt doom in my eyes. The
fishermen were talking about a landing centre being
developed, and several fish processing plants were
coming up.
When I was there again in 1994, I spent a rather long
time in the area. I couldn’t believe what I saw in that
old fishing village, which had been so vibrant on my
first visit. It was absolutely dead. Men and women
were sitting idle on the beach. The small craft were
lying overturned and there were just a couple that had
ventured out and people were waiting to see what they
came back with. It was depressing to hear the women
talk about how the fishery had been destroyed after
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the trawlers were introduced. Since they had their
OBMs, they hadn’t taken the subsidies offered then
to buy trawlers, even if they understood that the trawl
was not an ideal gear. Now, they had nothing and
would sometimes go to the landing centre to look for
wage work. Some of the small boats also worked as
offloading craft for the trawlers. That was how the
fisherfolk of  Veraval earned their living now.
I can tell you heaps of  stories like this. Another
situation that has made a marked impression on me is
what I saw happen over some years in the transient
winter fishery of  West Bengal. In the winter fishery,
fixed bag-nets are used. They are fixed in the water
for the duration of  fishing. These fishing operations
are huge, with one fisherman hiring a crew for the
fishing season and setting up a ‘transient’ establishment
at the landing area. This establishment includes living
quarters for the crew—about 25 of them—a huge area
to store the fish that is dried, and a drying area that is
fenced off. All the drying is done by women and the
poorer men, who also move to the area with bag and
baggage during the season. Earlier, these families came
from other fishing areas, but, over time, they are
coming increasingly from inland villages, where there
is no other agricultural work. The incomes got during
this transient winter fishery season actually kept the
people going. Yet, as the labour supply increased, wages
fell and, over time, the catches began falling too.
On one visit, I noticed a huge construction coming
up near one such transient winter fishery area. On
enquiring, I found out that it was a fish drying plant, a
quasi-government venture. I was shocked because this
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would displace the poor women who came to dry fish.
The fishermen’s union used that as an occasion to
organize the women in the area and they succeeded in
seeing that the project did not take off.
So you really have to be watchful of what happens in
an area, because if you are too late, there is no way of
going back.
Mike: I would really like our fishermen to hear all these
stories; they certainly are depressing. The dilemma the
fishworker organizations face in Canada is how to
recover fish stocks. You cannot de-mechanize the
boats, but how will you recover the stocks?
Aliou: I don’t think the big problem is the recovery of the
stocks, but recovering what has been lost, the people
who have been expropriated.
Mike: I think you are dreaming. What other actions by
fishermen can you have? Is the State going to be able
to handle that kind of situation? What will community
mean in such a situation? I can only see that the
interest of the community should be to recover the
stocks for the community.
Aliou: Even if I’m dreaming, let me ask you a question. Are
you going to recover the resource only for those who
have the means to exploit them now? What about those
who have already been dropped out?
Mike: That’s an excellent point and I can begin to theorize
idealistically, if  you like. You can try to contain the
fishing fleet that has developed and stabilize it in terms
of  capacity. Then the rest of  the fishermen can benefit
from recovery measures. I can’t say it’ll work easily,
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because we are always struggling with things like this
ourselves. But what’s the alternative?
Aliou: My only answer is that I cannot compare because I do
not know the Indian fishery well enough.
Mike: Well, I say all this with great hesitation because at
home, that is what we call micro-management. And
it’s a dog’s breakfast. But the basis of  all we do is the
conviction that the stocks will recover.
Aliou: What I am saying is that you cannot handle this issue
on a micro-basis.
Nalini: So now do you understand what we are up against in
our country? Can you understand better why the NFF
has grown to be a social movement union?
On Self-financing as a Means of Sustainability
Mike: I think the ambition behind the model of the MFU
was to be a membership-based organization that paid
its own way, collecting dues from members. The only
way you can be independent is when the members pay
for the organization. But, in the experience of the
Maritimes, it was never possible to finance the
organization from membership dues until we got the
necessary legislation.
Nowhere else in the Maritimes, outside New
Brunswick, do members maintain a broad-based
organization. They have no problem taking up single
issues that affect them locally. Fishermen will pay
unlimited amounts for a lawyer on a specific issue;
there is no problem there. The midshore fleets thus
have highly professional organizations, all of which
finance themselves. Ironically, if  you look closely, all
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expenses are charged to the enterprise—the fees come
off  the running expenses of  the boat, and the crew
members, in most cases, are being taxed without being
represented. So what can you conclude when you talk
of broad-based organizations?
In our context, if you have to depend only on
voluntary contributions, it is difficult to sustain an
organization. It is a dilemma that runs right through
the North Atlantic trade union movement. The trade
unions demand that union dues be deducted at source
from the worker’s pay. After a while, the worker forgets
why the union exists and begins to see his dues as a
tax.
In the MFU, over the first 10-12 years of  its existence,
enormous energies and time were spent to fight for
legislation that would allow for self-financing. So, one
of the political actions of a broad-based organization
involves winning concessions from the government
to provide enabling legislation to be self-financing. It
is easier to do this in the Canadian context because
the fish buyer is obligated to make other deductions
like unemployment insurance premiums and pension
plan contributions. So there is an administrative system
in place already.
Nalini: What you are saying, Mike, is that earlier, the MFU
had broader concerns, and now, with the shrinking of
those concerns, the organization has shrunk in scope
too. At a particular point, you made a choice, and, in
retrospect, it was the correct choice and it paid off,
also because of other related factors like the lobster
being a sedentary resource. So the MFU stabilized and
is now secure.
CONVERSATIONS158
But what will happen if, at this stage, you were to
leave the organization and be replaced by a person
without similar social consciousness, say, someone
who is more of a technocrat? That will be the death-
knell of  the MFU. What should prevent that from
happening?
Mike: You should never underestimate the anarchic character
of  the fishermen. This enabling legislation could be
overturned in a matter of  hours. We can be wiped out
just like that. You are right about the technocrat type,
but if  conditions do change, the fishermen can also
get rid of  the technocrat types just like that too.
In terms of  the organization, getting recognition has
to take into account self-financing. If  it doesn’t, will
it end up relying on supporters who draw their support
from any source, say, from the Green Party or any old
NGO?
Well, this makes me think of  something else related
to supporters. If  you have no supporters, the
organization actually doesn’t need much money.
Fishermen always fall into the trap of  saying they can
manage without staff as they would prefer their
organization remains local so that they have control
over it and can take up only local issues. We used to
say that organizing fishermen is a bit like having a
farm in the Brazilian rain forest and going away for
the weekend and, on your return, realizing that the
forest has grown over the farm. It is that fragile when
you depend on voluntary support.
And then there are people who would say, “So what if
the organization disappears? Fishermen have their own
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ways of  organizing when the need arises.” Well, you
can’t discount that position and it is not one that we
should take lightly. But we can ask, in return, whether
the fishermen of  the Maritimes would have been in as
good a position without the MFU?
But let’s hear from you, Aliou.
Aliou: I too am concerned about the question of autonomy
because of the complexities that money linkages bring
about. But you make me conscious of  several things.
I would like to indicate how complex it is to make an
organization independent, and how complex is the
relationship between a person’s professional and social
obligations. People have all kinds of  social obligations,
to individuals, to religious leaders, and so on. Then
there are complex relations between the organization
and the State. The State often uses the organization
to perpetuate its own ideas and to control it. This is
not new. You know how during the two World Wars
the traditional chiefs and religious leaders collaborated
in conscribing people to go to war for the Europeans
because the State could not do it directly.
Coming to what you have been saying, you are making
a positive link between gaining recognition and being
independent. I can see this as negative too. If  you look
at the CNPS, it is in search of  recognition from the
Senegalese government. At the same time, it has also
gone to the international level to get recognition there.
NGOs can lose their autonomy and gradually see a
build-up of  dependency.
Nalini: What happens next is that the NGO uses this
relationship for its own gains.
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Aliou: Of course. The other point is that it is difficult, in the
context of Senegal, to collect dues for the organization.
We have to raise other funds too, just like in India.
These contributions come in so many different ways.
At the local level, lots of voluntary contributions are
made at local meetings, when people have to be hosted.
The fishermen mobilize resources locally to make all
this possible. They look on it as a social obligation,
even if they have to borrow some money for the
contribution.
The fishermen find it more difficult to finance a
structure at the national level. This may also be due
to the bad experience they had with the co-operative
regime, when they got badly cheated. Therefore, they
resist a national organization whose headquarters are
away from the village.
The autonomy of the organization hasn’t to do with
money but with factors concerning power and
autonomy from religion and State. It is also difficult
to know whether the fishworkers we work with are as
concerned as the supporters about such things as the
sustainability of the organization. In my experience,
these issues have never been raised within the
organization; they have come from outside or from
some ideological thinkers. One wonders whether
sustainability is a priority for the fishermen.
One thing positive in what you have said, Mike, is
that, as far as the organization is concerned, sustaining
the resource will help to stabilize it.
Mike: What Aliou has said makes a lot of sense. There is the
whole business of voluntary spirit that exists in the
early stages of an organization. That never gets
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properly recorded. In the MFU too, the fishermen have
made enormous contributions. Whatever they do for
the organization is at the cost of their fishing time.
They too have hosted people endlessly.
In a sense, the voluntary spirit is the hard core of the
organization in its early stages. That is lost when you
reach a point of  self-financing. Then, the fishermen
who earlier did things voluntarily will ask for per diems,
sitting fees, and so on.
Nalini: I feel this is where women are different. They continue
to give freely of their time under very difficult
circumstances. Very rarely do they ask for sitting fees,
whereas most men see it as a right. This is because
women are used to doing so much without counting
the cost.
Mike: Well, we have been reflecting on the whole lives of
organizations. We are trying to relativize and put
nuances to what fishermen’s organizations, in fact,
achieve. What attracts some of us to work in fisheries
is the fact that the ocean itself is so anarchic.
The best plans of men and mice are constantly being
undermined and reversed for reasons that you cannot
predict.
* * * * * *
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Three Essays
An Essay on the
Maritime Fishermen’s Union
by Michael Belliveau
Introduction
Two recent events have motivatedme to return to a partially
constructed essay on the MFU. The first was a nasty conflict
that erupted this summer at the mouth of  the famous Miramichi
River in eastern New Brunswick. The conflict was precipitated
by a unilateral decision of a band of native Mi’kmaqs at Burnt
Church to fish lobster ‘out of season’.
I
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The second event was the recent breakdown of the
Constitutional Assembly of  the WFF in Loctudy, France. The
World Forum was the first attempt ever of  small-scale fishermen
and fishworkers to formally associate at a global level. After
four days of debate and workshops directed to adopting a
constitution, half  the delegates walked out to form a second
forum. The leader of  the walkout is said to have stated that the
split was inevitable and that he was satisfied to be free from the
‘harvesters’ to get on with his ‘fishworker’ concerns. (See Editor’s
note on page 281 – Ed)
An MFU type of organization is an easy mark for persons
who build their fight around identity or race or numbers. Our
members could be termed ‘harvesters’, although I always knew
them as inshore fishermen. Our fishermen are mostly male, and
on average are 47 years of age. Most of the crew members on
our inshore boats are not in the MFU.
Burnt Church native people showed little or no grasp of
the role the MFU was playing in this summer’s dispute. Similarly,
the Afro-Asian bloc that walked out at Loctudy appeared to be
oblivious to the nature of our type of organization. As a result,
I have an added motivation to write about the MFU.
On the face of it and from a ‘world’ perspective, the MFU
could be seen as passé. After all, our members are overwhelmingly
male, inshore captain/owners (as distinct from crew members).
They are largely Caucasian and middle-aged. In short, they could
be dispensed of  as ‘harvesters’, and presumably less
environmentally friendly because of that designation.
But I am not buying this kind of reductionism. In the
present ‘globalizing’ context, I believe, more than ever, in the
MFU type of organization that has been honed from 20 years of
struggle organizing inshore fishermen, that retains a broad
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membership base among inshore fishermen, that functions
through a democratic structure and that maintains a progressive
approach to the fishery and social matters.  I believe the survival
and development of our type of organization is even more
important.
At the outset, I refer the reader to A Word to Say, a readable
history of  the MFU written in the late 1980s. This work by Sue
Calhoun gives a well-documented background to the organization
that is the subject of  my personal reflections below. My longtime
colleague in the MFU, Réginald Comeau, began organizing the
fishermen on New Brunswick’s Acadian Peninsula back in 1972.
Five years later, the MFU was finally launched in the famous
fishing village of Baie-Ste-Anne. Even in the 1970s, most of
the fishing villages in this region were ‘dirt poor’, but Canada’s
post-war boom economy was inevitably trickling down even to
its remote fishing villages.
Comeau himself grew up in the tiny fishing community of
Val Comeau. His father eked out a living from the sea and the
woods; salted herring and potatoes were the staple diet at the
family supper. Comeau was the first generation of  Acadians to
go to university in significant numbers, but, like many of his
student associates, he rejected the pull of the metropolis to return
to his people. The Réginald Comeaus of this world make a story
that runs through virtually all working-class movements.
I have no precise definition of the ‘working class’, but I
count the fishermen of  the MFU in this category, recognizing
that the intellectuals around our organization used to always have
some trouble figuring out how the fishermen fit into a sociological
categorization. In the early days of organizing, we used to talk
of them as ‘dependent contractors’ or ‘tradesmen’; those
opposing unionization of  fishermen would say they were
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‘independent businessmen’. Others talk of  fishermen as ‘primary
producers’, while yet others see them in social anthropology
terms as ‘hunters’ and ‘gatherers’.
Truthfully, my own motivation for joining the MFU’s
organizing work back in 1981 was at least partially to come to
terms with what I believed to be a worldwide challenge. In my
vague notions, I saw inshore fishermen as primary producers, or
‘peasants’, if  you like. From this perspective, inshore fishermen
were in the sector where most of  the world’s population was.
The challenge was to see whether this sector—the peasant
farmer, the primary producer, the inshore fishermen—could
organize effectively to defend and create a long-term future for
this ‘way of life’.
So, I came to the MFU with a rather intellectual conception
of the challenge. Not so for a person like Comeau, who knew
the straightforward hardship of  fishermen. Even the social
security systems we now know in the Canadian fishery were barely
functioning in 1972.
Interpreting the organizing experience of the MFU is
fraught with ambiguities and ironies, and whether I have reached
any conclusions about my original question will have to await
the unravelling of  this essay.
Fisheries in Canada
For the international reader, I should provide a little more
detail about the Canadian situation. Canada has a vast continental
shelf on its Atlantic seaboard. It ranges from Davis Inlet in the
Arctic to George’s Bank, a stone’s throw from the Boston States,
as they are still called by Maritimers. In Canada, ‘Maritimers’ are
the people who live in the eastern provinces of Canada (New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island or PEI and Nova Scotia).
Newfoundland is separated from the Maritimes by the Gulf of
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St  Lawrence. It has a largely separate history from the Maritimes,
having joined Canada only in 1949. In Newfoundland can be
found half  the fishery of  Canada’s Atlantic coast. The Maritimes
have most of  the rest of  the fishery, while Quebec would have
five per cent.
It is the fishermen of  the Maritimes—the inshore small-
scale fishermen—that the MFU set out to organize. The average
inshore fishing vessel is approximately 12 m long and, on average,
there are 2.5 fishermen to a boat. So, you find about 25,000
inshore fishermen in the Maritimes. Due to weather conditions
(a sizeable portion of the Maritimes is frozen in for four to five
months a year), most inshore fishermen would actually be at sea
for 60 to 100 days a year. The fishery is seasonal and provides
incomes that vary from place to place. The fishermen who hold
licences are the owners of their own vessels, and they tend to
have yearly incomes on par with most working Canadians, while
the crew members or helpers vary considerably in the amount of
fishing they get. Some work on a share basis in the pelagic and
groundfish fishery; others are on a straight weekly wage.
Newfoundland is known worldwide for its cod fishery that
has since been devastated. The Maritimes has always had a more
diversified fishery, but, in recent years, the lobster fishery, which
is almost entirely inshore (that is, in waters of 5-15 m in depth),
produces over 60 per cent of  the value of  the inshore fleet’s
landings. The inshore fishermen in the Maritimes catch
approximately Can$450 million worth of  landings per year.
All fishing communities have wharves where you find
anywhere from 20 to 120 inshore vessels. While Newfoundland
still has many remote outports, most fishing communities in the
Maritimes are well connected by road to urban centres.
Nevertheless, it is fish that makes them work.
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Most fish caught by our fishermen–90 per cent–goes to
the export market. The single largest centre for Canada’s fish
exports is Boston, where it is further distributed throughout the
US. Japan is an important market for our herring roe, tuna, snow
crab and lobster, and the EU buys up to 25 per cent of our
exports.
Subsistence fishing has been practised by native peoples
in eastern Canada for thousands of  years. The commercial fishery,
predominantly cod, was spawned by Europe in the 1500s.
Canada’s east coast fishing grounds have been the target of
countless fishing nations, especially after World War II. These
nationals included not only the Spaniards and Portuguese but
also the Soviets, the Japanese, the French, the Americans, the
Faroese, the Dutch, the Germans, the East Bloc and even the
Cubans. This fishing frenzy culminated in over 800,000 tonnes
of cod being captured in Canadian waters in 1968. In 1987,
Canada claimed jurisdiction over its 200-mile EEZ and, since
then, there has been an almost total Canadianization of the
fishery–small comfort for the decimated cod fishery, where much
of the original damage was done by international fleets in the
1950s and 1960s.
Canada is generally considered an industrialized Western
nation. As such, the size of its inshore fishery is an anomaly in
the Western context. The inshore supports hundreds of  fishing
villages, and lands as much as 70 per cent of  the country’s fish
catch, especially since the virtual elimination of the offshore
cod, flounder and ocean perch fisheries. Even the herring fishery
that was heading toward total industrialization with the advent
of a large purse-seine fleet in the 1960s is still 50 per cent made
up of  inshore small gillnet fishermen. (The MFU played an
instrumental role in the reversal of  a seiner-dominated fishery
to an inshore fishery in the Gulf of St Lawrence, to which I will
come back later).
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Réginald Comeau and others began organizing on the
Acadian Peninsula, the heartland of the Acadian people.
Acadians have a distinct history in Canada. Having settled in
Nova Scotia in the 1620s from France, they are some of the
original European families to settle in North America. They
flourished as small farmers until the French-English wars of  the
1750s. In 1753, they were victims of  ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the
British, who controlled the colony. They were violently evicted
from their lands by British troops and deported mainly to the US
and the Caribbean. Many escaped by river and forests to
coastlands on the Gulf of St Lawrence. The Acadian Peninsula
juts out into the Gulf  and is a major fishing centre to this day.
When Comeau started organizing, lobster catches were a
quarter of  present-day landings.. The rich herring schools were
rapidly shrinking under heavy fishing pressure from the recently
arrived purse-seine fleet. The cod landings were down to 10 per
cent of the previous decade, and prices of fish were generally
depressed. Nova Scotia fishermen had been through a very
difficult strike in Canso, which highlighted the general plight of
fishermen, and Newfoundland fishermen were organizing into a
union. In general, there was a fishermen’s movement driven by
harsh working conditions in the industrial sector, incessant
incursions on inshore fishing grounds by industrial fleets (national
and international), and an apparent trend towards concentration
among fish buyers and processors.
The Canadian fishery was bleak in the early 1970s. Some
say conditions have to get bad for fishermen to organize, but
this cliché is not demonstrably true. I have worked on the notion
that people organize to recover their rightful share of power when
there is a sense of  possibility. In the 1970s, cod was almost as
low as the moratorium levels of the 1990s, but there was
recruitment (number or percentage of  fish that survive from birth to a specific
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age or size – Ed); there were strong year classes about to enter the
commercial fishery (A year class is fish of a given species spawned or hatched
in a given year; a three-year-old fish caught in 1998 would be a member of  the
1995 class – Ed).  There was also public money directed to the
fishery for loan boards, price support and unemployment
insurance, and licence buy-back programmes. And, perhaps most
significantly, the federal government was preparing to assume
control and jurisdiction over the continental shelf. This created
new optimism and expectations. Along with the national recovery
of jurisdiction also came the expectation that the fishery could
be managed under a sophisticated regulatory regime of limited-
entry licensing, stock assessment and catch limits.
A Fledgling Union
The changing regime in Canada’s fishery management
coincided with the ambitious organizing drive of the fledgling
MFU from 1977 to 1984. Reginald Comeau claims he had no
idea of launching a union, let alone an organizing drive across
the Maritimes, when he started a small association of  fishermen
in places like Caraquet, Pigeon Hill and Val Comeau. “It just
started to mushroom,” he says. By 1978, Acadian fishermen all
along New Brunswick’s Gulf  of  St Lawrence shore were coming
into the MFU. Comeau had no ambitions for a movement. He
was after practical results for the local fishermen. “It was the
outsiders that started seeing it as a movement—the intellectuals
and the militants,” he recalls.
In any case, the poorly financed MFU quickly moved to
sign up inshore fishermen in the neighboring Maritime provinces
of  PEI and Nova Scotia. Key fishermen pitched in for these
organizing drives, as did university professors and young educated
professionals willing to work for peanuts. Locals of  the MFU
got formed quickly in major inshore fishing areas, where
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fishermen came in by the hundreds. (In North American usage, a local
is a branch or chapter of a trade union – Ed) There were marches and
protests. Highways were blocked with fish, and huge seiners were
stopped from landing their fish catches. Politicians were cornered
and fisheries offices occupied. It was a period of  energy and
militancy, and the ambition was to unionize inshore fishermen
across hundreds of harbours and thousand of miles of coastline.
This early burst of  energy spanned a period of  three, at
most, four years. It was based on the general assumption that
thousands of  fishermen were conscious of  being inshore
fishermen, that the inshore was under threat from the new
national fleet of offshore vessels and that the markets were
increasingly being dominated by vertically integrated fishing
corporations, which were gaining control of smaller companies
and having an impact on local co-operatives.
So, in the first instance, the MFU organized on practical
bread-and-butter issues relating to access to the resource and
markets, but the model for organization that the MFU embraced
and pursued was derived from the trade union movement.
Organizing inshore fishermen did not have a legislative context
of  making formal application under a trade union act for
certification to represent inshore fishermen for the purpose of
collective bargaining with buyers. So, one of  the central
mobilizing tools that the MFU used was the demand for
appropriate provincial legislation that would allow us not only
to sign up members but to be formally certified as the
representative of  the inshore fishermen and to have a procedural
way by which the buyers would be obligated to commence
bargaining with the MFU in good faith.
The MFU wanted to have inshore fishermen recognized
as workers with the same rights to collective bargaining as other
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Canadian workers.  In the minds of  the MFU organizers, an
important by-product of collective bargaining legislation is to
have a dues check-off system. In Canada, the trade union
movement won an important victory in the l940s when Justice
Ivan Rand recognized that all workers in a given certified
bargaining unit should be obligated to pay the equivalent of union
dues, even if they were not members of the union. This became
known as the Rand Formula and its rationale is simple: if  the
majority of the workers in a collective bargaining unit have voted
for union representation and they are successful in negotiating a
collective agreement, then all workers benefit from the collective
agreement and so should be obligated to pay dues, even if they
refuse to become members of the union.
Again, for the sake of the international reader, I must point
out that Canada has federal and provincial jurisdictions; the ocean
fisheries are under federal jurisdiction, but the subject of labour
relations is generally under provincial jurisdiction. So, the MFU,
with its ambition to organize inshore fishermen across the
Maritimes (meaning the provinces of  New Brunswick, PEI and
Nova Scotia), had to seek collective bargaining type legislation
in three different provincial jurisdictions.
By the late fall of 1981, when I began working with the
union in the province of Nova Scotia, the MFU had been
successful in having the province of  New Brunswick agree to
recognize inshore fishermen’s right to collective bargaining and
were in the process of implementing appropriate legislation.
Again, I refer the interested reader to Sue Calhoun’s book,
A Word to Say, for details of  this organizing period. What I am
attempting here is a subjective reflection, based on my own
association with the MFU, which began in November of  l981.
The situation of the MFU in the province of Nova Scotia at
that time was greatly different from that in the neighbouring
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province of  New Brunswick.  Indeed, I was coming into a
situation where the early enthusiasm, protests and militancy
already had an air of defeat about them. The substantial numbers
of  fishermen who had rallied to the call for one united inshore
fishermen’s organization, who had directed their protests at both
the federal fisheries management authority (the DFO) and the
provincial government in Halifax, who had mobilized to get
markets for their herring and squid, who had blockaded highways
and occupied government buildings, had little to show for their
actions, in terms of  tightly structured union locals, with regular
dues-paying members and hired staff. Their last hope was a
collective bargaining draft bill that was to be enacted in early
l982, but the provincial cabinet in Halifax, Nova Scotia, slammed
the door on this type of  legislation for inshore fishermen shortly
after I arrived.
So, when I started travelling to the fishing villages and
meeting with fishermen on the wharves and in the bait sheds, I
couldn’t help but remember an encounter I had had with a social
animator from the Dominican Republic. She described how an
organizing team would go to different communites to get things
moving; when it encountered a community that had had a recent
failure in organizing, the team moved on to the next village. The
team assumed that it would take another generation to recover
from that kind of failure.
So, there I was, within a couple of  months of  joining the
MFU, beginning to wonder whether the conditions still existed
to build up the MFU. The Nova Scotia initiative appeared to be
going downward at the same time as the New Brunswick
initiative appeared to be winning. If  we talk about an organization
having a centre and a periphery, Nova Scotia was the MFU’s
periphery, especially with respect to inshore fishermen along the
long shoreline that borders the Atlantic ocean (as distinct from
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the much smaller shoreline that bordered the Gulf of
St Lawrence). The herring fishery, for example, was central to
the preoccupations of  the MFU’s Acadian fishermen in New
Brunswick, but was of  marginal interest to most inshore
fishermen in the area of  Nova Scotia, where the MFU was failing.
Even the lobster fishery in Nova Scotia was largely different on
the Atlantic coast than within the Gulf of St Lawrence. Nova
Scotia fishermen generally sold their lobsters into the fresh market
trade centred in Boston, whereas the New Brunswick Acadians
were dependent on the processing sector that used the smaller
Gulf  lobster that were packed as various frozen products.
Halifax and Nova Scotia were also centres for fishing companies,
which were generally antagonistic to the interests of inshore
fishermen, especially in the groundfish sector (cod, haddock,
pollack, etc.). But the fisheries politics of Nova Scotia was also
greatly influenced by the large numbers of inshore and near-
shore operations in the region known as Southwest Nova Scotia.
This region shared with Massachusetts fishermen the famous
and resource-rich George’s Bank. Despite there being large
numbers of  fishermen in Southwest Nova Scotia, the MFU had
not been able to expand its organizing work into this area.
Shifting Gear in Nova Scotia
So, by the summer of  l982, we were faced with a dilemma:
there were no prospects for winning legislation in Nova Scotia,
and two of  the three locals in the province were failing. MFU’s
governing council endorsed our proposal to look longer term
and to begin exploratory work in the Southwest Nova Scotia
region, while continuing to service locals at the other end of  the
province. At the same time, we abandoned the general demand
for collective bargaining rights. Not only was there little interest
from the fishermen in the southwest region in bargaining rights,
the specific provincial government in Halifax was generally
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anti-union. It was gradually eroding the trade union rights that
Nova Scotia workers had won and, in the fall of l979, had passed
one of the most regressive trade union act amendments since
the World War II. The amendment effectively broke the unionizing
drive of  the United Rubber Workers, who had gained support
among workers at the Granton Nova Scotia plant of Michelin
Tire.
The new organizing plan for Nova Scotia not only
abandoned the specific demand for trade union-type legislation,
but it also dropped much of the rhetoric associated with such a
demand. Still, inshore fishermen were faced with issues of
resource access and management that were under federal
jurisdiction, and there were always issues related to market access
and price. Our plan was to shift gear in terms of  organizing
rhetoric and emphasizing inshore fishermen as workers. There
were certainly lots of  other reasons for fishermen to unite. The
new direction for organizing in Nova Scotia simply put emphasis
on other aspects of  the ambivalent nature of  the inshore fishery.
On the one hand, it was expected that inshore fishermen would
be attracted to a union approach insofar as they know themselves
to be working people. On the other hand, they are also
independent operators and, as such, their problems relate more
to the regulatory authority (DFO) and the market place.
The decision to expand the organizing efforts of the MFU
into the rich fishing territory of Southwest Nova Scotia highlighted
what had always been present in the MFU but was less evident
because of  the ideology of  unionizing; that is, we are, first and
foremost, a primary producer organization that derives much of
its structure from the trade union model, but which carries out its
practical work much like an association. In any case, contrary to
most people’s predictions, we gradually built up a very influential
MFU local in the Southwest Nova Scotia region, a region long
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known for its antagonism towards unions and where, in many
villages, supporting unions was almost like going against religion.
I believe that the work in Nova Scotia through the 1980s is a little
bit of  the hidden history of  the MFU. People who have a longer
association with the MFU in the Acadian context would not
immediately see or believe that the work in Nova Scotia through
this period ended up being a key factor in the survival of  the
MFU.
Today, the base of  the MFU is still found along the Acadian
shore of  New Brunswick, which borders on the Gulf  of  St.
Lawrence, where the MFU was founded.  As a surviving broad-
based organization of  inshore fishermen, the MFU has never
been unidimensional, even if the dominant rhetoric of its
formative years would make it appear that way. Organizing
inshore fishermen is a multidimensional project, reflecting the
ambivalent and complex nature of the independent operator or
primary producer. Another way to put it might be to say that the
MFU is a hybrid organization; it is not a union in the sense that
trade unions are known in this country. The organizing efforts in
the region of Southwest Nova Scotia made the hybrid nature of
the MFU more evident.
The southwest region is not only culturally different, but
the fishery itself is quite distinct from that of the Acadian inshore
fishery of  New Brunswick. Nevertheless, it was the Acadian
aspect of the MFU that actually opened the door to the
development of a dynamic local in Southwest Nova Scotia.  The
local (MFU Local 9) was founded in an area called the French
shore on Baie-Ste-Anne. The first members of the local were
also Acadians and their first issues were actually centred on the
herring fishery on Trinity Ledge, a fishery dominated by the purse-
seine fleet that not only landed most of the fish but also controlled
the markets. The MFU was a natural choice for fishermen in this
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specific area, given their common Acadian background and their
interest in recovering some control of the herring fishery from
the seiners.
The new local benefited from the brilliant work of Sandy
Siegel, who joined the MFU in Nova Scotia in l983 as an
education officer, having left a successful career as a university
professor. The competence of  this staff  person cannot be
underestimated in attempting to analyze the success of the MFU
in building inroads in this region.
One of the first challenges of the new local was to wrest
back control of the over-the-side sales programme that was being
run by the seiner co-operative. This was a period when the
Canadian government authorized Russian trawlers to fish a
limited quota of groundfish in Canadian waters in return for the
freezer trawlers purchasing herring. By negotiating their own
over-the-side sales, the new local not only improved market access
for inshore fishermen but also gave them the base to build a
voice around herring management issues, especially in terms of
pushing back the large herring seiners from their traditional
inshore grounds on Trinity  Ledge. The competence and success
of  MFU Local 9 did not go unnoticed among other fishermen in
the region, and, over the next three years, the MFU developed
as a major force in the fishery of the region. It tackled issues of
groundfish quotas; it developed its own marketing initiatives in
the Boston market; and it was also representing fishermen on
lobster issues in the single largest lobster zone in the country.
MFU’s work was instrumental in defeating the questionable issue
of offshore lobster licences that would have expanded the
holdings of the largest lobster company and brought company
boats into the owner-operated lobster fishery. In this same period,
the local also played a big role in having a ban imposed on oil
exploration on George’s Bank.
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In general, MFU’s long-term organizing plan for Nova
Scotia was working. Not only did we expand into Southwest
Nova Scotia but the other two locals were also establishing a
stronger foothold in the fisheries of Cape Breton and the Gulf
of St Lawrence region of Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotia locals
were voluntary locals, in the sense that they had no legislative
context that provided for formal recognition and dues deductions.
Under these conditions, as an organizer, you always had the sense
of  working like a farmer in the Brazilian rain forest; if  you left
the farm unattended for a weekend, you would come back to
find it overgrown again. Still, the organization was bigger than
any given local and this is an essential feature of the MFU; we
are what we call broadbased. This is what distinguishes the MFU
from a fishermen’s association. Associations are usually based
in one or two harbours, or they are often species-specific and
formed around one issue. Associations had to organize around
one strong fisherman, and, while they often survive in name for
years, they usually come and go with the issue. The MFU
definitely has associational features, especially in the locals that
depend on voluntary dues payments, but it has also demonstrated
a structure that has survived time, geography and a diversity of
issues. In this way, it carries the potential of  being a political
force.
The decade of the 1980s must be considered the heyday
of  modern Canadian fisheries. Fish stocks were growing and
international markets were relatively strong up to 1987-88. All
major fisheries were performing, both in terms of  landings and
(apparently) management systems, as well as in terms of  markets
and prices. The backdrop to the success was the often unnoticed
lobster fishery, where catches generally continued to climb during
the 1980s. (Some analysts claim that the expanded landings in
this fishery came from increased capacity, fishing technology and
so on. This cannot be discounted altogether, but there is little
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doubt that catch per unit of  effort was expanding. In other words,
the resource itself  was growing.) The dominant model in fisheries
management was derived from the groundfish sector, where after
the declaration of the 200-mile EEZ in 1977, the DFO
developed an increasingly complex management regime based
on quotas, stock assessments, sector limitations, capacity
restrictions and so on. Generally, the fishing industry co-operated
in the development of this management system and, until l988,
most senior government officials and the corporate sector were
priding themselves on having a worldclass management model,
and favourably comparing their approach with that of  the US,
which was taking a different approach. But things changed for
the MFU at the end of this period, as they changed for fisheries
in general worldwide.
At the same time as the Nova Scotia component of the
MFU abandoned its call for union-type legislation, the Acadian
fishermen in New Brunswick were implementing their newly
won fisheries bargaining legislation. The MFU won overwhelming
majorities from the fishermen in votes formally conducted by
the province to determine whether the MFU should be certified
as the collective bargaining agent. There were legal challenges
to the legislation, but, finally, by l985, the MFU was accredited
and commenced bargaining with the association of buyers, within
the framework set out under the inshore fisheries bargaining act.
The first attempts to bargain collective agreements with
the buyer group in l985 were unsuccessful. But prior to the
opening of the l986 spring lobster season, the MFU finally
reached a collective agreement that included union recognition
and dues check-off  from all fishermen selling lobster in the
Acadian Peninsula. The essence of the agreement was fixed price
for the lobster catch. But this was our only lobster agreement; it
failed on the simple premise that fish buyers were interested in
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negotiating a fixed price for lobster, and the price put forward by
the buyer group in the spring of l987 was lower than what
fishermen knew individual buyers were prepared to pay. The
companies knew that the MFU badly needed the dues check-
off, which had been included in the l986 agreement, and they
attempted to leverage the negotiating team to accept the lower
fixed price, in return for the dues check-off. They thought they
had us in a bind because they were pretty certain that the union
had no strike mandate. (It is virtually impossible for fishermen
to contemplate a strike action in this specific lobster fishery that
is only open two months of the year and which is so central to
the fishermen’s income.) We had to tell ourselves that to sign
this kind of agreement just to get union dues was simply not
acceptable. What was the point of maintaining an organization
that gets a lower price than the open market would deliver? We
walked away from the company negotiators and never returned.
You can imagine the dilemma within the organization and
the impact that our decision to walk away had on the fishermen.
And this, after one years of  struggle to win the legislative right
to collective bargaining. The fishermen were despondent and
we faced the possible breakup of the very heart of the
organization. But that was the same period in which association-
type work in Nova Scotia was giving the MFU significant power
and profile throughout the fishery. Since the Nova Scotia work
was not premised on collective bargaining, and since the work
at that juncture was somewhat successful, I believe that Nova
Scotia, which had been a kind of  periphery for the MFU, was the
essential factor that got the New Brunswick sector through the
crisis. The fishermen’s leadership and the staff  could see a future
for a strong MFU without collective bargaining.
The history and development of the MFU has clearly been
uneven. I haven’t even referred to the MFU’s positive work in
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the large inshore fishery of PEI. The Island is situated to the
south and west, within the Gulf of St Lawrence, and shares the
same fisheries and fishing grounds with its Acadian neighbours.
Inshore fishermen on the Island were very receptive to the MFU’s
organizers, but the drive to win bargaining rights legislation in
the Island province ran into trouble in the mid-l980s when the
province conducted a referendum on the issue and the leadership
of  the MFU on the Island decided to boycott it. The MFU’s
inability to consolidate its support on the Island warrants separate
analysis and will not be addressed in this essay.
A Watershed Period
By 1988, the MFU had clearly reached a threshold. Its
period of expansion in Nova Scotia had peaked and, with the
inability to win collective agreements, MFU New Brunswick was
facing serious morale problems. Still, the Acadian fishermen had
made the MFU their organization; and the organization was
widely respected in the broader Acadian community, which had
been going through a social and political renaissance since 1960.
In 1988, the province’s electorate rejected the governing
Conservative Party and voted in a new liberal government. It
was the Liberal Party and its charismatic leader, Louis Robichaud,
who had put Acadians on the provincial political and social map
in the 1960s. After 18 years of  conservative government, the
liberals were re-elected, and they brought many Acadians into
senior positions of power, people who were contemporaries of
the founders and supporters of  the MFU.
This proved to be very fortunate timing for an MFU in
turmoil over having to re-consider the collective bargaining idea.
The MFU immediately began looking for an alternative form of
legislation that would provide for an automatic check-off.
Eventually, the new provincial government, recognizing the years
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of work of the MFU on behalf of the inshore sector and the
value of  fishermen being organized, introduced the Inshore
Fisheries Representation Act. In essence, the act provided for
the Rand Formula, without obligating the union to reach a
collective agreement. Under this new act, the province’s coast
was divided into three regions. If  an organization could
demonstrate that it had the majority of  support of  the fishermen
in a given region, then it could apply to the province to issue an
order to the companies to deduct dues from all fishermen in the
region and remit them to the recognized organization. Fishermen
overwhelmingly re-signed with the MFU and, by l991, the MFU
was certified to represent all inshore fishermen on the Gulf  of
St Lawrence coast of  New Brunswick. It was a stunning reversal,
especially given the resistance of the companies to the new
legislation. MFU New Brunswick was back on track.
On the other hand, after l988, the MFU in Nova Scotia
was lurching into difficulties. Over the next few pages I shall try
to explain what happened. The one years following the
‘Canadianization’ of the fishery after 1977 saw the emergence
of an elaborate fisheries management system. The national
government not only assumed jurisdiction and control of its 200-
mile EEZ, but also embarked on a large public enterprise to
manage and eventually micro-manage, the fisheries. The
centrepiece of the system was limited entry and quota allocations
by fleet and area. The implementation of the system generated
enormous conflicts between sectors. For example, there was an
ongoing struggle between the Canadianized industrial offshore
fleet and inshore fishermen. But there were countless complicated
issues of quota allocation, total allowable catches, fleet
restrictions and so on, and the forum where the conflicts were
expressed was an elaborate system of  advisory committees.
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On the committees would usually be representatives of
the fishing companies, specialized midshore fleets, processors,
and inshore organizations, as well as DFO managers and
scientists. In the end, fishing plans were set by the DFO after
consultation with the industry. During the 1980s, the high-profile
conflicts centred on the groundfish and pelagic fisheries, which
were becoming more and more micro-managed through enterprise
allocations in the offshore and individual quotas in the midshore
dragger and seiner sector.
I have used the term midshore or nearshore sector without
explaining its difference from the inshore fishery. Today, in all
of Atlantic Canada there are approximately 600 midshore vessels,
compared to 15,000 or more traditional inshore fishing operations.
(The term ‘traditional’ is used fluidly since most of  the inshore
fleet is quite modernized in terms of  electronics, durability and
even engine power.) A typical midshore vessel employs five to
six fishermen, but the capital-to-labour ratio is five times that
of  a typical inshore boat that employs, on average, 2.5 fishermen.
These midshore vessels are normally high-tech, often steel, boats
in the 20-m range, worth between Can$700,000 to Can$2 million.
I refer to this midshore fleet as the ‘ascendancy’ fleet
because the fishermen who operate them tend to have risen from
the ranks of  the inshore fishermen. They were often singled out
by small fish-plant owners, or provincial government
development boards, for special financing and special quotas.
Provinces financed them to ensure that fish supplies were landed
in their provinces, thereby providing needed plant work in rural
high-unemployment areas.
After 1977, the first wave of capital expansion in the
Canadianization process went into the industrial offshore
company-owned trawlers. It then followed quickly into the
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emerging midshore groundfish draggers. In government
terminology, these vessels were defined as inshore, with a number
of horsepower tonnage restrictions and a 65-ft limit on their
length, approximating vessels of the offshore. The pattern in
the groundfish sector was for the powerful fishing boats and
companies to demand a share of the quota, based on their recent
catch histories. So, by 1982, the offshore company fleets had
already established their own quota shares and were developing
enterprise allocations. Similarly, as the midshore draggers
expanded in number and capacity, they claimed recent historical
catch as the basis for quota shares. Newfoundland’s Gulf  of
St Lawrence midshore draggers were the first to carve out special
quotas that led to a form of  individual quotas. New Brunswick
and Quebec’s fleet of  midshore draggers and Danish seiners went
the same route, followed by those in the southwest of Nova
Scotia. In short, they were establishing property rights based on
recent historical catch. Needless to say, this was done largely at
the expense of  the large number of  inshore fishermen, who relied
on more ‘passive’ fishing gear like handline and longline.
Often, the ascendancy fleet of  high-tech mobile draggers
or Danish seiners also had access to shrimp and snow crab, but
throughout the 1980s the midshore became more and more
specialized into groundfish draggers, herring seiners, shrimpers
and crabbers. While a typical inshore fishermen might earn a
working class standard of living, fishing several species over a
fishing year, the licence holders in the specialist midshore fleets
were earning superprofits. It was difficult for the rest of  the
fishermen not to see these few midshore specialists as bastions
of privilege—‘privilege’ because the DFO management system
quickly froze the number of licence holders, while allocating
quota based on recent catch history. (Of  course, these high-tech
boats had no trouble building up a history.) One simple example
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of the ‘bastion of privilege’ would be the 80 snow crab operators
on the Acadian Peninsula. In a typical year, their snow crab quotas
represented a landed value of Can$50 million. The 700 inshore
operators in the same region would land roughly Can$36 million
worth of fish. It was a similar picture in the groundfish sector,
where 10 per cent of the vessels under 65 ft (the midshore
draggers) were being allocated 70 per cent of  the general
allocations.
By 1989, the inshore fleet of 8,000 vessels in the Maritime
provinces was progressively being disenfranchised from the
groundfish sector by the emergent midshore specialists who were
supporting ITQ systems that protected their quasi-property rights.
This was especially felt by fishermen in the MFU’s Southwest
Nova Scotia Local 9. At the same time, as quotas were being
captured by the specialist mobile fleet, the cod stocks, in
particular, were showing signs of stress, further creating the sense
among inshore fishermen that they were being pushed out of
the fishery.
I have often referred to the period commencing in 1988-
89 as a watershed period. You could call it a regime shift. It was
a period of  upheavals in world history and Canadian politics.
The historian Eric Hobsbawm writes of  the “short” 20th century,
seeing it coming to a close with the collapse of  the Berlin Wall
in l989 and the end of the ‘East Bloc’. During the watershed
period, people’s world-views were put into question. The Soviet
Union broke down. Canada entered into a Free Trade Agreement
with the US. It was a moment in Canadian history where the
traditional power bases of the two dominant political parties
were breaking up. In Quebec, the Bloc Quebecois was forming
and would capture the traditional Liberal Party base in Quebec.
In the West, the rightwing populist Reform Party took shape by
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attracting large segments of  the right in the Conservative Party.
Furthermore, the sovereignty movement in Quebec was
re-establishing its force that would eventually lead to a full-scale
referendum in 1996. The national government was progressively
adopting policies of privatization and deregulation, in concert
with World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes. It was a
period in which Canadians were growing increasingly sceptical
of  the public political process.
During this period, commencing in 1987-88, we begin to
see a change in the fishery. The markets for fish in Japan and the
US were anticipating the coming recession. The period of
relatively strong prices for cod were slackening and herring roe
prices in Japan took a beating in 1988, precipitating a strike among
our herring gill-net fishermen on the Acadian Peninsula. In 1989,
in the fall season, lobster prices began an unprecedented decline
that continued into the 1990 season, as North America fell into
recession.
As the watershed period progressed into 1990, the price
of lobster throughout Atlantic Canada fell to its lowest levels in
20 years. That created a general panic among inshore fishermen,
even where landings were strong. The lobster industry was still
in turmoil over a US trade bill, the Mitchell Bill, that prohibited
lobsters that were legal size in Canada—Canadian lobsters, in
general, tend to mature younger and at smaller sizes—from
entering the US. Fishermen in Southwest Nova Scotia came under
intense pressure from lobster exporters and the government to
conform to the American size. In concert with MFU Local 9 in
the southwest area, the MFU conducted a very sophisticated
campaign that included the Department of External Affairs and
lawyers from the Justice Department in Ottawa challenging the
newly established free trade panel under the US-Canada Free
Trade Agreement.
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Senator Mitchell had argued that the new minimum size
measure in the US were conservation measures that would be
undermined if  smaller Canadian lobster was allowed to be traded
freely in the US. In the end, the sweeping bill was modified to
prohibit only live lobster that did not meet the minimum size
from entering the US. This left the Canadian lobster companies
complaining that they would not be able to sell the smaller (but
legal) live Canadian lobster, and so they demanded the Canadian
government increase the minimum size of lobster in Southwest
Nova Scotia to the American size. The MFU strongly resisted
the corporate lobby argument that lobster marketing was already
far too dependent on the Boston market and that Canadian
entrepreneurs were acting like compradors, simply brokering this
prized animal into Boston, rather than developing initiatives to
market more in Europe and Asia. In the end, the MFU position
prevailed and was proven to be right, as the companies quickly
adjusted and reduced their dependency on the Boston market.
The readers should know that the two-clawed lobster found
in eastern Canada and the eastern seabord of the US is called
Homarus americanus and is found virtually nowhere else. The
Canadian consumer absorbs, at best, only 10 per cent of the
landings of  our fishermen. So lobster is an export commodity,
80 per cent of which traditionally went to the US and the rest to
Europe and Japan.
The dramatic fall in lobster prices in 1989 and 1990 was
generally attributed to a backup of various processed lobster
products and the difficulty companies faced in financing
inventories during the recession period. Interestingly, the large
lobster fishery in Southwest Nova Scotia, where lobster is almost
exclusively caught for the live market trade, was affected by a
tightening of prices in 1990, but far less dramatically than the
rest of  the Maritimes. Furthermore, in the heart of  this Southwest
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Nova Scotia fishery, we find one of  those pockets of  ‘elite’
fishermen, whose landings and landed catch value were far above
those of  the average inshore fishermen in the Maritmes. Ironically,
it was these fishermen who generated a spontaneous tie-up of
vessels at the start of their November 1991 fishery after the
general price drop had already re-stabilized in the rest of the
region. But, we are jumping ahead of  our story.
In 1990, we had an MFU local of  some 200 fishermen
along the north shore of Nova Scotia that borders on the Gulf
of  St Lawrence. The fishermen there were very similar to our
Acadian fishermen in New Brunswick, fishing in the same general
body of water, the Gulf of St Lawrence (quite separate from
the Scotian shelf that extended off the east and south coast of
Nova Scotia into the Atlantic), and faced with similar fisheries
management issues. This local was smaller than those of  New
Brunswick, but had been with the union since its second year.
The fishermen in the area were an English-speaking mixture of
Protestants and Catholic Scots. They tended to have had more
experience as tradesmen and with trade unions, and were adjacent
to one of  Nova Scotia’s industrial areas, New Glasgow, where
there were not only mining and steel works but also the French
tyre giant Michelin Tire, which had established a major tyre plant
there in the 1970s, and the multinational Scott Paper, which
had established a large pulp and paper mill. It was this local that
generated the highly esteemed bona fide licensing policy that
was endorsed in 1982 by all fishermen in the Southern Gulf,
including those of  New Brunswick and PEI. This is the licensing
regime under which most of the MFU members still fish.
The Gulf Nova Scotia local had always played a key role
in the policy and governance of  the MFU, and, by the late 1980s,
was largely self-managing, in the sense that it did not rely heavily
on the staff  services of  the organization. One of  its local leaders
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had been elected president of the MFU in 1997, even though
the majority members of the MFU are francophone and he spoke
only English. During the 1980s, some of the key members of
this MFU local had also taken a very active role in the
revitalization of  the North Bay Co-operative, a fishermen’s co-
operative that not only marketed the catch but also did some
processing of  hake and herring. The North Bay Co-operative
was a member of the federation of fishing co-operatives, the
United Maritime Fishermen (UMF), that itself  had its origins in
the famous Antigonish Movement of the 1930s, which still has
an institutional centre at the university, known as the Coady
International Institute. (The Antigonish Movement is a people’s movement for
economic and social justice that began in Nova Scotia during the 1920s. The Coady
International Institute is a centre of  excellence in community-based development,
adult education and group action. Established by St Francis Xavier University in
1959, the Institute was named after Rev Dr Moses Coady, a prominent founder of
the Antigonish Movement – Ed) Through the 1980s, the North Bay
Co-operative played a challenging role within the UMF,
a federation of inshore fishing producer co-operatives that
expanded into operating its own processing companies and even
owned an offshore trawler. The North Bay Co-operative was
seeking more autonomy from the federation structure, and was
taking alternative marketing initiatives. By 1988, the UMF, as it
was known, became bankrupt and never recovered as a federation
of  fishing co-operatives.
The majority of the members of the North Bay
Co-operative were also members of  Local 4 of  the MFU. At the
annual meeting of the co-operative in 1990, a debate developed
over the future direction of the co-operative, especially with
respect to investment in vehicles and approaches to marketing.
As the meeting progressed, a kind of internal purge developed,
whereby the manager and his bookkeeper were dismissed against
the will of some members and for no apparent reason. It tore the
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co-operative in two and it was clear the bitter split was going to
spill over into the local of  the MFU. The leaders of  this internal
coup in the co-operative were also fishermen who were
developing a special status in the fishery because they held snow
crab licences. According to the descriptions we were getting from
fishermen members of  the co-operative who ended up on the
receiving end of the purge, the leaders of this takeover within
the co-operative used innuendo and personal attack, suggesting
misuse of funds and possible bookkeeping irregularities, all of
which proved unfounded. While the apparent reason for this
unpredicted fissure was a strong resistance among some members
to expanding the co-operative in terms of  investment and
marketing initiatives, the ‘coup’ had a hint of a fundamentalist
type of thinking—an unwillingness to tolerate intellectual
ambiguity, an infantile belief  that managers (and bureaucrats)
were not needed to run a co-operative, and that it could be done
by the fishermen themselves with minimalist infrastructure;
suggestions of  plots and collaborators were also heard. In
particular, one of the leaders of the ‘purge’ was getting his feet
wet as a rightwing populist; we were to hear more about him on
the broader terrain of  fishermen politics in the Maritime
provinces.
As I said, the fishermen engineering the takeover in the
co-operative tended to be also snow crab licence holders. These
particular snow crab licences were limited to approximately 10
per cent of  the fishermen in the area that the MFU Local 4
covered. The crab licences themselves had become quite valuable
because of  the returns the fishermen could make in the fishery
over a three-to-six-week period. These licence holders were still
considered to be inshore fishermen with other fishing privileges
but they were taking on their own special-interest identity.
This became particularly evident when the Government of
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Canada extended its new programme of dockside monitoring to
the inshore snow crab fishery in Gulf Nova Scotia. Some of the
licence holders reacted with extraordinary emotion, given that,
objectively, the new system would cost them pennies in
comparison to what they were deriving from this fishery. Dockside
monitoring was generally something that the MFU believed was
useful in large-quota fisheries like herring to ensure that large
landings by herring seiners were counted against the quota.
Dockside monitoring was a logical requirement in fisheries that
were being managed by individual quotas, as the snow crab
fishery was. We could only assume that the strength of  the
reaction by this relatively privileged snow crab group cannot be
attributable to the one cent per pound that they now had to pay
for monitoring. It was also a more generalized reaction to
government imposing fees on fishermen. It was only the tip of
the iceberg and, in this sense, they were certainly not all wrong.
(As the 1990s progressed, fishermen saw more and more fees
and user charges.) The reaction to monitoring of  their landings
was probably also explained by the fact that some of the catch
was not being reported, thus allowing individuals not only to
catch beyond their individual quotas but also to avoid taxes on
the unreported portion of catch.
In any case, this group of snow crab licence holders, many
of whom were principals in the ‘purge’ of the North Bay
Co-operative, were taking a position on dockside monitoring that
put the MFU in an awkward position and made it very difficult
to support them, even though the more general issue of new
fees was a concern for all inshore fishermen. The MFU certainly
could not oppose the principle of dockside monitoring in
individual quota systems. In short, the position of  the snow
crabbers was contradicting the more general policies of  the MFU,
and it was not surprising that this group would enter into an
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alliance with the Nova Scotia Fish Packers, the fish companies
lobby group, to fight the imposition of  the dockside monitoring
programme. This was a curious move to make by a group that
was posturing itself as the champion of the little guy in the fishery
against Big Government and—as we shall see—‘Big’ unions
(even if  they were little unions like the MFU). We were beginning
to see the emergence of a special group of licence holders whose
good fortune depended on their exclusive access to the snow
crab fishery, an access that was guaranteed by the very DFO
that would be increasingly demonized by the movement taking
shape and being spearheaded by a few of the snowcrabbers who
had also divided the North Bay Co-operative.
To return to the lobster fishery in 1990, catches were at a
record high for the 20th century and, given a weakening economy
in the major market of  the US, the traditional buyer-processing
group was experiencing a back-up in lobster products both in
US warehouses and in their own plants. Thus, financing of
inventories became a critical issue and companies began to sell
their products at discounted rates. The price drop, first seen in
the 1989 fall fishery in Northumberland Strait, carried through
to the main fisheries in the spring of 1990. However, the
Southwest Nova Scotia fishery remained somewhat protected
from the dramatic price drop because of its ability to hold live
lobster and because of its proximity to the Boston market for
live lobster trade. (Southwest Nova Scotia’s lobster was virtually
all sold in the live trade, as distinct from the Gulf of St Lawrence,
for example, where 70 per cent of the landings went to the
processors.)
By 1991, we were already experiencing some improvement
in price, but as the fall fishery in Southwest Nova Scotia began,
the price for live lobsters fell to lower-than-expected levels,
although not dramatically so. It was still a better price than what
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the rest of  the lobster fishermen in the Maritimes had received
for their landings, which went into both the live and processed
lobster trade. Nevertheless, a spontaneous tie-up of lobster boats
began in the Yarmouth area in protest against the price fall. There
did not seem to be much reason for such dramatic action,
especially since the price fall was unprecedented in this fishery
over the past 25 years. There was also a self-serving aspect to
the initial action in Yarmouth since the fishermen in this specific
area of the lobster zone were not as dependent on the first weeks
of the season and tended to fish farther out, as lobster retreated
from the cooling inshore waters to deeper waters, where
temperatures were less responsive to the pending winter. The
tie-up was spearheaded by a group of  fishermen in the Yarmouth
area who, for some years, had had remarkable annual catch levels
that tended to differentiate their annual incomes considerably
from those of  the average lobster fishermen in the area. Amongst
the ones sparking the spontaneous action against the price drop
was a former member of  the MFU who only the previous year
had been asked to step down as president of the MFU Local 9.
Interestingly, these fishermen had developed a friendship, through
the MFU, with the leader of  the North Bay ‘coup’ on the other
side of the province. They presumably had mutual sympathies
for the provincial Conservative Party that was governing in the
capital, Halifax. Actually, the two of  them—the former member
of the MFU and the leader of the North Bay ‘coup’—were
selected independently to go on a marketing tour of Europe,
just before the opening of the lobster season in the southwest
region.
In any case, the spontaneous tie-up was driven by the
Yarmouth area fishermen and small fish buyers with the hope
of improving the shore price for lobster, even though it was fairly
evident that the price was really determined by the live trade in
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Boston. Our own MFU members in this lobster fishing area were
somewhat bemused and sceptical of the tie-up since their work
through the MFU over the previous years had given them an
appreciation of what was possible in the live lobster trade.
Further, they found it a bit ironic to see support for the tie-up
coming from many fishermen who had for years spoken against
the union, painting it as an organization that would force them
into strikes in the lobster fishery. In any case, the majority of  our
members fished lobster in shallower waters, where the first weeks
of the fishery mattered more.
Regardless, most of  the lobster fishermen in the zone (Local
34) went along with the spontaneous tie-up, but up the coast, in
the St Mary’s Bay area, where the MFU was strong, there were a
couple of lobster boats that continued to operate. Even though
local MFU leaders did not fish, the gang in the Yarmouth area
started saying they were trying to break the strike and were
scabbing. This was turned into a widespread belief  that was
carried back to members in Gulf Nova Scotia by way of
conversations between the two individuals mentioned above.
The MFU president that year was also a fishermen from the Gulf
Nova Scotia Local 4 and he and his activist spouse swallowed
the Yarmouth/North Bay version of  events, further alienating
our key leaders in Southwest Nova Scotia. The tie-up lasted a
week, with no clear change in lobster prices, other than a marginal
increase that normally occurs as the Christmas season approaches.
Nevertheless, a new populist group emerged from the strike
and continued a sustained attack on the MFU that demoralized
leaders and members. The local has never since recovered its
widespread influence in this important fishing region. Instead,
the forces of  rightwing populism continued to grow, fuelled by a
series of developments in 1992 and 1993. The lobster strike
seemed to be a tempest in a teapot, in the sense that the objective
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conditions of  fishermen in the area were generally far superior
to those of  lobster fishermen elsewhere. Also, in any case, there
really did not seem to be much that could be done about the
lobster market in the short run by tying up, especially in an area
where much of the lobster can be held live in lobster cars after
they have been caught. Yet, since 1991, the group has carried on
and seemed to have had several spontaneous actions and rallies
where preoccupations and emotions were out of sync with
objective reality. Nevertheless, a kind of  populist wildfire was
taking hold of  many inshore fishermen in the areas of  Gulf  Nova
Scotia and Southwest Nova Scotia that had a devastating effect
on the MFU locals in these areas.
In retrospect, the period of the 1980s, prior to what we
are calling the watershed period, was a period of unspoken
consensus among inshore fishermen that a reasonable fisheries
management system was evolving, where there were many issues
to be resolved but where there was a kind of general
co-management agreement with the fisheries authority, the DFO.
(The exception to this would be in the groundfish fishery, where
inshore fishermen using passive gear like longlines and handlines
were seeing a gradual diminishment of catch in the inshore
grounds and where the implementation of quasi-property rights
for the more powerful midshore and offshore fleets was gradually
taking hold.) But, after 1987-88, the general consensus gradually
unravelled, particularly in the Nova Scotia regions.
As the MFU was beginning to get rocked to its roots in
Nova Scotia through the watershed period, in New Brunswick,
MFU was consolidating into a widespread membership-based
organization. Its Acadian members remained largely immune
from the collective fears and paranoia that had gripped inshore
fishermen in other parts of  the Maritimes. There are several
objective reasons for this, including the organization itself, an
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inshore fishery that was less dependent on groundfish, stable
herring and lobster catches, as well as increasing lobster prices.
Since the fishermen had much more experience in a sound and
well-run organization, they were more confident about the
information that was provided, and they had more opportunities
to debate and inquire into issues to determine their relative
importance. The difference between working within a sound and
experienced organization and relying on spontaneous populist
reactions was especially highlighted during the growing crisis
around the collapse of the cod stocks in 1992 and 1993. (The
difference can also be attributed to having achieved a stable
membership dues structure and a general agreement between
inshore and midshore fleets.)
In short, the MFU on the New Brunswick coast, by 1991,
was an experienced, functioning membership organization that
enjoyed large majority support among the whole community of
inshore fishermen. In Nova Scotia, the MFU as an organization
could never claim more than 20 per cent of  inshore fishermen
as members. So it was in a weaker position to mediate the virtual
social and ideological chaos that was showing itself in the
fisheries of that province.
If  there were forms of  hysteria or semi-paranoia or
conspiratorial thinking spreading throughout the fishing
communities of Nova Scotia, even while the fishery itself was
generally performing well, there were nevertheless identifiable
reasons for growing insecurities. Those reasons can be first found
in the groundfish sector, where government policy was
progressively hiving off portions of quota for selected fleets of
specialist midshore trawlers. In 1988, for example, one of  the
groups of  fishermen backing the MFU Local 9 were small dragger
operators still considered inshore fishermen. But when the
opportunity arose for them to join an individual quota system
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that was allocated largely on their average historical catches,
they bolted from the MFU with little compunction or hesitation.
In their minds, it all boiled down to an issue of  bread and butter.
At the same time, the much more numerous fixed-gear
inshore sector (longlines and handlines) was being squeezed into
new licensing and enforcement regimes that was believed to be
part of a general government plan to privatize quota. The
insecurities were also exacerbated by the loss of herring markets
to the seiner fleet of the area. (With the crisis and collapse of
the East Bloc, over-the-side sales evaporated in Eastern Canada.)
My sense is that fishermen generally tend to pick up,
instinctively, trends or tendencies in the ocean prior to them
being formally recognized. There is little question that Maritimes
fishermen, like their inshore counterparts in Newfoundland, were
not only sensing deep trouble in the cod fishery, but maybe, at
some collective level, they already believed the fishery to be
collapsing. Of  course, in saying this I do not wish to diminish
the many inshore voices that were speaking out as early as the
mid-1980s about threats to the cod resources.
I believe, in the 1989-91 period, fishermen were feeling
the deep crisis looming in the cod fishery. In March 1992, the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, John Crosbie, took the
unprecedented step of  closing the northern cod stocks. In
December of  that year, he confirmed the northern cod fishery
would continue to be closed and several other cod quotas in the
Atlantic region would be severely reduced. At the same time
that he made these dramatic announcements, he also, with one
stroke of the pen, cancelled thousands of what his Department
called ‘inactive’ groundfish licences. These licences were held
by inshore fishermen, many of  whom had given up on the
groundfish sector for the simple reason that catches in the inshore
had diminished drastically. Crosbie’s actions only confirmed the
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fears of  many fishermen in the Maritime provinces that they
were being scheduled for elimination. For the MFU fishermen in
the Gulf  of  St Lawrence, Crosbie’s actions were inexplicable.
Their bona fide licensing policy regime explicitly allowed a
fisherman to retain his licences for five years without having to
use them. This was fundamental to the concept of a multispecies
approach to fishing, where fishermen could move away from a
diminishing fishery without the fear of having to use their licences
or face the consequences of  losing them. Further, fishermen were
affronted that they were being targeted when they had clearly
lost their resource to the midshore and offshore draggers. Crosbie’s
move was a breach of  trust and was a policy derived from the
Newfoundland context, where there was virtually no limited entry
in the inshore fishery.
The Crosbie licence cancellation announcement generated
more insecurities among fishermen and became fodder for new
rightwing populist formations. But the new policy was actually
reversed by a very effective resistance by the MFU and allied
organizations. This reversal was not achieved by the populist
visionaries who were forming what they called the ‘Bona Fide
Defence Fund’. Their grandiose visions included massive legal
action against the government for having bungled the
management of  the cod fishery. The legal action as articulated
by the group’s legal advisers had little chance of  success but was
attractive for all fishermen, including many of  our own fishermen.
Our own long-time legal adviser in Halifax, Ray Larkin, was able
to convince our fishermen about the inadvisability  of  jumping
into such legal action; it had no chance of success under our
system—and he was proven right. The MFU, instead, focused
on a more specific political battle: winning back the cancelled
licences.  It was an important achievement to have the minister
reverse his decision and it contrasted our organization sharply
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with the populist phenomenon of living out the cod disaster in a
psychological and vicarious way. By this I mean that though these
fishermen were not the ones so affected by the cod collapse,
they were using the imagery of a collapse to build a climate of
crisis and conspiracy among the fishermen.
Another event during the same period again served to
generate fear among inshore fishermen that their status was being
threatened. This time it came from the west coast of Canada
through a Supreme Court decision recognizing that a British
Columbia Indian  had been wrongly charged for fishing without
a licence for his own food and sustenance. The Sparrow Decision,
as it came to be known, led to the assertion by Pacific coast
natives of their  inherent right to fish in previously limited
commercial fisheries, particularly the salmon fisheries of British
Columbia’s rivers and esturaries. On Canada’s west coast, the
fishermen formed a coalition of  fishermen’s rights groups to resist
the encroachment of  natives into their fishery. This coalition
contained, in its early formations, a broad range of  fishermen’s
organizations, including the well-established United Food Fish
and Allied Workers Union, long considered to be a progressive
and militant defender of  fishworkers and fishermen on the Pacific
coast. The British Columbia union knew that the coalition was
tending towards a rightwing populist, and possibly even racist,
approach, but felt that by staying in the coalition, it could mitigate
those tendencies.
The west coast coalition quickly embraced support from
the new emerging rightwing Reform Party, which was gaining
strength in western Canada. Coalition leaders were quick to find
counterparts on the east coast of  Canada  and were instrumental
in creating a virtual hysteria in the southwest region of Nova
Scotia over the pending implications of the Sparrow Decision,
that is, the threat of unregulated native fishing in and out of
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season. This issue of a new native presence in the east coast
fishery is developed at a later point in this essay, but, for now,
we have to state that the reaction among the fishermen in
Southwest Nova Scotia seemed to be grossly out of proportion
to the objective threat the local area natives could pose since
they—a few hundred souls—comprised only a small fraction of
the population. In my judgement, the reaction has to be
interpreted in the context of the broader psychological
atmosphere and populism at play, which I have been discussing.
This is not to say that the Sparrow Decision has not had
implications on the east coast; we surely know this and we will
return to it.
The cod moratorium got extended to include almost all of
Canada’s cod stocks. Interestingly enough, the only stocks
exempted were those of Southwest Nova Scotia, where cod was
thought to be part of a different discrete stock and ecosystem.
The moratorium was of such historic magnitude that every other
aspect of the Atlantic fishery seemed to be subsumed by this
unprecedented crisis in one of the staple industries of Canada.
Curiously, the ill-defined populist groups of  Nova Scotia reacted
to the moratorium as a kind of  conspiracy. In 1993, they claimed
that the dismal state of the cod stocks was being highly
exaggerated by scientists, the government and the industrial
fishing sector in order to drive out the little inshore fishermen.
And they were tarring with the same brush fishermen’s
organizations like the Newfoundland union and ourselves,
attacking us as collaborators. By now, the leaders of  the populist
coalition were using slander, false witnesses and division, always
keeping a hold on some thread of  truth and legitimate fear, while
simultaneously elaborating a fictitious conspiracy by enemies.
This aspect of the populism inevitably petered out as it was
unable to demonstrate any material success and as the nature of
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the cod crisis became more differentiated in the minds of
fishermen. Nevertheless, the legacy of  Nova Scotia has been to
further fragment fishermen’s organizations, to burn out rational
leaders, and to leave the fishermen vulnerable to the next major
fear (witness the 1999 Marshall case – see page 254 — Ed) The
populist ideological upheavals that occurred especially in Nova
Scotia during a period of similar upheaval around the world,
following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, might well provide us
with some hints of how we can get back to a broader
understanding of  social action and social struggle.
Ascendancy in the Inshore
The concept of a ‘midshore’ fleet is a fluid one. My calling
it an ‘ascendancy’ fleet is a way of depicting the dynamics of a
modernizing and Canadianizing fishery that was increasingly
becoming institutionalized within an elaborate fisheries
management system. In a sense, all fishermen were bought into
the system, not always willingly, and often under protest. It is a
system loaded with grievances and inequalities, but the authority
of the federal State and the fisheries minister was generally
recognized and accepted. The title of  Sue Calhoun’s book on
the MFU, A Word to Say, is instructive, but, at the same time,
perhaps misleading. Canada was not only claiming its 200-mile
EEZ, it was also going to manage the fishery as a joint project
with fishing interests. But it was never clear to inshore fishermen
whether they were recognized as an indispensable party in this
joint project. They wanted a word to say. But fishermen also
wanted security of  access and protections. In short, they wanted
their rightful share of  power. So, the MFU was part of  a
movement of  inshore fishermen in the years leading up to, and
following, 1977. Some would say the MFU was the lead
organization of  this movement in the Maritimes.
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Inshore fishermen had a common cause and they had a
basis for solidarity, at least within the framework of  the fisheries
management system. But inshore fishermen, as a constituency,
are always an ambiguous group; some parts were ‘ascending’,
not only because of hard work and fishing skills (although we
don’t discount those) but also because of financial backing by
companies and provincial government interests, and, sometimes,
because of luck—snow crab licences in some areas were actually
won in draws—and certainly because the DFO management
system was generating micro-interests and ‘bastions of privilege’.
Ascending fleets not only emerged from the general inshore
sector, but also arose within the MFU itself. The only real
‘breakaways’ that we have had as an organization since the onset
of the ‘watershed’ period can be traced to this ascendancy
phenomenon. But the nature of these breakaways, at least in
some instances, is obscured by populist rhetoric. As I have said,
the split in MFA Local 4 can be traced back to a small number
of snow crab licence holders, and that of MFU Local 9 in
Southwest Nova Scotia to an elite group of  lobstermen. What is
ironic to the MFU is that this populist group managed to project
a militancy that attracted hundreds of  inshore fishermen who
were not normally part of  the ‘ascendancy’ group; indeed, they
were often amongst the most marginal and poorest.
I have been centering on one period, the watershed period,
in Nova Scotia because, in my position in the MFU, I had to live
through this specific populist movement. But, the phenomenon
that I am attempting to capture is not unique to that time or
place. There continues to be lots of manifestations of it in the
present fishery, and it comes back in full force in the year 2000
as a result of the issue of aboriginal fishing, which I will discuss
later. In the 1989-93 period, we find the MFU, possibly the leading
voice of the inshore movement, itself becoming the target of
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the militant populists. In their eyes, we were in league with the
government; we were not militant enough (sic).
It was a curious period. In 1991, for example, we found
ourselves onlookers as the ascendancy group (midshore draggers)
in the Gulf of St Lawrence began looking like the militants:
they occupied fisheries offices, blasted the science community,
and stormed the capital. In Yarmouth, those who had feared the
MFU would bring strikes into the lobster fishery were the ones
now striking, while the MFU member fishermen in the same
area thought a strike to be a futile and untimely action. The
Bona Fide Defence Fund group, which was attacking the DFO
and its scientists, and criticizing the Newfoundland fishermen’s
union leaders, the MFU and the Quebec Fishermen’s Alliance,
for being in bed with the fisheries managers, was led by fishermen
who gained the most from DFO’s micromanagement policies.
But, for all this militant rhetoric, what were their actual actions?
Hiring a lawyer, drafting a manifesto, and commencing an
impossible legal action against the Government of Canada. In
essence, the populists had no legal case—not because there were
no huge blunders by the DFO, not because the cod collapse was
not a fiasco, not because the public management system was not
accountable, but mainly because the courts in Canada were not
about to take on the job of  assessing the country’s vast fisheries
management enterprise. Besides, Canada’s Fisheries Act gives
almost unlimited powers to the minister to run the fishery. In
other words, the issues were, at root, political, and not legal.
This commonsense legal assessment from our legal counsel
was quite acceptable to our elected council, but the populist
leaders would have none of it. Their rallying cry was to go to
court for the rights of  inshore fishermen. I have asked myself
for years why fishermen are so attracted by lawyers and court
actions. Why is it that they dream of  hiring lawyers and that,
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whenever a spontaneous new group arises around a fishing issue,
they think in terms of  legal actions? There is a tendency to invest
almost magical powers in pursuing a legal action to defend their
rights. I say magical because there is very little evidence to
demonstrate that legal actions have brought anything to the
collectivity of  inshore fishermen. Yet, it seems to be a feature
of being a primary producer that you do not have the same kind
of expectations of collective political action, so you think in
terms of  the powers of  the judicial system to deliver fairness.
I remember many years ago a colleague bringing to my
attention Karl Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of  Louis Bonaparte,
where he characterizes peasant farmers as having need for a
referee. (In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, written between
December 1851 and March 1852, and published as the first issue of the New
York magazine Die Revolution, in 1852, Karl Marx traces how the conflicts of
different social interests manifest themselves in the complex web of  political struggles,
and, in particular, the contradictory relationships between the outer form of  a struggle
and its real social content. The ‘Eighteenth Brumaire’ refers to 9 November 1799
in the French Revolutionary Calendar—the day the first Napoleon Bonaparte had
made himself dictator by a coup d’etat – Ed) They had no confidence as a
class to regulate their own affairs or to have collective action in
the broader framework of society and that it was therefore
necessary to have an arbitrator. This has a ring of  truth to it as it
applies to inshore fishermen and, indeed, it is the DFO that is
the present managing authority. The actual fisheries management
system is a very elaborate set of conditions and regulations, and
violations are subject to penalties and sanctions, and individual
fishermen surely are afforded the due process of  law. But matters
of  whether or not you qualify for a fishing licence, are permitted
to fish in a certain area, allowed so much quota, restricted to a
season, and limited to a certain size of vessel are not settled in
court. In the final analysis, they are the decisions of the minister,
usually mediated through his department and consultations with
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the ‘industry’. His decisions are certainly influenced by political
and economic forces and so, it is the job of  organized fishermen
to ensure they get fair treatment. That is a job for the MFU.
We have seen many instances where unorganized
fishermen raise significant sums of  money overnight to go to
courts for an injunction or other forms of  adjudication. Invariably,
the MFU concluded, in those same instances, that the matter
was political and could not be worked out in the courts. When
the year’s fishing plan is announced for the snow crab fishery in
the Gulf  of  St Lawrence and the inshore fishermen realize that
all the quotas are allocated to a fraction of  the fishermen, who
would end up earning as much in one year as the other fishermen
might expect to earn in 10 years, there is fury on the shore and
there are cries for justice. But a court action would get them
nowhere. It is not a judge who will make the minister re-consider
the decision; that will happen only through other forms of  action.
Litigation is, therefore, misleading and is just a form of
mystification and a means of  dissipating fishermen’s power.
It is the nature of our Fisheries Act and the powers
provided to the minister that leave little room for the courts.
Fishermen generally wish it were otherwise, but so do the
corporate sector and the specialist ‘bastions of privilege’. The
corporate lobby stands for private property rights and wants its
privileges protected under the Fisheries Act. In the mid-1990s,
the DFO brought forward a series of amendments to the Fisheries
Act that would, in fact, have allowed the minister to fetter his
own powers by entering into contractual arrangements with a
corporation or a ‘class of persons’ that could be vetted in the
courts.
The MFU, along with the other major fishermen’s unions
in the country, successfully resisted these amendments to the
Act, not because there was no attraction to formally negotiated
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contractual partnership agreements, but because there was no
provision to ensure that such agreements, while fettering the
minister, are not compromising the interests of the collectivity
of  fishermen. We said to ourselves we would prefer to take our
chances in the political arena, where a minister still has to think
twice before he/she acts contrary to the interests of  fishermen.
As fishermen’s organizations, we have a certain confidence that
we can fare better with elected ministers than in a legalistic system
that requires commissions, lawyers, licensing boards and so on.
Why would inshore fishermen, as a collectivity, believe they could
actually outcompete corporate and special interest groups on
legal terrain that generally depoliticizes issues and hence favours
the status quo?
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Canada recognize
that Canada’s native people have constitutional rights to fish.
Some of  the implications of  these decisions for the MFU’s
fishermen are discussed below but the decisions serve also to
remind fishermen that their status is not so secured. In fact, the
licence permits they are issued are considered as privileges. They
are not something a fishermen owns in a legal sense and even
banks will not take such licences as collateral. Still, there is
normally a de facto ownership, and licences are bought and sold
among fishermen. But, the value of  such licences is wholly
dependent on the DFO’s limited licensing policy. For example,
our midshore snow crab specialists (the 80 licence holders
referred to above) hold licences that are presently worth up to
Can$1.5 million. If the minister authorized the issuance of 200
new licences in this fishery, the value would drop enormously.
No wonder such groups want to have legally binding contracts
to fetter the minister’s power!
In any case, these issues of rights and privileges are
emotionally loaded terms, especially when an eight-generation
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fishing family is chided by a brash young native leader that he
has no right to the fishery, only a privilege. I take the view that
there are rights, yet most inshore fishermen want and dream of
a greater status in law because they live in a constant state of
insecurity, and because they have little confidence of  being able
to organize collectively.
Populism and Secular Fundamentalism
But, to return to populism, every time we come across a
group of  disaffected fishermen, we cannot attribute their
disaffection to rightwing populism. But we have seen enough
specific examples to set forth a series of characteristics that define
it. First, there is the allegation of  secret information being always
withheld, which, if revealed, would demonstrate a widespread
conspiracy to get rid of  fishermen. Such and such a document
found on the Internet or passed on by an insider is said to confirm
this, even if the document has already been available for some
time. There is invariably a call for audits on the established
fishermen’s organizations, insinuating that corruption exists.
There is usually a charge that organizations are selling fishermen
out. The bureaucrats are indolent and exist only to draw huge
salaries. There is an anti-intellectualism that focuses on informed
leaders and staff  who are not real fishermen. Fishermen can run
their own show, while the staff  are intellectuals who write stuff
and go to meetings, but are always collaborating with government
officials or the liberals or the ‘tree huggers’ or the bleeding hearts.
Inevitably, the populists turn out to be anti-union and sometimes
racist. There is always a ‘visionary’ who sees the big picture:
that the institutions and corporations are conspiring to rid the
fishery of the inshore and, of course, there are always at least
partial truths in his/her vision.
In essence, the populist leaders are secular fundamentalists.
They are tapping the feeling among fishermen that modern society
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is undermining their way of  life, that they are victims of  Big
Business, Big Bureaucracy and Big Unions. Where we have been
strongly touched by the populist wave, it always seems to be
charged with an emotional weight and psychic gravity that is out
of proportion to the specific issue being confronted, and the
militancy that gets expressed seems vicarious. The Bona Fide
Defence Fund, for example, built much of its populist attack on
the DFO around the loss of  the cod stocks. But, the ‘visionaries’
in this group were not dependent on the cod fishery; in fact, they
were doing very well in the crab, lobster and tuna fisheries.
Don’t get me wrong—the loss of the cod stocks was an
enormous trauma in Canadian life and it was a catastrophic failure
of the Canadian management model, and has generated a
prolonged crisis in fisheries management. But, the cod disaster
is centred in Newfoundland. The MFU is based in the Maritimes
inshore fishery, where cod represents a small portion of  the
fishermen’s catches. Objectively, most of  our fishermen did not
have a resource problem in the 1990s decade and, generally, the
management system (excluding groundfish) was actually working
well. (This is not true for a minority of  members who depended
heavily on groundfish in Cape Breton and the Acadian Peninsula.)
That is why it is difficult not to see the populist expression as
psychological. The thinking was politically naïve and magical,
bearing only a tenuous relation to the real threats to the livelihood
of  the advocates. The nouveau militants exhibited fantasies of
ominipotence and omniscience. They did not look to organization
but to the big court decision that would bring down the DFO,
enshrine fishermen’s rights and affirm identity. I speculated that
this form of  psychological militancy may actually be, at least in
part, an expression of considerable unease and bad feelings
associated with the protected status that the populist leaders
actually had. If, in comparison with the cod fishermen, the
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populists were holding a privileged status in an otherwise
devastated fishery, they must have sensed their status was not
easily justified to the public, when the industry had just finished
off  one of  the truly natural resources of  the nation.
The MFU was experiencing this ‘movement’ as a dissipation
of energies at the very moment when some of us believed we
could gain new influence over the future direction of fisheries
management. The populism was reactionary because it served
status quo interests; instead of winning a new deal for inshore
fishermen with a weakened federal authority, it turned fishermen
against effective political organization and splintered Nova
Scotia into a plethora of instant associations with local visionaries
voicing a cacaphony of  contradictory positions. It is hardly
surprising that the new groupings found their friends in the Reform
Party, while a British Columbia fishermen’s rights coalition
similarly allied with this rightwing party.  Is it not ironical that
key backers of this rightwing party were the owners and managers
of the largest lobster company in Canada? And, as we write in
November 2000, this same Reform Party, that now calls itself
the Canadian Alliance Party, has found enormous financial
backing from the truly elite corporate Canada in the centres of
banking and finance in Toronto.
The MFU began an ambitious project in the 1970s to unite
the inshore fishermen of  the Maritime provinces; the organizing
phase was all but ending in l988. Our base and role in the Nova
Scotia fishery shrunk and was virtually abandoned on PEI. We
were back to being a predominantly Acadian organization, with
our main base of  support  in the New Brunswick inshore and,
yet, the MFU has fought to retain a progressive role and, I will
argue, it has evolved to become a more effective political force.
The rest of this essay will attempt to demonstrate this proposition.
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Professionalization
As I have said, inshore fishermen as a class are ambiguous
and the MFU itself is a hybrid organization; it is not a union in
the sense of an industrial trade union nor is it simply an
association, although sometimes it refers to itself as a professional
organization. I want to pursue this idea of  professional fishermen
and the professionalization of the fishery that has become part
of  the fisheries discourse in the l990s.
In the late l980s, the Newfoundland Fishermen’s Union
hired Fr Des McGrath as an education officer. McGrath is a
legendary figure in the Newfoundland fishery. In l972, as a
Catholic parish priest, he teamed up with a St John’s lawyer and
former member of  parliament, Richard Cashin, in a remarkable
organizing project that resulted in bringing the Newfoundland
fishermen under one union umbrella. After a period back in parish
work, McGrath joined the staff of the union and began
developing his concept of professionalization.
McGrath began with an extensive and successful
‘Operation Lifeline’ programme where leading fishermen from
all over the island of Newfoundland would go through health
and safety training, not only for themselves but also to be trainers
back in their own fishing communities. During this work, he
learned about a federal government programme that was
promoting what was called ‘sector councils’. The idea of the
councils was for management and workers in a specific industry
to assess and plan their labour force needs.  McGrath believed
that fishermen should have their own sector council since they
were both managers and workers.
In l990, I remember receiving a call from a senior DFO
official informing us that his department had provided special
funding for a new initiative in professionalization. I was perplexed
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by the programme and the idea that fishermen should be
designated a professional group. We knew that some of  the
ascendancy groups were fond of appropriating the professional
designation for themselves, but it was never really something
that our own inshore fishermen had raised. Nevertheless, we
participated in meetings and discussions about the predominantly
Newfoundland initiative. By l993, though, we were still sceptical
about professionalization. Here is what we had to say on the
subject  at a major industry conference  in Moncton, New
Brunswick, in November l993:
The new professionalization programme has turned out to be
carrying far more freight than we had originally believed. In fact,
the freight borne by professionalization has turned out to be
sufficiently heavy that the whole process in the Maritime provinces,
at least, has bogged down since the last conference held in March
1991 in Moncton. It is now close to four years since the Atlantic
Fisheries Adjustment programme announcement (which provided
funds for a professionalization initiative); but the real wake-up
call for us at the MFU came on 18 December 1992 with the
announcement of  the then Minister of  Fisheries, John Crosbie,
who, with one sweep of the pen, cancelled thousands of so-called
inactive licences, while, at the same time, calling for the licensing
of ‘bona fide’ or professional fishermen…
The cancellation of  licences was the most evident arbitrary act
associated with the former Conservative government’s push for
professionalization.
The MFU went on to say that it felt that professionalization
was like a bus that they found themselves on, but it was not
clear who was driving the bus. MFU fishermen had warned, in
local consultations at the wharf level, that the government would
push for professionalization, regardless of  what the fishermen
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said. By l993, we were beginning to see that they might have
been right. We stated at the conference that there were definitely
some anti-democratic trends associated with the programme as
it was emerging. We continued:
Professionalization has crept into fisheries talk everywhere; but,
it is a vague, ill-defined term. In Newfoundland, in the l988-89
period, it had specific and sensible meanings. But government,
with industry collaboration, seems to have brought everything into
the term:  from the problem of  overcapacity, to the promotion and
extension of ITQ systems, to the cancellation of licences, to co-
management, to building fishermen’s organizations, to financing
fishermen’s groups, to consideration of  income stabilization, to
short-term adjustment and maintenance programmes.
Indeed, professionalization has become the terrain on which some
fishermen and some DFOs are working out what may be a new
Canadian fisheries management system in the wake of the rupture
and loss of faith in a system that had evolved since 1977 but
which appears to have brought us to the brink of catastrophe, at
least in the ocean itself, if not within the coastal communities.
The inshore/offshore groundfish review process in 1988 had mainly
left bitterness, partly because the offshore sector, holding 50 per
cent of the quotas, stonewalled the process and refused to accept
that capacity was a feature of the total system, claiming the problem
rested with the midshore and inshore. DFO management mainly
adopted the same position on capacity and proceeded to implement
more ITQ systems as the solution. Fisheries Minister Bernard
Valcourt popularized what we call the ITQ ideology in 1990,
with his simplistic cliche “Better to have two fishermen do well
than ten starve”.
His populist turn of  phrase moved the issue of  capacity from a
capital investment and technology problem into a human resources
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problem, meaning that there were too many fishermen and too
many unused inshore licences waiting in the shadows to be
actualized, rather than too much high-tech fishing power. So, while
the groundfish resource went into a free fall, at least partly as a
result of  overfishing by high-powered vessels, inshore fishermen’s
or ganizations were being asked to participate in a
professionalization programme that, at the very least, would
legitimize the DFO management regime’s determination to
downsize the fisher y by eliminating people, the so-called
‘unemployment insurance parasites’ and by concentrating quota
and operations within a self-managing elite.
Professionalization promises the monopolization of fishing by
the few, and protection against moonlighters, the indolent, the
poor and the UI abusers. “All professions are a conspiracy against
the laity,” claims George Bernard Shaw.
In the hands of a management regime that has suffered a loss of
client confidence, professionalization is felt by many of us to be
the regime’s effort to win consent from fishermen’s organizations
for the Valcourt approach that two is better than ten.
Professionalization is a kind of ideological justification for
eliminating licences, reducing the numbers of fishermen, and
extending private ownership and control of  quotas. From this
perspective, it is an ideology of  exclusion and adjustment.
In exchange for this basic consent from the fishermen’s
organizations, the fishermen are promised income stability, control
of the resource, new status and prestige, escape from the bondages
of  ignorance; and they are promised strenghtened fishermen’s
organizations.
However, the MFU’s experience since the Valcourt announcement
of May l990 has been one of continuous upheaval, and we ask,
‘Where was professionalization when we needed it?’—if  one of
its components is the strengthening of  fishermen’s organizations.
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The proud organizing achievements of  the MFU in Southwest
Nova Scotia, for example, were severely challenged by a split in
the inshore mobiles over ITQs and the lobstermen’s spontaneous
tie-up in the Yarmouth area. While we were unable to finance a
full-time or ganizer to get us through this divisiveness,
professionalization had bigger fish to fry by organizing conferences
and committees at the Scotia Fundy level.
We were being asked to embrace the benefits of  professionalization
at the same time  as we were having to face a de-certification drive
in eastern New Brunswick that was given credibility by the
province.
In the Maritimes, only New Brunswick fishermen have a
democratic means in legislation to determine what, if  any,
organization they want to represent them.  After three-and-a-
half years of professionalization promotion, neither Prince
Edward Island nor Nova Scotia has made any progress on this
organizational question.
A Human Resource Council will not resolve the organizational
question and, until fishermen have an adequate democratic
framework for determining representation, a sensible ‘industry-
driven’ approach to training and certification becomes extremely
difficult. Without this democratic framework for organizing,
professionalization is easily used as a terrain for gaining
advantage by special interests groups or by bureaucrats promoting
rationalization. In March l992, we were able to conduct formal
consultations with several hundred inshore fishermen in the
Southern Gulf . They were inter ested in so-called
professionalization, to the extent that the programmes were carried
out by the union.
The reader will detect a strident anger in our response to
the way professionalization was going on. You have to remember
that, by l993, all the major cod stocks in Atlantic Canada had
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collapsed. Richard Cashin called it a “catastrophe of biblical
proportions”. In the Maritime provinces, our MFU fishermen
were only marginally affected by the collapse, except for the Cape
Breton Local; but, overall, fisheries politics was being subsumed
by the disaster. It was a national trauma and we at the MFU had
to watch out that we didn’t become one of the proverbial babies
that gets thrown out with the bath water.
It is an understatement to say that professionalization got
off  to a bad start in the Maritime provinces. Fr McGrath’s interest
in professionalization in the Newfoundland context made lots
of sense. Licensing in the inshore cod fishery of that province
was a fluid concept, at best, and virtually thousands of licences
were held by people who did not make their full-time living in
the fishery. Those who were dedicated full-time fishermen and
who depended on the fishery smarted under a system where all
kinds of  ‘moonlighters’ would move in and out of  the fishery,
according to how good the catches and prices were. A mine
would close down in northern Newfoundland and the premier
would promise every laid-off miner a lobster licence, even though
there were hundreds of  inshore fishermen in the same area who
depended on the fishery for their livelihoods and could not get
such a licence. Or, the firemen in another town might have a
licence that they would use to enter the fishery at peak times,
while holding on to their full-time jobs. Teachers would do the
same during their summer vacations, and so on.  In the Maritime
provinces, this issue had been largely eliminated in the early l980s
through the MFU’s ‘homemade’ bona fide licensing policy and
its derivatives.
The Newfoundland open-ended system was also putting a
strain on fishermen’s unemployment insurance programmes
because thousands of individuals not attached to the fishery in
a significant way would use the fishery as a means of entry into
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the unemployment insurance system. In other words, the fishery
was being asked to carry the biggest load of  the general poverty
conditions besetting Newfoundland. Professionalization was seen
by the fishermen in that province as not only a means of  gaining
new recognition for their status and profession but also as a way
of  gaining new protections.
Nothwithstanding the MFU’s reactions to the way the
central agencies were using the positive initiative from
Newfoundland to carry other ‘freight’ in the Maritimes context,
we did see professionalization as a way by which we could make
new associations with other fishermen’s organizations across the
country, since there was substantial funding available that would
allow us to meet nationwide. (The geographic size of Canada
makes the running of  national organizations very costly.) So,
under the rubric of  professionalization, we joined with the British
Columbia fishermen’s union, the Newfoundland union and
several other smaller fishermen’s organizations to form the
CCPFH.
Burying the Hatchet
Although we didn’t clearly think so at the time, the MFU’s
organizing phase was over by the end of  the l980s. The inspiration
to organize inshore fishermen across the Maritimes under the
MFU was no longer realistic. Like the stressed fish stocks, we
reverted to our core spawning grounds in Acadian New
Brunswick to draw our strengths.
But I remain fascinated by how the MFU as an organization
was living out, in a microcosmic way, many of  the trends we
saw worldwide after the end of  the Cold War.  Yasser Arafat and
the Palestinians were talking to the Israelis; peace accords were
imminent in Northern Ireland; and South Africa’s apartheid system
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broke down under the co-operative work of Nelson Mandela
and F W de Clerk. So too with us in the fishery. The MFU began
talking with its ‘ancient rivals’ like the EFF and the PEI
Fishermen’s Association. The EFF had played a nemesis role
vis-à-vis the MFU throughout our organizing phase. This federation
of  fishermen was set up with largesse from the federal
government (see A Word to Say) that coincided with the militant
organizing expansion of  the MFU at the end of  the l970s. Perhaps
it does not matter whether or not the government’s largesse was
a conscious union-busting move by federal officials; it had the
feel of such a tactic. The most charitable view of the EFF was
to see it as representing management ideology, which is surely
part of  the ambivalent consciousness of  fishermen.
Following the MFU annual convention in l992, our
president extended an olive branch to the EFF and efforts were
made to co-operate on programmes.  But, in reality, the EFF
was, by then, a group of small and disparate local associations
that had little capacity to act and that retained  lots of hostility
towards the MFU. At the level of  the two organizations, co-
operation never really materialized into joint projects, but
‘burying the hatchet’ did provide a positive climate within New
Brunswick, in particular, where there had always been local
associations in some of the English-speaking villages that resisted
the MFU. These local associations were affiliated with the EFF
and, as relations eased with the federation, we made new efforts
to reconcile with local associations like those in Botsford, Little
Cape and Stonehaven. For the most part, these efforts were
successful and throughout the l990s, we had reached a kind of
peaceful co-existence.
 The PEI Fishermen’s Association was also an MFU rival
on PEI. They opposed the idea of unions and they too were
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almost completely dependent on provincial government
financing. The Association consistently opposed the MFU’s idea
of having organizing legislation. By l988, we decided that our
own resources were stretched to the limit and that we could not
continue competing against the provincial government’s funding.
We decided to withdraw any formal work on the Island until
such future time when the province stopped preferential
treatment to one group.
As the l990s decade progressed, relations with the PEI
Fishermen’s Association improved greatly. While never fully
divorcing itself from the provincial government, it nevertheless
demonstrated a real base of  supporting fishermen, and there was
much common ground for us to collaborate.
We also began to find some common ground with our
midshore rivals on the Acadian Peninsula. They were organized
in the Acadian Professional Fishermen’s Association (APFA).
They were the shrimpers, crabbers, seiners and draggers; most
of  them were owner-operator fishermen (who were reinvesting
their profits in their own fish plants) and, as such, there was
some common basis with other fishermen in the country. The
APFA saw professionalization as something to be introduced
for their crew members; while it was never stated openly,
professionalization was a way of avoiding a possible unionization
among the crew members. The executive director of  this
midshore association was a nationalist Acadian who never
opposed the development of the MFU as such. He supported
the idea of the emerging CCPFH and it was mainly through this
Council that the MFU had any association with this group. It did
not last long; the APFA split under the burden of  special interest
groups, especially in the snow crab sector and the executive
director himself was pressured out after the MFU won entry
into this exclusive fishery in l995 (see below).
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During the watershed period, our locals in Nova Scotia
took a terrific beating, but they held on to their locals with a
reduced membership base. In Southwest Nova Scotia, the MFU,
along with many other inshore fishermen, was resisting the full
expansion of  the ITQ system to the inshore groundfish sector.
Their alternative was to establish a form of  ‘community
management’, which, in practice, meant that quotas were
allocated to management boards made up of  fishermen’s
organizations. The local reached an agreement with the Bay of
Fundy Fishermen’s Association, whereby they would jointly
manage their fixed-gear groundfish allocations. It proved to be a
workable local experiment and continues to function to this day.
In Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, the MFU remained the
dominant inshore fishermen’s organization but still could only
claim support from half  the fishermen in that fishing region.
Here, too, the spirit of  co-operation led the local to join with
three other smaller associations to jointly manage the remnants
of  the groundfish allocations. This partnership has been limited
but workable, and now the area expects to use the new provincial
legislation that provides a framework for fishermen to organize
and collect dues. The legislation differs from that of  New
Brunswick insofar as it provides for the certification of  more
than one inshore organization in the same fishing region. This
fishing region has approximately 600 inshore operations, and if
the majority of  fishermen agree that they should pay dues to
one or more organizations, then these organizations can seek
certification from the province.
As I reported above, our Local 4 on the north shore of
Nova Scotia was devastated by the splits and divisions that first
started at the North Bay Co-operative. A few of  our long-term
supporters, nevertheless, kept the local alive and they too began
entering into new formations with other local associations to
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create what has become known as the Gulf Nova Scotia Fleet
Planning Board.
The fishery is conflictual at the best of times, and our Nova
Scotia fishermen leaders, in particular, went through some horrible
times as divisions and antagonisms among fishermen intensified
after l988. It truly took an emotional effort to ‘bury the hatchet’
with groups and individuals who had personalized their attacks
and misrepresented the work of  the MFU. But, if  Nelson Mandela
could do it with his South African jailers and Afrikaan racists,
then surely we could try to work on local reconciliations. (Nelson
Rolihlahla Mandela, who spent 27 years in prison, was the first
democratically elected State President of South Africa between May 1994
and June 1999. He retired from public life in June 1999 and currently
resides in his birth place, Qunu, Transkei – Ed).
Burying the hatchet was important for the MFU, but
entering into workable alliances with other organizations is more
complex and requires much care, if we are not to weaken the
power of  our own organization in the process. We had built an
inshore fishermen’s organization that was capable of  delivering
realizable ‘products’ in co-operation with others, but we have to
pick and choose. We hardly have the capabilities to be all things
to all people. We had emerged from our organizing phase as a
stable and well-run inshore fishermen’s organization, but we were
certainly not a movement, if indeed we ever were one. In some
ways, we had become a professional organization; maybe we
were still thinking globally, but we were acting locally. So, does
this mean that we are now to be dismissed as a managerial group
looking after the narrow interests of  owner-operator fishermen,
or are we better positioned to make a real political contribution
to the ‘movement’, as it were?
The ‘movement’ is not my own terminology but leftwing
people around the world still seem to use it. The best that I can
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say is that there are progressive political forces that add up to
what we call the Left and I assume this is what is meant by the
‘movement’. I believe that the MFU can and is a progressive
force, and can contribute to the Left, but we can only do this
from our own limited sociological base. In the Canadian context,
inshore fishermen are generating social power by virtue of  their
fishing work. This social power is always in danger of being
consumed by the ‘power eaters’, be they politicians, resource
managers, supporters or regressive fishermen leaders. The MFU
represents some of the recovered social power of the inshore
fishermen, and, because of  this, it is able to play a political role.
Whistling in the Dark
When you are submersed in the daily realities of  running
an organization, you can be surprised by simple facts that make
you think differently about the very organization. Some such
surprise is contained in a presentation I made in l994 at a
workshop of the International Collective in Support of
Fishworkers (ICSF) in Cebu, the Philippines:
To this, we must say that the 1990s’ MFU is not the same
fishermen’s organization as the 1970s’ MFU. There are some
simple sociological facts; the sociology in a nutshell is this:  in the
1970s, we had some of the features of a movement, wives and
families and coastal communities had at least some involvement.
Our fishermen leaders tended to be in their late twenties and
thirties, tended to have work experience outside of the inshore
fishery, tended to have more education, and tended to have chosen
to stay or return to the fishery. They were what we might call a
‘strong year class’. They have moved through the fishery with the
MFU right through to the 1990s. Generally, they bought into,
and had influence upon, the general fisheries management consensus
in Canada that managed with limited-entry licensing and a range
of effort and quota controls.
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They may have been a strong year class but there was very little
recruitment behind them, partially because of their own approach
to limiting entry. So what do we have in the MFU by the 1990s?
We have fishermen who tend to be males between the ages of  40
to 55. We have fishermen who are almost exclusively the skippers
of their own vessels, who have little or no connection with the rest
of the trade union movement and whose families tend not to be as
implicated in their more ‘professional’ (or ‘modernized’) operations.
Indeed, our fishermen tend to have between Can$100,000 to
Can$200,000 invested in the fishery (which, nevertheless, is still
a relatively labour-intensive operation in the Canadian context)
and some have living standards that sometimes exceed those of
the Canadian middleclass norm.
You could say that the 1990s’ MFU has a ‘thinner’ sociological
base and, predictably, its membership is less likely to adhere to
progressive solidarity-type ideals and is more demanding of ‘bread
and butter’ interest group results.
…the fishermen’s organizations are being asked to participate in
shaping future fishery with less government income supplement
and fewer participants. The government is intent on trimming the
fishery to a ‘core’ of  professionals that will hold the licences and
the quotas in the future fishery and that will be self-sufficient in
relation to State subsidy. The ‘core’ of professionals would have
their professional organizations who would control licensing and,
in the long run, co-manage the fishery.
It is for sure that we are in the midst of a restructuring in Canada.
The last restructuring of  the east coast fishery was in l982 and it
concentrated on setting up stable industrial fishery companies; the
present, as yet unformulated, restructuring is tending towards the
setting up of  stable professional fishermen’s organizations.  The
Maritime Fishermen’s Union is being invited to participate in
the restructuring, but our response has been ambivalent. We are
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faced with the dilemma of  a primary producer organization. If
we embrace wholeheartedly the process, we are taking a ‘tripartite’
and corporatist direction; we take on, or are delegated, some of
the powers of  the State and, in return, we yield our independence
and voluntary character. Put this way, we have no choice; we must
remain independent; we must remain a fishermen’s organization
that tries to follow a union line, a solidarity line.  But, our sociology
and the conditions of  the fishery push us more and more in the
direction of a professional association. And even our support,
over the past 15 years, for a ‘professional’ licensing system has
been a factor driving us in such a direction.
I should point out again who is missing from our own fishermen’s
organization. First, approximately half  of  the owner-operators
in our inshore constituency in the Maritime provinces do not belong
to any organization. Second, 95 per cent of  the men (and sometimes
women) who work as crew on the inshore vessels do not belong to
our MFU or to any other fisher organization. Third, the families
of our members, especially the wives who often help on the business
side, but also the young who are sometimes apprenticing, are not
in our organization. Fourth, most of  the dockside handlers,
weighers, truckers and fishplant workers in the inshore fishery
remain unorganized and outside of  the MFU. With our narrow
social base and without linkages to the rest of the working people
in the sector, the MFU will tend to be a professional interest
group, expressing managerial ideology. This would be another
huge irony for a fishermen’s organization whose members and
staff  sacrificed much to be an oppositional organization, a
fishworker organization!
But, I do not agree that the MFU is just a professional interest
group. We continue to try to unite fishers across barriers of
language, geography, gear type, fishing regions, provinces, and income
levels. We remain broadly based in the inshore fishery. Our
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fishermen continue to rely on the annual cycles of the fish, on their
traditional fishing grounds, on their own skill and wit as fishers;
many of the inshore fishers continue to share egalitarian principles,
principles of  fairness, and a basic solidarity with other fishers.
They are fishermen that continue to resist the economic model of
individual transferable quota systems that end up concentrating
quotas in the hands of  a few, often in the hands of  business
interests that end up having the fishermen back fishing for a
company.
Maybe I am just ‘whistling in the dark’, and sociology and fisheries
economics will relentlessly turn the MFU into a professional
association, regardless. Perhaps!  But, the fact also remains that
the inshore fishery situation is a fluid one. The challenge for our
fishermen’s organization is to find its way back to a ‘union line’,
recognizing that a ‘union line’ with inshore fishers is almost
contradictory to their status as autonomous primary producers.
If we do not find ways to include the preoccupations of our inshore
crew-member fishermen, and ways of bringing the future recruits
(the young) and the participating wives into the organization, it
will be impossible to find a way back to a ‘union line’.
The MFU history is full of ironies—perhaps to the trained
sociologist, it is all very predictable, but I still see much irony. It
is ironic that the federal Fisheries Department has bailed out the
MFU financially on as many as three different occasions, the
militant MFU whose earlier organizers were once booted out of
the trade union central building for being radical sectarians. It is
ironic that as the MFU fought for collective bargaining rights for
inshore fishermen on the premise that there was a growing
monopoly in the fishery, inshore fishermen were actually gaining
more independence from their buyers as a result of better credit,
more competition, better information flow, improved social
security, and better returns to the vessel, all of  which the MFU
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also had a hand in creating. In the end, the MFU won collective
bargaining rights for inshore fishermen but has seldom bargained.
Taken at face value, the exercise seems to have been a failure.
Indeed, it is a complex task to evaluate the role of
fishermen’s organizations in defending the inshore fishers and
the coastal communities. No one would have predicted that the
lobster resource would have tripled over the lifetime of  the MFU.
This resource is the backbone of the inshore fishery (outside of
Newfoundland), and the scientific community is at a loss to
explain this resource expansion, when exploitation rates on legal
size lobsters is as high as 80 per cent.
Ironically, this is probably the MFU’s major success story
and it derives from an MFU collaboration with government
regulators and enforcers to ensure basic adherence to restrictions
on size, egg-bearing females and limited entry. It was in its
capacity as a professional organization of limited-entry licence
holders that the MFU has contributed to a productive lobster
fishery.
In l994, following the cod collapse, I wrote:
It is also ironical that the inshore fleet of the Maritimes may now
be in a better position to participate in a future cod recovery (within
the Maritime provinces, that is, to again distinguish from
Newfoundland, where inshore fishermen are almost exclusively
dependent on the cod fishery). The inshore fleet is in a better
position than the vertically integrated industrial fishing companies,
not because of  the militant struggles of  the MFU and other
fishermen’s organizations but because of  an unpredicted lobster
expansion and because the specialized cod fleets have bankrupted
themselves.  There is a conjuncture here where the inshore fishermen’s
organizations can achieve future gains.
The present conjuncture has parallels from an earlier period. One
of the commanding myths in the MFU is that of the inshore
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fishermen’s militant fight with the large herring purse-seiners.
The purse-seine fleets arrived in numbers on Canada’s east coast
in the late 1960s; they landed millions of  tonnes of  herring in
the Gulf of St Lawrence, before they bankrupted themselves
and the resource by 1980. Because the MFU was organized and
in place in l980 and because the seiners were finished, the inshore
fishermen won major concessions over future access to the resource,
and, for some years now, we have enjoyed 80 per cent of  the
quotas, that is, 82,000 tonnes of  herring. (Note: Prior to l980,
the quota allocations were reversed, with the seiners catching 80
per cent of  the quota.) The herring resource in the Gulf  of
St Lawrence is now one of the most productive and best managed
fishery in Atlantic Canada.  It is now an inshore gill-net fishery
and fished by a thousand inshore vessels; this is an anomaly for
Western industrial countries, where pelagics are dominated by the
industrial fleets. You cannot say that the MFU defeated the seiners.
It was more dialectical; the seiners fished out their own resource
base and were, therefore, exposed to gains from the inshore.
In both the cod and herring fisheries, the State was ineffective in
protecting either the inshore fishermen or the resource against the
expansion of  catching capacity by larger and more heavily
capitalized fleets. Organizations like the MFU were never really
heard until most of the damage was done. The reason why we
may be able to achieve some gains now in the present groundfish
crisis is because our members have stayed with a multispecies fishery
and have stayed somewhat organized and, of  course, have had
the good fortune of  holding limited-entry lobster licences and,
therefore, have a resource base.
To win these kinds of  reversals, the MFU had to be there;
the inshore fishermen had to be organized. We have 25 years of
organization; we have built up a real collective practice; we have
an organizational culture amongst our members and staff, built
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up by actions and by working through a democratic structure.
Sure, we have a narrow sociological base, but so what? We are
who we are. The key is that, through the MFU, our inshore
members have recovered at least a portion of the social power
they generate as working, producing fishermen. Moreover, the
MFU has a power that is premised on being progressive. There
are very few identifiable inshore organizations in the country
that can make a similar claim.
An international aid and development worker who assisted
us with some international funding remarked on the culture of
the MFU, in particular, the relationship between the fishermen
and the staff. He noted that, often, you find with producer
organizations that the staff  runs the organization paternalistically
or, conversely, the staff  are not much more than hired business
agents, who are not allowed a role in policymaking and simply
carry out the orders of  the fishermen in charge. I have noted
that the populist and rightwing tendencies that are always present
in the fishing communities reject the idea of staff. They say that
fishermen can run their own organizations. In reality, there is no
broadbased fishermen’s organization in the country with an
ongoing structure that does not have staff. Prior to the 1990s
decade, the MFU referred to its principal workers as organizers.
It is fitting that the job designations changed in the early l990s;
organizers are now local co-ordinators, regional co-ordinators or
project officers. Regardless, it is the relationship of  the staff  to
the elected fishermen and wharf  representatives that is key to
maintaining a progressive organization.
Historically, MFU staff  have played many different roles
7in the organization, but the particular contribution that interests
me—and the one I believe the international aid worker noted—
is the struggle the staff  have made to retain their independent
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function and thinking in a kind of  dialectical struggle with the
fishermen. Staff  thinking and ideas are no good if  they cannot
be worked out with the fishermen, while fishermen’s thinking
can easily lose its political force if not tempered against that of
the staff. We have had good fortune with this relationship over
the years and it is part of  the essential culture of  the MFU.
Another characteristic of the MFU that is usually taken
for granted, but which should never be underestimated, is its
basic democratic structure. It is the structure that distinguishes
us from a local spontaneous organization of  fishermen. Even to
this day, when we hear the MFU being referred to as an
association, we smart under the designation. We never became a
formalized trade union, but we followed a constitution and a
democratic framework. We maintained a broad base, and we
depended less on one or two charismatic leaders. When you survey
the world for fishermen’s organizations, you simply do not find
many that span large geographic areas, different inshore fisheries,
diverse language groups and mixed races, and that maintain the
basic principle of one person, one vote. In other words, the MFU
is not a federation of  small associations. A member is a member,
not a member of an association that then joins an umbrella
federation.
Our type of  organization seems to run counter to the
anarchistic tendencies of  the inshore fishing culture. For example,
our veteran fishermen are very conscious of  the difference in
how the MFU conducts meetings, compared to the spontaneous
gatherings of  fishermen. Holding an annual convention can be a
financial and organizational burden for an organization like the
MFU. Most unions hold conventions every two or three years.
When we, as the staff, suggested that we go for a convention
every two years, it was placed as a resolution before the
convention and soundly rejected. Inshore fishermen just do not
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have the opportunity to meet and debate the issues of the day in
a parliamentary format and in a context that is usually less
conflictual. Its democratic nature and structure is a valued
component of  the MFU, even if  it does not take up much space
in this essay.
Spontaneous gatherings of  fishermen are a regular
occurrence around the world, but planned gatherings of
fishermen, where they are the main voices in an organized
environment with accepted rules of  procedure can become
potential moments for consolidating and recovering the social
power that I spoke of. Populist meetings, on the other hand, will
tend in the other direction towards a dissipation of energies and
social power. When meetings break down into shouting matches
or towers of  babel, fishermen will tend not to return. The nature
of the meeting itself then becomes a key component of building
durable organizations. Again, I should add that our type of
organizational model will not function without dependable
support workers who are able to find ways to not only organize
themselves and others around issues but to also engage in forms
of social animation.
During the upheavals of  the l990s, one of  the biggest
challenges facing the MFU was to keep our nerve. We had
something going for ourselves, but the cod collapse and structural
adjustment, with all that it entails, threatened to subsume us. As
an organization, it was critical to keep a clear head. It was
essential that we resist our reality being defined by other forces.
By this, I mean that the inshore that we represented, especially
in the southern Gulf of St Lawrence, had a stable resource base
in lobster and herring. We had evolved an effective licence policy
for our owner-operator multispecies inshore fleet. Our markets
were reasonably strong. There was no reason for us to accept
interpretations of the fishery that were based on the
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haemorrhaging cod situation. There was every reason for us to
demonstrate that fishing inshore with fixed gear was not only
productive but also demonstrably a better management model
than the one the DFO had developed for the cod fishery.
The MFU’s membership adds up to approximately 10 per
cent of  all the fishermen of  eastern Canada. So much takes place
in the fishery that is outside of any power the MFU might have.
Nevertheless, events transpire that open up possibilities for
organized inshore fishermen to make gains. The MFU made a
historic breakthrough in the snow crab fishery of the southern
Gulf of St Lawrence in 1995. That is a case study that
demonstrates my point.
This specific snow crab fishery developed after 1970. Over
the years, it evolved as an exclusive product for niche markets
in Japan. The fishermen who prosecuted it became increasingly
specialized and were very successful in creating a form of
monopoly. Using the backing of  the provincial government in
New Brunswick, it succeeded in having the federal licensing
authority restrict entry to 80 licence holders in the Acadian
Peninsula of  New Brunswick.
The ‘crabbers’ were notorious, even in the 1980s, for having
made ‘big money’ in the fishery. But, by 1994, their monopoly-
like position was becoming untenable. While most of the
country’s east coast fishermen were reeling from the closure of
the cod fishery, the crab resource was expanding. This was
happening in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but it was expanding at
the same time, almost exponentially, in Newfoundland. (Shrimp
too ‘bloomed’ after the cod moratorium, apparently because
waters were cooling, but most evidently because a major predator,
the cod, had been vanquished.) The Japanese market was also
strong due to weakened Chionoecepes opilio (Alaskan snow crab)
stocks and a strong yen. Prior to the 1994 spring season, it was
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clear that the 80 ‘crabbers’ in the Acadian Peninsula were heading
for a Klondike. (The reference is to a region of  Yukon Territory, Canada, just
east of Alaska and traversed by the Klondike River, where gold was discovered in
1896, leading to the gold rush of 1897-1898, when over 25,000 people sought
their fortune in frozen conditions – Ed)
At the same time, fishermen dependent on groundfish
everywhere went not only bankrupt but were also being sustained
by massive government aid. The government was forced to
reconsider its allocation of snow crab to such a tiny elite of
already ‘comfortable’ (and sometimes wealthy) snow crab licence
holders. The ‘crabbers’ quickly scrambled to propose a fund from
some of  their surplus to aid groundfish dependents. This was
done to fend off the possibility of losing some of their quota
allocations to other fishermen. In New Brunswick, this tactic
also worked to keep the dreaded inshore fishermen, represented
by the MFU, from gaining access to the snow crab fishery. Our
fishermen had argued for years that snow crab was found in their
inshore and that they should have access to it as part of their
multispecies approach to fishing. But, it was a demand that kept
being denied.
It turned out that the ‘crabbers’ did achieve superprofits
in 1994, even after contributing to the groundfish fund. Their
position became less tenable in 1995, as our inshore multispecies
fishermen were growing in militancy over this kind of  inequality
in the community, where they eked out a living wage, while crab
licence holders got millions of  dollars. Conditions were expected
to be even more favourable in 1995, both in terms of  price and
catch. The very legitimacy of limited-entry licensing was
challenged by such enormous profits accruing to a handful of
licence holders on the Acadian Peninsula. One chartered
accountant estimated that this group of 80 was worth half a
billion Canadian dollars in an area of the country where the
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unemployment rate was 20 per cent. The government’s
allocations of crab quota had to change.
The MFU was able to leverage the snow crab monopoly,
now verging on scandalous proportions, for a political foothold.
We proposed an alternative approach. We decided not to argue
for a handful of new licences that would benefit a fraction of
our members. The entire bona fide licensing system that we had
promoted for the past 15 years was designed to generate
reasonable incomes for the whole collectivity of  fishermen, not
just for new enclaves of  the privileged few.
We proposed that 25 per cent of  the snow crab allocation
should accrue to the MFU as an organization of  inshore
fishermen. Fishermen could fish part of  our MFU allocation on
charter and the proceeds would be invested in a health insurance
fund for all inshore fishermen in eastern New Brunswick. The
rest of the MFU allocation would be broken down into individual
allocations of  11,000 lb each and all fishermen would be eligible
to enter into a draw to have temporary (one-year) access to snow
crab. In practice, 11,000 lbs represented a good secondary fishery
for the inshore fishermen—and 240 fishermen qualified for such
allocations in 1995. We won the essentials of  our proposal and,
for the first time, New Brunswick inshore fishermen were
allocated, through the MFU, 20 per cent of  the quota formerly
monopolized by 80 licence holders. It was a bold decision by the
Minister of Fisheries, but the entrenched ‘crabbers’ were
outraged. They howled from the rooftops; it was ‘the end of
civilization’ as they knew it. The MFU had prevailed.
Our alternative model was enormously successful and the
health insurance fund, established in 1995, is still providing for
basic drugs for inshore families. The MFU had made a
breakthrough because political forces had converged to weaken
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vested interests. But the ‘Crab Lords’ were not finished. The
sequel to the story is less pretty; it is not germane to my example,
but it illustrates the role a broadbased progressive organization
of  inshore fishermen can play in a volatile and explosive fisheries
conflict.
The Lords of the Crab
The term ‘Crab Lords’ was coined by the MFU in 1996,
when the full power of the ‘crabbers’ was directed toward the
MFU on the Acadian Peninsula. The peninsula is fish country
and the base of  its local economy is the fishery. The 100,000
Acadians who populate the area were the former victims of
‘ethnic cleansing’ in 1755 by British troops who rounded them
up from their productive farms in Nova Scotia and deported
them to the US. Many found their way by river routes and the
woods to remote areas of  New Brunswick, aided, in some
instances, by Mi’kmaq Indian people through harsh winters and
past the probing eyes of  British colonial authorities. They learned
to live from the sea and built up communities that spent 200
years in relative Canadian poverty.
By 1996, the crab interests were beside themselves. Both
the price of crab and catches were projected to drop in the
coming season, although they would still remain lucrative. When
the DFO issued the crab plan for 1996 in early April, the MFU’s
‘temporary’ share was included. All hell broke loose. The crab
licence holders refused to accept the plan. They tied up their
vessels and orchestrated street demonstrations. Buildings were
smashed, barricades set up, individuals threatened and villages
invaded by mobs of angry protestors, as police were forced to
escort MFU leaders.
How could 80 snow crabbers create such threatening and
riotous actions? The short answer is that they had Mafia-like
control over local economies like Shippagan. By 1996, the licence
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holders were not only displaying conspicuous wealth but had
gained ownership of  the major crab plants and had enormous
influence over others who depended on crab for work.
Furthermore, they employed crew who made excellent wages
for a six-week fishery and who were superior in status and job
security. Some were family members who expected to eventually
take control of the enterprise; others were wage earners who
had no union and no security. The limit on the amount of  crab
that could be caught would affect the amount of work plant
hands could get, the income the crew would earn, and the number
of  temporary fishermen the crabbers would need. Furthermore,
while the MFU’s snow crab was being landed and processed on
the peninsula, it was often delivered to plants not directly owned
by crab licence holders. The situation was vulnerable to
manipulation, intimidation and half-truths. Some of  the women
plant workers were out on the streets, ordered there by their
boss. Members of  crew were threatened with layoffs because
quota was going to the MFU. The crabbers were successful in
making the MFU the scapegoat for all the troubles of the fish
plant workers. They were demagogic, stirring up passions and
hatred towards the inshore fishers.
One evening, a mob of some 500 people marched into the
village of  Val Comeau, where the MFU president lived and where
the small inshore community was long seen as a centre of MFU
strength. The villagers got confused and fearful, and some headed
to the woods, armed with hunting rifles. A promise by the MFU
president to take their demands back to the inshore fishermen
managed to defuse the fury of  the mob that evening. The
following evening, a thousand inshore fishermen filled the high
school auditorium in nearby Tracadie. They were furious; there
was talk of riot, retaliation, boatburning and so on. One
demagogic word from the MFU leadership and the peninsula
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would have been plunged into crisis. We were able to re-assure
fishermen that the government was not going to cave in to the
Crab Lords and that we were heading to meet with the fisheries
minister. Since the MFU was well known and respected, and
because the fishermen were used to working through the MFU—
in short, because they were organized—chaos, anarchy and,
possibly, bloodshed was avoided. The fishermen’s decisions to
go through the MFU in this volatile climate was key. The crab
protests abated. The minister stuck to his position and the 1996
fishery proceeded without major incident.
However, quotas continued to decline in 1997, as scientists
had predicted, and the MFU’s share of  the fishery was still only
designated as temporary. It was time for the provincial
government to show its bias towards local capital and against its
own inshore fishermen. Under the guise of  setting up a plant
workers’ fund to be financed by surplus revenues from the snow
crabbers, the provincial premier backed the crabbers’ five-year
plan that effectively kept the MFU out of the fishery when gross
revenues per licence holders fell below Can$500,000. It was a
sleight of hand and a capitulation to the mob terror unleashed
the previous spring.
There is so much more to the story, especially on the matter
of working-class vulnerability and gender issues, that cannot be
told in this limited essay. Fishplant workers are mainly women,
who are largely unorganized, earning wages barely enough to
keep them above the poverty line. If they had any interests at all
for fishermen, you would imagine those would be for the union-
oriented inshore fishermen. In 1999, two of  the snow crab lords
sold their licences to interests outside the province. It meant
nothing to them that their quota allocations might end up in
fishplants far from the Acadian Peninsula, far from the very
women who were forced into the streets on their account.
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The snow crab story is not finished. The MFU was excluded
for three years by the five-year ‘partnership’ agreement. But with
prices and quotas again rising, we expect to be back fishing in
2001, when we will be able to complete our rotation plan that
allows all multispecies fishermen to eventually have one-year
access, before returning to the top of the roster list.
A fishermen’s organization like the MFU will always be
unstable because of the nature of the fishery itself and the
character of  fishermen as independent operators. Members want
to see gains on basic bread-and-butter issues and not just on
broad policy matters. By using a portion of  the snow crab
allocation to fund a health insurance programme, the MFU, for
the first time in its history, was able to provide a benefit not only
for fishermen but also for their spouses and children. The
insurance programme has provided a kind of glue for the
membership, an extra incentive to support the union during
periods when there is no one dominant and uniting issue. The
final years of the 20th century was that kind of period.
Shrinking Government
For the 19 years that I have been associated with the
fisheries, there was always some public figure, political leader or
technocratic planner who intended to ‘rationalize’ the fishery.
For example, in 1985, a Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic
Prospects called for a drastic reduction in the number of
fishermen. During the inshore-offshore review in 1988, fisheries
officials claimed there was a huge overcapacity problem, but
instead of  focusing on technology and fishing power, they
actually exempted the offshore industrial fleet from their
definition of overcapacity because they were on enterprise
allocations. As late as 1994, a Task Force on Incomes and
Adjustment in the fishery wanted to reduce the numbers of
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fishermen by 50 per cent. On the west coast, in 1996, the
fisheries department introduced the controversial Mifflin Plan
in the salmon fishery that would force a concentration and
shrinkage in this famous Pacific coast fishery. Indeed, the number
of  registered fishermen dropped from 19,000 to 8,500 by the
year 2000.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) types,
Canada was up against a ‘debt wall’ in 1993, the same year that
the full dimensions of the cod loss were revealed. The collapse
of  this historical fishery, which first brought the Europeans into
this continent, was the last straw for the ‘rationalizers’. The
country’s managers were now openly talking of  the fishery as a
‘sunset’ industry, even though whole regions of  the country
depended on the fishery. Even if  the cod stocks recovered, the
managers were determined to have a dramatically reduced fishery
that would be largely privatized and self-financing. Public
ownership and management of the fishery was clearly under
attack. Indeed, government itself was increasingly under attack
as being too big; not only was the population of  fishermen to be
shrunk, the DFO was also facing massive cutbacks.
We were into the era of  privatization, de-regulation, and
cost recovery, and one of  the prized vehicles in the fishery to
carry this vision forward was the ITQ system and its variants.
The National Globe and Mail promoted ITQs as the answer to the
new fishery. Newly formed rightwing think tanks, like the Atlantic
Institute for Marketing Studies, conducted conferences in praise
of  ITQs.
To me, ITQs may have had the theoretical backing of  the
Chicago School of  economics and the Treasury Board of  New
Zealand, but in Canada, ITQs were used to create privilege and
drive people out of the fishery; they were implemented in
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piecemeal fashion, generally rewarding the most recent history
of catch—a kind of  ‘might is right’ principle. Most of the
aggressive dragger fleets, be they midshore or offshore, were
under some form of  ITQ by l992, when the ancient Northern
cod stock was closed. Since most cod was being caught under
this much-touted system of ITQs, it is difficult not to conclude
that they played a role in one of the greatest disasters in the
history of  the fishery. I, for one, find it astonishing that not only
did ITQs escape from bearing at least a portion of the blame for
our cod losses, they were being embraced ideologically with even
more vigour following the collapse.
The ITQ approach was included within a broader
framework of  partnership agreements. These agreements were
targeted at the specialist/ascendancy fleets and corporate fisheries
like the offshore scallop fishery on George’s Bank. In a partnership
agreement, the DFO would detail what a specific fleet would be
allocated for a five-year period and what would be the fleet’s
obligations in terms of  dockside monitoring, observers at sea,
scientific costs, air surveillance, licence fees and so on. The
agreements provided protection to the quota holders; in return,
the quota holders were paying new costs formerly picked up by
the public treasury. That may have been a great deal for the elite
specialized sector but it is generally inimical to the common good
or interests of  the collectivity of  fishermen who make their living
from fishing. Once again, the few offshore scallopers, midshore
snow crabbers and mid- and offshore shrimpers were being
offered more security and stability through privileged positions
and frequent superprofits. But the national planners could argue
that they were reducing the costs of  running the fishery and
improving control mechanisms.
The Fisheries Act was to be amended to give even broader
scope to the partnership approach. The inshore fishermen’s
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organizations, including the MFU, strongly opposed the proposed
Sections 17 to 21 of the new Act on the grounds that the
minister’s powers would be even further co-opted by ‘sweetheart’
arrangements with corporate fisheries interests, to the detriment
of  the multispecies inshore fishermen. The example that the
MFU knew the best came from the snow crab fishery, where
partnership negotiations had commenced in 1995, in private,
with representatives of the snow crab licence holders in the Gulf
of St Lawrence. Remember, 1995 was the year the MFU finally
gained access to the snow crab resource, and here were
government officials quietly working out a long-term partnership
agreement with the 80 midshore licence holders. When the first
drafts came to light in early 1996, the entire inshore was
astounded, and we went after the bureaucrats and politicians.
This draft was withdrawn, but a more sophisticated version was
finally signed in 1997, with the blessing of the premier of New
Brunswick.
The partnership approach was offering nothing to the
thousands of  inshore operators. It was only really entrenching
the status quo fishing rights of  select fleets. The approach also
appeared to be skewing DFO’s science branch towards the
interests of the select fleet. Here is a resolution that was passed
at our annual convention that expresses the anger we had with
the way science was going:
Whereas the Snow Crab Science Unit at DFO Moncton relies
on the traditional snow crab licence holders to pay for their annual
trawl survey;
Whereas this annual survey is the cornerstone of  the Snow Crab
Unit’s work;
Whereas this same Snow Crab Unit completely by-passed the
MFU in holding its recent science review process;
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Be it resolved that the MFU commissions its own study to determine
if  this Snow Crab Unit, which is employed by the Government
of Canada, is conducting its work in a fair and impartial manner.
Further be it resolved that the study inquire into whether it is in
the general interest of fisheries management, including the interest
of the bona fide (multispecies inshore) fleet to leave to the
traditional snow crab licence holders to determine whether or not
there will be an annual trawl survey.
In the end, the MFU did not commission an outside study,
but was able to apply pressure on DFO’s Science Unit;
nevertheless, the basic issue remains to be resolved and that is
that the scientists employed by the DFO have developed a special
relation with the midshore licence holders, through the
partnership agreements, whereby the financing of  the trawl survey
is paid by the licence holders.  In l997, when a dispute over the
sharing of crab with the MFU was still raging, the crabbers
withheld financing for the trawl survey, and it was not conducted
for that year.
The general trend of the government to cut back and
privatize, was placing a broadbased organization like the MFU
in an increasingly difficult position. We were obligated to look
after the interests of  the collectivity of  inshore fishermen. I tried
to capture our dilemma in a presentation made to a fishermen’s
workshop in St John’s, Newfoundland, in September l997:
This character of being broadbased makes us enormously sensitive,
and indeed vulnerable, to the apparent drive in the national
government towards ‘privatizing’ the fisheries. It places us at
loggerheads with the DFO as it progressively abdicates its role of
manager of  the fishery to brokering partnership deals with special
interests or specialist fleets. It also places our organization under
enormous stress, as the downloading of responsibility for the
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common good must invevitably be shouldered by our type of
organization. We are beginning to find that instead of  fishers
focusing on DFO as the architect of their problems, they are
beginning to view the staff and executives of the MFU as the
source of their inability to get what they want or need, regardless
of the common good…
Unfortunately, the legitimate aspirations of  fishermen and women
towards more say in the fishery quickly plays into the powerful
dynamic coming from Treasury Board planners who not only want
to divest from the fisheries but make a profit as they go.
So, the broadbased fishermen’s organization is caught in the
ambiguities of co-management. On the one hand, fishermen are
clearly attracted by the idea of having more control, and we have
to work with this. On the other hand, the DFO and the Treasury
Board, under the fine-sounding terms of co-management or
partnering, are pursuing a highly questionable privatization
agenda.
This is the agenda promoted by the corporate sector through the
Fisheries Council of Canada and it is legitimized by people like
Dr Art May, Memorial’s President who, if  last week’s Saint
John Telegraph Journal reported accurately, not only
enthusiastically embraces privatization but has also flipped history
on its head by blaming small-scale fishermen for the collapse of
the fish.
We are into a very ironic situation where the overriding policy of
the Government of  Canada is working in favour of  some very
special interests, while the rest of  us are left agonizing over the
fate of the coastal working people and their communities.
I’ll try to be more specific by following up on Dr Art May’s model
for privatization: the New Brunswick crabbers. This is a group
of  81 licence holders who’ve had quite a time of  it over the past
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15 years. One respected accountant told me that this group is
worth approximately half a billion dollars. This would mean
the average area 12 snow crab licence holder is worth
approximately 60 times more than the average Canadian. This
is the same group that DFO planners have been actively wooing
as a model partner. The basics of the partnership can be boiled
down to DFO using the full powers of the federal State to grant
private ownership of  most, if  not all, of  the Southern Gulf  of
St Lawrence snow crab resource to this group of crabbers. In
return, the group picks up some of  the annual costs of  the science
and management of this resource.
This is all fine and dandy, until you realize that there is another
fleet in the Southern Gulf. This is the inshore bona fide fleet
made up of 4,000 owner-operator fishermen who pursue a well-
developed and well-regulated multispecies fishery, relying first on
the productive and widely dispersed lobster resource and then on a
range of licences to make a full fishing season.
This fleet has permanent access to 10 per cent of the snow crab
resource. In New Brunswick, however, the inshore bona fide fleet
has no permanent access. Under the latest agreement between the
DFO and the New Brunswick crabbers, our 1,400-strong bona
fide fleet is allowed marginal and temporary access only when the
average gross value of the crab licence holder landings reaches
Can$500,000 (this is what they call the economic viability
threshold).
Make no mistake: the snow crab resource in the Southern Gulf
populates many of our inshore fishing banks. It is not in exotic
places accessible to a midshore vessel only. So, we have to ask
what kind of  policy drives the Government of  Canada to sign a
resource agreement that so favours an elite group, while the common
good of one of the most productive and broadbased inshore fleets
in the country is ignored.
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At face value, it looks good that fishers are being challenged to
assume responsibility for their fisheries. Who can quarrel with
that? That’s fine, but it is how the challenge is being implemented
that concerns us. Considerations for the collectivity of  fishers go
out the window when the overriding agenda is cost recovery,
downsizing of  government and privatization of  the fishery. You
can imagine the force of the lobby coming from those individuals
and groups who stand to gain from the privatization of  the country’s
marine resources. The 20-year old APFA blew apart under the
stress of the crabbers’ drive toward private (and exclusive)
ownership. All or ganizations are faced with potential
fragmentation into special interest groups who see the chance of
tying down their own ‘piece of the pie’, be it scallop or tuna or
haddock or shrimp. DFO is apparently open to all manner of
proposals, and is signing agreements that have enormous
consequences for the common good of coastal communities, but
which are not clearly scrutinized from the point of view of the
common good.
At the present time, some of our bona fide fleet faces bankruptcy
as a consequence of localized drops in the lobster catch and the
collapse of  herring roe price (not to mention the prolonged demise
of  the cod stocks). We cannot accept the inevitability of  these
bankruptcies when we see what DFO’s public policy is doing.
Our fishermen, for example, estimate that they are paying between
$5,000 and $9,000 in new costs as a result of DFO
requirements for licence fees, dockside monitoring, observers, science
costs, wharfage fees and so on. But this is only one aspect of it.
How can we accept the little guy’s bankruptcy when we have watched
a midshore mobile groundfish fleet (that appears to be one of the
architects of  the Southern Gulf  cod failure) kept on artificial
respiration with shrimp and crab quotas, special cod experiments,
special vessel maintenance payments, Provincial Loan Board
concessions, et al?
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We do not believe that DFO has the right or the moral authority
to decide who stays and who goes. Yet, from our vantage point,
this is what it is doing in its privatization drive, and this is the
context in which organizations like ours are being asked to
shoulder responsibilities for resource management. And this is
why co-management for us is fraught with ambiguities.
Things, of course, are not just black-and-white, and, while we
challenge public policy, we recognize that there remains many broad
areas of agreement that make it possible to work on a daily basis
with DFO’s public servants; nevertheless, the difficult context of
which I have spoken remains.
In closing, I must take issue with Dr Leslie Harris, who also
was quoted in Saint John Telegraph Journal, as saying that
the continued trend towards private property rights (generally known
as ITQs) cannot be stopped. Of course, it can be stopped, and it
will take broadbased fishermen’s organizations, working with
those individuals who still believe in public policy for the common
good, to do it.
Downloading of Responsibilities
One of our questioning members was recently profiled in
a local weekend edition of  the daily newspaper. At one point, he
is quoted as saying that the biggest problem he has to deal with
as a fisherman is the DFO management and MFU management:
“At one time, there were a number of  fisheries committees, such
as one for lobster and one for herring, and the fishermen on the
committee would sit down with the DFO people to discuss such
issues as net size, catch limits, number of  traps and so on. Now,
however, DFO meets with the MFU.  Now, half  the time, you
don’t know what’s going on. We don’t know what the discussions
are. It seems like the MFU is going into management. We already
have management—the DFO.”
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He goes on to say that the MFU has a place but it isn’t in
management. As an organization, we are always sensitive to
public criticism by our members, but I found these comments
important enough not to ignore. They capture perfectly the
situation our organization has been cast into as a result of the
cutbacks and downloading of  responsibilities formerly carried
out by DFO.
It is one thing to enter into partnerships in discrete fisheries
like snow crab, where there are a small number of  licence holders
earning rewarding incomes from lucrative fisheries. It is another
thing to sign agreements covering thousands of  inshore fishermen
dispersed across hundreds of fishing harbours, and fishing several
different species, all with discrete management plans. Inshore
fishermen are not members of  the MFU because it is a specialized
interest group; they join it because it fights for the general interest
of  inshore fishermen. But, the more we become implicated in
the negotiation and implementation of  discrete harvesting plans,
the more we are forced into positions of administration and
authority. Instead of  DFO being the target of  fishermen’s
frustrations and demands, the MFU itself  is seen as the
responsible party. In theory, this is a move towards self-
management and self-governing that is attractive to fishermen;
in theory, it gives them a more direct say in how their fisheries
are run. In practice, it can easily become a ‘set-up’. The MFU
does not have the powers of the minister; we are not the licensing
authority, we do not have taxing powers. Furthermore, our
members’ access to the fishing grounds is limited by the quasi-
property rights already allocated to the specialized fleets.
This parcelling out of the fishery has been going on ever
since Canada’s assumption of  the 200-mile EEZ in 1977. By
1998, there were so many emotions around this parcelling out
that I recall, in a spontaneous outburst during a high-level meeting
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of  the industry, likening it to apartheid. The inshore had 90 per
cent of  the fishermen but less and less access to the full fishery.
Co-management is a nice concept, but under conditions of
inequality, there is an aspect that is analogous to the governance
of a ‘bantustan’ (any of several all-black enclaves with a limited degree of self-
government that existed during the apartheid regime in the Republic of  South
Africa – Ed)
The apartheid analogy is not meant to imply, even for a
minute, that the situation of  Canadian inshore fishermen can be
compared to that of Black South Africa under the apartheid
regime. There is no comparison whatsoever. In fact, the objective
conditions of  inshore fishermen in the Maritimes improved
demonstrably in the 1990s because of the ironies and reversals
that took place especially in the lobster fishery.
The lobster fishery is almost everything that the planners
did not predict or have in mind. It supports thousands of
independent inshore fishermen. It is not managed by quota; it is
a competitive (as distinct from an ITQ) fishery; there is a high
degree of egalitarianism and it is spread over thousands of miles
of coastline. The management of the lobster fishery does not
depend on scientific assessment using surveys and year-class
analysis. In many ways, this particular fishery has been co-
managed for decades.
Management of lobster was not a top-down social
experiment; it evolved by trial and error, dialectically between
fishermen and the DFO regulatory body. Fishermen themselves
promoted most of the restrictions like seasons, zones, limited
entry and minimum sizes. Of  course, there are problems in this
fishery and it is being subject to enormous pressures under
modern conditions that should be treated in a separate paper.
But, as I have said above, there is a wide management consensus
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in this fishery that has gone largely unnoticed and unreported by
national planners and privatization ideologues. It also provides
the objective base from which the MFU is able to resist the trends
towards micro-management and corporate specialization. Our
experience in the lobster fishery explains why co-management is
ambiguous: one form of  it we have practised long before it was
embraced by public policy; the new forms of  co-management
coming from the policy visionaries can actually contradict and
undermine the co-management we already had.
At the level of  the MFU, the downloading aspect of  co-
management takes many different forms and covers many species
like rock crab, groundfish (cod and flounder, in particular),
herring, scallop and smelt and gaspareaux, not to mention lobster.
For fishermen to have access to a few days of  cod fishing, for
example, we have to negotiate a fishing plan that identifies
opening dates, the amount of quota, zones and so on. But we
also have to collect fees for dockside monitoring and observers
at sea, and we have to enter into agreements with the companies
that carry out these services. In the low-priced rock crab fishery,
we have to do all of the above and also ensure local community
quotas are fairly implemented. In short, there are complicated
administrative and managerial responsibilities that the MFU has
assumed at the same time as we continue to adhere to a ‘union
line’ in the fishery as a broadbased membership organization that
must fight back in the policy and political dimensions of the
fishery.
The simplistic notions of privatization, whereby the State
(through the DFO) progressively withdraws from the public
enterprise of fisheries management, has floundered on many fronts
as the 21st century arrives. As much as the central planners
scheduled the commercial fishery as a ‘sunset’ industry, they have
run up against the realities of  the political force of  the inshore
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fishery. It may prove to be a temporary setback in national policy
direction, since there are many forces that may yet undermine
the inshore fishery base from which the MFU works.
For example, the DFO itself  has been subtly shifting its
mandate from fisheries to oceans. In one sense, this could be
seen as the ‘greening’ of a department that basically saw
fishermen as its clients. Under an ocean mandate, priority goes
to integrated ocean management plans. On the surface, this would
seem to favour conservation and environmental protection. But,
it also appears to be related to alternative uses of the ocean. In
an advanced economy like Canada, leisure activities become
priorities; this includes renewed support for recreational fisheries,
boating and ecotourism. But, alternative uses also mean new
aquaculture directions, sea mining, and oil and gas explorations.
The ‘oceans vision’ leaves little room for fishermen as the major
client group. Fishermen are viewed less as primary producers
and engines of  the coastal economy, and more like anachronisms.
The oceans vision is fraught with ambiguities and it too
will have to contend with the surviving fishing culture of  the
east coast, which has defied predictions and which has resisted,
to a remarkable degree, the industrialization of the fishery that
seems to have decimated the inshore in Europe.
Aboriginal and Native Rights
An apparently unrelated phenomenon also appears to play
into the oceans vision or, at least, the trend towards
disengagement of  DFO from the commercial fishermen. This is
the recent Canadian Supreme Court decisions that have upheld
aboriginal and native treaty rights. Unquestionably, on both the
Pacific and Atlantic Coasts, the native peoples of Canada
practised subsistence fishing prior to European contact and ever
since, coastal bands have variously participated in commercial
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fisheries. The coastal native people of  the Maritime provinces
are the Mi'kmaq; they represent perhaps three per cent of the
coastal population of  the present-day Maritimes.
In the country as a whole, the Indian, Innuit and Metis
peoples comprise about three per cent of the population. The
history of relations with the Euro-Canadians is complex, but,
collectively speaking, there is little question that native First
Nations progressively lost their traditional territories and have
been reduced to reserve lands. An aboriginal has the same rights
and protections as every Canadian citizen, but, with respect to
treaties and traditional territory, there has been a long tradition
of neglect, fraud and outright discrimination. As a people, they
carry enormous burdens of  poverty and social breakdown, as
well as grievances.
In recent years, the courts have arrived at liberal
interpretations of  some of  their treaties and aboriginal rights.
But there is an enormous amount of  outstanding land claims
and litigation, and, taken as a whole, the natives’ place in Canada
still remains to be addressed in a modern treaty process.
The commercial fishery on both the Pacific and Atlantic
coasts believes that Canada’s federal government wants to use
the fishery as a central piece in settling native issues. This would,
in the minds of  fishermen, result in large transfers of  fisheries
resources, access and control to Indian peoples. ‘Robbing Peter
to pay Paul’ is how many fishermen see the issue. They feel they
are being asked to pay the cost of settling with the First Nations,
when such a cost should be borne by the society as a whole.
For native peoples themselves, there is a broad adherence
to the principle of self-government. I am hardly the person to
interpret how they see this being worked out in a practical way
within Canadian society. There appears to be a whole spectrum
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of adherents, who range in beliefs from full sovereign status to
local municipal-type powers. But the principle of  self-government
definitely pervades their formal policy approach to the fishery.
Since the Sparrow Decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in 1990, which recognized an aboriginal right to fish for
food, social and ceremonial purposes, native fishing issues have
increasingly preoccupied the commercial fishery, and the federal
government has evolved a whole approach to accommodating
the right. The centrepiece of  DFO’s approach has been the
negotiation of communal fishing licences, band by band. (According
to Canada’s Indian Act of  1985, a ‘band’ means a body of  Indians – Ed) The
approach recognized, to a degree, the idea of self-management
by the bands, whereby they would be allocated so much quota
for their apparent food and ceremonial purposes, while, at the
same time, they were helped with licences, equipment and
training to enter the commercial fishery. On paper, it seemed to
be a sensible and rational approach. In practice, the food fishery
built up into an enormous issue for our fishermen, and it is MFU
fishermen who have carried the burden of  this new fishery on
Canada’s east coast.
Food fishery problems are centred in the lobster fishery,
and the coastal bands exercising their food fishing rights are found
mostly in areas where the MFU is the main fishermen’s
organization. From St Mary’s Bay in Southwest Nova Scotia to
the Bras d’Or Lakes of Cape Breton, to the Gulf Coast of New
Brunswick and north Nova Scotia is where you find as much as
80 per cent of coastal Mi'kmaq people.
The MFU always believed the food fishery in lobster was
manageable, and MFU fishermen, generally, kept an open mind
about the issue. But it didn’t take long, though, before it became
a burning issue in specific areas. The lobster is quite a sedentary
251 CONVERSATIONS
animal and generally does not move more than a few kilometres
from its spawning grounds. Its habitat is in shallow waters; as
the water cools in the fall, it generally moves to deeper waters,
but returns in the spring and summer to the warm and shallow
waters of  the bays. Fishermen themselves reflect this relative
sedentary nature of  the lobster and normally fish in the immediate
areas of  their own wharves and harbours, although the lobster
licence that they hold actually permits them to move throughout
a zone. The lobster zones vary in size, some extending to 200
and 300 miles of coastline. The fishery is strictly limited by
seasons and the number of  traps an individual fishermen can
use. Lobster fishermen are very territorial and there are unwritten
codes about where a fishermen with his traps are permitted. In
extreme examples, fishermen have specific ‘plots’ in the water
that are established by lines extending from the property they
hold on land. Virtually every lobster bottom in the Maritime
provinces is fully subscribed to; there is no such thing as an
underutilized lobster fishery. In fact, scientists estimate the yearly
exploitation rate on lobsters of legal size to be as high as 80 per
cent.
There is nowhere to go to fish lobster where you will not
encounter fully licensed commercial fishermen who adhere to
their grounds as if  it were property. As late as 1975, a Canadian,
including an aboriginal Canadian, could purchase a lobster licence
for as little as 25 Canadian cents. In tiny native bands like that
of Burnt Church, there were 30 to 40 persons holding lobster
licences during the post-War period, but catches were low, as
were prices. Then, a freeze on the number of  lobster licences
was introduced as well as a government-sponsored buyback
programme. Licences were also re-classified as A and B licences.
Part-time fishermen could hold B licences, but could not transfer
them. They would disappear with attrition.
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During this period of transition to a limited-entry system
in the lobster fishery, there remained many areas of  resistance,
where poachers were strong and continued to fish with few
regulations, including out-of-season fishing. In the early years of
the MFU, one of  the most difficult and sometimes least recognized
tasks of  the organization was to bring an end to poaching. It is
easy to characterize poachers as criminal, and there were
organized rings that had this character. But many of  the poachers
were poor fishing families that relied on many marginal activities
to keep bread on the table. Not everybody saw the merits of
supporting a rigid system of  licensing and limited entry.
As poaching was brought under control, native fishing went
unrecognized. A status Indian could not raise money to purchase
the equipment, gear and licences necessary to compete in the
modernized limited-entry system. I do not have the story as to
how the numbers of  fishermen in a coastal band like Burnt Church
dropped dramatically, but native leaders say that the new system
was exclusionary and systematically worked to reduce native
participation. This is a story that needs to be told and
documented; it would help modify the righteous claims made by
some present-day fishermen that natives had equal opportunity
to lobster fishery but simply abandoned it. What role did outright
discrimination play in keeping natives out?  Where was the
government itself on this issue? Did it not have a fiduciary
responsibility towards native peoples?
The Supreme Court decision of  1990 that ruled that
Sparrow had an aboriginal right to fish for food, social and
ceremonial purposes originated from a  fisheries charge on
Canada’s Pacific coast, but it did not take long before Mi’kmaq
peoples of  the Atlantic Coast began exercising their food rights.
According to the Supreme Court, this right had priority over
commercial fishing, and was only subject to considerations of
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conservation. The court did not spell out what was actually meant
by food, social and ceremonial purposes, and it was natural that
some native bands would give it the widest of  interpretations.
The lobster fishery, which relied on seasons as a key component
of the management plan, was vulnerable. Natives started fishing
out of season, maintaining they were fishing for food. From the
fishermen’s perspective, this was a black hole that was
undermining the lobster management system and opening the
door to poaching and out-of-season commercial fishing under
the guise of  a food fishery.
There is a long history of relations between the Mi’kmaq
and the Acadian peoples that pre-dates the deportation of 1755.
So, it is not surprising to find that most of  the coastal bands of
Mi’kmaq are situated in areas where Acadians also live. Since
most Acadian inshore fishermen are also associated with the
MFU, it was inevitable that the MFU would become embroiled
in this difficult issue of  native fishing rights.
Under the Sparrow Decision, aboriginal people had a right
to fish for food but not for sale. Yet, out-of-season lobster catch
was going into the commercial trade and the DFO seemed to be
casting a blind eye. In the Richibucto area of  New Brunswick,
the commercial season begins in August. In June, the Mi’kmaqs
at the nearby Big Cove band would start putting traps in waters
within eyesight of  the commercial fishermen’s wharf  and bait
sheds. The traditional fishermen were being asked to stand by
and wait for the commercial season to open in August, while
they saw lobsters being removed daily from the very grounds
they would be fishing a few weeks later. How many lobsters
were being taken, how many females with eggs extruding were
killed, how many undersized were caught, how many traps were
in the water, and whether the lobster was really going back to
the reserve for food or into commercial trade for profit—these
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were the questions and doubts that arose. From 1993 to 1999,
summer tensions grew as the DFO seemed unable to satisfy
anyone that this was a truly limited and defined fishery for food
and ceremonial purposes. Fishermen were made to feel like
chumps and they were affronted by the periodic appearance of
native warriors bearing arms.
Our approach was to demand precise details from the
DFO, while, at the same time, establishing talks with native
people whereby they would substitute food fishing for access to
the commercial fishery. Gradually, the Big Cove band, for
example, agreed to limitations on the food fishery in exchange
for commercial access. The DFO, under its aboriginal fisheries
strategy, would work out commercial fishing agreements with
the bands. The issues continued to fester, but at least there was
some balance between removals from the food-cum-commercial
fishery and a reduction in the number of commercial licences
being used by commercial fishermen. Still, MFU fishermen were
shouldering much of the fallout from the Supreme Court decision
on Sparrow that gave priority to aboriginal food fishing over the
commercial fishery. In practice, the court decision was being used
by individual natives not for subsistence but for substantial
commercial profit.
The Marshall Decision and Burnt Church
All along the Miramichi, in the Maritime provinces,
beneficiaries of the aboriginal right to fish for food, like all native
people in the country, maintained that they also had a treaty
right to fish for trade. A Nova Scotian Mi’kmaq, Donald Marshall,
was charged with fishing eel for commercial purposes out of
season. Marshall was known nationally for having been found
guilty of  murder in a stabbing incident in Sydney, Nova Scotia
and then having been finally exonerated after 11 years in prison
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for a crime he had not committed and for which he had always
maintained his innocence.
The Mi’kmaq took Marshall’s fishing charge all the way to
the Supreme Court, and, on 17 September 1999, the Court ruled
in Marshall’s favour and found that he was fishing under a treaty
right negotiated with the British Crown in 1761. The decision
acknowledged that the treaty gave Mi’kmaqs a right to fish and
hunt for a moderate livelihood. It was a right that could be subject
to regulation, but was immediately interpreted by the Mi’kmaq
people as an enormous victory. It was variously interpreted by
native leaders and band members as a right to fish when and
where they so pleased. The commercial industry was once again
thrown into the dark as to what the right would do to their fishery.
Some tried to have the decision reversed, to no avail. The MFU
took the position that the treaty right could be accommodated.
After all, coastal Mi’kmaq people were not more than three per
cent of the coastal population of the Maritime provinces, and
only so many individuals would want to earn a ‘moderate
livelihood’ from fishing. But the court had not provided for an
adjustment period or an implementation phase, and the DFO
had developed no contingency plans in the eventuality that the
court would rule in favour of  Marshall and the treaty right.
Within days of the Marshall decision, hundreds of traps
were being set in the waters adjacent to the Mi’kmaq community
of Burnt Church, which is at the mouth of the famous Miramichi
river and which is situated at the edge of the Acadian Peninsula.
This was in September of l999. The commercial lobster fishery
in this particular zone finishes at the end of June, after which it
would become a closed area and would not be re-opened to
commercial fishing until the following May. Interestingly, the Burnt
Church band had just finished a ‘food’ fishery that had been
authorized by the DFO to be fished out of season under a
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communal licence. The amount of lobster allowed under this
communal food licence was substantial, and, according to the
fishermen in the adjacent community of  Neguac, at least some
of  the catch was sold commercially.
The reaction of  the commercial fishermen to the post-
Marshall setting of more traps was outrage. Where was the DFO?
How could this be happening to a fishery that they had fought
for years to bring under control from the poachers?  The modern
inshore fishermen had investments in boats, gear and licences,
and they were seeing all that go down the drain because of a
remote and obscure decision of the courts on an unknown treaty
negotiated 250 years ago. The MFU demanded a moratorium
and a stay on the court decision until all parties could work out
acceptable ways of implementing the treaty right.
But Ottawa was paralyzed by lawyers and politicians who
didn’t know what to do. There was a political vacuum and it
seemed like fishermen’s livelihoods were being sacrificed to larger
political interests in a country that nine years ago had gone
through a 78-day standoff with Mohawk warriors at Oka and
Khawawake (in the urban area of  Montreal). So, the build-up of
traps at Burnt Church continued. The situation was on the verge
of explosion after several Indian boats from the nearby Big Cove
reserve moved in their traps from a lobster fishing zone that was
open to commercial fishing and where they themselves had been
fishing alongside our inshore fishermen.  The regulatory authority,
DFO, watched and monitored, without intervening.
Fishermen had had enough. On Sunday morning, 3
October, two weeks after the Supreme Court decision and in
full view of  the enforcement vessels and surveillance aircraft,
the fishermen proceeded to haul up some 3,000 traps; they
removed the meshing, stuck the buoys inside and let the traps
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sink to the bottom. On land, they went in mobs to local fish
buyers who were buying the out-of-season lobsters and demanded
the records of purchase. They did all this without the support or
endorsement of  the MFU.
The MFU, in fact, had planned a demonstration for the
following day at the nearby headquarters of DFO in Moncton.
We proceeded with our demonstration, and it was only when the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Herb Dhaliwal, finally agreed
to meet us the next day in a downtown hotel in Moncton that we
dispersed. That was 5 October 1999, and the MFU found itself
thrust centrestage in a conflict that, on the surface, appeared to
be against the Mi’kmaq people.
I say ‘on the surface’ because, since the Marshall Decision,
we have worked with all of our powers as an organization to
reach an accommodation of native rights to fish for a ‘moderate
livelihood’. Our objective was never to oppose native fishing
but to accommodate it within a fishing plan that would be feasible
for both Mi’kmaq and commercial inshore fishermen. The
Supreme Court itself  was so shaken by the revolt of  fishermen
all over the Maritimes that it issued a clarification two months
after the original decision. It was clear the court never intended
to say the treaty superceded the authority of the Government
of  Canada to regulate the fishery. The court was saying what our
own lawyer had already advised us. It was advising the
government to negotiate, but it was also saying that the treaty
right was subject to limitation and regulation, and that the
exercise of the right cannot be at the expense of the rights of
the rest of  the fishing community.
To this day, we hold the Government of  Canada
accountable for the unfortunate actions of  Miramichi fishermen
on 3 October that eliminated so many native traps and risked
armed violence between the races. It is difficult for us to accept
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the simplistic argument that the authorities were unprepared for
the Marshall decision. Whether or not they were prepared, they
were seeing, on a daily basis, the buildup of an intolerable and
explosive situation—and they did nothing to intervene.
Ugly forces had been unleashed in the Miramichi and the
native leaders were blaming the MFU itself for perpetrating the
aggression. One letter to the editor, written by a Mi’kmaq from
the Tobique band, depicted the MFU as the New Brunswick
equivalent of the Ku Klux Klan and Michael Belliveau as its
‘grand wizard’. There were Mi’kmaq we had known for years
who refused to talk to us and be seen associating with us in
public. In their eyes, the actions of  the fishermen were our
responsibility; there was no effort to differentiate the role of the
MFU from the spontaneous actions of  a local group of  fishermen.
During the Sunday morning trap cutting of 3 October, the
television cameras filmed one individual fisherman dressed up
in Indian headgear doing a mock war dance. That was clearly a
racial slur, and the image was broadcast across the country. In a
meeting with some of the Burnt Church people following that
incident, they said some of the residents believed it was I who
was in the headgear! They were also offended by a quotation
attributed to me in the Saint John Telegraph Journal. I had been
asked about the buildup of native fishing and I had said we were
not concerned with some “poor bastard” who was fishing in a
dory in front of  the reserve; it was the larger boats, especially
the Big Cove ones that had sailed from the open zone off
Richibucto to the closed zone in the Miramichi that we were
worried about. The natives took my remark as racist. I had, in
fact, used the term sympathetically in reference to persons who
were truly without means and who were not a threat to the fishery.
But the reaction was an indication of the heights to which
emotions had risen.
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Regardless, the fishermen’s move to destroy and disable
traps in the Miramachi put the MFU in a very awkward position.
Had we simply come out and condemned the fishermen, we
would have made it impossible for ourselves to play an organized
role in what was becoming a nasty dispute. We had to work with
what we had. The fishermen’s actions were perhaps analogous
to a wildcat strike in an industrial context. The lobster fishery
that had developed over the past 30 years relied, in particular,
on enforcement by the DFO, and DFO was refusing to intervene.
In the minds of  the fishermen, they believed that they had been
forced into defending their own livelihoods.
The powers in Ottawa dithered while the fishing
communities were boiling over. In Southwest Nova Scotia, over
500 fishing boats had amassed themselves in the harbour at
Yarmouth as a show of  strength, threatening the type of  action
that subsequently was carried out in the Miramichi hundreds of
miles away. The situation in the Nova Scotian region was
substantially different; there was not the same immediate
substantial threat to the fishing stocks because there were very
few coastal natives in the area. Demography cannot be
overlooked when examining why things spilled over in the New
Brunswick context and were managed in Nova Scotia. Big Cove
is the largest band by far in Atlantic Canada that is immediately
adjacent to the lobster resource, while Burnt Church, 50 miles
up the shore, is the second largest. There was some post-Marshall
out-of-season fishing being done in St Mary’s Bay in Southwest
Nova Scotia but it was being done by Mi’kmaqs who were living
150 miles from the fishing grounds. It was a far more enforceable
situation.
There are those who believe that Ottawa’s dithering
following the Marshall decision was not so innocent. There are
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many dimensions to the situation of native peoples in Canada.
Their present population is not much more than three per cent
of  the country, but they are vastly over-represented in the prison
population and among the homeless. They have huge land claims
based on ancient treaties. Their treaties are recognized in the
constitution of  the country. The federal government is
responsible for the well-being of status Indians; they have a
fiduciary responsibility towards our first peoples. Actually, the
majority of  Indians now live away from the reserves and in
Canada’s urban centres. The status Indians that continue to live
on reserves live in conditions of  poverty and social breakdown
that are often appalling. In recent years, Supreme Court decisions
have been favourable to aboriginal positions and this gives them
a distinct kind of  power. With respect to the ongoing sovereign
movement in the province of Quebec, the native peoples have
tended to be allies of the federal government, at least insofar as
they are completely opposed to Quebec’s independence and
would demand their own forms of  separation in vast areas of
Quebec where they live. In any case, relations between First
Nations and Ottawa are sufficiently complex that it is not
inconceivable to believe that there were decision-makers on
Parliament Hill who saw an open conflict between fishermen
and local Mi’kmaqs as somehow advancing their interests.
For my part, writing a year later, and following another
traumatic summer in the Miramachi, the overwhelming
conclusion I am left with is that the country has a fundamental
problem of political relations with its First Nation people; a
problem at the highest level of power in the land, and at the
level of  the cabinet and the senior bureaucrats. In l999, our
fishermen were made to look bad, like bigots, because the highest
powers in the country had not sorted out their political relations
with First Nations.
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There is much fury and fear in the fishing communities
about native fishing issues; it built up over a food fishery that
was seen to be a commercial fishery in disguise. It reached almost
hysterical proportions after the Marshall Decision that threw into
question the very basis of  limited-entry fishing plans. The MFU,
which was set up to organize the underdog, the little guy in the
fishery, was cast into an awkward position. If  Mi’kmaqs were
getting into the fishery, it would be logical that they would join
with their brother and sister fishermen in the MFU. You are a
member of  the MFU because you are an inshore fisherman, not
because of your race or your colour or your language or even the
species that you fish. The cause of  Mi’kmaq fishermen should
also be the MFU’s cause. In practice, of  course, Mi’kmaq fishing
has been experienced by the inshore fishermen as antagonistic
and a threat to their fishery.  This is mainly because the natives
have chosen, in many instances, to fish outside the accepted
regulatory system.
In this context, the MFU has attempted to maintain a
progressive position that is consistent with our union’s history.
We have worked hard to create room for effective participation
of  native people in the fishery. For whatever historical and
cultural reasons, the natives have largely been excluded from
the modern commercial fishery. Naturally, their leaders want to
make up for lost ground and are using their Supreme Court
decisions to aid them. Our position has been that working-class
fishermen should not have to shoulder the ancient debt to native
peoples, that it is a societal obligation that all Canadians must
shoulder. In practice, we have succeeded in having the
Government of Canada recognize this principle by buying up
licences from commercial fishermen to allow for an orderly
accommodation of  natives into the fishery. There is always a
yearly turnover of licences that can be voluntarily sold back to
the government.
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But the transition period has been fraught with difficulties
and misunderstandings, both within the native communities and
in the rest of the fishing population. As the 2000 fishing season
approached in the Miramichi area, the Government of Canada
had not succeeded in reaching an interim agreement with Burnt
Church for the fishing season. The reasons are multiple and we
cannot discount the sense of grievance within the band towards
fishermen in the area who had cut traps the previous fall. Through
a series of  difficult meetings with our fishermen, we had
succeeded in getting an agreement from them that they would
replace the traps lost by Burnt Church people “within the context
of reaching an agreement on a fishing plan”. The MFU believed
it was making a breakthrough gesture of reconciliation, but native
leaders interpreted it as an attempt to leverage them into an
agreement and they discounted the gesture.
We were lurching into crisis in the spring of  2000 and, as
the summer progressed, Burnt Church became the focus of the
nation. This is not the place to recount the whole story, but the
Burnt Church crisis, I believe, demonstrates the value of having
an MFU.
Prior to the Marshall Decision of 17 September 1999, Burnt
Church had utilized the Sparrow Decision to prosecute an
extensive food fishery in August and September. There were years
when catches apparently exceeded 500,000 lb. While it was
supposed to be a fishery for food, social and ceremonial purposes,
it was a fishery where some individuals were making thousands
of  dollars. One band member told us he made Can$80,000 in a
given year. From all accounts, the food fishery was a racket,
where the benefits accumulated into the hands of a few
individuals, including the chief.
Burnt Church has approximately 1,200 native persons. It
is governed by an elected chief and band council, under a system
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established by the Department of  Indian Affairs. Prior to l970,
many of  its people practised a fishery, including lobster, but,
progressively, their participation dwindled, as the lobster fishery
became more regulated. The community is right in front of
Miramichi Bay, the fishing grounds for approximately 200 inshore
fishing operations that include some 600 fishermen.
Following the Marshall Decision of  l999, many Burnt
Church members took to the waters, but the Chief also invited
the Big Cove boats in to fish. The Big Cove vessels were much
like those of  other inshore commercial fishermen and their
presence made it obvious that we were not dealing with just a
local artisanal fishery. Nevertheless, there was also what might
be considered a sort of artisanal fishery conducted by many
reserve members in small outboard motors, with many women
taking part who were seeing some real dollars come into their
homes. It is this latter small-scale fishing that activated a kind
of ‘communalism’ in Burnt Church and appears to have laid the
groundwork for a growing movement on the reserve to have
their own treaty fishery. The fact that the artisanal group also
lost traps on 3 October l999 added to a sense of injustice and
grievance among band members.
While it seems that the food fishery reproduced the internal
system of privilege, favouritism and opportunism that band
members have described to us, the treaty fishery promised far
more equal opportunities, and gave rise to a fishing plan
constructed by social activists. Within the community, you had
the makings of  a populist reform movement. Implicit and
sometimes explicit in this movement was a questioning of the
formal Band Council and Chief  governance system. Among other
things, some councillors and the Chief were compromised by
the special benefits they had been deriving from fishing. This
put them into contradictory positions with respect to negotiating
within the process set up by the federal government to
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accommodate the Marshall verdict. On the one hand, the populist
group would be sceptical of an interim agreement that would
lead to new licences, boats, wharves and so on, since they had
no confidence that the community in general would benefit. On
the other hand, since some of the councillors and the Chief were
the main beneficiaries of out-of-season fishing, why would they
negotiate an interim agreement that is based on fishing within
the established season?
In the end, what appears to have happened with the
Council and Chief over the spring and summer of 2000 was a
split, whereby some were excluded from any effective influence
and others simply joined the populist aspiration to have their
own communal fishery in the spring and fall. But this is jumping
ahead of  our story.
It seems clear that there is a source of influence and power
in the Mi’kmaq communities that is based on traditional beliefs.
The populist grouping clearly drew from this source to win a
kind of  hegemony in the community. Indian pride and spiritualism
supported the movement, and they fused with a unilateral
interpretation of the Marshall verdict that claimed that not only
did natives have sovereign rights never ceded under the treaty
but that these rights had been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
and the Constitution.
What seems certain is that the populist grouping had a
potent mix of internal protest towards the Indian Affairs Band
structure, the promise of  material gains (from fishing) for the
little guy, and a new identity and pride for the community. A key
sociological factor that we see in all kinds of such populist
movements is the educated youth, who have usually been away,
have broader networks, and thirst for change for their people.
There is usually an unexamined psychological dimension in this
return to the ‘people’ that can get in the way of effective political
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accomplishment, but we hardly have the material or the space
to develop that line of thinking here.
One thing that is clear is that the young, educated social
and cultural activists at Burnt Church were able to plug into a
network of Church workers, human rights advocates,
environmentalists and professors. This outside support is
apparently indispensable to making and sustaining a big action,
but they can also enormously distort the group’s assessment of
the realities they face, and what is sustainable and effective
political action.
In this particular case at Burnt Church, the supporters from
the outside persistently demonstrated a wholescale ignorance
of  the modern fishery and its history. By maintaining their
uncritical support of Indian rights, they fed into the myth of
sovereignty and denial of  social reality. In its simplest terms, the
denied social reality is the fishing families of the Miramichi.
What we don’t know is to what extent fear and intimidation
were factors in moulding the populist group. We do know that
attempts to meet with persons associated with the group were
well received by those persons, but eventually vetoed. We know
that one of our staff was driven off the Burnt Church wharf,
with one person having drawn a knife. We know that a bullet
was put through a commercial fishing vessel. We know that shots
have been heard, guns seen. We know that a teenage daughter
of  a fishermen had to pass by armed warriors on the beach by
Burnt Church. We know that rocks thrown at fisheries officer
were vicious enough to cause serious injury. We know that one
of the militants clearly stated that he would fight to the death at
sea. We know that non-native residents at Burnt Church are living
a constant threat of  intimidation and violence. We know that
non-native fishermen at the Burnt Church public wharf  were
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forced to move their boats out. Equally, we know that native
young persons have felt fear of  reprisals outside the reserve. We
know that DFO senior officials have been verbally abused at
consultation meetings.
In any case, the MFU had been meeting informally with
some of the native leaders at Burnt Church in an effort to
reconcile and have a meeting of minds over the impending lobster
season. But, at the same time, the populist and militant group
on the reserve had engineered their own fishing plan independent
of any government agreement. The plan called for the use of
15,000 traps that would be tagged with their own issue of  tags
(not those of the DFO). The plan said there would be two
different seasons; the second season would begin in August  and
continue to 31 October. (Remember that the regulated
commercial lobster season in the Miramichi is between 1 May
and 30 June.) The plan was taken directly to the community and
over the heads of the Chief and Band Council. It was a statement
of militancy and the proponents argued that it would be selling
their rights to enter into an interim agreement with the federal
government. The moderates in the community, with whom we
had been talking, were replaced by the radical faction and made
to feel they were sellout Indians.
The plan was guaranteed to lead Burnt Church into
confrontation. It challenged the authority of the DFO to manage
the fishery and it ignored the fisheries regulations in place. So
began a long summer, as the populist group started putting
unauthorized lobster traps in the water and returned 1,200 official
lobster tags that DFO had issued under a communal licence.
While this group was attempting to implement their treaty fishery,
there were also 13 commercial operations fishing in the regular
season alongside the other commercial fishermen. The
unauthorized fishing was pursued throughout May and June,
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despite several interventions by DFO officers and several court
charges.
As the summer progressed, the militant group was
apparently gaining support within the Burnt Church band and,
come August, they began fishing again. The basic ABC arguments
of the group and its supporters were those of an oppressed
people, with Sup7reme Court rights, fighting a system of racist
oppression, enforced by the State apparatus. As long as this
equation could be maintained in the Burnt Church populist
movement as the picture of  reality, almost anything was justifiable
in resistance. The curious phenomenon of Christian peacemakers
obstructing the normal duties of  fisheries officers can only be
explained by this ABC construction of  reality.
One of the radical architects of the Burnt Church fishing
plan and a strategist of the ‘treaty fishing’ action became head
of the ‘local warriors’ and Chief of Security; this too seems to
be a logical outcome of  the ABC reality. A cursory look at the
volumes of  email exchanged among the supporters suggest that
they have never once considered that they may be spawning a
local version of  a militia group, replete with hardened teenagers
and various forms of  arms.
The DFO had not reached an agreement with Burnt
Church, but nevertheless granted it a small food fishery under a
communal licence that allowed for the use of  40 traps. This
complicated their job of enforcement because the populist
militant group put out several hundred of their own unauthorized
traps; the fishery could not be closed entirely. Instead, the DFO
had to go in with officers and vessels and check the traps and
remove the ones that were illegal. There were open conflicts on
the water between the DFO officers and Burnt Church natives.
One fisheries officer was severely injured in the face by a rock.
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A native boat was swamped by a fisheries boat in full view of
the television cameras. The Mi’kmaq barricaded the main
highway. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police surrounded the
reserve. And the conflict built up.
The MFU took the position that this was a matter between
the DFO management authority and the native band. As long as
the DFO was seen to be doing its job, then we were able to
convince our commercial fishermen to stay out of  the fray. The
growing confrontation was playing out as the militant faction
had hoped. It was gaining enormous media attention and they
were able to project the Little Guy vs the Oppressive State image.
Questionable tactics of some of the fisheries officers only
re-enforced the image.
As the government started getting bad press and began
looking like the bully, it began to back off  its basic enforcement
objectives. Fishermen began seeing that, once again, Burnt
Church natives were fishing lobster out of season, and the DFO
was doing little to stop it. Tensions grew among the fishing
communities and the fishermen. Another explosion looked
imminent and, this time, it threatened to degenerate into a
localized race war.
Native people from all over the country were embracing
the Burnt Church cause; some of the churches passed resolutions
that were general but nevertheless seen by fishermen to be against
them and for the natives. As the crisis built up, the MFU called a
press conference and blasted the government for its inept
handling of the situation and called for a closure of the whole
fishing area in the interests of peace. Here are some excerpts
from our written statement that was carried nationwide:
In the immediate area of the Miramichi, you have 200 inshore
vessels supporting 600 fishermen, who fish from Burnt Church,
Néguac, Tabusintac, Val Comeau, Tracadie, Baie-Ste-Anne, and
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Pointe Sapin. These communities are fishing-dependent; there is
really no other significant economic opportunity.
This is the social reality of the area, and we have said, and will
continue to say, that Burnt Church leaders will have to come to
terms with this. Over the past winter and spring, we had several
contacts and meetings with native leaders in Burnt Church. We
went over how their members could get into our professionalized
fishery and make a long-term living out of  it. We also tried to
reconcile after the trap-cutting incident of last October and had
offered to replace any lost traps as part of reaching a basic
agreement.
These kinds of exchanges came to an abrupt halt just prior to the
spring lobster season, when the promoters of  the Burnt Church
fishing plan effectively took over and rejected any discussions with
the MFU. Among other things, this group proclaimed its own
Burnt Church Fishery Act and some sort of  sovereignty over its
fishing plan. They also promised to fish come August in the closed
season. Our position was that this was a regulatory matter for
DFO; we expected basic enforcement, as we expect everywhere in
the lobster fishery.
We now find the issue has been elevated to the level of  grand
farce, partially as a result of a media hunger for simplistic
confrontation and because the regulatory body DFO cannot find
the will to close down the lobster fishery in the Bay. We have
never been briefed on the unfortunate incident last Tuesday in the
Bay that has been repeatedly flashed on television screens around
the world and that has paralyzed our national government.
Further, we will be engaging advisers to help us review the role of
the media over the past month. It is our belief that there are
media persons assigned to this story who have over-identified with
one group in this dispute and have mis-characterized the nature
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of the dispute; we will be particularly examining the work of the
CBC in this regard.
We are asked, what will our fishermen do? We can only answer
this: the MFU will not support, organize or encourage any direct
actions in the water that takes enforcement into our own hands,
but we will use all the peaceable means at our disposal to ensure
that basic enforcement of our members’ and their communities’
livelihoods is done.
We will also say this. Everything about the history of  the MFU
tells you that we were formed to organize the underdog, the inshore
fishermen who were, years ago, scheduled by the planners to
disappear. We are organized on principles of  fairness and without
prejudice on the basis of  language, creed, race and colour. We are
absolutely in solidarity with native peoples efforts to break years
of poverty and injustice, but solidarity is not a one-sided
proposition, and we refuse to give credence to a deadend declaration
of sovereignty that will inevitably isolate small bands of people
and mislead them into thinking that they are not interdependent
with the rest of us. Further, those who propose to be leaders in
the community surely cannot ask the tiny band at Burnt Church
to carry the burden of  what is clearly an unresolved national
issue of the relations between our first peoples and the broader
society.
And no one should ask ordinary, hardworking inshore fishermen
to pay the price for decades of national ineptitude towards one of
our founding peoples. The fishing itself in the Bay simply has to
stop. There has to be a moratorium and there cannot be boats on
the water fishing while the larger issues are being sorted out.
The role of media persons in relation to the populist group
has been seen by most of  the fishermen as outright biased and
basically one of advocacy journalism. Amateur footage was used
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without attribution. Mediapersons never indicated they were
subject to censorship, but it is a widely held belief  that they self-
censored in order to maintain approval from the populist group.
Language in reports was often synonymous with the language of
the group. As late as 28 September, the lead to a CBC Newsworld
story on Burnt Church was “Raid on native lobster traps
continue”. The clear connotation is that something wrong is being
done to native people, even though the fishery was closed by
variation order and the traps were not supposed to be there.
It took the MFU’s news conference on 5 September to
ring the bell on the media’s mindless adoption of  some ABC
equation of  social reality. There was a clear and visible shift in
some of  the media perspective following our aggressive re-entry
into the media field. This was hardly a uniform change, especially
after the fishery was officially closed on 22 September and the
warriors vowed to fight on.
At the national level, the Assembly of First Nations had
recently elected Matthew Coon Come. Coon Come became
directly involved with the fight for a treaty fishery at Burnt Church
in the middle of  August. Remarkably, Coon Come did not look
much different from the various supporters with their ABC
equation of  reality. We had thought his presence might bring
about some mediation and negotiation; but, instead of bringing
an element of political reality to the Burnt Church advocates,
he simply added a further burden to the populist group by making
it into a cause célèbre for native rights and, again, giving no
recognition to the social reality of fishing families in the
Miramichi.
Having no real access to native people at Burnt Church
during the August/September ‘struggle’ period, it is difficult to
know the pressure that must have been felt of having to live out
the struggle on behalf  of  distant and not-so-distant supporters,
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as well as the organized native rights organizations. At various
times, there were rumours of  shifts in band power relations,
almost always centred on whether moderates and elected
councillors were gaining some kind of governance over the
reserve, and whether the people associated with the Chief  of
Security’s intransigent position were being isolated and excluded.
The revelation over the week of 25-29 September that
there were two different warrior groups competing with each
other suggests there was some truth to the rumour that the Chief
of Security and his militant and warrior followers were losing
community support. The head of the second group of warriors
was from Nova Scotia and appeared to be sanctioned by the
traditional council of elders and chiefs to bring some kind of
order and governance to the reserve.
During this last week of September, DFO had announced
that they had pulled some 4,000 unauthorized lobster traps from
the waters around Burnt Church over the previous six weeks.
The treaty fishing proponents, for their part, gradually pulled
back, as fishing itself diminished and weather became an issue.
These last few days were volatile; some commercial fishermen
had turned on the union itself and were in a riotous mood. One
ventured into range of Burnt Church and put a bullet through
the cabin of his vessel. There were incidents at the nearby wharf
in Neguac and, generally, the affair wound down on a bad note,
with everything ‘hanging fire’.
The MFU had been cast in the middle of  a storm. We had
put enormous amounts of  energy into finding liveable solutions.
Throughout, we had maintained a consistent position that
fishermen should not intervene on the water, while, at the same
time, pressuring the highest powers in the country to bring the
out-of-season fishing to a close. We didn’t win any popularity
contests in the process, but thoughtful observers believe that
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we may have been the single most important factor in keeping
the situation from exploding into a conflict that would draw in
the army, the way it happened 10 years ago at Oka, a small town
in suburban Montreal,  where Mohawk warriors had barricaded
off access to a piece of land considered to be an ancient burial
site but which was going to be converted by municipal officials
into an extension of a golf course. The standoff with the
provincial government and then the army and the neighbouring
population went on for 78 days.
A Strangled Discourse
In a recent conversation, a CBC national radio
documentary producer used the term ‘strangled discourse’ to
characterize Canada’s relations with Indian peoples. The term
resonated within me. Not only is much of the expression coming
from the monologue of ‘aboriginal nationalists’, but most of the
rest of the Canadian citizenry have a difficult time talking about
native matters with any amount of  frankness. Even though native
relations are possibly the central political issue in the country, it
was seldom even mentioned in the recent federal election
campaign, except by the rightwing Canadian Alliance Party.
Something must surely be strangling discourse, and until there
can be new ways of talking, there may be many more Burnt
Church situations across Canada.
The MFU has been thrust into an historical moment and I
believe we can play an important role in loosening up the
“strangled discourse”.  It is because we are organized that we
have a chance. It seems to me that where fishermen abandon
organization, they regress into very reactionary positions. These
positions are encouraged by the Canadian Alliance Party, which
will have no truck with ‘race-based’ fishing, as they say. Everyone
should fish under the same rules. There should be no affirmative
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action programmes, no special concessions on gear, vessels and
even taxes. Fishermen are easily attracted to this position, and
the MFU does not have a lot of room to manoeuvre.
We start from the premise that there is nothing illegitimate
about our fishermen’s deep attachment to their way of  life; they
and their families have fishing rights that cannot be dismissed.
The Mi’kmaq aspiration to fish is also legitimate, and the Supreme
Court rulings give them important tools to open up new access.
The fishing issues can be worked out, just as so many other fishing
issues have been worked out. But the discourse gets strangled
on all sides by fear, racism, nationalism, manipulation and more.
This is where organization can be indispensable.
Some Further Considerations
I remember setting out, 19 years ago, for a fishermen’s
meeting in a small fishing village in Nova Scotia, some four hours
drive from my home. It was a Sunday morning and I got there in
time for the meeting. Three fishermen showed up. I thought of
the Biblical aphorism “Where three or more gather in my
name…”  I thought where three or more fishermen gather under
the name of  the MFU, there was a chance to move ahead. These
are the kinds of thoughts that must keep organizers going all
over the world.
Even three fishermen pulling back for a moment from the
intense realities they live, to consider organizing under a union
umbrella point to the essence of the MFU-type organization.
The powers-to-be are always threatened by people gathering and
whispering, as it were, among themselves in corners. To build
organizations, you have to be jealous of your ability to be a
caucus, to talk among yourselves without buyers or politicians
or bureaucrats. In any early formation of  an organization that
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sets out to recover the social power attached to its members’
production, there will be countless decisions to meet separately.
The MFU belongs to its fishermen and its staff, not to the Left,
not to the politically correct, not to university professors, not to
government scientists and managers, not to the
environmentalists, or the trade unionists, or the community
activists, nor the women’s movement or the internationalists.
To maintain our ability to act independently and with specificity,
we have to be clear about our relations with all such groups.
In my judgement, the truly radical aspect of  the MFU is
the simple fact that it has inshore members from hundreds of
different fishing villages, spanning large coastal distances, from
an assortment of cultures, who fish many different species, who
follow a constitution and who want to claim their rightful share
of the social power they generate. Such an organization, in the
end, is an affront to the status quo and, consequently, generates
no end of  conscious and unconscious drives towards it. We are
always embroiled in controversies with people and groups who
are supposed to be friends in an amorphous cause to change the
world. The controversies arise because we must fiercely hold on
to our specificity. There is pressure to disperse and fragment
into a species group or a quota group or an ideological group (of
the Right or the Left) or a movement or whatever. The trick is to
be able to keep your organizational nerve. To illustrate my point,
I will wade into three sensitive areas:  the issue of unemployment
insurance, women and fisheries, and international association.
The inshore fishermen that we represent are primary
producers and independent operators. Their counterparts in the
agriculture and forestry sectors do not have a programme of
unemployment insurance, but fishermen do.  Each year, they
can qualify for up to six months of unemployment benefits during
the season when weather and ice and fish migration keep them
CONVERSATIONS276
from fishing. In this sense, they are seasonal workers and qualify
for unemployment insurance, like other workers.  The corporate
lobby group, the Fisheries Council of  Canada, consistently
opposes this concession to fishermen. We have seen the US
launch countervailing action against Canadian fish products,
claiming the unemployment benefit to fishermen was a subsidy.
(The action was not successful because it was a benefit available
to all Canadian workers.) We have had commissions like the
Forget Commission that set out to reduce or eliminate the benefit,
but without success, to date. In the early 1990s, the government
established a task force to look into incomes in the fishery sector.
One objective of  the task force was to reform the unemployment
insurance system for fishermen that would make it more tailored
to the present fishing realities. The task force recommended that
owner-operator fishermen should qualify for the insurance based
on the value of their catch, up to a maximum insurable catch,
rather than on the number of weeks fished that was being used
at the time. This recommendation was widely supported by
fishermen and was incorporated into a series of  reforms of  the
unemployment insurance system that the Liberal government
introduced in l996.
These reforms of  unemployment insurance benefited
owner-operator fishermen, but for all other workers, the reforms
constituted cutbacks to the programme and were fiercely resisted
by seasonal workers, especially in New Brunswick. The reforms
meant that a worker needed to have more weeks of work to
qualify; benefits themselves were reduced as a percentage of
earnings, and repeat users were penalized. There were marches
and protest rallies, and confrontations with the politicians. The
Canadian Labour Congress (Canada’s House of  Labour) in the
Atlantic region picked up the cause of the seasonal workers and
new leaders emerged from the workers. Our fishermen were in
an awkward situation. They were faced with marginal cuts to
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benefits, but their overall system had been improved. In some
ways, they could not believe their own good fortune and certainly
were not in a militant mood. Furthermore, inshore owner-operator
fishermen were, on average, making reasonable livings and often
resided in communities where employment was hard to find and
where wages were low. In short, there was every incentive for
them to keep their heads down, and so the MFU had no real
base of support to join in the militant resistance that was swirling
around them, especially in New Brunswick.
The MFU supported the unemployment insurance
fightback in small ways, issuing press statements, providing office
space, speaking at some of the rallies and sending some persons
for the marches. The militants, including the trade union activists,
were frustrated that the MFU was not doing enough and was
not lending the full force of its organization to the fightback.
They knew that fishermen carry political clout and they saw the
staff  as unwilling to mobilize the fishermen around the issue.
But the reality was that it was not the fishermen’s issue.
In retrospect, the government, consciously or otherwise,
effectively neutralized the clout of  fishermen by introducing
positive changes alongside the marginal cutbacks. But the wrath
of the people had been provoked and the Liberal government
paid heavily in the l997 election because of  these cutbacks. In
the Acadian areas, the electorate voted in two candidates with
the New Democratic Party (Canada’s party of  the Left and the
labour movement); this was an electoral revolt and
unprecedented since Confederation. Fishermen may not have
been able to take to the streets, as other seasonal workers had,
but, in most areas, they revolted just as strongly at the polls
because they were being affected in an assortment of ways by
the general programme of downsizing, cutbacks and cost recovery
that hit the fishing sector particularly hard.
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To this day, unemployment insurance can represent as
much as 25 per cent of  an inshore fisherman’s annual net income.
The programme’s applicability to inshore owner-operator
fishermen remains an exception and, therefore, is always
vulnerable to new government policy.  The inshore fishermen’s
strength in the Maritimes that I wrote about earlier, and which is
built on their success in the lobster fishery, is nevertheless
potentially compromised by this significant government benefit.
The payments continue to be a focal point of the corporate
sector’s attack on the inshore fishery, that it is a social fishery
and not totally subject to the dictates of the marketplace.
 The MFU could have been as militant and rhetorical as it
wanted to on the issue of unemployment insurance cutbacks,
but, in a certain way, that would have been phoney because it
was not really the issue of  our members.
With respect to women in the fishery, we face a similar
dilemma, in that only a small fraction of women actually fish for
a living, and so it is logical that our membership has few women.
Fishermen’s wives contribute to the inshore fishery in all sorts
of ways that have been variously noted, but, given the societal
dynamics that are going on in the families and the increasing
differentiation of work where more and more partners are in the
workforce but in very different and separate occupations, the
issue of equal status and recognition is getting worked out
through new opportunities in the workforce.
Nevertheless, some women and fisheries groups are
critiquing the MFU for becoming professional and exclusive and,
by implication, making the role of women more marginalized.
The suggestion is that the more you get defined as a professional,
the more you hide the joint nature of the fishing operation, since
there is normally a woman employed in the household who
contributes to the fishing operation. And the fact that we accept
that the work of women is invisible indirectly leads to the fact
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that more and more importance is given to technology at the
cost of  labour.
I am not sure about the theoretical analysis, but, at a more
practical level, the issue of women and the MFU seems to be an
artificial discussion. The MFU could attempt, for example, to
amend its constitution to include wives as members. But,
generally, there has been no real demand arising from the women
for such an amendment. So why would the MFU make such a
structural change when the benefits of  doing so for the women
have not been articulated by the advocates of women in the
fishery? At various times in the history of  the MFU, it gets
recognized that women are absent and that we need more allies
and should get them involved. But this is a utilitarian approach;
it says nothing about the situation of  the women themselves.
There is little question that the inshore fishery, as a way of
life, is changing. Rural life itself  is becoming more of  an extension
of  urban centres. Still, inshore communities are managing to
retain their populations and they are also modernizing, as the
inshore fishery itself  is. Presumably, feminist theory sees this
modernization as patriarchical. In discussions raised by feminist
friends, two basic contradictions emerge from our present phase
of  social development. First, the structural adjustments that have
been imposed on us challenge our control over local resources.
So the micro-management successes we hold on to now are also
threatened and can be challenged if, for instance, the ITQ system
one day also penetrates the inshore. This also impacts on our
access to coastal spaces. On the other hand, destruction of  the
organic way of  life has also led to the destruction of  the organic
production of food and to a growing number of toxins in
whatever we consume—the toxification of primary production,
if you like. Both these present conditions cause us to reflect
further on the form of  organization that was accepted earlier.
The trade union form of  struggling for rights is within the ongoing
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form of  development, a development that has grown to be more
centralized, more capital-intensive and more exploitative of
nature—patriarchal, as feminists say.
 This may be true, but where do you go with that
formulation? Are we to throw the baby out with the bath water?
The feminists remind us that the MFU must pay attention to the
broader issues of the production of life, and this is undeniable.
But I would maintain that the MFU is biting off its portion of
the global struggle simply by addressing the issues its members
face. We have a critical stake in maintaining the ocean’s
productivity; damaged estuaries affect the inshore first;
sustainable fishing is essential to the coastal communities; and
sustainable inshore fishing is what the MFU is after—and so on.
Obviously, women are critical to the sustainability of  coastal
communities; if the young ones leave, the community is finished.
There is not much that the MFU can do directly about potential
and actual realities like this, except to support broader political
actions, where they emerge, in an effective way.
A very practical example of where the MFU has
successfully kept the issues of the production of life in its work
has been the establishment of a family health insurance
programme with the proceeds that were earned from the snow
crab allocation. This, in a small way, protects the family against
the financial effects of sickness when other health cuts are being
imposed through structural adjustments. It is one practical way
that the MFU is keeping in touch with the families. I contrast
our approach to using a quota for the collective interests of the
members and their families with examples in other jurisdictions,
where small temporary quotas have been allocated but strictly
on an individual basis and where the fisherman himself  derives
all the benefit. So, we are very proud of  having won a portion of
the quota allocation that we could dedicate to a collective plan.
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The women’s critique of  the MFU is potentially gratuitous.
The MFU is organized on the basis of  its members work activity,
that is, fishing, an activity that historically has been carried out
by males. From day to day, we have enough on our hands just
attempting to maintain a ‘union line’ in a context of centrifugal
forces. Still, the production of  life is a larger political issue that
must be supported, and we should remain vigilant to make
strategic contributions.
The world’s fisheries are under great stress. Coastal fishing
communities everywhere are facing problems of overfishing from
industrial fleets, displacement by tourist and recreational
interests, erosion of fish habitat, and more. Aspirations for a
world movement in fisheries flow inevitably from the conditions
faced everywhere by inshore fishing families and their
communities. The effort to develop a WFF is one expression of
such aspirations, although the particular results of the Loctudy
meeting are not the subject of my reflection here. (The meeting of
the World Forum of  Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers at Loctudy, France,
turned controversial. See Troubled Seas in Loctudy, SAMUDRA Report
No. 27 and Wag the Dog, SAMUDRA Report No. 28  – Ed) I want to
stay with matters directly pertaining to the MFU.
At times, there has been an air of  artificiality to the MFU’s
internationalism. In the early days of  its formation, the fishermen
took part in exchanges with the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, in a
programme promoted and supported by Oxfam Canada.
I am guessing that one of the expectations of the organizers of
these exchanges was to politicize the fishermen about Nicaragua
so that they would form a political support base in this country.
It was also seen as a form of  international aid to a struggling
new regime. The outcomes of those exchanges are difficult to
trace, although the organizing experience of the MFU was of
some interest to Nicaraguan activists, and there were amounts
of  aid in the form of  material and training that benefited two
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specific fishing areas. But the programme did not last and there
grew a sense of  ‘Third World issues’ being grafted on to the real
work of  the MFU, which was local.
The MFU’s relations with the Senegalese fishermen were
developed quite differently. The Senegalese had had a broad
experience with the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), whose aid was being actively questioned, after 1985,
by the emerging fishworker movement in Senegal. The CNPS
made conscious moves to build contacts with the MFU, partially
as a means of  countering the CIDA approach. Although the
inshore fisheries differ considerably from one country to the
other, the organizing work had much in common. Further, there
was never a question of  aid from the MFU to Senegal. We made
conscious efforts to avoid aid relations. In this way, the
interchange of  fishermen and staff  between the two organizations
has proved realistic, and lacks the sense of something being
grafted on to the MFU.
Canada has never had a distant-water fleet. On the contrary,
Canada’s marine resources have, until recently, been plundered
by distant-water fleets of  other nations. As I have noted above,
the collapse of our cod stocks should really be traced back to
the massive post-War fishing of  European and East Bloc
countries. In any case, in the organizational life of  the MFU,
foreign fishing has not been an immediate issue for our members,
except in relation to French fishing from St Pierre and Miquelon,
which was finally regulated at the International Court in the
Hague.
The international issues that most directly touch our
members are related to trade and markets. Our inshore fisheries
rely on the Japanese to purchase herring roe, on Haiti for heavily
smoked herring and ‘pickled’ gaspereaux, on the US, Europe and
Asia for our lobsters. It is our dependence on world markets that
is the practical base of  our international interests. Trade and
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market issues do not lend themselves easily to common solidarity
actions with our counterparts around the world. This may explain
why the MFU has not played a particularly strong role in the
development of  a formal organization at the world level. Just
prior to the Delhi meeting in November l997, where fishworker
organizations assembled to see if  they could form a world body
(See A New World Forum, SAMUDRA Report No. 19, January 1998  –
Ed), I wrote thus to Nalini Nayak, expressing caution about how
ambitious a world initiative could be:
I believe most of us are neophytes in this business of maintaining
effective broadbased organizations of  fishermen, and there is not
nearly enough reflection about what it takes to make up such
organizations.
This is what worries me about moving to a world stage beyond
anything more than the periodic associating as is being done at the
World Forum. Just in Canada alone, we are trying to use the
vehicle of  the Canadian Council of  Professional Fish Harvesters
to build productive relations with other broadbased fishermen’s
organizations and I can assure you that we are a long way from
becoming an organized force. We are always in danger of
dissipating our own organizational energies and specificity, and
of  being subsumed by programmes and visions that serve to yield
up the power of  the working fisherperson to interests and forces
that work against him or her.
I would hope that the World Forum will be an opportunity for the
fishermen and fishworker organizations to come to know precisely
who they are and what organized force they respectively have.
There will be a tendency to slip off into representations of realities
that do not correspond to the social and organizational realities
of the different groups represented.
I might even go further and say that the basis for solidarity is only
there in the most abstract of formulations. And, I am not really
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convinced that there is one unifying issue. The closest that we may
be able to come to a unifying issue is what I would call the
development dilemma.
We all have a development dilemma because there is no surplus
fish. So, if the dynamics of fisheries capital cannot be countered,
every new development results in the diminishment of  someone
else’s catch or access. In Canada, as I have said, at the national
level, the level of  the Treasury Board and the senior bureaucrats,
they are scrambling to divest from the fishery and transfer it to
private hands (to the ascendancy fleets). There are certainly political
counter-forces at play that may modify the privatization drive (and
the ‘popular‘ fishermen organizations are part of  the counter-
force). But, it remains a remarkable phenomenon in a country
that has just gone through a collapse of the cod stocks, a calamity
of ‘biblical proportions’ in which micro-quota management (with
its implicit privatization) was the cornerstone of  national fisheries
policy. But this is another question.
It is extremely difficult for fishermen organizations to come to
grips with the development dilemma because it emerges as much
from within its own ranks as from outside, and because the
dynamics of fisheries capital are so powerful and persuasive. But,
there are conjunctures when resource limits weaken ascendancy
fleets and when popular organizations can capture the political
terrain with alternative visions that promote the interests of  the
full community of  fishing people. I hope the Forum is able to
identify some of the conjunctures and is able to grapple with realistic
counter-policies.
Most of all, I hope you are able to come to grips with the challenge
of  organizing fishermen and fishworkers as effective forces within
their national and regional fisheries. And I am sure that you all
will consider long and hard whether it is possible to launch a
world initiative that can add to the force of  organized fishing
people.
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2001
I don’t like using the term ‘globalization’. Forty years ago,
Marshall McLuhan  coined the term ‘global village’. (Herbert
Marshall McLuhan, author of such influential works as The Medium is the
Massage and Understanding Media was born in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
– Ed) As a young undergraduate, the image resonated in me; it
was fresh and captured the speed at which the modes of transport,
travel and communication were shrinking the world, at least for
some people. But the difference between l960 and l900, let’s
say, was basically only a matter of  speed, and I believe the
essential difference between now and then is also mainly the
matter of  how fast the world is shrinking. The way globalization
is used in popular discourse, you would think that it is a recent
phenomenon. In other words, its popular usage is ahistorical.
Nevertheless, the speed at which systems are integrating around
the world is destabilizing, and renders insight into the future
even more difficult.
In the past few months, we have seen in the MFU some
new expressions of the rightwing populism that I described was
seen in Nova Scotia some 10 years back. This time, we are getting
a taste of it in the very Acadian communities of eastern New
Brunswick that were more resistant to the earlier phenomenon.
It is premature to make too much of this latest version but there
are signs in the broader society too that suggest we may already
be  moving into a new watershed period. It is difficult to imagine
one single event so defining of a new watershed period as the
downing of  the Berlin Wall was to the era that ended in l989.
Nevertheless, some post-Cold War events are unravelling. The
peace accord with the Israelis and the Palestinians is a glaring
example; the recent post-election spectacle in the US is suggestive,
where there is open talk of  recession in the world’s largest
economy; Russia is apparently continuing to decline; and so on.
(Readers should perhaps keep in mind the fact that these observations were made
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nearly two years ago, before the recent exacerbation of  the Israeli-Palestine conflict
and the relative revival of the Russian economy – Ed)
If the MFU is about to live out another tumultuous period
of populism from the right, I have to ask what is it this time that
the fishermen are anticipating or sensing. There will be no
dramatic cod collapse because the stock has not recovered,
although this lack of recovery is itself unexpected and
disconcerting. There is no apparent imminent collapse in herring
or snow crab, and the lobster resource continues to show
reasonably high catch rates. At the moment, at least, there seem
to be no dramatic shifts in the resource, but I believe there is a
potential economic problem in the cornerstone fishery, lobster.
A recession can play havoc with a luxury product like lobster
that is so dependent on the export market. The December price
for lobster in the Southwest Nova Scotia fishery dropped
significantly from the previous year, and this too is suggestive.
Further, the lobster fishery in the Gulf of St Lawrence, in
particular, is carrying too much freight. I mean that inshore
fishermen are rapidly overinvesting and becoming, therefore,
vulnerable.
The immediate rise of populist expression in the Acadian
communities is clearly related to the events this summer in Burnt
Church. In the eyes of  some fishermen at least, the MFU itself
became de-legitimized overnight because it was thought to be
collaborating with the authorities and especially the DFO in its
handling of  the out-of-season fishing. The uncertainties around
Mi’kmaq fishing aspirations are clearly great fodder for a new
wave of regressive populism, but my guess is that if we are to
get the kind of wildfire reactions we saw in Nova Scotia 10
years ago, where fishermen seemed to be living out bigger societal
dramas in a psychological way, then it may be because we are in,
or on the verge of, a new watershed period.
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The end of  the Cold War was an enormous and global
regime shift. Is it possible that we are already having another
‘regime shift’?  The last time, it seemed like overnight the
structures of  the communist bloc were swept away. This time,
if we are going to have a regime shift, it will be in the institutions
associated with the West, including the institutions that have
been managing the present phase of globalization. There are some
signs close to home to indicate that citizens are losing confidence
in some of  the key institutions in society, but it is not clear
whether this is a global phenomenon nor whether it presents an
opportunity for positive change. What is certain is that MFU
will not lack new challenges.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have attempted to provide a glimpse of  the
MFU as an inshore organization in the fishery of  Canada’s
Maritime provinces.  It was never my ambition to tell the story
of  the MFU. I have mentioned almost no names among the
hundreds of  fishermen that have worked in the MFU and have
made it a credible force in Canada’s fishery. Some of  the
individuals were acknowledged in Sue Calhoun’s A Word to Say.
When I think back over the previous pages, I cannot
imagine having written this essay without really commenting on
the issue of finance that plagued the MFU for most of its history;
also, an essay of  this sort should have addressed much more
thoroughly the role of staff. I have been conscious throughout
of trying not to duplicate the themes that are discussed in the
Conversations portion of this book. But, the real excuse for so
much lack of detail and depth is time. This essay was pieced
together hurriedly to provide the reader background on the MFU,
which is my reference point in Conversations. The essay was also
written to give the reader a taste of the issues in Canadian
fisheries from the perspective of the inshore.
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In the end, I am really only arguing one point:
As long as the MFU can maintain its reasonably broad—
in the Canadian context—membership base of inshore
fishermen, there will be conjunctures where we can play a
progressive role that would be a worthy contribution to the
worldwide struggle to keep the fishery in the hands of  those
who live it as a way of  life with their families and communities.
Michael Belliveau December 2000
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An Essay on the
Fishworkers’ Movement in India
by Nalini Nayak
Introduction
In the pages that follow, I will tryto give a brief  historical overview
of the fishworkers’ movement in India so that my views in the
preceding conversation can be contextualized.
Abbreviating a movement that spans over two decades
into a short essay is not an easy task. The fishworkers’ movement
in India has its roots in spontaneous people’s struggles that
II
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commenced in the mid-1960s and organizational processes that
supported its consolidation in the following decades. It is not
one singular process. It has been the result of  a conjuncture of
several things; it has grown from one issue to the next, from one
part of the country to another and has also acquired an
international dimension.
This essay will only touch upon some aspects of the
movement and will emphasize the constant struggle of  the fisher
people against the State to sustain their lives and livelihoods. It
will also highlight the dilemma of an organizational process that
seeks an alternative model of development.
Having been personally, and very closely, involved in
the movement myself means that I look at it from my own point
of  view.
The Context
After achieving independence from British colonial rule
in 1947, India launched into a phase of industrialization, heavily
subsidized by the State. The nation’s new democratic constitution
attempted to shatter old feudal structures. But the deep-rooted
caste system continued to play a significant social role even
amidst the emerging industrial class. There was a rapid growth
of modernization and urbanization.
Yet the majority of  the Indian population continued to
live in the rural areas as only a small percentage of  the people
were absorbed in the process of industrialization. Even at the
turn of  the century, only a meagre 10 per cent of  the country’s
labour force was involved in the formal sector. India continued
to be largely a rural economy, with over 70 per cent of  the
population eking out a livelihood from agriculture, artisanal trade
or natural resources held largely as community property.
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With the creation of  the nation-State, and formalization
of local governance, the tentacles of the State became all-
pervasive and the process of  erosion of  the rights of  local
communities over their resources was initiated. Caught in the
dilemma of a fast-growing population and the demands of a
democratic polity, the State willingly accepted the Western model
of  ‘growth’ to ‘enhance’ production, and created an infrastructure
of social development. A natural result of this logic was the
development of a small and rich elite, and an ambitious and
aspiring middle class, even as over half the population remained
near or below the poverty line.
Modernization became only a veneer for an otherwise
communal society in which religious and caste affinities continued
to provide elements of social cohesion. Always in debt, the State
was not able to develop large enough social security nets, with
the result that the post-independent period in India has been
one of continuous social unrest.
India’s indigenous people—the adivasis—continued to fight
for their autonomy and rights of  self-rule. (The Hindi word for tribe is
adivasi, which means ‘original inhabitant’. However, the Western experience usually
recognizes only those peoples as indigenous whose foreparents were conquered by foreign
invaders. In the Indian and South Asian context, indigenous/tribal peoples are the
descendants of  the first settlers or residents of  a country who once controlled the
entire territory of  their habitat, before being pushed into relative geographical isolation
by outsiders and invaders. They today suffer social, economic and political discrimination
– Ed) At present, they inhabit the rich forest areas in which also
lie large underground deposits of minerals and oil. The
‘outcastes’—the dalits—continued to fight social oppression and
ostracism. (Dalit is an ancient Marathi–the language of Maharastra,
India–word that means ‘ground’ or ‘broken to pieces’. It is said the word
was first used in the late 19th century by the Marathi social reformer
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Jotiba Phule to describe the appalling conditions of  the ‘outcastes’ or
‘untouchables’, those beyond the pale of the Indian caste system – Ed) As
they mobilized to confront discrimination, they met with even
greater ostracism and violence. The agricultural workers’
movements have fought exploitative landlordism in various parts
of  the country. The organization of  displaced people—persons
displaced by the construction of  large dams and the expansion
of urban centres—has challenged the course of ongoing
development. The fishworkers, living on the margins of  society,
also took up cudgels against the State in an effort to protect
their right to fish resources.
All these ‘social movements’ or workers’ struggles have
been very different from the trade union struggles of  the
organized working class, in which mainstream political parties
have been the stimulants, ideologues or organizers. Most of  these
movements have been independent of political parties, not asking
for a bigger share of  the cake, but struggling to defend the right
to life and livelihood of thousands of people whom the State
ignores and does not hold itself  responsible for. Today, these
people have called attention to their existence mainly because
they have organized under extremely difficult conditions and have
articulated their demands and dreams of a society that will
provide space and livelihood for all.
A Backgrounder on Indian Fisheries
India has a coastline of  8,041 km (according to the FAO),
along which lie nine maritime States. Although each of  these
States is a unique cultural region with a language specific to that
area, their fisheries share similarities of  physical geography.
According to A J Vijayan, one of the founder members of the
NFF, “Towards the end of  the 1970s, there were about 6.5 million
people who depended on fishing and allied activities for a
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livelihood. This represented about one per cent of the Indian
population. Of these, about 3.5 million depended on marine
resources, while the rest lived along rivers, lakes and backwaters.
Of  the seagoing fishermen, nearly 90 per cent were artisanal
fishermen operating small traditional craft and gear. It was
estimated that they owned about 150,000 fishing craft and
700,000 gear and tackle”  (see Need for Conservation by A J Vijayan,
in Struggle to Survive: A Dossier on the Struggle of  Traditional Fishermen
and Fishworkers in India, Indian Social Institute and Delhi Forum,
New Delhi, February 1987).
The distinguishing feature of this artisanal fishery was its
heterogeneity, conditioned by the physical geography of  the coast
and by the nature of the resource base. Being a tropical region,
it was characterized as a multispecies fishery, where the resources,
however, existed in smaller quantities than in temperate water
zones. Fishermen generally used dugout canoes on the west coast
because of the extended continental shelf and calmer waters
there, and kattamarams (catamarans) on the southeast coast,
where the continental shelf is narrower and surf conditions
rougher. The craft grew larger further up the east and west coasts
because of  the extended continental shelf. Traditionally, large
beach-seines were used along most parts of the west and
southeast coasts, but, for the most part, there was a variety of
large drift- and gill-nets that targeted different species and were
operated differently. Hooks-and-line were used mainly in the
southern areas, where the kattamaram fishermen have been
considered exceptionally skilled.
A significant feature of this fishery is that it is decentralized
and labour-intensive and adopts a complementary sexual division
of labour by which the men fish and the women are involved in
post-harvest activities, both being intrinsic parts of  the fishery.
Until the end of the 1960s, the fishing craft were not mechanized;
the navigational skills of  the artisanal fishermen of  south India,
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who, in some areas made week-long voyages, came to be known
the world over. Like artisanal fishermen in other parts of  the
world, Indian fishermen have, over the years, adopted fishing
techniques that they came across during their migrations or
through contact with foreign traders. Adaptation was always
tested over time and the evolution of  fishing technology was,
therefore, gradual and measured.
The estimated annual potential yield of fish resources for
the Indian marine waters is 3.9 million tonnes. Of  this, 53 per
cent is in the depth zone of 0-50 m (inshore), in which the
traditional sector is more than capable of operating to an optimal
extent, 36 per cent in the 50-100 m depth zone (offshore) and
only 11 per cent in the deep sea.
The modernization of the fishery and the resultant rapid
changes commenced in the post-independence period. It was
the Indo-Norwegian Project (INP) that gave an impetus to this
modernization in 1953. The first phase of the project extended
from 1953 to 1963, when its activities were primarily concentrated
in Kollam (then called Quilon) in the State of Kerala in south
India.
The stated objectives of  the INP, which initiated modern
fisheries development in India, were to:
• raise the productivity of  the fishermen and increase their
returns;
• develop an efficient system for the distribution of fresh
fish and improved fish products;
• improve the health and sanitary conditions of the fishing
population; and
• raise the general standard of living of the fishing
population.
John Kurien, a social scientist at the Centre for
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Development Studies, Trivandrum, and part of  an activist group
that was instrumental in organizing the first viably operating
grassroots fishermen’s co-operative in Kerala in the mid-1970s,
has analyzed the INP. “Although the Norwegians intended initially
to improve the efficiency of the local craft, they failed to do
this, and the introduction of a smaller flat-keeled boat, designed
in Norway, was an easier alternative,” he writes. “By 1958, goaded
on by the successes of private exporters of shrimp that existed
in the Kerala waters, they introduced the trawl and purse-seine
gear on to the small mechanized craft. This introduction got a
boost with the growing demand for shrimp in the US and Japanese
markets, and private investors were lured into the fishing industry.
The INP provided infrastructural facilities like ice plants, and
freezing and processing technology to cope with the increased
production and thus further develop the export market.
Within six years, the trawl boats increased to 700 and their
share of the shrimp catch rose from nil to 90 per cent. The INP
strayed far from its brief as it was further pressured by private
interests, supported by government allocations of the Second
Plan, which grew from Rs0.27million to Rs6 million.
In the period 1967-75 there was a marked rise in fish
production and the peak of 4,20,000 tonnes was reached in 1971.
That level was close to the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) in
Kerala waters. (The maximum sustainable yield is the largest average catch
that can be harvested on a sustainable basis from a stock under existing environmental
conditions – Ed) The major share of this increase was from the
demersal species, especially penaeid prawns. During this period,
the share of the mechanized sector increased to 16 per cent of
the State’s fish production.
It must be pointed out, nevertheless, that even in this
period of  rapid introduction of  new technology, 84 per cent of
the fish landings in Kerala were still from the traditional sector.
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Fish prices also increased rapidly from Rs290 a tonne in 1967 to
Rs1,760 per tonne in 1975. The total value of output rose from
Rs105 million to Rs740 million in the same period.
From the early 1960s, all attention was focused on the
penaeid prawns. From an export turnover of  a little under 500
tonnes of frozen prawns at the end of the 1950s, by 1961, the
figure had reached 1,462 tonnes, with an export value realization
of over Rs4,000 per tonne, compared to the internal fresh-fish
shore price of Rs150 a tonne. In 1962, having lost their access
rights to Mexican waters, the Japanese paid Rs8,900 per tonne
for prawns from India. The phenomenal export earnings of shrimp
made both the INP and the fisheries administration of Kerala
devote their undivided attention to the pursuit of  prawns.
By 1963, the most notable structural change in the project
area, consequent to the introduction of  the new technology of
fish harvesting and processing, was the creation of  a new class
of non-operating entrepreneurs or capitalists who owned the
means of production and, through this, opened up avenues for a
large migrant labour force recruited from outside the INP area.
The change in the technology and labour process in the
realm of  fish harvesting and processing, taken together with the
entry of this new segment of the merchant class interests into
the fish economy, was the death-knell of  the fisheries
development policy in Kerala, which had commenced with the
stated objectives of providing cheap protein for local
consumption, ensuring a more decentralized mode of functioning
and greater spread effects with regard to employment generation.
A sector that was relatively outside the mainstream of the
economic and social processes of Kerala society was suddenly
transformed into a respectable avenue for investment and
involvement. The possibilities of a ‘modernized’ fishery emerged,
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quickly breaking down traditional barriers of  entry into the sector.
The export-oriented thrust that began to get ingrained in the
sector was blessed by the country’s own attempt to boost foreign
exchange earnings” (see Norwegian Intervention by John Kurien,
in Struggle to Survive, 1987).
Subsequently, there were rapid changes in Kerala’s fishery.
Between 1976 and 1980, despite the continued rapid
introduction of new trawlers and purse-seiners, there was an all-
round decline in fish production. Overall, fish landings dropped
to 332,000 tonnes. Pelagic catches declined to 220,000 tonnes,
while dermersal catches were more or less steady at 112,000
tonnes, and the prawn catch dropped marginally to 40,000
tonnes. Interestingly, the only increase in this period was in the
catch of the mechanized sector, which almost doubled its output
from 61,000 tonnes to 120,000 tonnes.
The most catastrophic decline was experienced in the
landings of  the traditional fishermen, whose production fell to
230,000 tonnes. This was below what they were catching
between 1956 and 1959. Nevertheless, prices continued to
increase and, despite the fact that fish production was as low as
279,000 tonnes in 1980, the prices reached a peak of Rs2,970
per tonne. On the export front, the same increase was
experienced. Although the quantum of exports between 1975-
76 and 1979-80 remained around 31,000 tonnes, the value
realized shot up from Rs680 million to Rs1,040 million (figures
from the Marine Products Export Development Authority,
MPEDA, for 1970, 1978 and 1984).
The cumulative deterioration in the conditions of the
majority of  the fishermen became more apparent following an
official socioeconomic census survey conducted by the Kerala
Department of Fisheries in 1979. Only 2 per cent of the fisherfolk
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population had qualifications of SSLC (Secondary School
Leaving Certificate) and above. Housing conditions were poor:
48 per cent had shabby huts and only 16 per cent had pukka
houses. Fishing villages were marked by their excessive crowding
along narrow strips of coastline. Access to drinking water was
meagre, and sanitary and lighting facilities were abysmal (from
reports of the Department of Fisheries, Kerala, 1979).
The Beginnings of the Fishworkers’ Movement
Spontaneous outbursts of the artisanal fishers occurred
all over south India against the trawl boats that were increasingly
fishing in the inshore waters. Sporadic protests were the hallmark
in Tamil Nadu, the State neighbouring Kerala. The major revolt
was in and around the fishing harbour of  Tuticorin where, by
the end of  1978, the fishermen had destroyed 11 medium-sized
trawl boats and, in the course of  the struggle, 16 fishermen had
lost their lives. There were also protests in central Kerala, where
one inshore fisherman lost his life when a trawl boat rammed
into his country craft.
These protests first took on the form of  organized
collective action in the State of Goa in 1977. The artisanal
fishworkers there were involved in hauling shore-seines or
rampons, as they were locally called. These bag-like nets,
sometimes a kilometre long, were payed out from large wooden
outrigger boats, each of  which consisted of  around 70 to 100
persons. When the operations of  this sector were hampered by
the trawl boats fishing for prawns, which were to be exported
out of Goa, the rampon owners (ramponkars) mooted an agitation
under the leadership of Mathany Saldanha. (Mathany Saldhana was
General Secretary of  the Goenchea Ramponkarancho Ekvott, Goa – Ed) This
young and dynamic schoolteacher had just led a successful
struggle against a chemical plant that was polluting the sea with
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effluent discharge. Having appreciated the support he received
from the fishermen in the anti-pollution struggle, Saldhana was
keen to support their struggle too. He was able to rally support
from the public through slogans like “Fish for Goa” and “Save
Goa, Save Our Beaches”.
The struggles of  the ramponkars took the State of  Goa by
surprise. Without any history of organization, the ramponkars
were able to command large numbers of workers to demonstrate
on the streets of Goa. They got the support of the local people
because fish, an indispensable component of the Goan diet, was
either becoming scarce or very expensive. The ramponkars
agitation made news all over the country. Not only fishermen
but large groups of the population, including nature lovers and
environmentally conscious citizens, came out on the streets also,
demanding a ban on trawl fishing.
The initial mobilization of the fishworkers was not only a
protest against modern technology destroying the fishery and,
therefore, their livelihoods, but was also linked to conserving
the ‘Goan way of  life’ and preserving the beaches. But these
were new demands and the fledgling movement was unsure whom
these demands should be addressed to. Unable to find any
framework or legal basis to oppose trawl fishing, the Goenchar
Ramponkarancho Ekvott (GRE), as the movement was then
called, realized that it had to first wage a struggle for marine
regulation and this would have to be done at the national level.
The GRE would, therefore, have to find other allies around the
country and work out a strategy to pressure the Indian parliament
to frame a Marine Regulation Act. At the national level, this
would be a Herculean task, especially as there were no
parliamentarians who came from coastal fishing villages. Those
from the big coastal cities did not consider fishing an important
sector of  the economy. Parliament House in New Delhi was
CONVERSATIONS300
located far from any ocean, and the largely non-fish eating
population in the north of the country could not be expected to
understand the implications of a demand relating to fish as a
source of food and livelihood.
Xavier Pinto, a young Redemptorist priest, who was
involved in the Goan outburst recalls, “Mathany and I made a
trip all along the southern coast. We knew of  some organizational
activity among coastal communities in south Kerala, where
successful co-operatives of  artisanal fishermen existed. Through
the activists in Kerala, we got to know other groups involved
with coastal communities in south India. We met large groups
of women fish-net weavers in Kanyakumari, who voiced
apprehensions about machine-made nets entering the market and
how those would eventually render them jobless. We invited all
of  them to a meeting in Madras. There were finally about 30 of
us, representing 13 fishing organizations at the meeting. All
echoed the same issues of conflict between the artisanal and
trawl sectors, and diminishing catches. We decided that we should
create a national organization and make a representation to the
Prime Minister. We thus created the National Forum of  Catamaran
and Country Boat Fishermen’s Rights to Marine Wealth. Mathany
was elected Chairman of  the forum, which was later called the
National Fishermen’s Forum” (from the diary of  Xavier Pinto).
What followed was a long legislative process that was
pursued only because it was accompanied by people’s uprisings
and protests all over the country. Getting a Bill passed in the
Indian Parliament is no easy task. There was some support for
the fishworkers’ cause from the Left parties and, finally, about
18 parliamentarians were willing to support the Bill. After a sit-
in before the house of the Minister of Agriculture on 28 July
1978, the National Forum was assured that its demands for a
Marine Regulation Bill and some welfare measures for fishermen
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would be seriously looked into. It was the next Prime Minister,
Indira Gandhi, who instituted the Majumdar Committee to study
the reasons for the revolts in Tamil Nadu earlier in 1978. The
Majumdar Committee strongly advocated a Marine Regulation
Act at the national level. Unfortunately, its recommendation was
referred to the State governments so that each State would create
its own regulation and get it approved by the Centre. The lost
battle for a regulation to be administered by a single central
authority was to be the springboard for the irresolute struggles
of the future.
In 1979, fishermen’s organizations in different States
initiated fasts (including a 367-day relay fast) and other public
action to pressure the government to enact the legislation in Goa.
In 1980, the National Forum presented the Central Ministry of
Agriculture with a model copy of a Marine Regulation Act. The
Minister agreed that he would act on it without delay.
From 1981 onwards, because of the pressure from
fishworkers, some States began to formulate and pass Marine
Regulation Acts, but the boatowners’ associations, which were
more powerful and better organized, instantly opposed these
moves. Thus began a long process of  litigation between the State,
the boatowners’ associations and the fishworkers. These struggles
and experiences of litigation became a schooling for the
fishworkers and their leaders in the process of building up a
movement.
Structuring the Organization
Structuring the fishworkers’ organization was the next step.
In this phase, and for the decade of the 1980s, it was the State
of Kerala that took the lead. Kerala is the State that was home
to India’s first project to modernize the fishery, with the
assistance of  the Norwegians, in the early 1960s. It is also the
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one State in India where fish is an important part of the diet of
the local population, as in Goa. The majority of the fishworkers
in south Kerala were Christian.
In the southern part of  the State, where the struggle gained
momentum, the main fishery pivoted around the kattamaram.
This was a very diversified fishery that engaged thousands of
fishermen. In labour terms, it was a small operation, consisting
of  two to four fishermen with very traditional, but efficient,
skills, using hooks and a variety of nets and sails, and, in some
areas, going out for two to three days at a time. Women too were
very involved in the post-harvest fishery, drying, processing and
distributing headloads of fish.
More than a decade of NGO activity had been witnessed
amongst the coastal communities of the south. In the Kerala
fishing village of Marianad, people initiated participatory
processes in new co-operatives to control the sale of their fish
and free themselves from moneylenders and merchants. These
struggles brought significant approval for a community that was
otherwise considered backward and looked down on.
The process of  forming co-operatives and generating data
on the artisanal fishery provided the base for contesting the new
modernization logic of the State and for valorizing the artisanal
fishery. The process also revealed the subjugation of  the poor
fishers to the authority of the Catholic Church, which won
material gains, even as the community continued to live in
squalor.
Within the Church itself, there were groups of nuns and
priests who opposed the institutional stand of the Church, and
engaged with the struggles of  the people. A process of  creating
people’s organizations (POs) commenced. These processes and
the growth of local community leadership succeeded in projecting
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the artisanal fishery as a viable sector. Youth from the community
began to assume leadership and challenge the oppressive social
structures. The fisherwomen began to create their own local
organizations of  vendors. Soon, awareness grew in the community
that rights could be gained only by struggle. SIFFS, an apex body
of  the co-operatives of  the contiguous districts of  Trivandrum,
Quilon (in Kerala) and Kanyakumari (in Tamil Nadu), was already
in place at the turn of  the 1970s.
With the creation of  these people’s organizations, which
were probably among the first of  their kind in the country, the
fishworkers, for the first time, did not have to depend on either
the political parties or the Church for leadership. The active
functioning of their organizations also brought them credibility;
by being able to defend their positions with facts and figures,
they were taken seriously.
SIFFS, in particular, entered into research and development
for more cost-effective craft design and post-harvest technologies.
In 1978, SIFFS conducted a Statewide seminar on depleting fish
resources. The fishworkers were already aware of  the problem,
as they directly faced the crunch. But it was hard for both the
officials of the Fisheries Department and scientists at large to
accept the phenomenon of resource depletion. They viewed any
decline in resource as a passing, cyclical phenomenon.
In the period 1978-80 two challenging processes
commenced. The fishermen of  Anjengo village in south Kerala
created the Anjengo Boat Workers Union to expose the
corruption within the Anchuthengu Refinance Scheme. This was
a scheme initiated by the State government a few years earlier to
assist the fishermen with mechanized boats, for which the
fishermen received soft loans. As the boats were of  poor quality,
the fishermen could not get large enough catches to repay the
loans. As a result, their boats were confiscated. The fishermen’s
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union then decided to protest. Some fishermen went on a protest
fast, demanding the boats be released. Consequently, the
government was forced to return the boats and conduct an enquiry
into the corruption charges.
Women too had begun organizing. Women fish vendors at
the Chirayankeezh market in Kerala demanded reduction of
market taxes. Then the fisherwomen of  Trivandrum District
publicly protested the fall in fish prices consequent to the arrival
of  cheaper fish from the trawl boats. The women were forced to
walk several miles to the market, as they were not allowed to
travel in public buses with their baskets of fish. Therefore, under
the banner of  the Coastal Women’s Forum, they took to the streets,
demanding their right to travel on public transport. This took the
government by surprise and embarrassed the Fisheries Minister;
after all, it was not a demand for higher wages, but for the
fundamental right to travel on public transport. More importantly,
the demand came from women.
What triggered off  a larger protest in 1981 was the fact
that the government proclaimed a three-month ban on trawl
fishing but withdrew it in three days. This was done at the behest
of the then Education Minister of Kerala, who was out of the
country when the ban was proclaimed. The minister had a
personal interest in the trawl fishery, as he directly and indirectly
owned several trawl boats. Enthused by the successes of  their
earlier, smaller struggles, the entire fishing community surged
up in revolt. Joyachan Anthony, a young and dynamic fisherman,
and Fr Thomas Kocherry, a priest who lived and worked in the
fishing village of  Anjengo, went on a hunger fast. This was the
first organized struggle in the State that was led by a trade union
not affiliated to any political party. To quell the struggle, the
government instituted a commission to look into the matter.
Meanwhile, it became clear to the emerging local leaders of the
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movement and their supporters that the struggle would have to
be taken forward through mobilization and creation of an
organization of a political nature.
The State of Kerala has had a long tradition of leftwing
politics. Workers of  all sections, except in the fishing sector,
were organized, and the concept of workers’ rights was well
accepted. But, as elsewhere in the country, the Left’s
consciousness related more to workers in the organized sector,
since the consciousness of  “class for itself ” was conceived within
the traditional framework of  modernized industry. While there
was political space for a more militant mobilization of workers,
sustaining an artisanal or traditional sector was not within the
ambit of  the Left’s consciousness. Thus, it was a significant
breakthrough for the fledgling fishworkers’ movement when it
could prove, using data that was compiled by supporters and
NGOs relating to the sector, that the artisanal fishery was more
viable than the modern fishery on all economic and social counts.
Interestingly, among the activists were those with a more
political consciousness, some who were concerned with
organizational processes, and yet others who had a purely
economic thrust. These activists, men and women, came from
both within and outside the fishing community. The synergy
created was the result of an interaction and collaboration between
all these processes and people.
The process of  structuring a political organization was
greatly debated. By this time, as the result of the first
spontaneous outburst of  struggles, conscious priests from within
the institutional Church began associating themselves with the
struggles, as they continued to be important rallying points in
the fishing communities. While it was clear that the political
organization of the fisher people should be independent of, and
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free from, all party affiliations, the bone of contention was
whether it should be a class-based organization including fisher
people from all coastal communities or a religious, community-
based organization including only Latin Catholic fisher people,
who were the majority of fisher folk in the southern districts of
Kerala (the others being mainly Syrian Catholics).
This was the first big rupture in the process of  building
the movement. What finally took off was the mobilization of
the fishworkers on a class basis, a process that gradually led to
the registration of a trade union. Those priests who supported
such a process remained in the trade union. In fact, the first
president of  the Kerala Swatantra Matsya Thozhilali Federation
(KSMTF), as the union was called, was a Diocesan priest, Fr
Jose Kaleekal. The Latin Catholic group grew initially, but its
hold on the union gradually weakened.
Registering an owner-operator fishing sector as a trade
union was indeed something new. However, it gave the
fishworkers an identity as workers who had rights to a livelihood.
Building up a trade union consciousness in a sector that was
until then considered a vote bank for the Congress party was a
new step. But Kerala’s tradition of  Left politics made the trade
union concept more easily acceptable. At one stroke, the
fishworkers were on par with other workers as a sector that the
government had now to take seriously.
Yet, it was not an automatic process. The union had to
prove its strength. That was achieved through the large and
persistent struggles, in the form of  hunger fasts and ingenious
mass protests every monsoon time, from 1981 to 1988,
demanding the imposition of a monsoon trawl ban from June to
August.
The protests made the government sit up, although it felt
uncomfortable about negotiating with a union that had no political
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affiliation. The political parties, for their part, were caught on
the rebound, seeing the massive turnout of  people at KSMTF’s
demonstrations, and the way the union was able to sit around a
table alongside other party-affiliated ‘unions’.
Right from its first struggle, the KSMTF realized that the
other political unions would appropriate the gains of  its struggle.
Indeed, that was precisely what happened. However, in doing
so, the unions that blindly followed their party line were forced
to take positions on crucial issues that had an impact on the life
of  the artisanal workers. These manipulative political party
unions, together with vacillating scientists, wanted to buy time.
The State government resorted to the creation of commissions
to study the scientific basis of the demand for a monsoon trawl
ban. It took three such commissions for the government to finally
institute a one-time ban for 45 days in 1988. As it was only a
temporary ban, KSMTF was forced to wage a struggle every
year since 1988 to see that a monsoon trawl ban was proclaimed.
Meanwhile, the government tried to appease the people
by sanctioning all kinds of welfare measures like accident
insurance for fishermen, housing grants for the coastal people,
special buses for women fish vendors, abolition of market taxes
for small vendors, schooling grants for the children of the
fishworkers, and old-age pensions. All these measures were a
spillout of  the larger struggle for the monsoon trawl ban, which
also led to other important successes later: the creation of a
Fisherman’s Welfare Corporation; a Bill to register all fishworkers;
and the creation of Matsyafed, a chain of fishing co-operatives
based on the Marianad model. (In the early 1960s, the Catholic Bishop of
Trivandrum, Kerala, inspired by the spirit of  the Second Vatican Council, set up a
development wing to promote the interests of fishing communities. A small number
of lay volunteers were involved in creating the new community of Marianad, a
fishing village off  Trivandrum, which was to serve as a laboratory where innovations
could be tested. One of these was a new auction system, which could be controlled and
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operated by fishermen for their own benefit. This proved successful, and the idea soon
spread to other parts of Trivandrum, and the neighbouring district of Kanyakumari.
The Marianad Matsya Utpadaka Co-operative Society became the model for fish
marketing societies, and the team of  voluntary social workers behind the Marianad
initiative set up the autonomous voluntary organization, Programme for Community
Organization (PCO), which, in turn, helped to establish SIFFS as a district
umbrella body of  fishermen’s co-operatives The ‘Marianad Model’ of  fish marketing
societies implies a member-based, marketing-oriented co-operative structure, with
membership open only to active fishermen The three core activities of the model are
marketing of fish caught by members, providing credit for fishing equipment, and
promoting savings of  members – Ed). These were innovative structures
that later inspired other States in the country to develop their
own welfare programmes for the fishworkers.
A Trade Union with a Difference
At the outset, it must be stated that the NFF is a national
trade union and a federation of autonomous fishworker unions
and associations. Although most of  the member federations were
officially created after the birth of  the NFF, the growth of  the
NFF was, in fact, coterminous with the rejuvenation and growth
of  these autonomous federations through struggles, the revival
of  dormant federations, and the widening of  fishworkers’
concerns. This indicates that at the State level, each member
organization had its own modus operandi and political praxis,
whereas the NFF has remained independent of  any political party.
I do not intend to deal in great depth with the developments
in each of the member federations; that would be too Herculean
a task because of the number and complexity of the issues and
problems that each organization has encountered. Nevertheless,
reference will be made to them in the context of  NFF’s focus on
national-level micro-issues and macro-level issues of
development in the fisheries.
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It must also be recognized that a trade union in the
unorganized sector of a scattered coastal fishing population has
had to involve several individuals and NGOs in sustaining the
people’s struggles. Some conscious individuals and a few NGOs
that have a true stake in, and concern for, the union, have taken
up the responsibility of local organization and animation. While
some of these NGOs and individuals have enhanced the growth
of  the fishworkers’ movement, the NFF, as such, has been an
autonomous and independent trade union.
Despite being registered as a trade union, NFF functions
more like a mass organization. Membership is not clearly defined;
owner-operators, workers, women processors and vendors
participate in the organization. While some of the larger
associations have been able to afford full-time staff, the full-
timers in the poorer fishing areas have been mostly voluntary
workers or those aided by supporters. Thus, despite a fairly
democratic constitution and the creation of local units, the
smooth functioning of NFF depended on the interest and
commitment of  the voluntary full-timers. Membership fees are
nominal and are usually collected during ‘membership drives’
than through ongoing member affiliation programmes.
Membership is, therefore, very fluid. Although a membership
list does exist, verification of membership is not practised, as it
would be a very laborious task.
NFF demonstrates its strength not by its paid-up
membership but by the number of people it can mobilize during
the struggles. It is for this reason that the NFF functions more
like a mass organization than a structured union. That is also
one of the reasons why it has not been able to take the most
advantage of  the gains of  its struggles.
Most mass-based unions in the informal sector in India
function similarly. From the point of  view of  the KSMTF, which
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has made significant gains for the fishworkers, this nature of
organization has also been its bane. For instance, the union’s
full-timers are obliged to reach out to all fishworkers in times of
need, to help them avail existing government assistance, for
instance. But several of the welfare schemes are controlled by
political parties, who often exploit the hard work put in by the
independent union. On the other hand, KSMTF has successfully
fought several legal battles, like the ban on purse-seining and
the ban on night trawling. These have, in fact, been occasions
for landmark judgements, where the Supreme Court of India
ruled in favour of  the artisanal fishers on the basis of  Article 21
of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life
and livelihood.
Unfortunately, KSMTF has not been able to ensure that
these judgements are implemented. This is the result of the
union’s organizational structure as a mass-based organization
that has little or no links with the independent co-operatives
that focus on the economic activities of  the fishermen or those
that are organized by the State.
To some extent, this lack of  co-ordination between the
political organization (the independent union) and the economic
ones (the co-operatives) is understandable, as communicating
with a base that is so dispersed and still not very literate is
extremely difficult. On the other hand, the fact that the co-
operatives have only owner-operators as members means that
the members of the co-operatives will use the union when it is
advantageous to them. Otherwise, they do not wish to be
inhibited by it.
In the initial stages, the NGO support network played an
important role in mobilization in the co-operatives, and the union
did receive an impetus from the NGOs. But once the union began
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to have an identity and a dynamic of its own, and the leaders,
now regarding themselves on par with other trade union leaders,
began to wield power, the nature of the NGO support had to
necessarily change. This relationship will continue to be a
difficult one in the future too. The fishworkers’ movement will
continue to need NGO support, if  it is to survive and grow,
especially in areas of  the dispersed fishery. Yet, the relative
autonomy between the NGO and the movement has to be
safeguarded.
In some cases, there is a tendency for the movement leaders
to impose themselves, on the grounds of their legitimacy as
elected leaders, insisting that the NGO should toe the line of
the movement. There are also times when the NGOs want to
call the shots, on the grounds of the support they offer, and fail
to respect the independence of the union.
Today, the dependence on outside funding makes NGOs
increasingly liable to get appropriated by the funders’ interests.
This can damage the thrust of  the people’s movements. This
nexus between funders and NGOs is a very crucial one in
countries of the South, where the process of globalization seems
to camouflage it all the more.
When ‘Fishwokers’, Not ‘Fishermen’, Took Centre Stage
In 1984, the Food and Agriculture Organization of  the
United Nations (FAO) organized the World Conference on
Fisheries Management and Development. This was a conference
that focused on the management of the EEZ, in the wake of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
A hundred fishworkers and their supporters from 34 countries
had gathered under a separate umbrella, as the FAO did not pay
heed to the existence of  the artisanal fishers. The alternative
meeting was the fishworkers way of making their presence felt.
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The initiative to organize that alternative conference came
from India, when friends in Rome, who were aware of the
fishworkers’ struggles in India, sent news about the FAO
conference and suggested that the NFF be asked to participate.
Not being recognized as a national trade union, NFF was denied
permission. Hence, the Indian supporters decided that the
presence of the artisanal fishers should be made visible in other
ways. Spontaneously, friends from various NGOs all over the
world rallied together and decided to organize a parallel
conference of fishworkers and their supporters in Rome, with
John Kurien as the organizing secretary.
The open letter to the delegates of  the FAO conference
from the fishworkers who had gathered for the alternative Rome
Conference, as it came to be called, read: “You gather here, under
the auspices of  the FAO, to formulate and endorse policies which
will affect the lives of  millions of  fishworkers. Much of  this
takes place without their participation. We meet to assert our
rights to share the experiences of  our life and struggles and to
expound our perceptions of fisheries development and to build
new links of solidarity and co-operation. The world over, and
particularly in Third World countries, fishworkers do not receive
a fair share of the wealth they create. They are victims of
development and, in response, have begun to organize to demand
their rights” (from the Report of the Rome Conference, ICFWS
Document Secretariat, Hong Kong, 1984).
Besides creating a forum for fishworkers from the coastal
fisheries of several countries to interact with one another, the
Rome Conference also made two very significant contributions
to the international discourse in fisheries. First, it introduced the
category of  ‘fishworkers’, as distinct from fishermen. In this way,
it highlighted the reality of the Southern world, where fisheries
was still a family occupation in which men, women and children
were involved in different aspects and where any development
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of the fishery had to take the development of the whole
community at heart. It was clear that the involvement of women
in the coastal fishery is what also made it viable and sustainable.
Their contribution and spaces had to be recognized and
safeguarded.
The second important aspect that was highlighted was the
viability of  the small-scale artisanal fishery.  As a fishery that is
diversified, environmentally friendly and capable of contributing
to local food security, the small-scale artisanal fishery is a means
of livelihood for thousands of coastal people.
 Importantly, these positions were taken at a time when
the whole world was trying to convince itself that there were
large fish resources in the deep seas that the developing countries
had no means to exploit, for which industrial fisheries and joint
ventures were the answer. History subsequently called this bluff,
when the very same FAO, which had given leadership to such
thinking at that time, changed its position entirely a decade later,
in 1994, and began consultations for a Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries, vindicating many of the positions of the
first fishworkers’ conference in Rome in 1984.
One important fallout of the Rome Conference was the
creation of ICSF in 1986 at a conference held at the Centre for
Development Studies, Trivandrum, and supported by SIFFS. The
formation of  ICSF was in direct response to the suggestions of
the fishworkers in Rome, who realized that building their national
organizations was imperative for any impact on policymaking at
the national level. For that, they would need support, and that
should be the task of  a support network like the ICSF.
Support for the fishworker organizations can be conceived
in various ways, but, in the ICSF, it boils down to an involvement
in those issues that national fishworker movements think are
beyond their abilities to tackle single-handedly and for which an
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international network is necessary. Such an international network
would also facilitate interaction amongst fishworkers of different
countries, from the North and the South, so that they could not
only build up solidarity but also try to better understand global
developments in the artisanal fisheries. Essentially, ICSF has
played such a role since its inception. Without claiming to
represent them, ICSF has consistently tried to ensure that the
issues and perspective of artisanal fishworkers find a place on
the agenda of international institutions and in the language of
global fisheries discourse.
ICSF was founded by people from different backgrounds—
academics, activists and NGO workers. Their common link was
an interest in sustaining the artisanal fishery and upholding the
rights of  the artisanal fishworkers. As an international NGO,
ICSF is a very loose network that initially functioned on a totally
voluntary basis. Eventually, it set up a small full-time co-
ordination secretariat in Chennai, India. ICSF is probably one of
the few international NGOs with roots in the South and that
keeps the priorities of  the South uppermost on its agenda.
The Kanyakumari March
By 1983, the old National Forum of  Catamaran and
Country Boat Fishermen’s Rights and Marine Wealth had been
registered as a national trade union with the name ‘National
Fishermen’s Forum’ and Fr Thomas Kocherry had taken over as
chairman. (The name was later changed to National Fishworkers
Forum, in line with the nomenclature that was born in Rome.)
 Towards the end of  the 1980s, after a sufficiently long
period of action in the southern States of India, the NFF decided
to push for a nationwide mobilization campaign to give fisheries
issues a national colour and to build up its profile as a national
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trade union. The year 1989 witnessed a large mobilization of
coastal communities through the ‘Coastal March’. United by the
slogan, “Protect Waters, Protect Life”, two groups of  people
travelled along the east and west coasts of  the country,
southwards to the tip of India, meeting up in Kanyakumari,
India’s Land’s End, on 1 May 1989, International Labour Day.
The march not only opened the eyes of the general public
to fisheries issues, but turned out to be a major milestone in the
history of  the NFF, as the slogan “Protect Waters, Protect Life”
struck deep and rallied thousands of  men, women and children
whose lives depend on water resources.
The Kanyakumari March, as it came to be called, projected
the NFF as a worker’s movement that was conscious of  larger
ecological demands. Though its call for marine regulation was
essentially an ecological demand, the Kanyakumari March
widened the ecological concerns of the participants and the
general public, as water resources and coastal communities were
being threatened in diverse ways, through industrial pollution,
destruction of  fish habitats and industrialization of  the coastal
zone.
What also made the news was that hundreds of women
from a coastal community that was threatened by a proposed
nuclear power plant joined the rally, insisting that the NFF take
up the anti-nuclear issue as well. This was a very sensitive issue
politically and caused the State to sit up and literally direct its
guns at the movement. The final gathering of the Kanyakumari
March was ruthlessly disrupted by the police, ending with the
police opening fire on the marchers without any provocation.
The mobilization of fishworkers by the Kanyakumari
March carried fisheries issues to the inland areas as well. With
that, a new spate of dynamism and voluntarism entered the
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movement. Having established more contacts along the east and
west coasts of India, NFF then moved into a decade of national
struggles.
Many participants expressed fears about the NFF being
hijacked by the environmental groups that had lent extensive
support to the Kanyakumari March. The general consensus,
though, was that the NFF should continue to herald fishworkers’
issues and participate in environmental struggles that affected
their lives, but not allow itself to be used by environmental
groups. Responding to the expectations raised during the March
was already more than the NFF could cope with and it had to
start to consolidate the gains of the March.
In 1989, there was a change of government at the national
level. For the first time, the newly elected government was a
non-Congress one. (The Indian National Congress had been in
power ever since the time of  India’s independence in 1947.) The
new government, which had several leaders who sympathized
with people’s movements, promised to be more people-oriented.
The Planning Commission of India, in particular, proclaimed
that it would focus on programmes for fuller employment and it
asked the movements to make their suggestions in writing.
The NFF used the occasion to make a proposal for the 8th
Five-Year Plan, based on a perspective of  sustainable
development and fuller employment. It gave the NFF the
opportunity to provide a national platform for all those who had
serious contributions to make in the area of fisheries and who
could think of the macro-trends underlying the kind of alternative
development that it sought. Unfortunately, the non-Congress
government did not last very long, but the exercise of preparing
an alternative development strategy did provide some openings
for discussion with parliamentarians and bureaucrats. It was also
at this time that a discussion for a CRZ Notification was mooted.
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The Feminist Perspective
All through the 1980s, the feminist movement that was
growing in India also influenced the NFF. Thousands of  women
in coastal communities actively participate in post-harvest
activities. Valorizing their contributions to the community and
making visible and protecting their spaces in the fishery was
considered an important demand of the fishworkers’ movement.
Several women who supported the fishworkers’ movement
were active in the feminist movement too. In the process, they
not only stimulated the participation of women in the fishworkers’
movement but also brought new dimensions to the analysis of
the movement through a feminist perspective on fisheries and a
feminist critique of development.
The presence of feminists in the movement has not been
without its difficulties. Initially influenced by the positions of
the ‘autonomous women’s movement’, some of  the feminists
pushed for the autonomy of women in the organization. Others
felt that the movement should be a united one of men and
women, in which women’s issues would find a place on the
agenda. In the long run, this proved to be the right decision,
despite several hiccups. It can proudly be said that the efforts
made in mobilizing women in India had far-reaching ripples in
the fishworkers’ movement internationally.
It was the feminist perspective that swung the spotlight
on to the living fact of fish as a source of food and affordable
animal protein, and fishing as a means of livelihood. The feminist
viewpoint focused on the ‘nurture’ aspect of  fisheries.
By introducing this perspective into the fishworkers’ movement,
the focus shifted to making women’s work in the fishery visible,
and protecting their existing spaces in the fishery. This pushed
the union to take up issues related to daily life in the
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community—supply of water, health- and child-care facilities,
education, and so on. The nurture approach also opened up
thinking to the need for conserving fish habitats, including
mangrove vegetation and estuarine niches, and recreating
destroyed fish habitats through artificial reefs.
From 1990 until the mid-1990s, the NFF organized formal
training programmes to develop its cadre, with support from
NGOs. The programmes included sessions on fisheries
development, organizational strategies and trade union
consciousness. From a duration of  three days, the programmes
stretched to 10 days by 1991, and catered to member
organizations from all over the Indian coast. The training had to
be necessarily multilingual, for which the NFF developed skills
of  simultaneous translation in at least five languages.
In 1995, on the urging of  the then NFF General Secretary,
who came from West Bengal, another experiment was tried to
bring about a more personalized approach that would relate the
theoretical understanding to people’s lives and their personal
convictions, as well as to the personal conflicts that they
developed because of  their involvements. The experiment began
as a two-week period of living together, when activists and
leaders, along with their spouses, engaged in housekeeping chores
while simultaneously learning about unionization and
consciousness-raising. This was a very meaningful and enriching
period that contributed enormously to building up the union in
West Bengal. Unfortunately—and probably because of  the high
quality of that first session—no further training sessions were
undertaken.
One important input in the sessions was the discussion on
patriarchy and a feminist perspective of fisheries development,
which gradually began to have an impact on the consciousness
of  the participants. In 1993, this perspective led to a specific
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Women in Fisheries (WIF) programme in the NFF, as part of  a
larger ICSF-sponsored programme undertaken by different
fishworkers’ organizations in other parts of the world. The WIF
programme sought to create a core group of women leaders in
the union to take up specific issues of women and see how their
spaces in the fishery could be safeguarded.
The programme helped to impart some amount of
theoretical clarity by tracing the links between technology
development and the destruction of  natural resources, and the
marginalization of  women in the fishery. Besides organizing
specific sessions for the core group of women, a serious attempt
was also made to collect data on women’s nvolvement in fisheries
all over the Indian coast. Although the exercise was not
exhaustive, the resulting document, published by ICSF as part
of  its Women in Fisheries Dossier series, is the only one of  its kind.
The core group of women that resulted from the training
programme also took up the issue of injustice done to migrant
women workers in India’s fish processing plants. Under the
auspices of  the NFF, they organized a Public Hearing on the
Struggles of  Women Workers in the Fish Processing Industry in
India at Cochin, Kerala on 23 and 24 June 1995 (see SAMUDRA
Dossier Women in Fisheries Series No.1).  Live testimonies of
women workers from fish processing plants convinced the
hearing’s jury that serious consideration should be given to protect
the rights of these migrant women workers and their spaces in
the fishery. Subsequently, the NFF successfully intervened to
ensure that the State’s Department of  Labour took the plight of
these women seriously, insisting that the processing industry treat
these women on par with other contract and migrant labour,
according to legal norms. Although some States did respond
positively to this call, the problem of poor working and living
conditions of women in fish processing plants is not yet totally
solved.
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Despite these attempts to create gender awareness in the
fishworkers’ movement, there continued to be resistance to the
more vocal and able women leaders that were emerging. The
women of the core group were consistently chided by some
members of the movement, and, by the end of the 1990s, most
of them either withdrew from, or left, the movement.
Nevertheless, the male leaders in the union took upon themselves
to see that women’s issues would still remain on the agenda.
This was either because they were genuinely convinced about
gender equity or because, by that time, a general ethos of
recognizing women’s participation had emerged. Ironically, the
men seem more secure talking about women’s issues than the
women themselves.
In some States, some women organizers preferred to work
only with women vendors or processors to build separate unions.
But there was resistance to all-women unions becoming members
of the NFF in their own right. At present, the official requirement
is that the women’s unions should be part of, and under, the
State federation in order to be accepted. The male leaders refused
to accept that the women could create a separate State leadership
on specific issues.
There was also resistance to changing the name of the
national union from the National Fishermen’s Forum to the
National Fishworkers Forum, as some State unions were not
convinced of  the need to represent women’s issues, feeling that
women did not make any substantial contribution to the fishery.
This reaction came particularly from those States where women’s
involvement in the fishery was not considered paramount. This
view resulted from a typically patriarchal perspective and not
because there were no women involved in post-harvest fishing
activities.
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In  1999, the NFF took up a large national struggle to get
women recognized as fishworkers and be eligible for the welfare
benefits that fishermen got from the government. In some States,
like Orissa and West Bengal, NFF’s mobilization around this
issue challenged the accepted norm that fisheries was a male
domain and took the legislators by surprise. In response to NFF’s
campaign, the State had to accept the fact that women also earned
their livelihoods from fish-related activities. The NFF had thus
succeeded in projecting this issue to a national level. Interestingly,
the demand for parity of  women’s representation in the WFF
also came from men in India; it was finally carried through, despite
initial resistance from some quarters. It is still to be seen whether
parity for women was a mere token gesture or whether it will
genuinely challenge power relations in the fishworkers’
movements.
Growing into the Stature of  a National Trade Union
In this section, I would like to reflect only on two important
issues.
The turn of the 1980s saw stagnation and decline in marine
fish catches globally, even as the demand for fish remained high.
There was tremendous overcapacity in the Northern fishing fleets,
which were heavily subsidized and constantly in search of new
fishing grounds. This period was also one of  extensive trade
liberalization, with Southern countries keen on becoming
competitive players in world markets. These Southern countries
sought out foreign currency to catch up with the technological
advancement of the North.
Around this time, two things happened in India. Firstly,
the decline in fish catches, coupled with the need to earn foreign
exchange, paved the way for a State-sponsored drive for
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aquaculture as a solution. Secondly, the State began to claim
that there were marine resources in the deep seas that the Indian
fleet could not access and, hence, joint ventures with foreign
companies would help exploit these resources.
The aquaculture-industrial fisheries combination was meant
to meet India’s foreign exchange crunch. But it was clear that
the combination would jeopardize the artisanal fishery. That was
the next big battle that the NFF had to wage to protect the coastal
fishers and the livelihoods of  the fishworkers.
Already, in the latter part of  the 1980s, the NFF had sought
alliances with other workers’ unions challenged by similar
processes. Textile workers in central India were on a long strike
for compensation in the wake of the modernization of the textile
industry, which led to the closure of  hundreds of  textile mills.
The unions that represented workers both in the formal and
informal sectors of  the economy created a national platform
called the Platform of  Militant Trade Unions. However, that
process of consolidation did not last long as the textile workers
faced a stifling defeat, shortly after which their trade union leader,
a prominent militant organizer, was killed, and a reign of terror
grew in the political arena.
Nonetheless, the interaction with other unions that ensued
from that process did pave the way for the future national
struggles of  the NFF. Subsequently, two national platforms in
the unorganized sector began to grow as a result of the coming
together of  various people’s movements in the country. One of
them was the National Alliance of  People’s Movements (NAPM)
and the National Centre for Labour (NCL), a national trade union
of  unions in the unorganized sector. The NFF was an intricate
part of  both these forums.
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The Case of Aquaculture
In 1991, the Chilika Bachao Andolan led the first protest
against the privatization of Chilika Lake for shrimp aquaculture.
Chilika Lake, in the State of Orissa, is the largest lake in India.
Thousands of fisherpeople fish for a livelihood in this lake, while
others practise traditional aquaculture. Privatization of the lake
was, therefore, a step against the customary rights of these coastal
people. Moreover, the move threatened to damage the sensitive
ecosystem of the area. Students, environmentalists and
fishworkers joined hands to defend the lake. The struggle was
led by a veteran freedom fighter, Banka Behari Das. An alarm
was raised all over the country when 21 Members of Parliament
signed a memorandum that appealed to the Prime Minister to
stop the project on environmental grounds. The long struggle
led to a court verdict in favour of the people. The private
company that was behind the project, one of  India’s largest
business houses, withdrew.
Efforts continued all over the country to privatize water
bodies, especially as the government announced several schemes
to introduce semi-intensive aquaculture in the coastal rice tracts,
which local farmers were eager to take up as the price of  paddy
was low, while its cost of  cultivation was rising. Traditional
aquaculture was nothing new in India. It had been practised in
several coastal areas that made use of the natural ebb and flow
of  the water systems in the rich wetland ecosystems. Numerous
communities made a living from such aquacultural practices,
which were not only integrated into the cycle of food
production—intercropping of shrimp with paddy—but also
sustained social interactions as local communities evolved their
own ways of  appropriating and sharing production and its surplus.
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When semi-intensive modern aquaculture was introduced
in India, other Asian countries had already seen the boom-and-
bust cycle of  the industry. In 1987, Taiwan was producing 21
per cent of  Asia’s cultured shrimp, the highest output in the Asian
region. But attacks by viruses and bacteria decimated aquaculture
production. In the process, the entire rich mangrove ecosystem
was also destroyed, and the shrimp lands could no longer be
used for anything. China then took over to produce 21.6 per
cent of  Asia’s aquacultured shrimp. Using a more cautious
approach, they continued to maintain high rates of production
until they too were hit by disease in 1991. The Philippines and
Thailand followed suit (see The Environmental and Social Costs of
Developing Coastal Shrimp Aquaculture in Asia by Ian Baird, Earth
Island Institute, 1993).
By 1992-93, the protests of the coastal people in the Indian
States of  Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu against the growing
menace of  aquaculture were intensifying. Within a short spell of
time, the coastal people had begun to feel the impact of intensive
aquaculture on their freshwater sources and on their access to
hitherto common lands. Andhra Pradesh had no history of
traditional aquaculture. The pioneering aquaculture investors
there came from Kerala. They were actually shrimp exporters,
who probably moved to Andhra Pradesh to avoid tax payments
in Kerala. The lure of lucrative returns made them shift their
establishments from the west coast to the east coast of the
country.
The ‘Blue Revolution’ promised fast returns, and soon
found support amongst scientists, who were keen to experiment
with new technologies. The governments of  Andhra Pradesh and
Tamil Nadu leased out vast expanses of  their coastal lands to
investors for little or no money. With absolutely no concern for
the environment, many investors went about their new business
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as if  it were any other industry, using large machines to excavate
tanks and then constructing long canals or pipelines to pump
saline water into the tanks.  They sunk bore-wells to pump in
fresh water so as to maintain the required salinity levels in the
tanks and then pumped out the used, polluted water into the
neighbouring canals, thus polluting them.
At the start of the 1990s, the Indian government
announced its New Economic Policy. Privatization and
liberalization programmes were high on the agenda, while,
politically, the process of  decentralization commenced. This
period saw a phenomenal rise in the cost of inputs in fisheries
because of  the devaluation of  the rupee and the new import
policy. By the mid-1990s, fish was increasingly being diverted
into the fishmeal industry as there was an increasing quantum
of by-catch from the trawl sector and fishmeal was an important
ingredient in aquaculture. Fish consumers who depended on
cheaper varieties of fish were increasingly deprived of fish for
food. The struggle against intensive coastal shrimp aquaculture
saw small farmers, fishworkers and environmental groups get
together to demand a ban on intensive aquaculture. Many of
these struggles took place outside the confines of  the NFF, as
there were several NGOs on the east coast that saw the potential
for using the issue to mobilize large sections of the population.
The issue was taken to court by another veteran freedom
fighter, S Jaganathan, of the Gram Swaraj Movement, with the
support of the Campaign Against Shrimp Industry (CASI) and
People Against Shrimp Industry (PASI).  The work of  ecofeminist
Vandana Shiva, the Third World Network and some investigative
journalists drew public attention to the problem. (Vandana Shiva,
founder of  Navdanya, is chairperson, International Forum of  Agriculture of  the
International Forum of  Globalization. The Third World Network is based in
Penang, Malaysia – Ed) The Supreme Court of  India delivered a
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landmark judgement in 1996 calling for a cessation of all
aquaculture activities in farms that violated the CRZ Notification
of 1991. The other important feature of the judgement was a
directive to the Government of India to constitute, before
15 January 1997, an Authority under the Environment
(Protection) Act of 1986 to confer with all relevant powers to
protect the ecologically fragile coastal areas, seashore,
waterfront, and so on.
The Supreme Court’s verdict caught the State governments
napping. None of  them had paid attention to the CRZ
Notification of 1991. Moreover, the liberalization plans of State
governments would be badly hit if the Supreme Court judgement
were taken seriously, as numerous schemes were in the pipeline
for the ‘development’ of the coastal zone and the tourism
industry. No State government took action on the Supreme Court
judgement. Instead, the governments of the coastal States,
together with several interested parties, filed petitions in the
Supreme Court against the judgement.
The Central Government’s Ministry of  Agriculture, on the
other hand, drafted an Aquaculture Authority Bill in great haste.
The Bill was tabled in the Rajya Sabha (India’s Upper House of
Parliament) on 19 March 1997 and passed in great haste at its
next sitting, on 20 March.
As the issue gained national importance, the NFF took up
the struggle, creating the National Action Committee Against
Industrial Aquaculture (NACAIA) and two jathas (marches) were
organized, one from Porbandhar in Gujarat and the other from
Calcutta in West Bengal, to make people aware of  the
contradictions in the legislation, and to oppose the stand of the
Central and State governments. According to NFF’s Chairperson,
Harekrishna Debnath, “The Aquaculture Authority Bill is one
of the most anti-people legislations ever introduced in the Indian
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Parliament. It is contrary to the Environment (Protection) Act
of 1986 and to the environment policy of the Central
government, as reflected in the CRZ Notification. It is also
contrary to the welfare of  the rural population living in coastal
areas. It is an act of  gross injustice as it seeks to protect the
documented, judicially recognized, ecologically disruptive effects
of present-day shrimp culture pursued by the industry” (from
the 1996 Annual Report of the NFF).
Already, in the early 1990s, the dreaded EUS (epizootic
ulcerative syndrome) disease had hit fish species in the inland
waters of  many parts of  the country, especially in Kerala, where
thousands of inland fisherfolk live off the resources of the inland
waters. In an attempt to increase production in the inland waters,
the State’s Fisheries Department had actually encouraged the
introduction of modern techniques of aquaculture. These
necessitated the privatization of inland water bodies, which was
the first big obstacle to the customary access rights of the
fisherfolk.
The outbreak of EUS took everyone by surprise and led
to massive loss of  fish. The KSMTF, particularly its women
members, led a long struggle for compensation from the
government. Although the compensation they got was small, it
was for the first time that fishworkers were being treated on par
with agricultural workers, who used to gain compensation during
crop failures from natural disasters.
India is probably the only country in the world where the
development of semi-intensive aquaculture was challenged in
this manner and where the Supreme Court took a stand in favour
of the people, understanding the damage that the industry was
causing to the livelihoods of  people through the destruction of
the environment.
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The Struggle Against Joint Ventures
During the same period, the NFF waged a war against the
government policy on joint ventures for offshore and deep-sea
fishing. It was the mechanized sector of  Maharashtra, comprising
trawls and gill-netters, that was most vociferous against the
government’s joint-venture policy. Through their apex
co-operative body, the Maharashtra Machimar Krithi Samithi,
the traditional fishermen could access government support and
subsidies to develop their fishery. By the late 1960s, the trawl
sector was highly developed in this region and it was landing
large catches of  high-value species. There was also a fixed-bag
net fishery that netted large quantities of  Bombay Duck (Harpadon
nehereus).
The employment generated for men and women in coastal
communities was substantial. As a very enterprising community
with a sizeable amount of accumulated capital, the fisher folk in
this sector considered it their right to extend their fishery by
entering the deep sea, as the inshore was already maximally
exploited. The Maharashtra Machimar Krithi Samithi
categorically demanded that the new Deep-sea Fisheries Policy
of  the Ministry of  Food Processing be banned.
On closer examination, it became clear that there was no
real ground for signing joint ventures to harvest the untapped
resources of  the deep sea. In 1992, the FAO published the report
of a consultant who had analyzed the existing potential of the
Indian fishery in the light of  further development possibilities.
The report concluded: “The main problem of the deep-sea
fisheries is not so much its capital and operational costs, which
have been generally fair by developing country standards. The
primary problem is, by far, the situation of overinvestment in
the shrimp business, and, subsequently, of  economic overfishing
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of the target resource. Therefore, the priority need for this fishery
is not further development but resource management. The first
step of this policy should be to decrease the pressure of the
deep-sea fishing on the paenid shrimp stock through retargeting
a substantial portion of its catching power on other resources”
(Study on Deep-sea Fisheries Development in India, M Giudicelli, FAO,
1992).
In 1993, the total marine catch in the country was
2,720,000 tonnes; the total catch, including inland and
aquaculture catch, was 4,768,000 tonnes. However, the
proportion of shrimp produced by aquaculture was on the
increase. Yet, over 200,000 traditional craft and about 20,000
mechanized craft depended greatly on this fishery. Moreover,
with the motorization of the traditional craft, an important
segment of the sector began to operate beyond the 22-km limit
of the territorial waters, in an effort to catch more and make
their fishing operations viable. It appeared that, with some
minimal support, they could be helped to harvest the deep-sea
resources at a much lower cost and to a greater social and
economic advantage.
In June 1994, a Supreme Court judgement was passed in
support of  the Kerala Government’s ban on bottom trawling
during the monsoon months, which nullified the earlier High
Court judgement in favour of  the Kerala Trawler Boat Operators’
Association. In this judgement, the Court wrote: “Public interest
cannot be determined only by looking at the quantum of  fish
caught in the year. The government is under obligation to protect
the economic interests of  the traditional fishermen and to ensure
that they are not deprived of their slender means of livelihood”
(from the judgement of the Supreme Court in Joyachan Anthony
vs State of  Kerala and others, Civil Appeal Nos. 3532 of  1986,
as quoted in NFF Annual Report 1993).
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Despite this, the Central government went ahead with its
new deep-sea policy. According to social scientist John Kurien,
“Part of the answer to this contradiction is to be found in the
present scenario in global fishing. Global marine fish catch has
stagnated at around 85 million tonnes after 1989. Distant-water
fishing vessels, the world over, are in a particularly bad shape.
Their capacities were built up over the years with massive State
subsidies, which promoted easy entry. Unfortunately, a fishing
vessel once built, has a fairly long economic life and little alternate
use other than as scrap metal. Redeployment to other less
exploited fishing areas is, therefore, the only solution for owners
who wish, for whatever reason or compulsion, to continue in
business. The liberal Indian policy seems to have come at the
right time for them. All the tabs have been taken off  earlier norms
for joint ventures. The State made the Indian EEZ one huge
open-access regime and the resource was up for grabs. In such a
regime, there are no property rights; it is possession that is proof
of  property. Hence, the scramble to get in as quickly before too
many joined the fray. The scramble is really not for any particular
variety of commercially valuable fish but for any fish resource,
which can be harvested quickly, in order to obtain a profit on
the investment made. On the part of the Indian government, it
has provided every bait to attract foreign investment—subsidized
fuel; 100-per cent export, with permission for transhipment at
sea; no compulsion to dock in an Indian port during operations;
and permission to use any foreign port as base operation for
fishing in our EEZ” (op cit).
The NFF believed that the drive to make quick profits in
a situation where resources were seriously under threat and where
there were no management regulations would ensure the
ecological ruin of  the fishery. Many of  the species are stocks
that move in and out of the inshore, offshore and the deep sea
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at different points in their life cycles. Consequently, merely
because resources are harvested in offshore waters provided no
guarantee that such action would not affect the resources in the
inshore.
From February 1994, the NFF launched a nationwide
struggle against the licensing of  joint-venture fishing vessels.
The first All India Fisheries Strike on 4 February was the first of
its kind and a total success. With no fish in the markets, the
strike caught the attention of all consumers, who began to be
informed of  the reasons for the high price of  fish and its fall in
supply. In May 1994, leaders of  the artisanal and mechanized
sector from all over the country created the National Fisheries
Action Committee Against Joint Ventures. The committee, which
comprised all the leading trade unions in the country, under the
leadership of  the NFF, with Thomas Kocherry as convener,
pledged to continue the struggle until the demand for a ban on
deep-sea joint ventures was met.
A Black Day was observed all over the country on 20 July
1994. The second All India Fisheries Strike on 23-24 November
1994 was politically crucial. All the political parties intervened
in the issue in the Indian parliament on 14-15 December, and
the Minister for Food Processing was forced to freeze the issuing
of licences for deep-sea joint ventures, promising to appoint a
Review Committee to re-study the matter. The P Murari
Committee was thus appointed on 7 February 1995, but as it
included only government representatives, the National Fisheries
Action Committee decided to continue its agitation, with its
convener going on a hunger strike in Porbandar, Gujarat, followed
by a mass satyagraha (nonviolent sit-in) in New Delhi on 2 May
1995. These actions were supported by demonstrations in all
the coastal States, which caught the attention of the parliament,
which demanded an explanation.
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Subsequently, the Minister for Food Processing agreed to
withdraw all the licences issued to joint ventures, to reconstitute
the Murari Committee and to change its terms of  reference. Six
individuals, representing different fisheries’ interests, and 16
Members of Parliament, belonging to different political parties,
were inducted into the committee. The committee then
undertook a unique procedure of travelling all around the country
for public hearings with local people, to ascertain for itself the
pulse of  the coastal communities on the government’s deep-sea
policy. The mass response of  the people was indeed an eyeopener
for the parliamentarians, who got educated not only on the
negative impact of the deep-sea policy but on the actual living
conditions of  the coastal people and their various problems.
Large groups of women participated in the public hearings, much
to the surprise of the parliamentarians, who did not know that
so many women were also involved in the fishery.
The factfinding process had a deep impact on the public.
Yet, despite the positive recommendations of  the Murari
Committee, on 6 February 1996, the bureaucrats of  the central
government stalled the process of putting the recommendations
into practice. It took another protest fast by the convener in
Mumbai, and a series of  mass protests all over the country, to
get the government to finally agree to execute some of the
recommendations of the Murari Committee.
That struggle certainly propelled the NFF to centre stage
and, despite its independence from political parties, gave it the
stature of an all-India trade union that was able to focus the
problems of the coastal communities at the national level.
Nonetheless, the struggle did create waves of  discord within
the movement itself. One important source of discontent was
the initial base of  the movement—the artisanal fishers. This
group, which comprised motorized crafts, now had to join hands
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with their traditional enemies—the small trawlers—to ward off
the bigger evil of  the deep-sea vessels.  The movement’s
leadership saw it as a necessary alliance between groups of actual
traditional fishermen, who had been fishing all their lives, against
the industrial sector operated and controlled by outsiders. Yet,
there remained doubts in the minds of  the artisanal fishers. The
other necessary but difficult experience for an independent union
was to be hand in glove with mainstream political unions in the
intensely active two-year period of  the struggle.
The struggle against deep-sea joint ventures also elicited
solidarity from all over the world, including from countries that
were deploying industrial vessels in Indian waters. Groups lent
support in various ways, by protesting to their governments. ICSF
included NFF’s then co-chairperson, Harekrishna Debnath, in
its delegation to the second session of the United Nations
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, where he was able to make an intervention, which was
also supported by Greenpeace International. That exposure to
an international milieu of foreign communities that were also
being affected by new liberalization policies gave the movement’s
leadership a new insight into the expansion of capitalism. It also
won for itself  new allies.
Thus, although global fisheries have always been interlinked
by centuries-old trade, this period was possibly the first time in
history that the world’s fishworkers and coastal communities
realized that they had something to defend against a common
enemy. In 1996, the FAO celebrated the 50th anniversary of  its
founding with a Conference on Food Security at Quebec in
Canada. The CCPFH decided to invite fishworker organizations
from other parts of the world to interact amongst themselves on
that occasion. As one of the members of the Canadian Council,
Michael Belliveau, was also a member of  ICSF, he suggested
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inviting movements that represented coastal fishers. Among those
who were invited were representatives of  NFF and SIFFS.
Enthused by the successful struggle against joint ventures but
seeing in it only a fragile victory in the wake of the new
globalization policies of  the WTO, these groups easily lent
support to a suggestion to create a WFF. The NFF hosted the
founding meeting of WFF in New Delhi on 21 November 1997
and Thomas Kocherry was elected its first Co-ordinator.
Conclusion
I hope that this brief history of the fishworkers’ movement
in India has helped readers understand the particular context
and manner in which the NFF, a trade union with a difference,
grew in India, and why I have referred to it as a social-movement
union, very different from a trade union in the conventional sense.
This history will also, I hope, help those not familiar with India
get some idea of  the complexities of  the country’s system of
governance and the difficult terrain such a dispersed people’s
organization has had to traverse.
One probably has to know India fairly well to appreciate
the role that the NFF has played in highlighting the cause of the
coastal fishworkers. Organizing a countrywide movement in a
sector where over 60 per cent of the population is illiterate, and
speak nine different languages, is no mean achievement. Despite
the fact that numerous people have contributed to such a gigantic
organizational task, none of it would have been possible if the
actual leadership of the NFF had not been willing to commit
itself wholly and completely to the cause. No movement can be
sustained over such a long period and continue to grab news
headlines without dedicated leadership, which is not lacking in
the NFF.
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Having said that, I will now try to dwell on what I consider
to be the shortfalls of the movement. Among the several gains
of the movement, the most significant have been the judgements
that the Supreme Court of India pronounced in favour of the
people in cases of litigation filed by the movement.
Unfortunately, several of  these judgements have not been
implemented, for lack of  an organizational infrastructure. As
the State is biased in favour of monetary interests, it lacks the
political will to execute the Supreme Court’s judgements. Political
pressure from mainstream political unions is not forthcoming as
they remain largely unconvinced of the viability of the artisanal
fishery. The movement itself, because of  its mass nature, does
not command a significant place in the day-to-day activity of
the fishworkers; it is, therefore, unable to reap the benefits of its
own struggles.
As mentioned earlier while assessing the nature of the mass
movement and its membership, this shortcoming has its roots in
the social process’ dichotomy between its economic and political
logic, two sides of the same coin that have, in this case, been
kept quite apart. That is, the fishworkers’ union has little or no
connection with the matters of the fishing co-operatives
wherever they exist. The co-operatives have their own agenda
and make use of the union when it suits them, and vice versa.
To the extent that the co-operatives are made up of  the better-
off  fishermen, their aspirations are naturally to grow bigger and
go deeper into the sea to make ends meet. Neither have the
co-operatives tried to halt such competition for resources nor
have they attempted any conservation or management strategies.
The strategy of  the union for legal battles to safeguard the rights
of  the inshore fishermen thus often falls short of  expected gains,
as these are not translated into the reorganization of  the fishery.
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On the other hand, the effort that the fishworkers’
movement makes to safeguard the rights of the ‘traditional fishing
community’ is also questionable. While the ‘traditional fishers’
are vehement about conserving their access rights to the
resources, nowhere do traditional fishing norms still hold sway.
The dichotomy between tradition and modernity is a live reality
in coastal communities. With the modern State having taken over
control of the resources by displacing the earlier system of local
government, the traditional management systems have been
eroded and the traditional community differentiated. Old
community norms of  control no longer exist. There is thus an
urgent need to redefine what constitutes the coastal or artisanal
fishery, and to clearly spell out whose interests and access to
resources have to be safeguarded.
In India, most work is still caste-determined and any aspect
of a ‘traditional’ occupation is deeply rooted in caste identity; a
person’s occupation is determined by his or her caste. A trade
union that is class-based has also to mediate caste issues, but as
caste itself gets politicized and seeks to enter the ‘mainstream’,
the efforts of  purely class-based organizations get defeated. To
explain this further: A major demand of the backward castes is
to strive for niches and spaces within mainstream development,
from which they have hitherto been excluded. In the course of
capitalist development, which is based on individualism, it is
only the more fortunate individuals of the backward castes who
get to enter the mainstream, while the others remain backward.
Identity politics, as this politics of  difference has been termed,
comes into play when actual economic power grows beyond the
ambit of  politics. This is increasingly so in this phase of
globalization, when the role of the State in defending the rights
of  its citizens gets overrun by the interest of  finance capital. In
this context, the process of identity politics subsumes class under
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the caste framework and risks political advancement for an
economic base.
Though the growing differentiation within the artisanal
fishery is a reality, it is an area that has not been addressed. The
rapid motorization that took place since the early 1980s
introduced destructive fishing techniques like large ring-seines
and mini-trawls into the artisanal fisheries sector of India. In the
upper coastal regions, the large gill-netters were transformed into
trawls. While ownership of  the craft remained with the members
of  the coastal communities (traditionally, fishing castes), the
number of craft or motors owned varied, thus causing the growth
of a non-operator/owner class, on the one hand, and large-scale
marginalization of  the less fortunate, on the other. The shift in
terminology from ‘fishworker’ to ‘fisher people’ or ‘fishing
community’ is a sign of  this ambiguity, which is beginning to be
recognized but is yet to be adequately addressed.
A structure like that of  the NFF does not facilitate such
questions being addressed. Being an apex federation with a federal
structure, the NFF has no direct control over the activities of
its member unions. Regular and deeper debate over these issues
is also made problematic because of communication difficulties,
both in terms of  language and geographic distances.
The absence of  a larger movement for social transformation
creates a political vacuum in which a movement like the NFF
operates. Having remained independent of  political party
affiliations and not being, therefore, led by electoral politics, the
NFF seeks to project the need for a more people-centred and
participatory political process, which the present parliamentary
form of  democracy does not permit. The NFF also demands an
alternative development paradigm, where life and livelihood for
all and not growth and profit for a few will be the guiding
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principle. But these are long-term objectives and cannot be fought
single handedly. While the NFF has built more broadbased
alliances to work towards these objectives, such a movement
remains on the periphery of the Indian political system.
Moreover, people-centred development has, at its core,
the issue of  gender equity. The artisanal fishery has proven to be
viable and resilient because of the participation of women in
the fishery, making the fishery a family-based occupation with a
complementary sexual division of  labour. Again, while the
fishworkers’ movement has tried to put women’s issues on its
agenda, no attempts have been made by the members to evolve
ways by which women’s spaces in the fishery can be safeguarded.
Having been themselves bitten by the modernization bug, the
artisanal fishermen are also trapped in the logic of  getting the
best prices in order to pay for the new costs in fishing operations.
Fishermen would rather give the last of  their catch to an export
merchant rather than to their women for local sales or for their
own consumption.
A cost-and-earnings study by SIFFS in the mid-1990s
indicated that 60 per cent of  the fisherman’s earnings went to
service capital investments, which, in fact, means that the
fishermen are fishing more to refuel business houses than to feed
their own families. On the other hand, whatever earnings the
women get by selling fish returns directly to the home and the
community, thereby ensuring food security. The fishermen’s co-
operatives are largely male-dominated and there is very little
consciousness on the close tie-up between profit-making,
patriarchy and the exploitation of nature and women. The logic
of  a subsistence economy is overrun by the logic of  a capitalist
economy and, in the process, even a movement that struggles
for an alternative is not able to intervene creatively.
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One has to also admit that there continued to be ideological
differences within the movement. Although this is nothing
unusual, these ideological differences seem to get shoved under
the carpet because of interpersonal disagreements at the
leadership level. These differences have to do both with different
perceptions of leadership styles, alliance building and the
importance given to national vis-à-vis local issues. While some of
these differences could be sorted out if more time could be found
in already tight schedules, not addressing them promptly only
leads to bigger problems that threaten the creative dynamism
within the movement. One can even talk here of a generational
gap, in the sense that each movement or leader wants to make
an own experience instead of learning from the experiences of
older movements and former leaders. As an example, consider
what I would call the false orthodoxy of  structure. While any
functioning organization requires a minimum of  structure, the
unorganized sector, like that of  the artisanal fishery, requires
numerous hands, heads and hearts from outside the formal
structure to make it operational. The leadership of  the formal
structure often tends to see this as a threatening proposition and
instead of encouraging it, tends to marginalize it.
Reflecting on the preceding narrative, it is clear that the
fishworkers’ movement has its grass roots in the fishing
communities but functions effectively at the provincial, national
and even international levels. This kind of  functioning is
necessitated because borders or boundaries have never restricted
fisheries. Yet, while the fisheries themselves are so ‘fluid’,
organizations tend to be more restrictive. The local leadership
insists on giving priority to local issues and resists involvement
in national issues. On the other hand, the national leadership
tends to impose national agendas on the base. Negotiating
CONVERSATIONS340
between the two is not always easy. But it is clear that a
movement like the NFF needs a national framework in which to
operate. Mediating local and global issues becomes more an
organizational and structural problem, rather than an ideological
one.
The position of such a movement in the present phase of
globalization is also very precarious.  As a movement of  the
informal sector, it confronts the nation State and demands an
alternative political process and development paradigm. But, it
also needs a strong State to offset the impact of globalization.
In its efforts to affirm its sovereignty, the State is forced to make
compromises, further complicating its task. For instance, on the
international arena, the NFF may find itself defending the
positions of the Indian State, but for different reasons, as in the
case of the social clause that the International Labour
Organization (ILO) is trying to negotiate.
To end, as a middle-class supporter of  a working-class
people’s movement, I can say that I have learnt a great deal about
the complex social reality we live in. Associating with the struggles
of the fishworkers makes me question my middle-class
aspirations as well as the promises of  the growing Information
Technology age—the icing on a cake that does not exist. If
struggles of  the unorganized people have to make headway, larger
sections of  the middle class should relate to, and support, these
struggles by taking these issues into the mainstream. Assisting
grass-roots organizations to reorganize on the principles of
participatory management, supporting viable alternatives in the
subsistence artisanal fishery and continuing to strengthen
fishworkers’ solidarity across the country will continue to be the
challenges of  middle-class supporters. Broadening alliances and
expanding the support base is the only way to challenge
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globalization and its destruction of  human societies. Working
out creative alternatives cannot be the task of unions alone.
Large groupings of heads, hearts and hands have to work
simultaneously towards such a process.
Nalini Nayak June 2000
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An Essay on the
Fishworkers’ Organization in Senegal
by Aliou Sall
Introduction
From colonial times onwards, thedevelopment of the industrial
fishery in Senegal received greater attention than the
development of  the artisanal fishery. This trend continued after
independence, as the artisanal fishery was considered doomed
to disappear.
III
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The priority given to the industrial fishery led to investments
and subsidies from banks and investment companies, well before
independence. Only with the artisanal fishery development
programme of the 1970s did artisanal fish processing and trading
receive any attention.
Traditionally, three communities were involved in the
artisanal fishery—the Wolofs of  Guet Ndar, the Lebous of  Cap
Vert and Petite Côte, and the Seres Nyominkas of  the Saloum
Islands. The pirogue, the local dugout craft used, goes back,
according to certain sources, to the 16th century.
Senegal’s artisanal fishery is characterized by its dynamism.
Market factors and the state of the resource have induced changes
in the practices of  fishermen, traders and processors. The craft,
for example, have undergone several modifications over the years
to adapt to the evolution of  the industry. The introduction of
the outboard motor to the pirogue revealed the great capacity of
the artisanal fishery to adapt to technological innovations.
Nowadays, it is common to see pirogues of over 20 m propelled
by 55 hp engines. Beyond its capacity to adapt to, or adopt, new
technologies, the artisanal fishery develops its own ‘survival
strategies’, such as a combination of gear, to face the progressive
degradation of  the resources.
The introduction of the outboard motors constitutes the
turning point in the modernization of  the artisanal fishery. The
co-operative movement   played an important role in the testing
and popularization of the motors even if, as we will see later,
this movement was a complete failure in rural Senegal.
In 1972, the government launched an extensive programme
for the motorization of pirogues. This would have tremendous
impacts on the working and living conditions of  fishermen and
other players in the fishery. The objective of  the State was to
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motorize the entire fleet. For this, the central administration would
rely on the co-operative movement, which began just after
independence in 1962.
Role of Co-operatives
Beginning in 1962, the State established co-operatives
through a programme that had a triple objective: modernization
of the fleet, modernization of production, and advancement of
the fishermen themselves. Funding was provided by the
Senegalese Bank for Development (BNSD), which, in 1965,
became the National Development Bank.
The first phase of co-operative credit, which began after
1962, operated as follows: The BNSD focused on funding fishing
gear. It funded the co-operatives directly for the acquisition of
motors, on condition that they transfer them to their members.
In 1972, the motorization programme, relying on the experience
of co-operative credit since 1962, was used as an opportunity to
reform the co-operative movement. That year, the State launched
a national programme of co-operative reorganization. At the same
time, it decided to cancel the sector’s debt. That reform resulted
in:
• primary supply co-operatives working under the
supervision of  the Fisheries Division; and
• co-operatives  in the form of   groups and unions
undertaking marketing by acquiring and managing
fishing gear.
One of the most important components of that first phase
was the creation of a centre to assist the motorization of pirogues
(Center d’assistance à la motorization des pirogues) in 1972, with
Canadian funding. Its mission was to support the process of
motorization of  the pirogues.
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Between 1972 and 1982, 95 primary supply co-operatives,
17 processor co-operatives and five regional unions of
co-operatives were created, as well as the National Union of
Co-operatives. At the root of  the new hope placed in the artisanal
fishery was the grim future due to the wave of droughts in the
1970s.
The second phase of  the artisanal fishery reform project
consisted mainly in improving financial systems that were already
in place. Co-operatives were now allowed to deal directly with
the banks without supervision. Guarantees for loans were based
on the principle of solidarity amongst the members of the co-
operative.
In the second phase, close to 90 per cent of the pirogues
were motorized, that is, 11,000 motors were distributed, resulting
in a significant increase in landings. This represented a total
volume of  6 billions CFA francs in financing. Besides funding
for motorization of craft, the outcome of the credit co-operatives
was not very promising, and not what the government and the
artisanal fishermen had expected.
There were a few positive results during the period.
Co-operation contributed to the modernization of the fishery by
facilitating access to credit and allowed for practically the whole
pirogue fleet to be modernized. Co-operatives also served as a
base for saving-and-credit schemes, even if these were shortlived.
The introduction of motors and the subsequent increase in
landings gave an impetus to the use of cold storage by artisanal
processors and traders.
The weaknesses were related to the difficulties, inherent
in the co-operative movement, in having fishermen accept the
consequences of the guarantee system. Besides, the State, by
frequently granting debt relief  in the rural sector in general,
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created dangerous precedents, with the result that today
fishermen are in perpetual conflict with banks and creditors.
Significance of  the Artisanal Fishery
Today, the pirogue fleet comprises 11,600 pirogues, of  which
91 per cent are motorized. Fishing gear, which have undergone
major changes in usage, include gill-nets, shore seines, purse
seines, handlines and traps of  different types.
Landings amounted to 415,000 tonnes in 1996. Most of
this production goes for local consumption. In spite of its
informal characteristics, the artisanal fishery contributes to 60
per cent of  the fish exported by processing plants.
According to the last census of 1977, the artisanal fishery
employed around 52,000 fishermen. The role of  the artisanal
fishery as a job creator for dispossessed people coming mostly
from rural areas, is increasingly visible. Indeed, fishing and related
activities, such as processing, helps limit urban drift. Apart from
contributing to the food security of the subregion, the artisanal
fishery also contributes to the national wealth by earning foreign
exchange.
A combination of positive factors has contributed to the
development of  the artisanal fishery, narrowing the dividing line
with the industrial fishery, and thereby paving the way for a more
visible integration with the industrial sector. Notable among these
positive factors are the motorization of the pirogues, the scarcity
of  the resource and the dynamic nature of  the markets.
Motorization permitted the artisanal fishermen to extend their
territories and compete with the industrial fishermen. Increasingly,
the major issue for the artisanal fishermen today is access to the
resource. Further modernization of the fishery through new
equipment like depth sounders and GPS are increasingly being
used. Such equipment allows the sector to target resources outside
the traditional artisanal zone.
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According to CRODT, motorization multiplied the
landings of sardinella fourfold between 1970 and 1980, as motors
raised the harvesting capacity of  fishermen. By enlarging their
territory, they also worsened working conditions as they were
now forced to fish farther and farther from home and faced
conflicts with the industrial fleet at sea.
Yet there is an interdependence between the two sectors
through an exchange of large amounts of fish that blurs the
distinction between the two sectors. Thanks to motorization,
‘collector’ or pick-up boats (bateaux ramasseurs) on contract have
succeeded in collecting products from Senegalese fishermen
fishing as far as the offshore of Angola.
The scarcity of the resource forces some Senegalese
fishermen to get their supply through transshipping. Even though
prohibited by law, transshipping is on the increase and is
challenging the development of the artisanal fishery in the area
of la petite Côte. The expansion of the market for yeet (sea snails
or gastropods, Cymbium sp.) in Asia and its success in the subregion
has led to its overexploitation, which forced the fishing
administration to impose a moratorium on the stock. The crisis
was precipitated when parallel transshipping of yeet started along
the Senegalese coast, especially in the Mbour-Joal zone.
The dynamism of the markets also greatly contributed to
the complementary nature of  the artisanal and industrial sectors.
Species like lobster, cuttlefish and octopus would not have been
considered resources without the existence of foreign markets,
especially the Japanese market and, more recently, the European
markets. Consequently, the small-scale sector, Japanese importers
and Senegalese exporters have come together in a relationship
mediated by local brokers.
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The above factors will continue to influence the conditions
of cohabitation between the artisanal and the industrial sectors
in Senegal’s fisheries.
Crisis in the Industrial Fishery
The different interest groups in the industrial sector are
represented by three professional organizations: Le Groupement
des Armateurs et Industriels de la Pêche au Sénégal (GAIPES),
L’Union Patronale des Armateurs, Mareyeurs et Exportateurs
du Sénégal (UPAMES) and Le Groupement des Industriels,
Mareyeurs et Exportateurs du Sénégal (GIMES).
The Senegalese industrial fleet is largely obsolete, with the
average age of  vessels being 20 years. Most of  the fleet, which
includes trawlers and sardine and tuna boats, suffer from lack of
maintenance.
In the sardine fishery, the nine boats in operation in 1994
were reduced to five in 1996. These range between 20 and 25 m
in length, with gross registered tonnage of 60 to 120, and fish
for pelagic species on inshore grounds. The overall potential of
the inshore pelagic resource is estimated at between 200,000
and 450,000 tonnes. In 1996, 7,800 tonnes of  pelagic fish,
consisting mainly of ethmalose (Bonga shad), sardinella and
chinchards, were landed, commercially valued at 522.6 million
CFA francs.
The management of the sardine fishery is a source of
conflict between the State and Senegalese artisanal fishermen.
Sardinella accounts for more than 70 per cent of the catch. It is
because sardinella plays such a key role in the survival of  the
artisanal fishery that the fishermen and women affiliated to the
CNPS are constantly expressing their concern about its future.
The first reason for concern is the opening up of access to the
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pelagic species to the European fleet, mainly to Dutch and, lately,
French fleet owners. The second reason is linked to the presence
of  20 Russian boats in the sardine fishery. According to the
fisheries department’s statistics, only 30,000 tonnes of  sardinella
were landed by this Russian fleet in 1998. Due to the suspected
underreporting of catches by the Russian fleet, there is a real
risk of overexploitation of this resource.
The Senegalese trawler fleet is made up of 152 vessels, of
which 91 are freezer trawlers and 61 are icebox trawlers. The
total landings, essentially composed of high-value demersal
species (benthic fin fish, cephalopods and crustaceans), were
estimated to be 50,000 tonnes, worth close to 23 billion CFA
francs.
In 1996, the tuna fleet was composed of 42 canner seiners
and longliners, of  which two were Senegalese. Ten of  these have
their base in Dakar, where they land their entire catch, while the
remaining 31 land only occasionally in Dakar.
The total landings of tuna in Dakar are around 30,000
tonnes, worth 10 billion CFA francs. Three species are landed:
yellowfin, skipjack and bigeye. The landings decreased by 25
per cent in 1996 (35,600 tonnes in 1995), due to a reduction of
the fleet and also because of the scarcity of the resource.
Some of the demersal and sardine fisheries are facing
overexploitation. Access to the coastal demersal resources, where
the annual potential yield is estimated to be 130,000 tonnes, is a
source of  conflict between the artisanal and the industrial sectors.
Exploitation of these resources by foreign vessels is one of the
reasons why artisanal fishers are against fisheries access
agreements.
According to the 1998 Master Plan of the Department of
Fisheries, certain coastal demersal species, in both the artisanal
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and industrial fisheries, are declining. These include crustaceans,
spiny lobster, cephalopods (octopus, cuttlefish) and fin fish.
According to the institutions in charge of research and planning
in the fishery, the demersal resources of  the EEZ are fully
exploited. Some fishing zones like the shrimp grounds and the
intermediate grounds of  the shelf  between 30 m and 60 m have
seen a decline in the resource over the last few years due to
intensive trawling activities. Species like catfish, tongue soles
and groupers are showing signs of overexploitation. The bad
state of the coastal demersal resource can be appreciated by
comparing the increased effort with the landings. During the
period between 1995 and 1996, the fishing effort of the
Senegalese trawlers increased by 30 per cent, without any
significant increase in the landings.
The decline of the demersal resource is affecting the
security of  the artisanal fishers. In recent years, our fishermen
have been arrested on the borders with Mauritania and Guinea-
Bissau. The issue was debated during the National Fisheries Day
held in 1998 in St Louis, and CNPS has demanded a review of
the fisheries access agreements signed between Senegal and
foreign countries, including countries of  the EU.
The conflict between the artisanal and industrial fisheries
and the inefficiency of  government surveillance and enforcement
sometimes induce fishing communities to challenge the central
authority. In the village of  Fass Boye, 120 km from Dakar, for
the last 10 years fishermen have been organizing a vigilance
group, whose objective is to survey and intercept ships caught
fishing inside the six-mile zone. Several arrests were made and
captains held as hostages until the relevant authorities arrived.
Scarcity of resource has also led to an increase in the
activities of the pick-up boats (bateaux rammasseurs). This type
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of  fishery, which began in the 1980s and was traditionally
practiced by the Koreans, expanded greatly in the 1990s. In 1995,
the Spanish and the Portuguese entered the fishery too. In 1992,
several fishers from Kayar were jailed in Liberia and then released.
In 1998, over 100 fishing units were seized by the Angolan
coastguard. Fishers abandoned by their pick-up boats were
released after being jailed for a few days. Their equipment was
confiscated by the Angolese authorities. These events created
such an uproar that the Senegalese minister of fishery went to
Angola to negotiate the recovery of  the fishing gear. The illegal
status of many of these pick-up boats forces them to operate in
countries where war is going on, like Sierra Leone, Liberia and
Angola.
Working conditions on board these boats are bad. The
fishing trips are long (40 days) and the fishers are paid a piece
rate, 200 CFA francs per kg. But the fishermen increasingly accept
these inhuman conditions because of resource constraints and
the need for revenues. The devaluation of  the CFA franc led to
an increase in the price of gear and spare parts, which are not
available in the domestic market and have to be imported.
Forty per cent of  the demersal resource is black hake. The
deep demersal resource, between 150 and 1000 m depth, consists
of shrimp and finfish hakes, rock fish, gulper shark, angler and
pink lobster.
According to the Fisheries Department, the deep demersal
stock (shrimp and hake) do not seem to show any signs of
overexploitation. However, the recent increase of the Senegalese
fishing fleet to around 50 units can represent a threat to the
shrimp fishery. Hake, which migrates in the Senegal-Mauritania
zone, do not show any sign of being threatened, since fishing
effort on that resource has reduced in the last few years.
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Trawling, which is the main harvesting method for the
demersal fishery, especially for shrimp, constitutes the main threat
to the aquatic ecosystem. Pair trawling, which is still practised,
even though it is against the law, has led to the disappearance of
many habitats that were traditional fishing grounds for line fishing.
Given the highly migratory nature of the main species,
namely, yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack tuna, and their large area
of distribution (the Atlantic), the potential of the Senegalese
EEZ is hard to estimate, but is said to be between 15,000 and
20,000 tonnes.
These estimates of the principal stocks correspond to the
maximum equilibrium Catch (MEC) obtained by a model. (The
maximum equilibrium catch is equivalent to the maximum sustainable yield, which,
according to the FAO, is the highest theoretical equilibrium yield that can be continuously
taken—on average—from a stock under existing—average—environmental
conditions without affecting significantly the reproduction process – Ed) These
species are not subject to competition between artisanal and
industrial fishermen, but are mainly fished by the Europeans
and the Japanese under fisheries access agreements with Senegal.
Social Practices in the Fishing Communities
There exists a contradiction between the principles and
rules that govern the management of  fishing co-operatives and
those that govern family-based organization of  the fishery. There
are interesting changes in the recruitment of  manpower and in
the conditions of  work contracts. The number of  relatives within
enterprises is declining, while technological innovation has led
to changes in manpower recruitment. For example, the
introduction of  new technology, like seine nets, not only favours
more recruitment but also necessitates strong young fishermen.
Often, physical prowess is more in demand than maritime
knowledge and fishing techniques. Despite the breakup of  the
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tradition of  family labour, and the trend to recruit a more mobile
workforce and despite the emergence of new types of non-fishing
owners (intellectuals, professionals, exporters, processors, etc.),
the family-run enterprise still remains the prevailing model in
Senegal’s fisheries. The organization of  fishing operations and
fish processing and the wholesale of fresh fish are all still
dominated by kinship ties. That explains why the co-operative
movement has failed to take off in Senegal—it is largely
incompatible with the prevalent family property model.
Facilitators, commissioned by the government to lead the co-
operative movement, never understood that the co-operators
were attending meetings not as individual co-operative members
but rather on behalf  of  a whole family.
Another reason for the failure of the co-operatives was
their misuse for personal gain by the presidents and those serving
on the board of directors, who usually represented a pro-
establishment network. Often they were village or district chiefs,
or simply high-profile persons who collaborated with the State,
participated in local politics and were attuned to maintaining
the power equations of  the status quo. Curiously, the vast majority
of  former officials of  the co-operatives continue to be on the
local committees of  the grass-roots organizations of  the ruling
party. Through such participation in the reproduction of  political
power, the co-operative movement individualized or privatized
the fishing environment.
Besides the family factor in the organization of coastal
communities, other factors have contributed to the failure to
‘modernize’ the fishery in general. The informal nature of  the
artisanal fishery and its marginalization have also resulted in
informal credit arrangements and trade networks that are as
efficient as those implemented through the Canada-Senegal aid
agreements.  In fact, the survival of  the artisanal fishery can be
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said to be due to some of  these informal institutions that
competed with the co-operatives.
Fish processing in the artisanal sector is essentially done
by women. About 30-40 per cent of the landings of the artisanal
fishery (mainly molluscs, crustaceans and pelagics) are processed.
Politically, despite the absence of  effective support from
the government, the traders of processed fish contribute to the
integration of  the countries in the subregion through their trading.
Culturally, the use of  traditional technologies brings about a
certain valorization of local knowledge. Several new techniques
introduced by the Northern countries, like electric ovens for
drying and smoking fish, have proven unsuccessful. Part of the
reason for failure is the traditional Senegalese taste for fish
processed in a particular manner.
Informal Credit Markets
Among these institutions, the most familiar and perhaps
the most important are those dealing with credit and markets.
The success of  informal credit in the artisanal fishery arises from
the incapacity of  the formal financial institutions to efficiently
meet the funding needs of  the fishers, processors and brokers.
The very high interest rates set by the informal credit sector can
only be attributed to the failure of  the formal financial markets
to adapt to the fishing sector. Different types of  credit are needed:
short-term, to finance fishing trips; revolving, to buy fresh fish
for processing; and mid- and long-term, to buy equipment either
for processing or for trading.
The formal sector not only recognizes the informal one
but also contributes to its survival and dynamism. This is the
case with the very modern export processing plants that finance
the artisanal fishing operations on which they depend for 60 per
cent of  their supply. In order to ensure the loyalty of  the
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fishermen, these exporters provide substantial funds through their
brokers, who are the main players in the informal credit sector.
All along the Senegalese coast, particularly in the areas of Mbour,
Hann and Kayar, can be seen this indirect and very efficient
involvement of  the fish processing plants in the informal credit
system. The minimal success of banks in advancing credit to
the sector has also contributed to strengthening avenues for
informal credit.
This aspect of the Senegalese fishery is often ignored or
simply misunderstood by technocrats. That explains the failure
of  numerous State projects aimed at marketing. Take the case
of the three procurement centres financed and set up by Canada
in the 1970s in Kayar, Joal and Rufisque, with the aim of
providing Senegal with the infrastructure to handle and distribute
fish in the same way that the Canadians did. By the 1980s, the
project failed. A project that aimed to help both producers and
buyers could not match the traditional solidarity between buyers
and fishermen, a relationship that was conventionally
characterized as that between exploiter and exploited.
The Market for Fish
Senegal is a large consumer of fish, and fish plays an
important role in meeting the protein needs of the population.
The national average per capita consumption is 26 kg per year.
Consumption has risen substantially since the liberalization of
fish trade and the progressive withdrawal of the State from the
frozen-fish sector. However, since the devaluation of  the CFA
franc in 1994 and following the increases in exports, there has
been an upward pressure on prices, especially of  ‘noble’ species.
 The country’s main market is the central fish market of
Dakar, which receives products from all the coastal regions,
including Dakar itself, and from other countries of the subregion,
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notably Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau. Dakar is also a
transshipment point for the interior markets, which are supplied
by merchants and producers, mainly women.
In 1999, Senegal exported 124,423 tonnes of marine
products worth approximately US$310 million. The European
market absorbs up to 60 per cent of  the total exports. The
devaluation of  the CFA franc has greatly contributed to the
expansion of  exports. However, meeting international standards
has been difficult for fish exporters.
The African market absorbs 35 per cent of the total exports
of  frozen and other value-added products. Processed fish
occupies an important place in this local market, which has
nevertheless remained underexploited because it is not well
understood. The Asian market now takes 5 per cent of marine
exports from Senegal, mainly shark fin, cephalopods and
gastropods. Products like murex, cymbium, sea snail, mussel and
shark fin, which used to be discarded, are now harvested. The
US market is still not very accessible to Senegalese exporters,
though there are real opportunities there. Exports to the US are
still limited to whole fish (fresh or frozen) and to molluscs.
Alternative Insurance Schemes
Fishing involves so many risks that the need to be insured
is greatly felt by fishermen. Several initiatives have been made
by insurance companies to offer fishermen a variety of  products.
Among them insurance for equipment has been the easiest one
to manage. However, the companies face constraints, inherent
to the fishery, which they are unable to solve. For example, the
inspection necessary for the issuance of an insurance policy and
for settlement of claims add up to transaction costs which the
insurance agents say they are unable to recover. Fishermen can,
after all, modify their vessels any time, and accidents at sea do
not leave any trace in the water.
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In this context, alternative insurance mechanisms have
emerged to satisfy claims of equipment loss and compensation
for families in case of  death. In certain cases, the fishermen,
especially the migrants, have even introduced insurance schemes
to compensate for the loss of  revenue from poor fishing seasons.
The Impact of the Rome Conference
The 1984 Rome Conference, organized parallel to the
FAO’s official conference, encouraged participants from Senegal,
led by Dao Gaye, at present the General Secretary of  CNPS, to
develop a collective awareness as well as an aspiration for
autonomy.
One of the main demands of the participants at the Rome
Conference was that those who had taken the initiative to found
ICSF should support them in the future to form an international
organization of  fishworkers. If  the fishers from India or Chile,
for instance, already had at the time powerful organizations with
politically charged demands, the Senegalese fishers were still
victims of co-operatives, limited to negotiating for economic
and material benefits.
The contact with other fishers at the Rome Conference
stimulated the Senegalese to integrate issues of deteriorating
resources, coastal zone management, fishing regulation and the
development of tourism. Though these problems were not new
to the coastal Senegalese communities, such an international
meeting helped them reflect on the challenges thrown up by a
globalizing environment.
The Rome Conference also helped the Senegalese fishers
fight feelings of helplessness and incapacity in the face of
policymakers and co-operation agreements. Indeed, sharing
experiences with the Asians and Latin Americans helped
demystify the centralized power of the State. One thing that
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particularly impressed a Senegalese fisherman, who later became
the General Secretary of  CNPS, was the mobilization skills of
the small-scale fishermen of  India, who used their catamarans
to confront industrial fishing boats in the middle of the ocean.
Rome 1984 was also an opportunity for the Senegalese to
question the false dichotomy of a rich North vs a poor South,
which was the way conventional development discourse
projected the issue. Senegalese fishermen no longer accept that
the South is organizationally backward compared to the North.
The fact that, organizationally speaking, French fishermen lagged
behind the Chileans and the Indians was often used as an
illustration. For people from a country colonized by the French
for more than half  a century, these were stirring aspirations. At
the same time, acknowledging the problems and constraints facing
some coastal communities in the Northern hemisphere
stimulated international solidarity.
As an autonomous organization, CNPS is indeed a
precedent in a country with a long tradition of creating, by
decree, national organizations with strong links to the State. Since
the 1960s, no important decision concerning the co-operatives
or the Groupement d’Intérêt Economique (GIE) or the
Economic Interest Group has been taken without the
involvement of the government department responsible for
co-operatives. Senegal is still regarded as a showcase of
democracy in West Africa. In 1998, for instance, a gathering of
the country’s major opposition parties demonstrated before the
French National Assembly to plead for some fundamental rights
at the same time as the Chief of the Senegalese State was
addressing the French parliament. This action came after a ban
on a march that was planned a few weeks before.
Despite this veneer of  democracy, any decision to create
an organization outside the State network is considered a
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nuisance, as evidenced by the political pressure applied on the
leaders and some supporters of CNPS from 1985 to 1992. That
is why they felt that a permanent link with an international
network was important for both solidarity and security.
Participation in the Rome Conference thus gave the leaders
of the CNPS both local credibility and protection from political
repression. But manipulative tactics and pressure were applied
in many instances, the most flagrant being the case of forcing
the first president of CNPS to resign and join the competing
organization, which was closer to the powers-that-be.
It was only during the 1980s, and more precisely after 1987,
that a new consciousness to develop organizations with political
agendas and union-related issues developed. That was how the
CNPS was born in 1987, in the fishing village of Soumbedioune.
It now has a membership of 12,400, according to the last census
of July/August 1998.
Remembering the context in which the CNPS emerged will
help those who are unaware of the real story behind the
organization understand the complex organic relations that CNPS
maintains with NGOs and institutions like the Church (which
supported it, and did so in a country that is 92 per cent Muslim).
Besides the problems related to the resource and the need to
build a strong national organization, other factors contributed
to the emergence of  CNPS. Amongst them was the demand from
people from fishing villages who later constituted the core of
the team of CREDETIP or the Centre for Research for the
Development of  Intermediary Fishing Technologies, which
became a partner of  CNPS. It was to avoid drawing CNPS into
complex relations between leaders and supporters that we
established CREDETIP, as an NGO, in 1990, three years after
the creation of  the CNPS.
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The involvement of these resource persons, who were from
fishing villages but were not themselves fishermen, had a real
effect on the emergence of  leaders. They brought to the CNPS
an accumulated experience of broadbased militancy in the fishing
villages. For example, in the village of  Hann, between l976 and
l979, they had organized free tuition for the children of
fishermen. Thus it was not just a coincidence that the most
important meetings that took place between l987 and l991 (with
the exception of the General Assembly) were also held in Hann.
The Importance of  Hann
We should note the importance given to Hann as a location
that has played an extremely decisive role in the first years of
CNPS. The first facilitators of  the project were from this village
and their commitment has its roots in a very localized activism
that was being practised in the 1970s. Beginning in 1974, a group
of  six, including two future employees of  CREDETIP, studied
the problems of schooling in fishing families, and of the
expanding industrialization along the bay, which made it the most
polluted one in the continent. Through this process, they also
became aware of the problems in the fishery of Hann, where a
French company, Pêcheurs de France, had been established with
a large female workforce, even as a major Japanese fishing
company was also being established in the village.
Hann also provided protection against political sanctions
of  the State authorities. We must recall that some of  us come
from strong and popular families that represent traditional power
in a country where the State is not the only expression of political
power. There is, in fact, a balance between the State and religious
and traditional powers. This tends to get weaker in the process
of cohabitation. But it is difficult to precisely define the
boundaries between these three axes of  power.
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The first president of CNPS was the president of the
Hann’s Young Fishermen’s Association, founded in the early
1980s under the tutelage of the First Assistant to the President
of  the Dakar Urban Community, who is now one of  the symbolic
heads of  the party that has been dominant since the 1960s. His
assistant became Mayor of Hann, which became a district in the
decentralization process. Indeed, the leaders of  associations play
ambivalent roles, because they represent the interest of fishers
to the political authorities even as they represent the interest of
the authorities to the fishing communities. The ambiguous status
of the first president of CNPS later jeopardized his relations
with the organization’s base.
How CNPS Emerged
The first reason for the emergence of CNPS as a force to
reckon with was the disappointment with the co-operative
movement, which did not deliver what the fishing communities
expected. This was due to several causes. First, the co-operatives
had not been managed in a transparent and democratic way.
Favoritism in their management had led to discriminatory
practices. While certain fishermen had difficulties equipping
themselves through the co-operatives, others had managed to
acquire several fishing craft and gear. Alongside this
discriminatory practice was a disastrous management of funds
that made the State indebted to the fishermen. This paradoxical
situation was created by co-operative bureaucrats who collected
millions of  CFA francs from the fishermen as initial contribution,
to be eligible for co-operative credit. Fishermen claim that several
hundreds of  millions of  CFA francs are still due to them. Some
co-operative board members shared the profits of the co-
operatives instead of distributing them on a pro rata basis amongst
the members. In the 1980s, more precisely between 1984 and
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1986, Malic Gueye, currently the national treasurer of  CNPS,
led a campaign in St Louis denouncing the role of the State in
this programme. He demanded an interview with the President,
who finally met them at his secondary residence of  Poenguine in
the region of Petite Côte.
The second reason for the growth of CNPS was the blind
eye the co-operatives turned to the other important issues that
faced the coastal communities. The co-operative movement, and,
later, the GIE, chose to concentrate on economic concerns like
access to credit and equipment, thus getting reduced to a
piecemeal, project logic. Aid sponsors and the overwhelming
majority of development brokers, including NGOs, continue to
maintain this ‘development politic’, as they intervene almost
exclusively to satisfy economic and material demands. This
explains why the co-operatives are the main forms of  organization
that exist in the Western African fishery, from Senegal to the
Gulf  of  Guinea. While the co-operative’s objectives have been
mainly supply of  credit to equip fishermen, and marketing
through the creation of commercial centres in Rufisque, Kayar
and Joal, other important issues have been bothering the fishing
communities. For one thing, resources are diminishing. The
dramatic decline of the pelagic catch by the seiners led to a major
crisis. In 1986, the fisheries administration felt the operations of
the seiners were no longer viable, and a reduction of the fleet
had to be considered.
Another concern was the progressive loss of traditional
rights of access to the land on the coast. The need for an
organization to defend the rights of  fishermen and women who
rely on the fishery for a living was thus strongly felt. This became
all the more important in the absence of  a national platform for
debate on fisheries issues.
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Africa has a long tradition of association, though mostly
oriented towards projects at the village levels. For instance, the
fishing village of Fass Boye, situated some 150 km from Dakar,
is known for its decades-old success in maintaining a sentinel
committee against illegal fishing by the industrial fleet. Battu
Tefess, an association from Mbour, has had a long experience of
resistance against the development of tourism. But these actions
have always been limited to very local action. It was really the
resource crisis that drove the fishermen to regroup themselves
around a national organization.
Between 1987 and 1989, CNPS ran a mobilization and
awareness campaign throughout the main fishing villages, with
the demand for improved living conditions, better safety at sea,
and defence of  fishers’ rights. Meetings were held in the main
fishing centres, where many issues were debated. The main
themes were linked to the resource, the deterioration of safety
of  fishermen at sea, the difficult cohabitation with the industrial
fishery, the problem of  tourism development in the inshore zone,
the increase in cost of fishing equipment and the scarcity of
spare parts for outboard engines.
Fishing communities are not homogenous and the
importance of  issues varies greatly between localities. During
the mobilization phase, in Mbour and its surrounding areas, the
problems of tourism and availability of land were much more
pronounced. Intrusion of  industrial fishing vessels in the inshore
zone and the resulting damages were more frequent in Joal,
Mbour, Fass Boye and Casamance.
Beginning in 1990, CNPS gave priority to safety-at-sea and
resource issues. This led CNPS to criticize fishing policies and
to formulate a few specific demands, namely:
• an evaluation of the resource available for artisanal
fishermen;
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• better appreciation of local fishing effort;
• an extension of the artisanal zone from 6 miles to 12
miles;
• a ban, or at least a limitation, on the activities of the
industrial vessels fishing at night since most of the
accidents involving artisanal fishermen occurred during
the night; and
• delimitation of the 6-mile limit in order to eliminate the
incursions of the industrial fleet within the zone.
This first campaign was held against the backdrop of the
renewal of the fisheries access agreements, which were identified
as the main enemy. For the next 10 years, fisheries access
agreements with other countries and with the EU would
preoccupy CNPS.
Fisheries Access Agreements
Senegal signed its first fisheries agreement with the EU in
1979, which consisted of a protocol agreement renewable every
two years by both parties. However, CNPS only began to get
involved in the issue in 1990, following its recognition in late
1989. Between 1990 and 1992, CNPS campaigned through two
networks: ICSF and the French coastal communities. Only from
1992 did CNPS sit in, for the first time, on the negotiations
between the EU and the Senegalese government. During CNPS’
1991 convention, the first public debate on the problem of the
fisheries access agreements occurred, and a specific workshop
was held on the subject. An initial attempt, with the participation
of  fishermen, to evaluate more systematically the damages
caused by the industrial fishery had already been done in 1990.
The results of  that inquiry, although incomplete, gave an
idea of the important losses (of nets and lives) suffered by
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artisanal fishermen due to the incursions of  the industrial fleet
close to the shore. This was happening at a time when the
resources were getting increasingly scarce.
Fisheries access agreements are generally negotiated
through successive rounds in Brussels and Senegal. CNPS has
been present at these different rounds. Its interventions
essentially sought to bring about a fair evaluation of the resource,
with data being made public, a recognition of the resource
problem already affecting the local fishery (artisanal and
industrial) and an extension of the exclusive inshore zone from
6 miles to 12 miles. These demands were justified on the basis
of  the importance of  the inshore fishery, its place in the economy,
its contribution to foreign exchange earnings and the inability of
the inshore resource to support the expanding fishery. CNPS asked
for a moratorium, or at least a strict limitation, on night industrial
fishing (since most accidents occur at night) and a demarcation
of  the industrial and artisanal zones.
The debate with the government began in 1993, when
CNPS denounced the silence of the members of parliament on
the problems of  the fishermen. When environmental movements
and political pressure groups from abroad supported CNPS,
contacts with the members of parliament increased. The
Senegalese members of parliament took an active role in a joint
session with the members of the European Parliament in Dakar,
following a request from parliament on the impact of the fisheries
access agreements. CNPS also participated in the joint
commission, which traditionally focused on agriculture but, for
the first time, gave priority to fisheries. Fishermen from CNPS
were invited to make a presentation, which centred on two
essential points: how to integrate the artisanal fishery into the
development programmes of Senegal and how to revise policies
that were so heavily  focused on fisheries access agreements.
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In 1994, CNPS reached an all-time high. The renewal of
the fisheries access agreement with EU was delayed for several
months, resulting in the closure of the tuna factories, pending
negotiations. At the same time, there was solidarity with
fishermen from the North at a crucial moment in the history of
the French fishermen who protested and destroyed important
quantities of  fish around the Rungis market in Paris.
The energetic campaign of CNPS to have greater
involvement of fishing communities in the fisheries access
agreements forced the government to realize that they were not
facing a simple associative movement but rather a trade union.
Hence the fisheries minister at the time and some of his senior
officers tried to destabilize the organization. The minister’s
antagonism to CNPS reached its peak the day a delegation of
CNPS blocked his entourage as they were leaving Joal, a village
about 110 km from Dakar. This happened when the fishermen,
travelling in an overloaded public transport vehicle, were stopped
by the police. The fishermen then decided to block the road,
saying, “If we can’t pass, the ministerial cortege won’t pass
either.” The problem was settled after an intervention by the
minister’s bodyguards and the police. For the first time, the
minister had experienced the expression of  counter-power.
The tension between CNPS and the fisheries administration
increased from the time of its first campaign on the fisheries
access agreements between Senegal and the EU. The industrial
sector later discussed with CNPS the new fisheries policy,
proposed by the government in 1993, to arrive at a common
position. CNPS eventually organized a meeting where the
representatives of the industrial sector, for the first time, shared
not only their meals but also their concern regarding fisheries
management.
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Senegalese are avid fish consumers, and many feel that
the scarcity of fish was linked to access of foreign vessels to
Senegalese resources. A large number of  Senegalese participated
in live radio programmes to express support to fishermen. The
media, particularly private radio, has succeeded in presenting
the problems of the sector to a population that depends heavily
on fish. A good number of newspapers in Dakar had just begun
to include pages and articles exclusively on fisheries. All this
contributed greatly to a certain valorization of  the fishery,
especially the artisanal sector.
Besides this recognition from the population, the campaign
against the fisheries access agreements gave a special profile to
CNPS, especially amongst organizations traditionally locked in
co-operation with the State. With the support of the media,
mainly through broadcasts in the national language all over the
country, CNPS could easily make fisheries access agreements a
key theme of its campaign.
Role of  Women
From 1996 onwards, women gave a strong push to the
movement. That year Senegal had just signed an agreement with
the EU on pelagics, mainly for yaboye (sardinella), the main species
marketed and processed by the women. The agreement on yaboye
drove the women to take more responsibility inside the movement
and to claim more power in the decision-making of  CNPS. The
women’s demands soon became so strong and politicized that
we began to speak of a movement within a movement. From
actors, the women became leaders. Today, they have a much
more responsible role within CNPS than they had at the beginning.
It is important to understand that women’s representation
in CNPS is not the opportunistic strategy we see in many
organizations, designed to attract funding from Northern partners.
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Many organizations and movements, even governments, ‘involve’
women but without really giving them the power to intervene in
decision-making. Women are now part of  the CNPS board and
they have revolutionized the union from the inside. Their
involvement has widened the concerns of CNPS and led to talk
about a social movement in the fishery.
In fact, CNPS owes its politicization to the active role
played by women who, as early as 1992, started to participate in
negotiations on fisheries access agreements. That was historic,
considering that the women, traditionally devoted to post-harvest
tasks, were not considered as having a stake in the debate on the
resource. The Senegalese government as well as a good number
of Senegalese viewed this debate on resources as one for
intellectuals or ecologists. The government often accused CNPS
of being manipulated by environmental organizations like
Greenpeace International. This was a strategy to discredit the
CNPS and also a way for the State to deny the existence of the
resource problem.
The idea of boycotting the funding that comes from the
financial compensation part of the fisheries access agreements
was proposed during a meeting of  CNPS’ Women’s Board, in
Hann, in 1992. During the last agreements between Senegal and
the EU in 1997, the women, once again, demonstrated their
militancy and firm will to fight against the access of  foreign
vessels to our resource. Not only did their protests against the
agreement increase CNPS’ credibility, but it was also very useful
in making the movement itself known to the Senegalese public
outside the maritime sector. The intense campaign spearheaded
by the women at the local level as well as at the international
level to stop the agreement, allowed a sector as marginalized as
fisheries to be the object of  public debate. Similarly, issues related
to the development of tourism and to the occupation of the
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coastal zone were progressively put on the agenda of  CNPS,
thanks to the women. This contribution of the women in the
conscientization of the maritime communities surprised
observers of  the sociocultural milieu of  Senegal. Indeed, the
role of women in the artisanal fishery sector was ignored for a
long time. Moreover, the administration still considers women
processors as mere housewifes or ‘unemployed’.
The gender division of labor in the artisanal fishery makes
women the main players in processing and in small-scale fish
brokerage. Their specialization in this subsector made them the
natural antagonists of  tourism, and led them to fight to preserve,
what is for them, a right to the land. They are the first ones to
experience the impact of collaborations of tourism promotion
agencies and the State. The development of vacation villages in
the area of  Petite Côte, and, more recently, the tourist camps in
the area of St Louis, makes it necessary for the women processors
to go farther than their traditional preoccupation with things like
access to credit or infrastructure.
In 1990, for the first time, the women of the CNPS raised
the issue of market and toll taxes that were paralyzing their
commercial transactions. They asked that this issue be put on
the agenda of  the 1991 and 1994 CNPS Conventions. Access to
credit or transportation problems were previously seen as issues
related to the commerce of fish. CNPS then started to realize
that the taxes represented administrative constraints to the
marketing of  fish. With the support of  ICSF, a study was
completed, followed by a seminar at Kayar, where the fisheries
administration and finance officers were invited. CNPS thought
it was necessary to involve the State in this event inasmuch as it
had more to do with a political will or decision to improve the
situation than with an ordinary development project. It was one
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of the more concrete actions of the CNPS and most of the taxes
have since been abolished.
All these issues have been gradually integrated into the
programmes of CNPS at the request of the women, whose levels
of consciousness and mobilization are much higher than those
of the men. How can this be explained?  In my opinion, it is
because women are more exposed than men to the eventual
consequences of State politics that they feel more the need to
react to difficult situations.
In 1995, women were integrated into the National Bureau
of  CNPS, and began to play an active role in campaigns and
advocacy actions abroad. The General Assembly of 1998
attracted a significant number of women. Despite their integration
in the National Bureau, they also chose to keep active their local
women’s cells, which gave them the additional power to discuss
issues that are specific to women.
Alliances with Fishworker Organizations Abroad
In 1990, a delegation of five leaders of CNPS visited
France for the first time, to meet their colleagues in Guilvinec,
Brittany. The trip, funded by Le Comité Catholique contre la
Faim et pour le Développement, the Catholic Committee against
Hunger and for Development (CCFD), was widely covered by
the French media and some articles ended up on the desk of the
Senegalese Minister of  Fisheries. This particular minister did not
appreciate the fact that these fishermen made public the issue
of the fisheries access agreements, which were considered a State
matter, mainly because of their importance for foreign exchange.
While the trip went well, allowing CNPS to gain some
support from the militant French maritime world, it later led to a
loss of  trust from some sympathizers. This was the result of  an
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article by a senior officer of  Senegal’s Fisheries Administration,
published in a French paper from the Brittany area. In that article,
the delegates of the CNPS were described as belonging to a
sectarian Muslim group. It was a well-prepared strategy with the
objective of  cutting funding to CNPS from the Northern NGOs.
It proved all the more effective since the trip had been completely
funded by CCFD. Following the publication of  this article, a
priest and member of the CCFD offered his resignation,
wondering how a Catholic humanitarian organization could
support a fundamentalist movement.
But this campaign against CNPS had a very positive effect
by activating, at the local level, a new alliance with the local
church. Indeed, the Archbishop of  Dakar, Cardinal Yacinthe
Thiandioum, who has credibility at the international level and at
the Vatican, reacted directly to the article with a letter to CCFD.
In his letter, he took a political stand in favour of CNPS and the
Senegalese coastal communities in general and declared that he
was himself originally from an artisanal fishing family from Petite
Côte. For those who know Senegalese reality, such a reaction
from the head of  the church was not surprising, firstly, because
it is common in Senegal for a part of the family to be Muslim,
while another part is Christian, and, secondly, because the
Cardinal, according to people close to him, owns some artisanal
fishing gear himself!
It was in this particular context that CNPS started to
collaborate with Church organizations, namely, Mission pour la
Mer and Caritas. Two important initiatives were born from this
collaboration. The first was an animated debate with the elderly
fisherman, Malic Gueye, acting treasurer of  CNPS and grand
scholar of both the Bible and the Koran, on Islamic-Christian
dialogue. Gueye believes that there is in the Christian and Muslim
sacred texts a theology of  the environment addressed to the
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leaders of all religions, indicating how the resources are to be
managed. In 1992, during a meeting of  CNPS, Caritas and the
Mission pour la Mer, Gueye thought of gathering Christian and
Muslim leaders to discuss the problematic of the resource.
Though the project was not fully realized, regular informal
contacts are still maintained with Abbe Seck, the priest at Joal,
who is very active in propagating Islamic-Christian dialogue. The
alliance between CNPS and the local church resulted in a pastoral
letter in 1993 from the bishops on the situation of the fisheries
resource in Senegal and of the urgency to put in place means of
improving its management.
In 1994, assisted by the Coalition for Fair Fisheries
Arrangements (CFFA), CNPS held its second campaign against
signing fisheries access agreements that would cover the 1994-
96 period. (The ones binding Senegal and the EU for 1992-94
were coming to an end.) The campaign launched in 1994 was
supported by a certain number of members of parliament,
including the ‘greens’ of the European Parliament and some
socialists. The alliance with these parliamentarians allowed
Senegalese fishermen to be heard in parliament. Some leaders
succeeded in making presentations at sessions normally reserved
for the members. But the collaboration, mainly of  ecologists and
socialists, with the members of parliament hurt CNPS in
surprising ways.
The socialists, mainly the French and English, suddenly
stopped supporting the fishermen, following lobbying by some
influential members of  Senegal’s ruling party (also socialist) who
claimed that CNPS was the right wing of the Senegalese
opposition.
CNPS’ alliance with the ecologists made the establishment
claim that there was no resource problem in Senegal and that it
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was all a manipulation of the international environmental
movement. Yet, at that time, Greenpeace International, for
instance, was not collaborating with CNPS, except to exchange
some documentation. The demonizing of the ecological
movement by the government was designed to weaken the
credibility of  the fishermen.
In 1994, as paradoxical as it may seem, CNPS fishermen,
while condemning the fisheries access agreements, began to claim
their share of the compensation fund allocated for the support
of  the artisanal fishery. This stand may seem contradictory, but
it can be explained. For a radical organization like CNPS, to
obtain a share of the compensation implied a political recognition
of  itself  by the government. Secondly, it proved to fisheries
authorities that it was possible, using these funds, to envisage
an alternative programme for the development of the artisanal
fishery. One such idea involved funding a research project for a
database different from those developed by existing research
centres. These ideas were stymied by counter-offers from the
government, including one for the provision of expensive vehicles
and fishing gear. One of  the biggest mistakes of  CNPS was to
accept this offer, which created strong divisions amongst leaders
and between leaders and members. A similar division also
occurred in the two other organizations that received the same
benefits from the State, namely, GIE and FENAMS, the
federation of  fish merchants.
Grants of  around 52 million CFA francs from the fisheries
access agreements and the availability of vehicles weaned some
leaders away from collective union claims to individual survival
strategies. The minority of  fishermen who benefited from these
grants saw their integrity and honesty being questioned by some
members who thought they had failed the overall philosophy of
the movement to promote solidarity.
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These developments also led to conflict between fishermen
and the women, who had started to assert themselves more
efficiently in the organization after 1996. The women demanded
that a part of the fund be put in a separate account over which
they would have full responsibility. After several meetings with
the fishermen, they got this point conceded. Though it threatened
to jeopardize the stability of the movement by potentially
marginalizing the women in the leadership, the process was,
nevertheless, positive for them from one point of  view. As a
learning process, it strengthened their political consciousness and
negotiation skills.
The Impact of Legislation
Fisheries legislation in Senegal got transformed in the mid-
1980s, ending up with the adoption, in 1987, of a complex set
of  rules and regulations. Decree 87/27 of  18 August 1987,
known as the Maritime Fisheries Code, set an example in the
subregion for other coastal States to consider resource
management issues in the light of  the 1982 UNCLOS. However,
the decree was never applied in toto and is today obsolete as it
has been overtaken by recent changes in the fishery sector.
Threats to the environment and the overexploitation of
fish resources led the State to commit itself to improved resource
management. At a convention, the fisheries commission for the
subregion announced certain practices and rules for better stock
management. But Senegal, though a member of the commission,
has not yet integrated these practices and rules into its own
legislation.
A new fishing law adopted in 1998 (Law 98-32 of 14 April
1998) sought to incorporate the biological, socioeconomic,
political and technological conditions needed for the management
of  the fishery. CNPS attempted to popularize the law in two
CONVERSATIONS376
steps. Fishermen first engaged a Dakar-based Camerounese
lawyer fluent in Senegalese maritime law to provide briefing
sessions. Later, the law was discussed in the different fishing
areas of  Soumbedioune, Hann, Joal, Mbour and St Louis.
The fishermen’s reaction did not take long to come. Four
points of the Code were unanimously and immediately rejected
by the fishermen: payment for a fishing licence in the artisanal
fishery; the introduction of a new status for the artisanal fishery
with the notion of a mechanized fishery for vessels using onboard
engines; mandatory declaration of  all new constructions or
modifications of pirogues; and, finally, the banning of
monofilament nets in all Senegalese territory.
The position taken between the end of 1998 and the
beginning of 1999 by CNPS against the implementation of the
new fishing law restored the credibility of the organization and
even won some support from non-members in the community.
This solidarity was weakened by the monofilament nets issue
that later split the movement between those using monofilament
nets and those using handlines. This explains why relations were,
and continue to be, very tense between the CNPS leaders of
Kayar and those of  St Louis.
Access to the resource was often a source of conflict
between residents of Kayar and migrants from St Louis fishing,
respectively, with handlines and gill-nets. Cohabitation between
fixed-gear and mobile-gear fishermen in Kayar is difficult, and a
bloody conflict in the 1970s ended up with several being seriously
wounded and many others arrested. The ban on monofilament
nets, as scientific and valuable as it may have been, served only
to wake up an ancient social volcano that had been lying dormant
for the last 20 years. The implementation of  such a ban would
require that the St Louis fishermen, the vast majority of  whom
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use monofilament gill-nets, be compensated to allow them to
re-equip themselves. Some of  the CNPS leaders, including the
Secretary General, are from Kayar where there is a long tradition
of  migration of  fishermen from St Louis fishing with gill-nets.
The new law was a source of division within the
movement, and some members soon became frustrated and began
to mistrust some leaders, believing that they had discreetly
approved the law without considering the wishes of  the members.
These doubts about the leaders were fanned by some public
servants. They also formed the basis of  new alliances among
fishermen using the same gear.
The growth of  the octopus fishery affected CNPS too. In
the area of Petite Côte, and more precisely in Joal, there is a
very dynamic cephalopod artisanal fishery. The cuttlefish fishery
started in the 1970s, while the octopus fishery began in 1986.
Both were indirectly stimulated by the Japanese market. Export
plants, which gave fishermen access to informal credit,
encouraged the use of  traps (for cuttlefish) and jiggers (for
octopus). The octopus fishery is a very lucrative activity that led
to the migration of  fishermen to Joal, between 1994 and 1996,
and also contributed significantly to changing the working habits
of  some fishermen.
Between 1994 and 1996, the Petite Côte, which includes
Joal, where the main landings of octopus occurred until 1999,
was the site of  a major migration of  fishermen. A huge capital
investment in vessels occurred, mainly during 1995 and 1996,
after the devaluation of  the CFA franc in l994. In 1996, the
administration imposed a closure of the octopus fishery for three
weeks. This decision, which had serious consequences on the
fisheries dynamics in general and the movement of  fishermen in
particular, was taken after scientists noted that octopus was close
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to overexploitation in the countries where the fishery was the
most developed–Senegal, Morocco and Mauritania.
Given the large gap between the perception of scientists
and the industry on the state of the resource, and the failure of
the scientists to manage the fishermen’s expectations, what
followed was a test of credibility for research. In fact, according
to the fishermen, at the end of  the biological closure period,
only old year classes would be left in great quantities. The
disappointment of  the fishermen was even more because many
of them, especially a large number from St Louis, were coming
to Joal for the first time, having taken large loans from buyers to
finance their fishing trips.
The 1996 season was one of the worst in the history of
this fishery in terms of  landings. The administration and the
scientists were accused by the fishermen. According to the
fishermen, the closure was ineffective for two reasons. Firstly,
the fishery was closed to the artisanal fishery only and not to the
industrial sector. Secondly, the fishermen felt they knew more
about the resource than the scientists.
The discontent of  the fishermen affected CNPS. Its image
as an organization defending fishermen’s interests was tarnished
as the fisheries administration continued to claim that its leaders
had participated in the consultation meetings that led to the
biological closure. In Joal, the CNPS local committee had already
organized weighing equipment for the fishermen to cope with
the landings from 319 pirogues that supplied the processing plants.
In 1997, the closure of the octopus fishery was increased
from three weeks to a month. The season proved worse than the
previous one. This again divided the fishermen, even at the
leadership level. The situation was used by some people, very
close to the ruling party, to put in place a new union. The leaders
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of the CNPS in Joal initially took part in the organization of this
new union. They travelled to St Louis to promote it, but the new
union did not last very long because the fishermen soon saw
through the political ambitions of  the founders.
The experience with the octopus fishery closure and the
ban on monofilament nets forced the fishermen to demand that
important meetings with the administration include more
members from the CNPS’ mass base. It is in this context that we
must look at the importance given to the participation of
fishermen in CNPS’ last General Assembly in Mbour on 23
September 1998. Several commissions were created to ensure
the participation of a greater number of members in the decision-
making process.
The Impact of  International Aid
Since its creation in 1988, CNPS has had relations with
some development organizations from the North. The very
paternalistic attitude of the NGOs from the North and their
lack of  experience in working with a union in the informal sector
resulted in very little funding for the partners.
In 1987, only CCFD of France, through its Oceans
Programme, was willing to give financial and political support
for institutional improvements and for building up the negotiating
capacity of  CNPS. From 1989, Misereor, the German Catholic
Church development agency, and Bread for the World of
Germany, started to give their support by way of  a project
spearheaded by CREDETIP and directed at fishing communities.
This programme, which lasted until the end of the 1990s, dealt
with training and support of the communities to defend their
rights. Beginning in 1990, the Canadian Catholic organization
D&P, agreed to fund a long-term programme to promote
solidarity between members of  CNPS and the MFU.
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Collaboration with these partners from the North was
important in building international links between maritime
communities. The resulting exchanges between organizations
greatly helped CNPS in its different campaigns against fisheries
access agreements and tourism. Links with this first generation
of NGOs from the North contributed to the education and
development programmes in fishing communities carried out by
local NGOs like CREDETIP. The support of  these Northern
groups in institution-building and consolidating the negotiation
process improved the credibility of the local NGOs, who were
previously refusing to follow a project-based approach. Often
government officers criticized the local NGOs for not adopting
a project approach. The project logic also sometimes generated
conflicts among CNPS members.
During the 1990s, under the direction of the fisheries
minister of  the time, the Federation Nationale and the Federation
Nationale des GIEs de Mareyeurs were created. The Fenagie
Pêche, which was integrated into a national network called
Conseil National de Conservation des Ruraux (CNCR), enjoyed
financial support not only from several NGOs but also from the
government. This was facilitated by the fact that the former
president of  the Federation of  Senegalese NGOs (FOSNG),
which entertained long-term relations with foreign funding
agencies, was also the president of CNCR. From 1995, this
federation of  fishermen received significant funds from NGOs,
traditional partners of  the FOSNG, from the prelature of  the
Senegalese embassy, and even indirectly from the World Bank.
Such funding challenged some of the gains made by CNPS since
1991, which desired to eventually bring to an end the dependency
on foreigners for our fishing needs.
After the first convention of 1991, CNPS started a
programme of  credit and savings. The goal was to provide
fishermen and women with a sustainable system of  credit. NGOs
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are involved in the funding of development through their role as
financial brokers. But micro-credit, which must be seen in a
geographical and not exclusively sectoral context, is far from
able to meet the funding needs of  today. The difficulty that
NGOs face in recovering loans comes from the fact that a good
part of the credit is used outside the activities related to the
fishery.
The direct involvement of the NGOs often kills initiative.
Thus, the rather large funds handed to the members of  Fenagie
Pêche led some CNPS members to question the usefulness of
savings programmes, when money could be got from other
partners. In 1999, some leaders of  Fenagie Pêche, in collaboration
with a Senegalese NGO, went as far as to offer funds to very
influential leaders of  CNPS. This kind of  co-option is a method
often used by so-called broadbased organizations and NGOs.
Indeed, in the beginning of  the 1990s, two of  CREDETIP’s
facilitators were thus co-opted.
The majority of NGOs operate credit programmes that
target mainly women. In order to maximize funding, NGOs often
have to ‘feminize’ and ‘environmentalize’ their programmes. But
this approach weakens the autonomy of  the women’s
organizations. In some situations, the credit programmes seem
to have polarized organizations. These experiences led CNPS to
decide not to renew its ongoing programmes but to act as an
intermediary between communities and local financial
institutions, concentrating on credit unions.
Despite its internal contradictions, CNPS has, more or less,
succeeded in maintaining itself, thanks to its choice of goals,
such as resource conservation, safety at sea and the fight for
fundamental rights. But the direction of  the organization is greatly
influenced by external cultural and religious factors that contribute
to maintaining the power of the State.
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Again, we must stress that Senegalese society is co-
managed by the traditional, religious and State powers. These
powers are maintained by networking and a reciprocal client
relationship in a very subtle and informal process. For example,
during the last convention of  CNPS, the presence of  the supreme
chief  of  the Leboue community, one of  the three main maritime
communities of Senegal, was considered by a good number of
fishermen as the beginning of  a political alliance between the
movement and the government. This claim was based on the
complex nature of the relations between the traditional chief
and the State. The Leboue community represents a very important
vote bank in the capital city of Dakar, where they have
traditionally owned most of the land. Since independence, a good
number of the ministers of the government are from this
community.
Conclusion
The CNPS has, therefore, succeeded in valorizing not only
Senegal’s artisanal fishery but also the fishing communities
dependent on the fishery, while simultaneously bringing to the
open the manner in which fisheries access agreements favour
the North, at the expense of food security for the peoples of the
South.
Aliou Sall June 2000
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
APFA Acadian Professional Fishermen’s Association
AT Animation Team of  ICSF
BNSD Bank for Development, Senegal
CASI Campaign Against Shrimp Industry
CBC Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
CCFD Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le
Développement
CCPFH Council of  Canadian Professional Fish Harvesters
CFA Communauté Financière Africaine
CFFA Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CNCR Counseil National de Conservation des Ruraux
CNPS Collectif National des Pêcheurs Artisanaux du Sénégal
CREDETIP Centre de Recherches pour le Développement des
Technologies Intermédiaires de Pêche
CRODT Centre de Recherches Océanographiques Dakar-Thiaroye
CRZ Coastal Regulation Zone
CUSO Canadian University Service Overseas
D&P Development and Peace, Canada
DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada
EEZ exclusive economic zone
EFF Eastern Fishermen’s Federation
EU European Union
EUS epizootic ulcerative syndrome
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FENAMS Federation of  Fish Merchants of  Senegal
FOSNG Federation of  Senegalese NGOs
FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional
G8 Group of  Eight (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, UK and US)
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GAIPES Groupement des Armateurs et Industriels de la
Pêche au Sénégal
GIE Groupement d’Intérêt Economique
GIMES Groupement des Industriels, Mareyeurs et Exportateurs
du Sénégal
GPS global positioning system
GRE Goenchar Ramponkarancho Ekvott
ICFWS International Conference of  Fish Workers and their
Supporters
ICSF International Collective in Support of Fishworkers
IFREMER Institut Français de Recherche pour l’exploitation de la Mer
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INODEP Institut Oecuménique au service du Développement des
peuples
INP Indo-Norwegian Project
ITDG Intermediate Technology Development Group
ITQ individual transferable quota
KSMTF Kerala Swatantara Matsya Thozhilali Federation
MEC maximum equilibrium catch
MFU Maritime Fishermen’s Union
MIA Multilateral Investment Agreement
MPEDA Marine Products Export Development Authority
MSY maximum sustainable yield
NACAIA National Action Committee Against Industrial
Aquaculture
NAPM National Alliance of  People’s Movements
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCL National Centre for Labour
NFF National Fishworkers Forum
NGO non-governmental organization
NUPAUB Núcleo de Apolo à Pesquisa sobre Populações Humanas e
Áreas Úmidas Brasileiras
OBM outboard motor
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PASI People Against Shrimp Industry
PCO Programme for Community Organization
PEI Prince Edward Island
PO people’s organization
SIFFS South Indian Federation of Fishermen Societies
SSLC Secondary School Leaving Certificate
TAC total allowable catch
TESCOD Technical Services for Community Development
UI unemployment insurance
UK United Kingdom
UMF United Maritime Fishermen
UN United Nations
UNCED United Nations Convention on Environment and
Development
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UPAMES L’Union Patronale des Armateurs, Mareyeurs et
Exportateurs du Sénégal
US United States of America
WFF World Forum of  Fish Harvesters and Fish Workers
WHAT World Humanist Action Trust
WIF Women in Fisheries programme of  ICSF
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVERSATIONS386
A
aboriginal rights 248-254
A Word to Say 44, 81, 165, 172, 201,
217, 287
Acadian Peninsula, Acadians 64, 169,
179, 181, 185, 195, 208, 230, 231, 233
Accra 5
adivasi 291
Agenda 21 133
aid and development 26, 76
All India Fisheries Strike 331
Andhra Pradesh  (India) 324
Angola 348, 352
Anjengo (fishing village in Kerala)
303
Anthony, Joyachan 304, 329
anthropology of fishing 140
Antigonish Movement 189
anti-intellectualism 137, 207, 227
anti-nuclear issue 315
apartheid  216, 246
APFA 218, 243
aquaculture 322, 323-327
Aquaculture Authority Bill 326
aquarian reform 70
Arafat, Yasser 216
artificial reefs 124, 318
artisanal fishery 293, 313, 335
in Kerala 295, 298
in Senegal 347-349
‘ascendancy fleet’ 184, 201-202, 238, 284
Asia 324, 357
AT 4, 5
Atlantic Canada, fisheries in 13, 52
Atlantic Institute for Marketing
Studies 237
B
Bai-Ste-Anne 165, 268
Baird, Ian 324
bands 250
Bangalore (India) 9, 27, 109, 125
bantustan 246
Baretto, Duarte 27
bateaux ramasseur 348, 351
Battu Tefess 364
Bay of Fundy 50
Bay of  Fundy Fishermen’s
Association 219
Belkin, Gerald 20, 77
Berlin Wall 185, 285
Berman, Marshall 128
Biafra 77-78
Bible 274, 372
Big Cove 253, 254, 263
Blue Revolution 324
BNSD 345
Bombay Duck 328
Bona Fide Defence Fund 198, 203,
208
Bonaparte, Louis 204
Boston 168, 174, 177, 187, 192,
194
Bourdieu, Pierre 32
Bread for the World 379
Breau, Lucie 82, 89
British ‘ethnic cleansing’ 169
British Columbia 38, 216
Brittany 371, 372
Brussels 366
Burnt Church 164, 251, 252, 254-
273, 286
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Calcutta 326
Calhoun, Sue 44, 81, 165, 172, 201, 287
Canada-Senegal aid 354, 356
Canadian Alliance Party 209, 273
Canadian Autoworkers Union 14
Canadian Council for International
Co-operation 25
Canadian Labour Congress 38, 83, 85,
276
Canso (Canada) 169
Cape Breton 178, 208, 219, 250
Caraquet (Canada) 170
Cargill 108
Caribbean 169
Caritas 372, 373
Casamance (fishing village in Senegal)
16, 364
Cashin, Richard 210, 215
CASI 325
categorization of fishers 165-166
Catholics, Latin, Syrian (in Kerala) 306
CBC, CBC Newsworld  270, 271, 273
CBD 133
CCFD 371-372, 379
CCPFH 107, 111-113, 216, 218, 333
Cebu Conference 43, 221
Centre for Development Studies 294,
313
CFA 55
CFFA 373
Chantal (Abord-Hugon) 89
Chennai (Madras) 314
Chicago School 237
Chile, Chileans 358, 359
Chilika Lake 323
China 324
chinchards 349
Chionoecopes opilio (Alaskan snow crab)
230
Church
in Canada 265, 267, 268
in Kerala 28, 143, 302, 305-306, 307
in Senegal 360, 372
CIDA 282
Clinton, Bill 127
CNCR 380
CNPS 9, 16, 111, 116, 117, 118, 121,
136, 145, 159, 349, 359-361,
371-373
Coady, Rev Dr Moses 189
Coady International Institute 189
Coastal Women’s Forum (Kerala,
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Cochin (Kerala, India) 319
cod fishery 197-199, 208, 215, 225
Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries 313
Cold War 216, 285, 287
co-management 246
Comeau, Reginald 165, 169, 170
Communist Manifesto 129
community-based development 189
community-based organization 102,
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community-based resource
management 54, 145, 147, 148, 151
Conference on Food Security 333
Conservative Party (Canada) 186
Consultative Advisory Board in
Fisheries (Senegal) 117
controls, on input, output 139
Coon Come, Matthew 271
Cooper Institute 89
‘Crab Lords’ 233
crab quotas, in Canada 90-91
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Culas, Eugene 31
‘culture of silence’ 27
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